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ABSTRACT
Just after 20 years of independence, Papua N e w Guinea is undergoing a rapid
exploitation of its rich natural resources in minerals, petroleum, forestry and fisheries.
These resources are exploited by foreign capital and technology. S o m e of the mineral
projects are world class, particularly the now-closed Bougainville copper mine, O k Tedi
gold and copper mine, Porgera gold mine and the Lihir gold mine. T w o petroleum
projects - Kutubu and Hides - have been established in the early 1990s. Another two Gobe and Paua - are expected to be developed in the late 1990s.

The financial benefits generated or expected to be generated by these resource
developments are quite substantial compared to PNG's small population of about four
million. Generally, Papua N e w Guineans have high expectations of the P N G economy
growing as a result of the revenue generated or expected to be generated by these
resources developments. P N G , however, has a weak economy exemplified by the cashflow crisis which began in late 1994. This contrast has engendered a number of legal
and socio-economic problems. M a n y Papua N e w Guineans argue that P N G has a weak
economy because the natural resources laws allow foreign companies to transfer most
of the financial benefits generated from the resources developments out of P N G . They
argue that the laws are alien, pro-foreign investors and do not make adequate provisions
for national interests. Thus, the laws need to be changed. The aim of this thesis is to
examine the veracity of this hypothesis. Because it is difficult and beyond the scope of
this thesis to examine all the legal frameworks for every natural resource, this thesis
isolates and examines only the legal framework for petroleum.

The thesis concludes that, generally, PNG has a good petroleum framework, and
substantial benefits are accruing to the country from resources exploitation. However,
because of gross mismanagement of these benefits, P N G faces financial and economic
problems. Sound and sustainable management of benefits from resources exploitation
is suggested as a solution to P N G ' s economic problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Petroleum has been an important resource for many Papua New Guineans since
time immemorial. M a n y tribes in the highlands region of Papua N e w Guinea ( P N G )
extracted oil from natural seeps and used it for several purposes. They used it to treat
scabies, dye hairs and decorate bodies.1 Trade in oil flourished.2

In modern PNG, the first commercial petroleum development at Kutubu in the
Southern Highlands Province, which commenced production in 1992, made substantial
contribution to the P N G economy. Between 1992 and 30 June 1995, it generated about
K 6 0 0 million to the P N G government.3 B y the end of 1995, it paid the Kutubu
landowners and the Southern Highlands Provincial Government K 3 2 million in
royalties.4 Petroleum and mineral exports earned P N G a total of about K2.4 billion in
1995.5 This was about 72 percent of PNG's total export earnings in 1995.6
The Hides Gas Project, the first gas project in PNG, is small a small field
compared to Kutubu, but it makes significant contributions to the P N G economy. It
generates electricity for the Porgera gold mine. Gobe, the third petroleum project in
P N G , is expected to be developed in late 1997. It will increase the total volume of
petroleum exports from P N G . Paua is the next commercial field which will develop after
Gobe. The Paua reserves are larger than Kutubu and Gobe. Natural gas reserves are
estimated to be between 15 to 20 trillion cubic feet.7 Development of these fields will
certaintly make significant contributions to the P N G economy.

The legal framework for petroleum exploration and exploitation in PNG has a
long history. Before the colonial period, customary norms, rules and principles applied to
traditional uses of oil extracted from natural seeps. Although custom is a valid law
today,8 it no longer applies to modern methods of petroleum exploration and

1

Chapter two provides more accounts on the traditional uses of oil from natural seeps.

For example, Southern Highlanders traded oil with the Engans for traditional salt.
PNG Resources Reporting on PNG's Petroleum, Mineral and Forestry Industries (October December, 1995) p.3.
4

The Independent, 10 May 1996, p.30.
Orogen Minerals Limited Prospectus (Port Moresby: 17 September, 1996) p.2.

6

7

Ibid.
Papua New Guinea, 'Draft' Government Statement on Natural Gas Policy (Port Moresby: May
1995) p. 11.

s Schedule 2.1 of the PNG Constitution adopted custom as one of the laws of PNG.

2
exploitation.9 Today, petroleum exploration and exploitation is governed by legislation principally by the Petroleum Act Ch. 198. The first petroleum legislation in Papua was
passed in 1911.10 In N e w Guinea, the first petroleum legislation was enacted in 1922."
Both legislation vested ownership of petroleum in the respective colonial governments.
They also provided for proper regulation of petroleum exploration and exploitation. B y
today's standards, these legislation were not comprehensive.

In 1938, a more

comprehensive legislation w a s enacted for both Papua and N e w Guinea. 12
consolidated legislation was adopted in 1951

13

A

after the administration of both territories

was unified in 1949. In 1977, the national Parliament of the Independent State of P N G
enacted the Petroleum

Act Ch.198.

That Act abolished all previous petroleum

legislation.14 However, it still retains many features of the 1951 legislation.

A few years before the development of the first commercial petroleum field in
1992, a number of Papua N e w Guineans quiried whether the Petroleum Act Ch.198
serves the interests of Papua N e w Guineans well. For example, it was argued that
vesting ownership of property in petroleum in the P N G State conflicts with customary
principles of land tenure practised by majority of the population.15 A s recently as in
1996, the then Opposition Leader, Honourable R o y Yaki, asked whether revenue
collection through dividends, royalties and taxes levied on profit, under the current legal
framework, was the right w a y for the P N G government to maximise revenue from
petroleum developments.16 At a public convention organised by the Constitutional
Reform Commission in January 1996, many commentators expressed sentiments that the
petroleum and mining laws allow foreign companies to exploit minerals and petroleum
resources easily, while Papua N e w Guineans remain poor, helpless and incapable of
exploiting these resources themselves. M a n y of them commented that changes should be
made to the petroleum and mining legal frameworks.

Two factors caused these recent negative comments and views about the legal
frameworks for petroleum and mining. The first is the Bougainville crisis which started
in 1989. It was argued that the mining legal regime failed to make adequate provisions
Statutory law takes precedence over custom: see section 9 of the PNG Constitution. See also
S.C.R. No.4 of 1980: Re Petition of M. T. Somare [1981] P N G L R 265, at pp.285-286.
1

°

The Mining Ordinance 1911.

1

Mining Ordinance 1922.

12

Petroleum (Mining and Prospecting) Ordinance 1938-1939.

13

Petroleum (Mining and Prospecting) Ordinance 1951.

14

Chapter three shows those repealed statutes.

15

Chapter four explores that issue.

16

The National, 19 January 1996, at p.9.

'

3
for the interests of Bougainville landowners concerning land compensation, protection of
the environment and distribution of financial benefits from the Panguna mine. A s a
result, landowner grievances built up over the years and led to the armed rebellion. The
second factor is the general economic situation in P N G . In most parts of P N G , essential
public services like electricity, water supply, health services and infrastrucuture, are
lacking. Also, there is no ostensible improvement in the living standards of majority of
the people despite the b o o m in petroleum and hard rock mineral exploration and
exploitation.17 The assumption is that this is because the respective legal frameworks for
petroleum and minerals fail to m a k e adequate provisions to secure m a x i m u m benefits to
flow to P N G from the exploitation of these resources.

The aim of this thesis is to ascertain the veracity of this hypothesis by examining
P N G ' s petroleum law and policy. The thesis unravels the problems in the legal
framework for petroleum, and offers suggestions for remedial action. The thesis
concludes that the weaknesses and problems in the petroleum legal framework do not
have any significant causal impact on P N G ' s economic situation. The problems lies in
the management of petroleum revenue.

Chapter one of this thesis provides a general overview of the scope of mining and
petroleum exploitation in P N G , and an overview of the socio-economic background
relevant to the thesis. The second chapter provides an historical review of P N G ' s
petroleum industry from the pre-colonial era to the present. The chapter entails accounts
of: (1) petroleum appropriation by local inhabitants from natural seeps; (2) exploration
attempts before the first commercial development in 1992; and (3) the intricate
development of law and policy before and after independence. Such a background study
is necessary because: "In order to understand the present situation in connection with oil
it is necessary to study the past."

Chapter three provdides a general review of the PNG legal framework for
petroleum and the essential features and policy considerations therein. Generally, the
review shows that P N G ' s legal framework satisfies three essential characteristics
international oil companies and host governments normally look for in a petroleum legal
framework. These are: (1) that the legal framework is detailed and makes adequate
provisions in both the exploration and exploitation phases of the industry; (2) that the
rights and obligations of both parties are written in a statutory form, and therefore,
certain; and (3) that the legal framework is flexible because individual issues which
require negotiation on a project by project basis are accommodated for by the use of a
17

The cash flow crisis in 1994, which led the government to devalue the kina twice before it finally
floated it, is a clear example of the economic problems P N G has.

18

Henri Madelin, translated from the French by Margaret Totman, Oil and Politics (Westmead,
England: Saxon House and Lexington Books, 1975) p.l.
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Standard Petroleum Agreement. The review, however, reveals three areas which require
amendments. First, there is a need to m a k e clear provisions to accommodate the stated
petroleum policy objectives which call for Papua N e w Guineans to exploit bulk of the
petroleum resources using local resources, skills and technology. Secondly, there is a
need for a separate legislation for natural gas exploitation. The third area relates to the
need for extension of the time period for oil companies w h o wish to keep a discovery to
undertake further appraisal activities.

Chapter four examines the arguments for and against the vesting of ownership of
property in petroleum in the P N G state. In the first part, the chapter reviews the legal
basis and justifications for state ownership. The next section goes on to show that the
basis for challenging state ownership of petroleum is essentially based on customary
principles of land tenure. That section then examines the cases which attempted to have
the ownership issue determined by the National and Supreme Courts. The final part
examines the possible constitutional arguments for and against state ownership of
petroleum. The chapter concludes that any court challenge in the National and Supreme
Courts will not succeed in divesting the state of its title in petroleum.

Chapter five examines the legal provisions and policy considerations relating to
compensation payments for deprivation of customary land use and surface rights by
exploration and development activities of mining and petroleum companies in P N G . The
first part of the chapter examines the pre-independence law on compensation payment for
deprivation of land use and surface rights by petroleum companies. The second part
examines similar provisions in the Petroleum

Act Ch. 198. A few examples of

compensation in practice by mining and petroleum companies are provided in the third
part. The chapter argues that P N G lacks a clear and uniform law and policy on
compensation payment to customary land owners both in the petroleum and mining
industries. Further, it is argued that unreasonable compensation demands pose a
potential threat to the stability of petroleum and mining operations in P N G . The chapter
concludes that there is a need for urgent government intervention to introduce uniformity
and transparency in this area of the law.
Chapter six examines petroleum fiscal issues. It attempts to look at, on the one
hand, the fiscal incentives that attract oil companies to make risk investments, and on the
other, the considerations of host governments to maximise revenue. The chapter
discusses three levels of taxes a host government m a y impose on international petroleum
companies. The are: (1) pre-production taxes; (2) taxes based on production; and (3)
taxes on gross profits. The chapter goes on to discuss which level of tax is burdensome
to international oil companies, and act as disincentives for making risk investments. The
final part examines PNG's administrative problems relating to the fiscal regime. The
chapter concludes that P N G ' s petroleum tax regime is not burdensome to international oil
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companies; therefore, international oil companies should not attempt to avoid their tax
obligations by exploiting the weaknesses of the tax administration.

Chapter seven examines the implications of the partial privatisation of Mineral
Resources Development Corporation ( M R D C ) 1 9 on State equity participation. It argues
that privatisation of M R D C was against the clear policy objective to vest majority
ownership and control of petroleum operations in the hands of nationals. T o show that
this objective is consistent with international practice, and thus, one which should be
promoted, the chapter refers to similar objectives and practices of some developing and
developed countries. The chapter concludes that, since partial privatisation of M R D C
conflicts with the stated policy objective for government equity participation, there is no
reason to maintain equity participation. T o m a k e up for the revenue the government
would lose on its equities, it should be offset through appropriate tax measures.

Chapter eight examines recent attempts by the government to address issues
relating to benefit-sharing. The first part of the chapter examines the legal and financial
arrangments between the national government and the provincial governments. The aim
is to show the reason w h y landowners and provincial governments from resourceproducing regions complained that they were not receiving adquate benefits
commensurate with their loss of land and damage to their environment from mining and
petroleum operations. Since Bougainville copper mine was the first major mining project
in P N G , the discussions focus on the complaints of the Bougainville landowners and the
North Solomons Provincial Government. The discussions then go on to show that the
government's failure to address these concerns early led to the Bougainville crisis. T o
avoid similar problems arising from other resource-producing regions, the government
introduced the concept of "development forum" at which all concerned parties meet to
discuss all matters concerning benefit-sharing before a project is commissioned for
development. The chapter traces the history of this forum, and the nature and
composition of the forum. The chapter attempts to show that, as a result of the forum,
substantial benefits n o w flow to landowners in project developing regions of P N G . The
chapter then goes on to suggest that, if managed properly, these benefits are substantial
enough to improve the living standards of the landowner-beneficiaries. The chapter
concludes that this is unlikely to happen because m a n y landowner-beneficiaries grossly
mismanage these benefits.
Chapter nine makes a comparative evaluation of the PNG petroleum framework
with other major international petroleum frameworks. In so doing, the chapter attempts
to address the question whether PNG's tax/royalty regime is appropriate. The chapter

M R D C is the entity of the government which carries the State's equities in mining and petroleum
projects.
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suggests that amendment m a y be needed in some areas, but not wholesale replacement.
The last chapter makes appropriate conclusions.

This examination covers the upstream sector (exploration, development and
production) of the petroleum industry only. It does not cover the downstream sector
(shipping, marketing and refining). This is because the current petroleum law and policy
of P N G largely concerns only the upstream sector.

A number of changes in the petroleum law and policy framework have been
effected while this thesis was being written.

Mineral Resources Development

Corporation was privatised in 1996 by the Mineral Resources Development Pty Limited
(Privatisation) Act 1996. This resulted in amendments to the Petroleum Act Ch.198.
The Organic Law on Provincial Governments was repealed and replaced with the Organic
Law on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments in 1995. This thesis has
taken into account these changes, and attempted to state the law as it stood on 31
December 1996.
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CHAPTER

ONE

BACKGROUND
I. MINERAL AND PETROLEUM RESOURCES
Papua New Guinea (PNG) is rich in a lot of natural resources.1 Hard rock minerals
and petroleum hydrocarbons are two of the most important non-renewable natural
resources vigorously exploited today. Bougainville copper mine was the first major
project, which commenced development in 1972 under the colonial government. It had
been the mainstay of P N G ' s economy, accounting for nearly 10 percent of G D P , 36
percent of export earnings and 18 percent of government revenue, until its forced closure
by militant landowner activities in 1989. O k Tedi, the next major project, commenced
production of copper, gold and silver in 1984. In taxes alone, O k Tedi has contributed
K214, 130 million since it commenced production. Misima gold mine was the next after
O k Tedi, followed by Porgera. Misima is a low-grade ore body laden with silver. From
1989, when it first began production, to 30 June 1996, it produced approximately 2.3
million ounces of gold, and 12.8 million ounces were yet to be mined.

Misima has

generated K 7 4 million in taxes, K 1 9 million in import duties and K 9 million in royalties for
the country.5

Porgera is "one of the largest gold mines in the world."

Production

commenced in 1990. B y 1996, it had produced 6.4 million ounces and 11.5 million

Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), Papua New Guinea: The Role of
Government in Economic Development (Economic Insights Pty Ltd., June 1994) p.xi.
See David Parsons and David Vincent, High Stakes: Mineral and Petroleum Development in Papua
New Guinea (Port Moresby: Institute of National Affairs, 1991) p.47. According to Jackson
Rannells, B C L "produced 45 per cent of PNG's export earnnings and paid government bodies an
average of K54, 380, 000 a year in taxes, dividends and royalties": PNG: A Fact Book on Modern
Papua New Guinea, 2nd ed., (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995) p.97.
PNG Resources Reporting on PNG's Petroleum, Mineral and Forestry Industries (October December, 1995) p.40.
Orogen Minerals Limited Prospectus (Port Moresby: September 1996) p.l 1.
PNG Resources, above n3, at p.23.
Orogen, above n4.
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ounces were yet to be produced. Porgera has so far paid about K 2 5 million in royalties to
the State.8

The other mines which are yet to come into production are Lihir, Tolukuma,
Wapolu, Nena, Hidden Valley, Wafi, R a m u , Hamata, Kerimenge, Wild Dog, Tabar, Eddie
Creek, Mt. Kare and Laloki. Lihir, which is scheduled to begin production by late 1997, is
very large by world standards. Its current estimated ore reserve is about 14.6 million
ounces of gold.
In respect of petroleum projects, Hides, a gas project, was the first, followed by
Kutubu petroleum project. Gobe petroleum project is expected to commence production by
late 1997. Kutubu generated about K 6 0 0 million to the government between
commencement of production in 1992 and 30 June 1995.

Other prospective petroleum

fields on the horizon are Pandora gas field, and Paua and Makas petroleum fields.

There

are approximately one billion barrels of oil and 21 trillion cubic feet in place of gas from
k n o w n fields.
By 1988, mining alone accounted for 65 percent of total export earnings. In 1995
alone, P N G earned from the current projects above about K2.4 billion from minerals and
petroleum exports, which was about 72 percent of the country's total export earnings.

Ibid.
PNG Resources, above n3, at p.23.
Orogen, above n4, p. 12.
PNG Resources, above n3, p.3.
Id., p.18.
Department of Mining and Petroleum, quoted in Orogen, above n4, at p.92.
A Regan and K Ongwamuhana, "Ownership Minerals and Petroleum in Papua N e w Guinea: The
Genesis and Nature of the Legal Controversy" (1991) 7 QUTU
109, at p.l 11.
Sir Julius Chan, Prime Minister of Papua N e w Guinea, in Orogen Minerals Limited Prospectus, 17
September 1996, at p.2.
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II.

S O M E OF THE MAJOR ISSUES ARISING F R O M
RESOURCES EXPLOITATION

NATURAL

Exploration and exploitation of minerals and petroleum resources has given rise to a
number of significant legal and policy issues. O n e of the most important issues which has
been raised is whether title in all minerals and petroleum vested in the Independent State of
Papua N e w Guinea 15 should be divested in the customary landowners.16 If ownership of
minerals and petroleum are vested in the customary landowners, serious legal implications
will follow; for example, the current legal arrangement between international companies
and the State will have to be rearranged, since the State will have no right to grant
exploration and development licences to these companies. This m a y lead to questions
about the validity of the existing exploration and production titles. Furthermore, questions
about revenue sharing will arise. Since mining and petroleum projects are important
revenue bases for the national government, serious budgetary problems will follow if
customary landowners, as owners of the resources, decide to keep all or most of the
revenue.

Proper management and regulatory controls performed by the national

government m a y be weakened or lacking. This could provide a conducive environment for
malpractices and breed corruption, as is believed to be generally the case in the forestry
industry, where customary landowners w h o o w n the forestry resources are allowed to
enter into legal relationships with foreign companies to harvest the forest resources.17
Another issue of equal significance relates to revenue sharing which has serious
implications for the fiscal regime. Customary landowners on whose land mineral and
1R

petroleum exploitation are taking place and governments of the provinces in which these
The Independent State of Papua N e w Guinea will be interchangeably used as "Papua N e w Guinea",
"the State", the "national government" or simply "the government" throughout the thesis.
The relevant mining and petroleum statutes vest property in all minerals and petroleum existing both
offshore and onshore areas in P N G in the Independent State of Papua N e w Guinea. The relevant
provisions for petroleum will be examined later in the thesis.
Malpractices and corruption in the forestry industry has been revealed by the Commission of Inquiry
into Aspects of the Timber Industry in Papua N e w Guinea established in 1987. A summary of the
Commission's report has been published by the Asia-Pacific Group under the title The Barnett
Report: A Summary of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the Forestry
Industry in Papua New Guinea (Hobart: Asia-Pacific Group, 1990).
Provincial governments were replaced by repealing the Organic Law on Provincial Governments of
the Constitution and replacing it with Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level
Governments. Throughout this thesis, I will use provincial government(s) for purposes of ease and
convenience.
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resources are located are pressuring the national government for more economic benefits in
terms of a higher royalty payments, equity participation, provision of infrastructure (such
as roads, schools, aid posts, water supply and electricity), procurement of goods and
services, and employment opportunities. Recent actions taken by the G o b e landowners in
holding up timely development of the Gobe oil project aptly demonstrate the importance of
this matter:
Gobe Hongu landowners want the State to give them the first option to purchase
12.5 per cent of its equity in Gobe before it sells off to other interests.
Landowners' chairman Philip Kende said yesterday that they also want the
government to give the landowners, both in the Southern Highlands and Gulf
provinces a free 10 per cent equity in the project. Landowners already have a 2 per
cent free equity under the government policy and want an additional 8 per cent.
G o b e H o n g u landowners are also demanding that they be given contracts for Phase
T w o of civil works at the project area "to be worked with a reputable partner of our
choice on a 50/50 basis."
They are also demanding that they be involved in a 50/50 basis with all successful
tenders in all other contracts awarded for the project.
These demands were followed by threats of disruptions to the operations on the project
site. Already, physical assaults on the personnel of both the project developer, Chevron
Niugini, and the Department of Mining and Petroleum had been committed, and as a result,
work on upgrading of the Kutubu pipeline access track, "the only viable route to the Gobe
project," was temporarily abandoned.
The issue of compensation payment for land use and surface rights, such as hunting
rights, easements etc., nuisance and damages to improvements, are also becoming
contentious and at times unnecessarily hold up the progress of a project. Generally, it
appears that compensation issues initially arise between neighbouring clans disputing
ownership of the land on which resources exploration or exploitation is taking place; the
determination of ownership being necessary to determine w h o is entitled to the
compensation payments.

At a m u c h later stage of the project, however, more
21

compensation payments from the project developers m a y be demanded.
Exorbitant
compensation demands are made on the basis of "erroneous" notions held by customary
Post-Courier, 30 August, 1996, p.5. See similar reports in The Independent, 30 August, 1996, p.4.
The Independent, ibid.
Compensation demands by landowners from Bougainville and O k Tedi provide clear examples.
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landowners that they o w n the resources in question. This is apparent from the report that
the "people that were disrupting the work [on the Gobe project] n o w were the same ones
that continue to confuse ownership and user rights over the elevated areas that the Lands
Titles Commission has been trying to resolve."22

Questions of some participation by Papua New Guineans in the day-to-day
operations of petroleum projects and national ownership and control of petroleum pipelines
were raised prior to the issue of the Kutubu access pipeline to Chevron Niugini. While the
Kutubu pipeline issue was settled when Chevron was awarded the licence, ownership of
pipelines from other projects like G o b e and future projects m a y become a contentious
issue. Communications with principal landowners of the Gobe oil field revealed that they
would push for ownership of the pipeline from Gobe to the main Kutubu access pipeline.23
In relation to some form of participation by nationals in the day-to-day operations of
petroleum and mining projects in the country, the government has incorporated the Mineral
Resources Development Corporation ( M R D C ) , which carries the State's equity in mining
and petroleum projects and which would enable Papua N e w Guinean employees of M R D C
to be on the boards of directors of projects such as Kutubu, and which would allow them
access to the day-to-day operations of such projects. However, there are two noticeable
problems with M R D C . First, m a n y of the senior executives of M R D C are foreigners, and
as such, the hope to educate Papua N e w Guineans to gain knowledge of the mining and
petroleum industries m a y be slow to come. Secondly, substantial interests of the State in
M R D C have been privatised and foreign investors like Petronas of Malaysia, B H P
Petroleum of Australia and Esso and Union Texas of the United States initially showed
interest to buy out most of the shares, if permitted.

If and when foreigners buy most of

the shares, the question of substantial national control and ownership of minerals and
petroleum operations m a y continue to remain.
One other issue which was raised recently is whether additional taxes,- in the form
of an export levy, should be imposed on all crude and mineral exports. This question was

The Independent, above nl9, p.4.
Personal communications with Mindi P o m b o and Philip Kende of the Bogasi Landowners
Association in January 1996.
24

The Independent, above nl9.
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raised by the Public Accounts Committee in August 1996.

Although the Department of

Mining and Petroleum and the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum are against the
introduction of these additional taxes, it will be a political decision.26 If such a tax is
introduced, further questions about the government's undertaking to maintain a stable fiscal
regime would arise.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AT THE TIME OF PNG'S
INDEPENDENCE IN 1975
On a wider note, many of these issues, such as landowners' demand for
infrastructure (roads, wharves, schools, health centres and aid posts), need to be
understood in the context of the general socio-economic background at the time of PNG's
independence in 1975. W h e n P N G got its independence in 1975, the majority of the
population (about 85-90 percent) were, and n o w about 60-70 percent are still illiterate.
Major infrastructures like roads linking many towns and government outposts and villages
were non-existent. For example, the Highlands Highway from Lae to the Southern
Highlands province was yet to reach Nipa, Margarima, Tari, K o m o and Koroba districts.
Public services like schools, hospitals, electricity and telecommunication were largely
absent or, where they existed, not accessible to majority of the people w h o live in the rural
areas. Travel to Port Moresby, Papua N e w Guinea's capital, from all other parts of the
country was (and still is) by air. There are no roads connecting it to other centres.
In terms of human resources development, there were only a few highly educated
Papua N e w Guineans then. They comprised, particularly, the first graduates from the
University of Papua N e w Guinea ( U P N G ) , and a few w h o were educated in Australia.
Garnaut points out that this created shortage of qualified personnel to fill senior positions in
government departments at independence in 1975 and thereafter.

This has perhaps

resulted in the employment of a large number of incompetent personnel.

Ibid., at p.8.
Ibid.
For example, the late Sir Buri Kidu, thefirstnational Chief Justice of the National and Supreme
Courts of Papua N e w Guinea.
Ross Garnaut, "The Framework of Economic Policy-Making" in J. A. Ballard ed., Policy Making
in a New State: Papua New Guinea 1972-1977 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1981)
p. 157, at p. 160.

13
The problem created by recruitment of incompetent personnel, according to Sause,
is poor performance in their duties in delivering goods and services to the people.29
Moreover, the bureaucracy is alleged to be "corrupt, inefficient, unresponsive, too
bureaucratic, and '[eat up]' a large portion of the government budget with minimal
productivity."30

Papua New Guineans, in general, had very little knowledge about business. The
business community comprised foreign nationals w h o managed and controlled the small
and fragmented monetary economy.31 The only exception was in the area of production of
agricultural crops for export, which was expanding in m a n y villages.32 Studies undertaken
before independence revealed that "almost two-thirds of the developed section of Papua
N e w Guinea's economy is controlled by Australian companies and individuals. A n d with
the rapidly increasing extent of Japanese involvement in large scale economic activity here,
it is clear that w e Papua N e w Guineans at present control only a very small part of our o w n
economy, and will remain in this subservient position unless firm action is taken to change
the existing situation in a meaningful way."33

There is also a perception that PNG was not adequately prepared for independence
in 1975. For example, when the Somare government was first formed in 1972, none of
the characteristics of a national economy were in existence. "The colonial authorities lacked
the instruments and institutions within which policy is framed and implemented in a
national economy."

Lawrence Sause, Dean of the Arts Faculty, University of Papua N e w Guinea, and a consultant to the
Constitutional Review Commission, speaking at a public conference at Granville Motel, Port
Moresby, in January 1996.

Hengene Payani, "Equality and Participation in the Papua New Guinean Bureaucracy", 2 (1) Curren
Issues (1994) 27, at p.28.
Garnaut, above n28, p. 159.
Ibid.
Constitutional Planning Committee Report, chapter 2, p.3, para. 64, reproduced in Brian Brunton
and Duncan Colquhoun-Kerr, The Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea (Waigani:
University of P N G Press, 1984) p. 16.
Garnaut, above n28, p. 159.
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IV.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES FOR RESOURCES

EXPLOITATION

Realizing this economic status quo, the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC)
under the pre-independence Somare government proceeded to work on the aims and
objectives which would guide economic development programs of the independent Papua
N e w Guinea. Their work culminated in the adoption of 'Eight Aims' by a unanimous
decision in the House of Assembly. Three of the Aims, the first, second and the fifth, are
pertinent in this context where they call for:35

• a rapid increase in the proportion of the economy under the control of Papua
N e w Guinean individuals and groups, and in the proportion of personal and
property income that goes to Papua N e w Guinea;

• more equal distribution of economic benefits, including movement toward
equalisation of income a m o n g people and toward equalisation of services
among different areas of the country; and

• a more self-reliant economy, less dependent for its needs on imported goods
and services and better able to meet the needs of its people through local
production.

Upon independence, these 'Eight Aims' were incorporated into the five National
Goals and Directive Principles, which are set out in the Preamble to the Constitution. With
reference to the National Goals and Directive Principles, the government adopted the
following objectives in 1976 in its White Paper on Petroleum Legislation and Policy:

35

The other A i m s are: decentralisation of economic activity, planning and government spending, with
emphasis on agricultural development, village industry, better internal trade, and more spending
channelled to local and area bodies; an emphasis on small-scale artisan, service and business
activity, relying where possible on typically Papua N e w Guinean forms of economic activity; an
increasing capacity for meeting government spending needs from locally raised revenue; a rapid
increase in the active and equal participation of w o m e n in all forms of economic and social activity;
and government control and involvement in those sectors of the economy where control is necessary
to achieve the desired kind of development: See Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr, above n33, p.3.

V,

In the Foreword of the March 1976 White Paper on Petroleum Policy and Legislation, at p.5.
Similar general goals are adopted in other policy statements and objectives of other resources and
also found in the "mission statements" and enabling legislations of state-owned corporations like the
National Housing Corporation.
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1. citizens and governmental bodies to have control of the bulk of the economic
enterprise and production;

2. strict control of foreign investment capital and wise assessment of ideas and
values so that this will be subordinate to the goal of national sovereignty and
self-reliance, and in particular for the entry of foreign capital to be geared to the
internal social and economic policies and to the integrity of the Nation and the
People;

3. the State to take effective measures to control and actively participate in the
national economy and in particular to control major enterprises engaged in the
exploitation of natural resources;

4. economic development to take place by the use of skills and resources available
in the country either from citizens or the State and not in dependence on
imported skills and resources;

5. constant recognition of our sovereignty, which must not be undermined by
dependence on foreign assistance of any sort, and in particular for no
investment, military or foreign-aid agreement or undertaking to be entered into
that imperils our self-reliance and self-respect, or our commitment to these
National Goals and Directive Principles, or that m a y lead to substantial
dependence upon or influence by any country, investor, lender or donor; and
6. wise use to be made of our natural resources and the environment in and on the
land and seabed, in the sea, under the land, and in the air, in the interests of our
development and in trust for future generations.
While these broad goals are taken as sign posts, some of which can, perhaps, be
treated as political rhetoric, the specific government policy for exploiting minerals and
petroleum is to generate m o n e y for rural development. In relation to mining, "the policy
.. .is, broadly speaking, that mining itself is not developmental necessarily, but it is needed
as the best w a y of raising large sums of m o n e y for 'real' development in as short a time as
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possible."' Similarly, petroleum exploitation is to make the necessary resources available
"for rural development and improvement of backward areas of the nation."38 In that
respect, Kennedy is correct in saying that: "Since independence in 1975, consecutive P N G
governments have pegged their prospects for 'national development' on earnings from
major resource projects."39

V. LACK OF "TRICKLE-DOWN" EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY
F R O M NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENTS
There is a perception held by many that, since Papua New Guinea is rich in natural
resources, Papua N e w Guineans are generally rich. A n d major improvements in the
backward areas of the nation are being rapidly achieved as a result of the huge mining and
petroleum projects. Economists and other commentators support this perception by
emphasising the "size" of the mining and petroleum projects and the huge contributions
made (or expected to be made) by them to the national economy. For example, according
to Herb Thompson, in 1986 P N G was the seventh largest gold producing country and
eleventh largest copper producing country in the world.40 These statistics were based on
copper and gold produced by the n o w closed Bougainville copper mine and the O k Tedi
mine alone. Once Porgera and Misima came into production, P N G m a y have been placed
as the sixth or fifth gold producer in the world. Lihir, "the world's largest undeveloped
gold deposit outside South Africa", Tolukuma, Hidden Valley, Eddie Creek and other
small mines on the horizon could further push P N G to third or second on the ladder of
world gold producing countries.
The other factor which reinforces this perception is the publication of large amounts
of cash figures which landowners, provincial governments and the national government are
reported to have received from mining and petroleum projects. These figures are produced

Richard Jackson, Ok Tedi: The Pot of Gold (Boroko: 1982) p. 107, as quoted in Catalyst: Social
Pastoral Magazine for Melanesia: A Special Issue on Development and the Environment in PNG,
vol.21, No.3 (1991) p.18.
See Foreword to the March 1976 government White Paper, above n36.
Danny Kennedy, Habitat Australia, August 1996, p.21.
Herb Thompson, "The Economic Causes and Consequences of the Bougainville Crisis", (1991)
Resources Policy.69, at p.71.
PNG Resources, above n3, p.4.
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by the media, the resources companies through resource journals and promotional leaflets,
the PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum and by the Department of Mining and
Petroleum. For example, the following was reported by the PNG Chamber of Mines and
Petroleum in the October - November 1995 issue of PNG Resources, the journal which
reports on PNG's petroleum, mineral and forestry industries:42
Ok Tedi Mine
Revenue in the first quarter increased to K 1 2 3 million compared to only K 6 3
million in this same period in 1994. The Lower O k Tedi/ Fly River
Development Trust receives about K 3 million annually and this goes into health,
educational, recreational and infrastructure projects since 1990.
Misima Mine
So far the mine has paid K 7 4 million in taxes to the government, K 1 9 million in
import duties and K 9 million in royalties. The local people have earned K 1 7
million in wages and salaries and a further K 3 million in tangible benefits under
the Tax Credit Scheme.
Porgera Mine
Projects funded under the Tax Credit Scheme since 1992 total K 1 0 million and
royalties to the landowners and the Enga Provincial Government has reached
K 2 5 million.
Kutubu Oil Project
Kl55 million worth of contracts have been awarded to landowner companies
and P N G businesses. O f this amount K 9 0 million worth of contracts was
awarded to landowners. Southern Highlands provincial government has been
paid K 3 2 million in royalties
The above figures are indicative of the huge amount of resources the minerals and
petroleum industries contribute to the PNG economy. In addition, some politicians also
boast by labeling PNG as "a mountain of gold floating on a sea of oil".4 Naturally,

therefore, one can expect that there are sufficient resources necessary to raise the pe

standard of living and improve rural life - a realisation of the national reason for r

exploitation. The harsh reality, however, is that there is no ostensible "trickle-down"

on the domestic economy. The fact of the whole economic situation is aptly described by

Id., pp.23-24. The quotation has been edited.
Kutubu Petroleum Development Project, (1994), a brief report on Kutubu provided by the
Department of Mining and Petroleum, p. 10.
Actually, such a statement is alleged to have been made by the then Minister for Mining and
Petroleum in 1992; see Kennedy, above n41.
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Iamo and Denklin when they say "Papua N e w Guinea is a 'rich nation of poor people'."45

Iamo and Denklin went on to substantiate their statement with the following observatio
The level of human development still remains low relative to many Pacific and low
middle income countries. Comparing the human development index from 1992 to
1993 and 1994, Papua N e w Guinea is not progressing but regressing. W o m e n
give birth in intolerable conditions and many die during childbirth.. .The majority of
the people in the country, as well as those in urban centres, do not have clean
drinking water or proper sanitation.
The country's infrastructure has deteriorated seriously, while pressing demand for
new infrastructure has brought about social and economic costs rather than benefits.
Roads, schools buildings, hospitals, government buildings and outposts, airports,
wharves and bridges, either handed d o w n from Australia or built within the last
twenty years, have deteriorated and n o w require repair.
There are others in P N G w h o echo similar sentiments. O n e of them is Pastor
Kumalo Tawali, regarded as a champion of ethics and equity and a popular columnist in
The Independent weekly national newspaper. In one of his columns, he lamented over the

dilapidating infrastructure in the country by beginning with a question his friend pos

during a conversation: "If I were the prime minister tomorrow, what would be one of the

first decisions I make?"47 And his friend surprised him with the answer: "My first deci
would be to repair all our physical infrastructure." Then he went on to give a lucid
description of the physical conditions of infrastructure in PNG:
Our roads! Yes our roads. One does not have to look at major roads like the
Highlands Highway to be shocked about the real conditions of our roads. Just look
at our doorstep here, in the National Capital District. The condition of the roads
here should m a k e anyone w h o cares about our nation truly ashamed. For m a n y
months for instance, I have noticed, running over big pot holes on the road in front
of the Granville Motel. That's just a little distance from Jackson's International
Airport. W h a t immediate impression do our foreign guests get, just before turning
into Granville Motel to stay?
Waigani Drive, a major route in our city, is in quite a shameful shape. But then just
turn off Waigani Drive into Morata Road, and you soon meet gaping pot holes,
Wari Iamo and Tony Deklin, "The Cooperative Decentralisation" (1995) 3(1) Current Issues 17, at
pp. 19-20.

The Independent, 26 January, 1996, p. 16.
Ibid.
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numerous, atrocious holes! It is as if by some supernatural means, one is
transported to some forlorn rural station somewhere in our country. N o , this is just
Morata, a suburb in our National Capital District.
W h a t about our hospitals, health centres and aid posts? I do not wish to discuss the
appearance of the biggest hospital in the country; the Taurama General Hospital.
Anyone in Port Moresby can tell you the story. But look at all our provincial
general hospitals, and there you have an immediate repair project which would
require three to five years, with little thought to spare about building new ones.
Many foreigners who have been to PNG also agree that: "Few benefits have
flowed to Papua N e w Guineans from multimillion dollar overseas investments. Although
classified as a country with lower to middle income levels, PNG's social indicators point to
a real standard of living closer to that of a low-income country. Health services are
stretched, infant mortality is unacceptably high and only 20 per cent of the urban population
has access to safe water."50 Perhaps m a n y m a y readily agree with Gabriel Lafitte that the
"average citizen of P N G is n o w worse off than 20 years ago, despite billions of Australian
aid dollars", over and above those earned from natural resources exploitation.51
Even if economic indicators like the traditional method of measuring economic
growth by the rise of gross national product ( G N P ) and G N P per capita are used to support
growth in the P N G economy, the physical evidence would prove otherwise. In that
respect, there is an increasing awareness world-wide, especially among the developed
countries, that economic growth alone measured by G N P is not sufficient to improve the
quality of life.5 S o m e "developing countries that witnessed economic growth [also
witnesses that] poverty actually grew in terms of the number of the poor and the economic
growth was of most benefit to the upper layers of society. Economic growth is
meaningless to the poor as long as the gross inequalities in income, power and status
remain prevalent."53

Liam Phelan, Habitat Australia, August 1996, p.19.
Gabriel Lafitte, Habitat Australia, August 1996, p.20.
Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific, vol. X L I V , No.2, (1994) pp.86-87. This Bulletin is
produced by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, based in
Bangkok, Thailand.
51

Ibid.
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VI.

THE

QUESTION

In view of the foregoing, the question Papua N e w Guineans are grappling with is:
what is wrong? Or what has gone wrong? If Papua New Guinea is resources rich as

popularly asserted, particularly in minerals, petroleum, fisheries and timber, then eco

indicators should indicate an increase in the GNP or GDP, even if that may not be relia
and one should see at least the physical evidence in such things as new or improved

infrastructures, improved health services or rural electrification, etc. In a letter to
Viewpoint column of the Post-Courier, Martin Yakem Sapala, a student of the Goroka
Campus of the University of PNG, put this idea more appropriately:54
Papua New Guinea is blessed with natural resources. Our population is small
compared to the rich resources w e have in the country. Before, our country was
depending on the Bougainville copper mine only, but n o w w e have a booming
mining industry. W e have giant Porgera Gold and O k Tedi Copper mines, Iagifu
and G o b e oil fields, Misima, Lihir and Mt. Kare gold mining coming up. Apart
from all these, w e also have rich forests, fish, coffee, copra, cocoa, rubber and tea!
If our country is rich in resources, why are our people still poor? Why is our
country facing financial crisis and begging for money from the World Bank and
other financial institutions? W h y are the bulk of the people in the country not
receiving adequate basic government services?
There are m a n y explanations given for this problem. S o m e argue that the current

natural resources legal regimes, particularly the mining and petroleum regimes, need to
changed. The Opposition Leader, Honourable Roy Yaki, and members of the
Constitutional Review Commission are advocates of this view. In a media release,
Honourable Roy Yaki stated quite distinctly that:
My view is that, the central issue to be addressed is the present regime under which
our resources of timber, fish, gold, oil, gas, etc are allowed to be exploited. Is the
dividend and the equity based resource regimes the right one? The profit driven oil
or timber exploitation the right way to go? W h o sets the phase of development or
exploitation of these resources?
Others argue that the problem is political. An emotional letter to the Viewpoint of
the Post-Courier dated 30 August 1996 by a unanimous writer under the pseudonym "Fed

Post-Courier, 3 October 1996, p. 10. The letter was slightly edited to put it in context.
The National, 19 January 1996, p.9.
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U p " m a y be taken as a representative view of those w h o support this argument. That letter
stated that:56
Since political Independence in 1975, this country has been led backwards by all
the successive governments to this day. F r o m the National Government d o w n to
Provincial Governments, the Prime Ministers, their band of ministers with their
parliamentary colleagues d o w n to the premiers and their ministers. They have all
been responsible for the mess this country is in now.
Our resources are sold under our noses in the name of development, development
which w e never seem to see. W h a t kind of people are running this country? Since
independence, this country has been steadily going to the dogs by the day. For so
long , the majority of us Papua N e w Guineans have been sitting around and silently
observing our God-given land, resources and finance being grossly mismanaged by
a handful of elected criminals.
The country is in absolute mess. Forget about all the technical terms terminologies
that the Prime Ministers and their Finance Ministers have been using daily to
distract the minds of the c o m m o n and simple people of P N G by saying that all is
well. They are a load of rubbish! I a m telling you that all is not well in this
country. A n d they k n o w that!
Their introduction of the Provincial Government system has proven to be just as
disastrous, if not worse. It did not improve services. But rather, it broaden their
political power base with more corruption. Provincial premiers and their cohorts
have effectively driven government services into oblivion.
To this day, no one government minister, provincial and national has properly
acquitted his spendings of his electoral development fund money. They have not
been held accountable at all by the system. That stinks.
The letter then goes on in a couple of paragraphs to describe the harsh living

conditions of the people of PNG in the rural areas without, especially, the essential se
such as water supply.
Sapala also cites political reasons as the cause of P N G ' s economic problems. In
answering the questions he posed, he said the problem is because "our self-centred socalled leaders in power grossly mismanage the country's resources. Once they are elected

into office, they find ways to maximise their wealth rather than serve the interest of th
people. They accept bribes from the alien multimillion kina companies and sell our
resources cheaply to them, jeopardising the country and its people."

Post-Courier, 30 August 1996, p. 10. The letter has been edited.
Post-Courier, above n54, p. 10.
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S o m e argue and accuse foreign companies of colluding with politicians to "rip off
the rest of the Papua N e w Guineans. Such arguments are again found in the same letters
above. Mining and petroleum companies are accused of "raping" the country of minerals
and petroleum resources in agreement with those in authority w h o receive bribe money. 58
"All spin offs are enjoyed offshore, the mining centres are virtually left under-developed
and the mining sites are a mere makeshift camp, to be left as ghost towns after the minerals
are exhausted."'

Mrs. Nahau Rooney, a former national Minister for Justice, is one of those who is
against foreign investors. But her views appear to be more along the lines of asserting
political sovereignty over natural resources and exploiting these resources by Papua N e w
Guinean skills and technology, as envisaged and directed by the National Goals and
Directive Principles, rather than xenophobia per se. In a speech delivered at an investment
incentive seminar, she said that P N G did not "need to offer further incentives because there
was enough foreign investors in the country already. 'They are in the mining and
petroleum, they are in fishing, they are in forestry, they are in insurance, they are in
financial institutions, they are in merchandise trading...they are in everything
already...What else is there that w e have to work hard to attract m a n y more investors
unless of course w e want them to take over the country, o w n all the businesses and let
P N G be the source of cheap labour for the investors.'"

Some think that it is the traditional "big man" syndrome in politics, coupled with the
greed for power and wealth, that causes PNG's economic woes.
The young men who rise to become big men among their people, use that as their
springboard to become big m e n in Moresby. Once in parliament, they face the
electors five years hence. In between, a n e w constituency woos them with offers
of kickbacks to agree to be the voice of their people in signing deals with logging
and mining companies.. .The primary task for which Australia gave its billions was
that the big m e n in Moresby should be a nation, but what it provided were sources
of m o n e y and power which owed nothing to their village roots. The cycle of
reciprocity was broken. The big m a n was free to rise, unchecked by the traditional

Ibid. There was also a letter which appeared in the Viewpoint column of the Post-Courier which
accused foreign companies of "ripping off PNG's resources and which was countered by the
Secretary of the Department of Mining and Petroleum in a letter published by the Post-Courier, 16
April, 1996.

Post-Courier, above n56.
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insistence all over Melanesia that a big m a n must be visible, accountable, present
and indispensable.
While statements and letters such as those above are individual views only, and
often politically motivated, one m a y not be wrong to assume that they indicate the general
perception of the populace in respect of the economic condition in P N G . A s a resort to
alleviate their lot, the government might be influenced to effect changes to the resources
regime. A n d given the fact that there is a political will, as revealed in the statement of the
Opposition Leader and from statements m a d e by certain members of the Constitutional
Review Commission, 62 this is not unattainable.

It is against this background that PNG's petroleum legal framework is examined in
the following chapters, with the hypothesis that the answer to the above question is to be
found in wise management of benefits from natural resources exploitation, and not in a
wholesale replacement of the petroleum legal framework.

Lafitte, above n51, p.20.
Eric K w a , a consultant to the Commission, told m e that the Commission would consider divesting
ownership in minerals and petroleum in the customary landowners.
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CHAPTER

TWO

A REVIEW OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the legal and historical development of Papua New Guinea's
petroleum industry. A review of developments in the past is necessary for two reasons:
first, to appreciate the current petroleum legal framework and discern future developments,
and secondly, because it is useful in "assessing the present status of the upstream industry
and evaluating the remaining and likely prospectivity" on which basis appropriate policies
can be designed and implemented.1 The methodology and approach is chronological in
order primarily to avoid confusion. The review begins from the commencement of initial
exploration to discovery and development of the first commercial field.

II. DEFINITION OF PETROLEUM
It is useful to provide a definition of petroleum for the purpose of this thesis.
Scientifically, petroleum and natural gas are classified as members of the bitumen family of
hydrocarbons.

Bitumen of commercial importance include asphalt (solid), petroleum

(liquid) and natural gas. The term "petroleum" is taken from the Latin words petra and
oleum which means rock oil, "a term which in its widest sense embraces all of the
hydrocarbons, but in its more proper and restricted sense is used to designate only the
liquid member of the group."

See Peter Botten, "Petroleum Prospectivity of P N G : Comparative Risks and Rewards", a paper
presented at a conference organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum in Sydney in M a y
1995, at p.3.
Bitumen is a "mixture of extremely heavy hydrocarbons obtained from the residue of the refining
process; used for road surfacing, roofing, etc.": P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, Glossary of
Words and Phrases Used in the Oil and Gas Industries (Mount Hawthorn, W . A.: Energy
Publications) p. 14. Hydrocarbons are "compounds containing only the elements of hydrogen and
carbon. They m a y exist as solid, liquid or gases." Ibid., at p.63.
Summer's Oil and Gas (permanent ed.) vol.1, (ss.1-86) (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Pub. Co., 1954)
p.2.
Ibid.
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F r o m the above definition, it can be seen that petroleum embraces two meanings: a
restrictive and general meanings. T h e restricted sense refers to the naturally occurring
complex liquid hydrocarbon, "which after distillation and removal of impurities yields a
range of combustible fuels, petrochemicals and lubricants."5 T h e general definition
includes all hydrocarbons, whether gaseous, liquid or solid.6

The legal definition offered by the Petroleum Act Ch.198 of the Revised Laws of
P N G embraces both the general and restricted scientific definitions and defines petroleum
as: "(a) any naturally occurring hydrocarbons, whether in gaseous, liquid or solid state; or
(b) any naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbons, whether in gaseous, liquid or solid
state; or (c) any naturally occurring mixture of one or more hydrocarbons (whether in a
gaseous, liquid or solid state) and any other substance."7 Natural gas is defined as "gas
obtained from a well and consisting primarily of hydrocarbons."8 At c o m m o n law,
petroleum, as used in the vernacular of non-scientific person, must be preferred to the
scientific definition if and w h e n there is a conflict.9

The petroleum industry in PNG generally accepts the definition of petroleum as
defined in the Petroleum Act, and this is understood to include natural gas except in special
circumstances where a separate definition is warranted and for purposes of clarity and
distinction.1 In line with this general understanding, "petroleum" in this thesis will m e a n
both the general and specific scientific definitions. Furthermore, "petroleum" will be used
interchangeably with "oil" or "oil and gas".

Robert L. Bates and Julia A. Jackson eds., Glossary of Geology (Alexandria, Virginia: American
Geological Institute, 1987) p.497. See also Malcolm Slesser ed., Macmillan Dictionary of Energy
2 n d ed. (London: The Macmillan Press, 1988) p.212.
Bates and Jackson, ibid.
Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 2.
Ibid.
Borys v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. [1953] A C 217, at p.226; (1953) 1 All E R 451, at pp.454455 (PC).
For example, the Government Statement on Natural Gas Policy released in March 1995 use
petroleum to mean oil and gas; see p.21.
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III.

THE

PETROLEUM

AGE

The Handa1' tribe of PNG to which I belong had traditionally had an "oil well"
which they named "Hip Tek" or "Art Tek".12 Art Tek was believed to have been handed
d o w n to them from G o d since time immemorial. A few other neighbouring villages had
their o w n "teks" too; for example, the "Are Tek" of Egenda and the "El Takis" of Pern.13
Tek was used as medicine to treat scabies, kill head lice, dye hairs and, most importantly,
for body decorations. Trade flourished, bringing wealth to those w h o produced tek in
terms of pig and shell kina.

Ancient civilisations in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, North America and Europe
also utilised oil for a variety of purposes.15 A s Giuliano notes, records of the ancient
"Mesopotamians, Elamites, Chaldeans, Akkadians, Sumerians, Babylonians, Egyptians,
Chinese, Japanese, R o m a n s , and Greeks show that they found sources of petroleum in
surface springs and tar pits, as well as in natural gas seepages."16 Brossard adds that not
only was oil appropriated from natural seeps but also from wells drilled by many ancient
civilisations, particularly India and China.17 However, these wells were not deep, because
wells as deep as 100 - 300 feet were drilled only in the first half of the nineteenth century.18
Petroleum and petroleum products obtained either from natural seeps or wells and pits had
a variety of uses.

Asphalt, pitch, bitumen, and oil were used as a "waterproofing

Handa is the name of m y tribe, w h o live in the border area between Nipa and Margarima districts of
Southern Highlands Province, P N G .
The so-called "oil well" is a natural hole through which oil seeps to the surface. "Tek" means oil or
oil well or oil seepage, depending on the context in which it is used, in the Angal Heneng
vernacular, the language spoken by the Nipa people. A n d any word in front of the word tek is the
name of the place where oil seeps occur. In early 1997, surveys for sinking drills have been
undertaken around these traditional teks.
Egenda and Pern are small villages in the Nipa district. "Takis" is the name for gas in the Angal
Heneng vernacular.
A kina is a pearl shell which is highly valued in the Nipa-Mendi area even to this day.
For a detailed account of ancient uses of petroleum see Frances A. Giuliano ed., Introduction to Oil
and Gas Technology 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N e w Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989) chapter 1.
Ibid., p.l.
E. B. Brossard, Petroleum Politics and Power (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Pennwell Books, 1983) p.l.
18

Ibid.
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substance to caulk boats, as cement and mortar in construction, in religious ceremonies, as
a military weapon, for medicinal purposes and in everyday use as a lubricant, illuminant or
fuel."1

The B o o k of Genesis in the Bible even makes several references to asphalt and

bitumen as mortar used in the construction of the Tower of Babel, Noah's ark and Moses's
cradle. A s Brossard records:
Noah's ark was waterproofed with asphaltic pitch, as was Moses's cradle. The
Egyptians used it in the process of mummification; the Romans used oil from Sicily
to light the lamp of Jupiter. American Indians used petroleum from seeps to line
their baskets and to perform cures.
The first recorded volume of output of crude oil (of about 1, 977 barrels) is
reported to have been produced in Rumania in 1857.21 However, the significance of this
production is overlooked in tracing the birthplace of today's modern oil industry. Instead,
it is 'Colonel' E. L. Drake's well, which produced just 25 barrels per day from a 70-feet
shaft near the banks of Oil Creek in northwestern Pennsylvania in the United States in
1859, which is credited as the birth place of the m o d e m oil industry.22 'Colonel' Drake is
described as the founder of the modern oil industry only because he was the first m a n to
2 -2

drill his wells using a cable-tool rig unlike his predecessors. In terms of sophistication,
by today's standards, however, "Drake's wells were hopelessly modest, involving a
94

wooden frame" and "a drill bit powered by human labour."
Oil produced in those early wells was of limited use: it was chiefly used for burning
2c

in stoves and in lamps for illumination and as medicine under the name of "Seneca oil".
Previously, whale oil was used for illumination, but it was soon replaced by kerosene from
coal, and later, oil replaced coal kerosene. With the invention of the electric bulb, oil was
no longer needed for illumination, so n e w uses had to be found, and energy was the next

Giuliano, above nl5, at p.l.
Brossard, above n 17, at p. 1.
Ibid.
William R. Freudenburg and Robert Gramling, Oil in Trouble Waters: Perceptions, Politics and the
Battle Over Offshore Drilling (Albany, N e w York: State University of N e w York Press, 1994) p. 13.
Brossard, above nl7, at pp. 1-2.
Freudenburg and Gramling, above n22, at p. 13.
Brossard, above nl7, at p.3.
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logical area.

Petrol ("gasoline" in the U S ) was initially considered as a nuisance. It was

obtained as a light by-product of refining that would vaporize and explode too easily to be
safe in oil lamps and stoves.27 However, with the invention of, first, the piston engine,
and then the turbine steam engine, and later the internal combustion engine, the need for
petroleum was propelled to unimagined heights. Perhaps more than anything else, the
growth of the automobile industry and the sheer size and rapid economic growth in the
United States boosted the rapid growth of the petroleum industry. A s Hartshorn
28

observes:
If the rapid growth of oil consumption during the first half of this century has been
associated with the most widely-ramified technical innovation of that period, the
internal combustion engine, it has also borrowed m o m e n t u m from the fact that the
industry developed first and farthest in the United States. O n e cannot perhaps
distinguish the two: the automobile and the United States, as phenomena
contributing to world economic growth, overlapped during the first half of this
century so far as to be in some ways inseparable. .. .The sheer size of the American
economy and its possession of oil and gas reserves have been tremendous elements
in the rise of world consumption of petroleum.
During the First World War, petrol proved to be the most significant product of the
petroleum industry, since by then the internal combustion engine had already established
itself as the most important technical and economic innovation of the early twentieth
century.29 Apart from the use of petroleum products as fuel, other uses were gradually
found which include, a m o n g others: "in the petrochemical industry producing organic
chemicals, plastics, and synthetic fibers; in paving materials for roads and roofing; in
-in

lubricants for machines; in pharmaceuticals; and even in food w e eat."
Because of the expanding industrialisation and the growing importance of oil in this
process, the European powers, and later the United States, scrambled for colonies to

J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments: An Account of the International Oil Industry in
its Political Environment (London: Faber & Faber, 1967) p.38.
Id., at p.39.
Id., at p.38.
Id., at p.3.
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establish bases for sources of raw materials, secure cheap labour and markets for their
finished products. A s Aaronovitch observes:31
Their scale of production and rate of profit was linked with their supply and
cheapness of their raw materials. They therefore sought, rather than buy them in
open market, to control the sources of their materials and get them at the lowest
possible cost. In the 1880s, for instance, having built a great soap factory in
Liverpool, Charles Lever picked up 200, 000 acres in the British Solomons and a
1,875,000-acre concession in the Congo to secure his raw materials. ...By the
beginning of the century the monopoly groups of a handful of countries had divided
the world up between them, thus converting the great majority of the population of
the world into colonial and semi-colonial peoples.
It was with this motive in 1884 that Germany sliced off the northern part of Papua
N e w Guinea to itself and called it "German N e w Guinea", while the southern half was
picked up by Great Britain and called it "British N e w Guinea". The British settlers w h o
panned for gold along the m a n y creeks, streams and rivers in British N e w Guinea sighted
numerous seepage of oil and gas.32

The initial impetus for oil exploration was spurred by reports of these gold
prospectors w h o had sighted numerous "teks" (oil and gas seepages) in the lower Vailala
River area in what is n o w Ihu district of the Gulf province in Papua (formerly British N e w
Guinea) in 19ll.33 These were reported to the colonial Administration in Port Moresby,
31

32
33

S. Aaronovitch, Monopoly: A Study of British Monopoly Capitalism (London: Lawrence &
Wishard Ltd., 1955) at pp.15-16.
F. K. Rickwood, The Kutubu Discovery (Victoria: Book Generation Pty Ltd., 1992) see chapter 3.
F. K. Rickwood, "The Geology of Western Papua" [1968] The APEA Journal 51 atp.52.
"Towards Development - The Long History of Petroleum Exploration in Papua N e w Guinea" in G,
J. and Z. Carman eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua New Guinea: Proceedings of the First PNG
Petroleum Convention, Port Moresby, 12-14 February, 1990 (Port Moresby: P N G Chamber of
Mines and Petroleum, 1990) p.l, at p.3; P. R. Lamerson, "Evolution of Structural Interpretations
in Iagifu/Hedinia Field, Papua N e w Guinea" in ibid., at p.283; Judy Tudor ed., Pacific Island
Yearbook and Who's Who 10th ed., (Sydney: Pacific Pub., 1968) p.400; C. Warrillow, "A Brief
History of Oil Exploration in Papua N e w Guinea", an unpublished paper made available to m e by
the Department of Mining and Petroleum ( D M P ) at p. 1; The Administrator, Papua: Annual Report
- 1921-1925 (Canberra: The Commonwealth Government Printer) p.91; R. B. Leslie, H. J. Evans
and C. L. Knight eds., Economy of Geology of Australia and Papua New Guinea: 3. Petroleum
(Monograph Series No.7) (Clunies Ross House, 191 Royal Parade, Parkville, Victoria: The
Australian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 1976) p.478. For general information on
explorations spurred by oil and gas seepages, see W . K. Link, "Significance of Oil and Gas Seeps in
World Exploration" (1925) 36 Bulletin of American Association of Petroleum Geologist 1505; C.
P. Meakin, "The Significance of Surface Indications of Petroleum" [1971] The APEA Journal 126;
B. A. Martin and S. J. Cawley, "Onshore and Offshore Petroleum Seepage: Contrasting a
Conventional Study in Papua N e w Guinea and Airborne Laser Fluorescensing Over the Arafura Sea"
[1991] The APEA Journal 62; A. W . Linder, "Petroleum Prospects, Blight Water, Fiji" [1972] The
APEA Journal 333; Giuliano, above nl5, chapters 1 and 2.
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who, in turn, reported them to the Commonwealth (Austraian) Government through Mr. J.
E. Carne, Assistant Government Geologist of N e w South Wales, and Mr. E. R. Stanley,
the Commonwealth Government's first geologist to the Territory of Papua. Because these
reports brought official recognition of the occurrence of oil and gas, on which basis
exploration commenced, it is generally said that the age of petroleum in P N G began in
1911.34

IV. POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER PETROLEUM RESOURCES
BEFORE 1921
Before we proceed to review the colonial legal arrangements and exploration
attempts from 1911, it would be important to provide a brief account of the political
arrangements in order to understand w h o had political sovereignty over petroleum
resources in P N G before 1921.

Although Great Britain declared a British protectorate over British New Guinea on
6 November 1884, it was not annexed as a British possession until 4 September 1888.35
Great Britain invited Queensland, its colony populated largely by British immigrants, to
jointly administer British N e w Guinea.36 After the British Australian colonies came
together to form the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, Great Britain transferred the
administration of British N e w Guinea to the newly formed Commonwealth Government.37
The Commonwealth Government did not take over until 1906 after the passage of the
Papua Act 1905, which came into force on 1 September 1906. The purpose of the Papua
Act was to effect the change of administration. In so doing, the Act abolished the joint
control of the possession by Queensland and Great Britain and changed the name from

But, in m y view, it began Jong before, since local inhabitants like the Handas had been appropriating
oil since time immemorial. However, it may be true in as far as commencement of modern
exploration is concerned.
R. W. James, Land Law and Policy in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: PNG Law Reform
Commission, 1985) p.l.
Tudor, above n33, p.328.
The current Australian States were British colonies until 1901, when these States came together
formed the Commonwealth of Australia as an independent nation: See Tudor, above n33, at p.389.
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British N e w Guinea to the Territory of Papua.

The Act also established and provided for

the legislative, executive and judicial powers and functions of the territorial government.39

German New Guinea became a German protectorate on 3 November 1884, and
annexation occurred the following year.40 From the year of annexation to 1889,
administration of the protectorate was entrusted to the N e w Guinea Company. O n 1 April
1889, however, "the Reich withdrew from the N e w Guinea Company and itself took over
the sovereignty over the Protectorate previously granted to the Company." 41 In response to
reports of coal and oil occurrences in what is n o w the Aitape district of Sandaun province,
the Reichstag voted up to 60,000 marks for the purposes of scientific investigation. Before
this s u m was fully expended, war between Germany and other Euroean powers broke out
in 1914.42 After Germany was defeated in that war, that is the First World War, German
N e w Guinea became a Mandated Territory of the League of Nations, under Australian
control, in 1921. The outcome of the war stripped Germany of its political sovereignty
over petroleum resources in German N e w Guinea as well as putting an end to its legal
influence.

From 1921 and thereafter, Australia had full sovereignty over petroleum resources
both in the former German N e w Guinea as well as in Papua. W h e n the Mandated Territory
of N e w Guinea became a Trust Territory of the United Nations in 1946 after the Second
World W a r , Australia was still entrusted to administer the Trust Territory. Australia
continued to administer both Territories separately until 1947, w h e n the two
administrations were unified.

In 1951, the Legislative Council of the united territory met

for the first time. The Legislative Council was replaced by the House of Assembly in

Ibid. See also P. Biskup, B. Jinks and H. Nelson, A Short History of New Guinea (Sydney: Angus
and Robertson, 1968) chapters 6 and 7.
See the general arrangements under section 3, Papua Act 1905.
Tudor, above n33, at p.328.
Gaya Nomgui v. The Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (Re Lae
Administration Land) [1974] P N G L R 349, atp.359.
The Commonwealth Government, The Power Resources of the Commonwealth of Australia and the
Mandated Territory of New Guinea: Report to the World Power Conference, London, 1924, compiled
by the Institution of Engineers, Australia (Sydney: Government Printer, 1924) p.91.
43

James, above n35, at p.l.
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1964.

In 1973, Papua N e w Guinea was granted self-government, and on 16 September

1975, it attained independence from Australia.

This political arrangement shows that Australia had a longer period of influence on
P N G ' s legal development. This means that P N G ' s petroleum law and policy developed
essentially on the basis of the Anglo-Australian legal systems. It is from this perspective
that the petroleum legal arrangements reviewed below ought to be seen.

V. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1884 AND 1975
To unravel the specific petroleum law and policy within this period, it is helpful to
begin by surveying the Anglo-Australian basic legal framework in force in Papua, which
was later extended to N e w Guinea when Australia extended its administration there since
1921.45

The original basic laws of British New Guinea came from three sources which were
specifically adopted by the Courts and Laws Adopting Ordinance 1888. These were: the
statutes and regulations which were in force in the colony of Queensland as at 17
September 1888, which were specifically adopted;46 those laws and statutes of Great
Britain which were in force in Queensland and which were adopted;47 and the principles
and rules of c o m m o n law and equity which were in force in England as at 17 September
48

1888. These adopted laws were to apply subject to the circumstances of the possession.
This basic legal framework remained uninterrupted even after the Commonwealth
Government took over after the passage of the Papua Act 1905. In fact, the Papua Act
clearly stated that "the laws in force in the Possession of British N e w Guinea shall continue
in force" until other provisions were made.

The Papua Act also stated that, apart from the

See The World Bank (Report of a Mission Organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development at the Request of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia), The
Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (hereafter "the World Bank
Report") (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965) p.5.
During the separate administrations, separate but identical legislations applied in the two Territories.
Courts and Laws Adopting Ordinance 1888, section 2.
Id., section 3.
Id., section 4.
49

Papua Act 1905, section 6(1).
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Acts specifically adopted from Queensland, Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth
of Australia were not to apply in Papua.50

Rickwood reported that by 1911 all petroleum and minerals in Papua were reserved
to the Commonwealth of Australia.51 O n a closer examination of the legal developments at
that time, it appears that this was the case. The Legislative Council of Papua passed the
Mining Ordinance 1911 to make an amendment to section 55 of The Mining Act 1898 of
Queensland (adopted) to insert a deeming provision, which stated that all coal shale and
mineral oils have always been the property of the Crown. 52 Also, section 3 of the Mining
Ordinance 1911 stated that the right to search for and work all coal shale and mineral oils
was reserved by the Crown.

What, then, was the law on petroleum before 1911? It appears that there was no
specific petroleum law or policy before 1911.53 One reason for this could be that, because
there was no official awareness of the occurrence of petroleum before 1911, there was no
need for petroleum legislation. However, by inference from the general constitutional
framework, the adopted c o m m o n law and principles of equity applied. If this was the case,
and it is submitted that it was, then the only issue the c o m m o n law provided for was on
petroleum ownership.

There are two common law views on ownership, but they are conflicting. The first
rule was developed in U Po Naing v. Burma Oil Company in 1929 by the Privy Council on
the assumption that, since petroleum was a fugacious substance, analogous to underground
water, the owner of the surface land did not o w n it until reduced into possession.

In the

Id., section 7.
Rickwood, "Towards Development...", above n33, at p.3; — "The Geology of Western Papua"
[1968] The APEA Journal 51, at p.52.
Mining Ordinance 1911, section 2, . The Mining Act 1898 of Queensland was adopted by the
Mining Ordinance 1899, enacted by the Administrator of British N e w Guinea. Section 55 provided
that any person w h o discovered coal could apply to the Lieutenant-Governor for a lease for purposes
of mining that coal. The section did not mentioned shale, mineral oils or petroleum. Also, title in
petroleum and minerals was not vested in the Crown.

I was not able to find any specific legislation or regulation or even a government policy statemen
relating to petroleum within this period.
U Po Naing v. Burma Oil Company (1929) 56 LR (Ind. App.) 140. For a discussion of the common
law cases on fugacious underground water and their analogy to petroleum, see J. M . Mclntyre, "The
Development of Oil and Gas Ownership Theory in Canada" (1969) 4 (2) U.B.C. Law Rev. 245.
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United States, this rule is k n o w n as the "rule of capture".

The second view stems from

the sweeping definition of land: cujus est solum jus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos,
which means 'to w h o m e v e r the soil belongs, he o w n s also the sky and to the depths.'56
This rule states that the owner of the surface soil o w n s the petroleum beneath his land.
Without following or overruling its previous decision in the U Po Naing v. Burma Oil
Company

case, the cujus est solum rule was applied by the Privy Council in 1953 in an

appeal case from Canada disputing the ownership of gas.57 Perhaps owing to legislative
enactments to regulate petroleum exploration and exploitation, the courts in England were
never presented with the opportunity to develop any further rules applicable to other areas
CO

of the petroleum industry. Since the legislative enactment in 1911, it is submitted that the
c o m m o n law rules m a y be of less importance or none at all in P N G today.
In N e w Guinea, the first minerals legislation was passed in 1922.

That legislation

vested in the C r o w n ownership to all metals, precious stones, coal, shale and mineral oils

In the United States, these c o m m o n law rules are still applicable, because apart from the offshore
areas and federal lands, the leasehold holders o w n oil and gas beneath if the Crown/ Federal or State
government had not reserved to itself minerals and petroleum resources before the grant. For general
information on this, see R. W . Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas 3r ed., Hornibrook Series (St.
Paul, Minnesota: West Pub. Co., 1991).
Co. Litt. 4, quoted in Hemingway, ibid. p.30. There is a great array of academic and judicial
opinions criticising the validity and applicability of this maxim in our modern world: see P. Butt,
"The Limits of Application of the M a x i m 'cujus est solum ejus est usque ed coelum'" (1978) 52
AU 160; Wright, "Airspace Utilization on Highway Rights of W a y " (1970) 55 Iowa LR 761; A.
J. Bradbrook, "The Relevance of the Cujus Est Solum Doctrine to the Surface Landowner's Claims
to Natural Resources Located Above and Beneath the Land" (1988) 11 Adelaide LR 462; Baten's
Case (1610) 9 Co. Rep. 536; 77 E R 810 (action in nuisance, overhanging portion of house); Fry v.
Prentice (1845) 14 L J C P 298 (action in nuisance, overhanging portion of house); Lemon v. Webb
[1894] 3 Ch. 1; [1895] A C 1 (action in nuisance, overhanging tree limbs); Pickering v. Rudd
(1815) 4 C a m p . 219; 171 E R 70 (action in trespass, projecting advertising sign); Clifton v. Bury
(1887) 4 T L R 8 (action in trespass, bulletfiredfrom a rifle range on nearby land near plaintiff's land
at height of 75 feet); Gifford v. Dent (1926) 71 Sol. J. 83 (action in trespass, sign attached to wall
of a room protruded over plaintiffs forecourt); Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Co. (of Great Britain and
Ireland) Ltd. [1957] 2 Q B 334 (action in trespass, advertising sign projecting 8 inches into airspace
above plaintiff's land); Woolerton and Wilson Ltd. v. Richard Costain Ltd. [1970] 1 W L R 411
(action in trespass, intrusion of crane jib at height of 50 feet above plaintiffs roof); Wandsworth
Board of Works v. United Telephone Co. (1884) 13 Q B D 904 (trespass, passage of telephone wires
across a street at height of 30 feet); Commissioner for Railways v. Valuer-General [1974] A C 328;
Sovmots Investments Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1977] 1 Q B 411.
Borys, above n9.
Apart from a few appeals to the Privy Council, which primarily concerned issues on ownership, I
was not able to find any case law on other areas like licensing, control and management, etc.
Mining Ordinance 1922; See The Administrator, Territory of New Guinea Annual Report - 19211922, p.98.
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in or under all lands in the Territory including the right to reserve and work any of these
minerals.60

The Mineral Oil and Coal Ordinance 1923 was the first petroleum legislation
enacted by the Papuan Legislative Council to regulate exploration and development in
Papua. 61

This ordinance remained the basic petroleum law until 1938, although

amendments were made from time to time to meet the growing needs of the exploration
industry. In 1938, it was repealed and replaced by a m u c h more comprehensive ordinance
- the Petroleum (Prospecting and Mining) Ordinance 1938-1939. Before w e look at the
general features of that ordinance, it is pointed out that, there were two other laws in
Papua, namely, the Minerals Oils Act 1886 of Queensland (as adopted) and the Petroleum
Ordinance 1927. The titles of these legislations are somewhat misleading because they had
nothing to do with petroleum exploration and exploitation. Their purpose was to regulate
refined petroleum products, such as petrol, imported into the Territory to be used as fuel.
The Petroleum (Prospecting andMining) Ordinance 1938-1939 was duplicated and
enacted by the Legislative Councils of Papua and N e w Guinea as separate ordinances since
the two Territories were not yet unified administratively.62 This ordinance was based on
British and N e w Zealand legislation.

Compared to the 1923 ordinance, this ordinance

was comprehensive. It contained four parts: Part I was on preliminary matters; Part II
provided for administration of the Ordinance; Part III had six divisions covering
fundamental matters such as exploration permits, licences, leases and compensation
payments; and the last part, Part IV, covered miscellaneous subjects.
The administration of the Ordinance in both Territories was vested in the
Commonwealth Government Minister responsible for mining and petroleum. A n Oil
Advisory Committee and a Petroleum Advisory Board were created in each Territory. The
function of the Oil Advisory Committee was to advise the Minister on technical and
scientific matters.64 O n the other hand, the function of the Petroleum Advisory Board was

This ordinance was published on 7 January 1924.
Since both ordinances were identical, I will refer to it as a single ordinance.
Rickwood, above n32, at p.56.
Petroleum (Prospecting andMining) Ordinance 1938-1939, section 7.
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to carry out the daily administrative work under the Ordinance.

The members of the Oil

Advisory Committee held office at the pleasure of the Minister.66 However, members on
the Petroleum Advisory Board held office at the pleasure of the Lieutenant-Governor in
Papua, and the Administrator in N e w Guinea.67

Section 10 reaffirmed the 1911 declaration that all petroleum and helium shall
always be deemed to have been the property of the Crown in Papua or the Administrator in
N e w Guinea. Section 11 attempted to reserve in retrospect all petroleum and helium in
previous C r o w n or Administration grants. Section 12 provided for the LieutenantGovernor (Papua) or Administrator ( N e w Guinea) the right to explore and carry out
petroleum operations.

A permit, licence or lease was available to any natural person, association or
company incorporated under the laws of the Territories.68 A non-holder of a permit was
not able to obtain a licence unless he held a permit.69 Likewise, a lease was only available
to one w h o held a licence.70 The purpose of a permit was to regulate the rights and
obligations in carrying out preliminary exploration activities like reconnaissance surveys,
seismic surveys, geologic mapping, etc.

The term was for one year. But this was

renewable, and if renewed, the aggregate term could not exceed 10 years.72 The purpose of
a licence was to regulate a more detailed exploration, particularly in a specific area chosen
by the permit holder, to sink exploratory drills, collect samples and test the results.73 A
permit and a licence did not grant title or the right to dispose of any petroleum discovered.74
It was a lease which granted the right to conduct mining operations and dispose of any
Id., section 8.
66

Id., section 7 (2).
Id., section 8 (2).
Id., section 15.

69

Id., section 24.
Id., section 36.
Id., section 22.
Id., section 20.
Id., section 29.
14

Id., sections 22 (2) (permit) and 31 (3) (licence).
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petroleum so found. " The term of a lease was for 21 years, but at the option of the lessee,
renewable for successive terms of 21 years.76

Provisions were made for the payment of compensation to a landowner on whose
land petroleum operations were carried out. A permittee, licensee or lessee was to pay
compensation for deprivation of possession of the surface land, or for any damage to the
surface, or severance of any part of the land, or deprivation of surface right of way and
easements and such other consequential damage.77

After 1947, when the administration of Papua and New Guinea were amalgamated,
the above Ordinances were repealed and replaced by a single ordinance - the Petroleum
(Prospecting and Mining) Ordinance

1951. The n e w ordinance, however, did not

introduce any fundamental changes, and thus, the basic tenets as outlined above remained.
A few of the changes introduced were mainly to provide incentives to encourage continued
explorations, or to clarify vague provisions in the previous ordinance, or to add minor
matters which had been overlooked before. For example, under the previous ordinance, a
permittee or a licensee was strictly prohibited to extract and dispose of any petroleum
discovered. In the n e w ordinance, however, an exception was provided for a permittee or
a licensee to extract petroleum for use in prospecting and mining operations in his area of
78

permit or licence. The total area covered by a licence under the former ordinance was
2,500 square miles, but under the n e w ordinance it was extended to 8,000 square miles.79
The term of a licence was increased from six years under the old ordinance to eight years.80

Although there were minor amendments made from time to time to accommodate
changing needs over the years, the 1951 ordinance remained the general petroleum law of
P N G until 1975. In 1975, it was repealed and re-enacted as an Act of the National
Parliament as a matter of formality to comply with constitutional requirements of the new

Id., section 38.
Id., section 37.
Id., section 80.
Petroleum (Prospecting and Mining) Ordinance 1951, section 25 (4) ( for a permittee) and s.36 (5)
(for a licensee).
Id., section 30 (3), and section 26 (2) (b) of the 1938-1939 Ordinance.
Id., section 31 (3), and section 27 of the 1938-1939 Ordinance.
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Independent State of Papua N e w Guinea. ' In 1976, a more modern petroleum legislation
was enacted. That will be discussed in the next chapter.

VI. EXPLORATION EFFORTS FROM 1911 TO 1975
Without examining the exploration efforts of some 70 odd years, which finally
culminated in the discovery and development of the Kutubu petroleum fields, our review of
PNG's petroleum industry would be incomplete. Hence, it is for the sake of completeness
that under this section, w e set out to look at the exploration efforts.

Since PNG's petroleum age began in 1911, it should not be surprising that there is
not any evidence of petroleum exploration between 1884 and 1910. All the available
literature begins from 1911, so w e begin from there. Since petroleum and helium in Papua
were reserved to the Commonwealth of Australia, all explorations were to be undertaken by
the Commonwealth Government. N o company or private individual was permitted to
explore, develop and produce petroleum without the Australian Government's consent.
After receiving the reports from Mr.Carne and Mr. Stanley in 1911, the
Commonwealth Government immediately engaged Mr. F. C. Grebin to select sites and
sink test drills in the areas where teks (oil and gas seeps) were reported to have been
seen.82 M r . Grebin, together with other government officials, explored the Vailala River
area of what is n o w the Gulf province from 19 October 1912 to April 1913.

O n 15 April

1913, a borehole, which was to become Papua N e w Guinea's first petroleum drill, was
sunk.84 O n 8 M a y 1913, oil spudded from that hole at a depth of 228 feet. Further drilling
to reach the required depth encountered muds, and the hopes of a commercial production
85

were shattered.

The Laws Repeal Act 1975, enacted by the pre-independence House of Assembly, repealed all preindependence legislation and then adopted them as Acts of the Parliament of the Independent State of

PNG.
The Administrator, Territory of Papua - Annual Report - 1912-1913 (Canberra: The Commonwealth
Government Printer, 1913) p.31.
Ibid.
Id., Loo N. Brown's Report, Warden, Gulf Division, at p.35.
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Still in the Vailala River area, at Upoia, the Australian Government spent about
131,035 pounds on six boreholes, which were sunk between 1913 and 1920.86 S o m e of
the wells spudded and produced a total of 2,000 gallons of oil. This oil was described as
"'a particularly valuable type of crude oil owing to the high proportion of light petroleum
and kerosene it contained and the purity of the fractions yielded on distillation, which
greatly resembled those obtained from crude Sumatra oil.'"87 Since these productions
indicated that the area was promising but too large for a government with meagre budget to
develop them alone in an inaccessible, unexplored terrain inhabited by hostile natives,88 Dr.
Arthur W a d e

recommended to the C o m m o n w e a l t h Government to allow private

companies to enter into the area.

The C o m m o n w e a l t h Government ignored this

recommendation and maintained its petroleum monopoly until 1923. In 1923, the
monopoly was partially relaxed after the passage of the Mineral Oil and Coal Ordinance
1923.91

After expending the 131,035 pounds on the promising but commercially unviable
wells in Upoia, Australia entered into a special agreement with Great Britain in 1919 to
jointly fund explorations and development through their nominated agent, the AngloPersian Oil C o m p a n y ( A P O C ) , by contributing 50,000 pounds each.93
86
87

Warrillow, above n33, at p.l. The six boreholes were named, U P O I A No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Ibid. Sumatran Light Crude oil is also known as Minas, a type of high quality crude oil produced i
Indonesia, which is of 35 degrees A P I (American Petroleum Institute) gravity and 0.1 percent
sulphur: see Gilbert Jenkins, Oil Economist's Handbook (London: Applied Science Publishers Ltd.,
1977) p.44.

"The chances of isolating commercial oil...are quite promising, provided systematic geological wor
is carried out continuously by well-tried men, used to tropical conditions and handling of natives.
This necessarily involves a great expense, but such expenditure would be worth while, if only
determining the occurrences and ages of rocks." The Commonwealth Government, The Power
Resources ..., above n33, at p.92.
89

90

91
92
93

Dr. Arthur Wade was the First Government Surveyor, who arrived in the Territory on 15 October
1913 and made extensive surveys of the country between Yule Island and the Purari Delta, selecting
sites for bores. H e worked with Mr. F. C. Grebin, the government geologist. Dr. W a d e left the
Territory in 1919: The Administrator, Territory of Papua - Annual Report -1924-1925 (Canberra:
The Commonwealth Government Printer) p.91
Rickwood, "Towards Development...", above n33, 1 at p.3; —The Kutubu Discovery, above n32,
at p.41.
Rickwood, "Towards Development...", id., at p.4.
APOC is now known as British Petroleum (BP).
Tudor, above n33, at p.400; Territory of Papua Annual Report - 1921-1925, above n90, at p.91;
Warrillow, above n33, at p.l; F. K. Rickwood, "Towards Development...", above n33, at p.4.
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It can be inferred from this arrangement a clear manifestation of the Commonwealth
Government's intention to retain it's petroleum monopoly in the Territories. Since it was
not able to sustain prolonged explorations, it had to invite Great Britain, its ally, to jointly
fund explorations instead of opening the area up for private companies. Although this
monopoly w a s relaxed in 1923, there were two conditions restriciting the operations of
private oil companies. These were: "that two-thirds of the shares in any [petroleum]
company be British owned, and the companies registered in N e w Guinea or Papua."94 B y
providing these conditions, Australia and Great Britain apparently wanted to keep foreign
oil companies out of Papua and N e w Guinea, or if they were in, that controlling shares be
in British nationals. This is affirmed by section 15 of the Petroleum (Prospecting and
Mining) Ordinance 1951, which stated that:
"(1) Subject to this Ordinance, a permit may be issued or licence or lease may be
granted to (a)

a British subject;

(b)

a company or corporation incorporated or registered under the law
for the time being in force relating to companies in the Territory;
[and]

(c)

an association of British subjects, or of companies or corporations
referred to in paragraph (b) of this sub-section, or of British
subjects and any such companies and corporations..."

Despite the fact that there were reports of many teks being sighted along the
mainland, particularly along the East and West Sepik coasts, there are no records of
petroleum activity in N e w Guinea between 1911 and 1923. The first well in N e w Guinea
was sunk in 1924 at Matapau on the Aitape coast (where teks occurred) by the AngloPersian Oil Company. 9 7 The company drilled nine shallow exploratory wells (the deepest
being 410 metres), which remained the only petroleum wells in the Sandaun province until
1984. 98
The Commonwealth Government, The Power Resources ..., above n33, at p.92.
Ibid.; Andrew Kugler, Jr., "Geology and Petroleum Plays of the Aitape Basin, N e w Guinea" in
Carman, above n33, at p.482; Tudor, above n33, p.353.
M y research did not reveal any records of petroleum activity in N e w Guinea within this period.
Tudor, above n33, at p.353; Kugler, above n95, at p.482.
Kugler, ibid.; Harry Doust, "Geology of the Sepik Basin, Papua N e w Guinea" in Carman, above
n33, at p.461.
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The first phase of exploration attempts between 1911 and 1922 was characterised
by an exclusive government monopoly, and the absence of any petroleum legislation. The
second phase commenced from 1923, after the passage of the Mineral Oils and Coals
Ordinance

1923, to 1938, when the next legislation, the Petroleum (Mining

and

Prospecting) Ordinance was passed. For the first time, six exploration permits were
granted to private oil companies in 1922 before the passage of the 1923 ordinance. After
enactment of the ordinance, 8 licences were granted to private oil companies in 1923.
These licences and the 1922 permits were for a term of five years.99 The Commonwealth
Government, however, still retained exclusive rights carried by the A P O C over areas that
were thought to be prospective, particularly areas between Yule Island in what is today
Central province, and the Vailala River areas of what is n o w the Gulf province.100 The
private permits also covered areas in the prospective areas of the Gulf province only. There
are no records to indicate that there were explorations undertaken in other parts of Papua,
or in N e w Guinea, between 1923 and 1938. The only exploration in N e w Guinea
undertaken during this period was that carried out by the A P O C at Matapau on the Aitape
coast between 1924 and 1929.

Between 1923 and 1938, APOC was prospecting around Popo, an area near the
Kapuri River inland from Iokea. Commencing in March 1922, the A P O C drilled three
wells at a total cost of 227,255 pounds. These wells were abandoned in 1926 due to
adverse drilling conditions. ' The A P O C employed a total of 255 to 300 Papuans and 12
to 17 Europeans.102 Other companies operating in the same area between 1922 and 1938
were: N e w Guinea Oil Company Ltd, which held a permit covering areas down the west of
the Vailala River; Nabo Oil Development Company N.L., which was prospecting along the
Lakekamu River; and the Papuan Oil Exploration Company Ltd, which had a permit
covering whole of the coast between Lakekamu River and Vailala River.

Later, two

other companies, namely, Oriomo Oil Ltd and Vogel (Papua) Petroleum Company Ltd

The Administrator, Territory of Papua Annual Report -1924-1925, above n89, at p.54; Rickwood,
"Towards Development...", above n33, at p.4.
Ibid., Rickwood.
Warrillow, above n33, at p.l.
The Administrator, above n89, at p.34, reported that the total workforce was 300 Papuans and 12
Europeans, but Warrillow, above n33, at p.2, reported that it was 255 Papuans and 17 Europeans.
Ibid., The Administrator; Rickwood, above n33, at p.4; Warrillow, above n33, at p.l.
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obtained licences to explore in the same area.

B y June 1928, the above companies held

a total of nine coal and mineral oil licences covering an area of 7,922 square miles.105

The world recession which began in 1929 and lasted through to the mid 1930s had
dramatic effects on the exploration campaigns of those companies. It also affected the
ability and interest of the Australian Government to continue to fund the A P O C .
Consequently, between 1929 and 1938, exploration declined sharply.106 The A P O C left
when the Commonwealth Government concluded its funding agreement with it in 1929.107
Three of the private companies either went into liquidation or withdrew from the area
10S

altogether.
Oil Search Limited, an Australian company which had been operating in
Queensland, incorporated in Papua and took over Oriomo Oil Company. 109

To maintain and encourage exploration interests, the government passed the
Petroleum (Mining and Prospecting) Ordnance 1938-1939, which introduced a number of
incentives. A m o n g others, one of the incentives was that a permit covered 20,000 square
miles (i.e. 51 000 k m ^ ) , m u c h larger than under the previous regime.110 Encouraged by
this change in legislative policy, the A P O C , which had by then been renamed, the AngloIranian Oil Company, came back. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Oil Search and
Standard V a c u u m of N e w Jersey (Stanvac) formed the Australasian Petroleum Company
(APC).'" The permits of Stanvac and Oil Search were pooled and the A P C took over.112

104

105

Id., The Administrator, at p.61.
Ibid.

106

Warrillow, above n33, at p.2.

107

Rickwood, "Towards Development...", above n33, at pp.4-5. Rickwood says that the great recession
which began in 1929 influenced the Commonwealth Government to conclude its funding agreement
with the A P O C .

108

Warrillow, above n33, at p.2.

109

I 10

Rickwood, above n33, at pp.4-5.
Ibid.

I I I

Id., pp.5-6; — " T h e Geology of Western Papua", above n33, at p.52; Warrillow, above n33, at p.2.

I 12

The total area of Stanvac was 51,000 km2, and Oil Search, 33,000km2; pooled together, this gave
the A P C 84,000 k m 2 at the time of its formation. Shell, which was also operating at that time, had
a permit covering 51,000 k m 2 : Ibid., Rickwood, "The Geology of Western Papua".
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Petroleum operations from 1911 to 1938 had been confined to geologic mapping,
seismic surveys and a few shallow test wells.113 The first deep well was drilled on 8
March 1941 by the A P C on the Kariava anticline in the Gulf province with a new drilling
rig which it purchased for 200,000 Australian pounds. The A P C employed 1,400 Papuans
and 138 expatriates for that deep test well.114 The well spudded, but it was abandoned in
1942 because of the intervention of World W a r II.115 After the war, drilling resumed.
After reaching 3,847 metres it was abandoned because there was no significant shows of
., 116

Oil.

The APC made geological surveys along the north coast of New Guinea around
W e w a k and the Sepik River between 1938 and 1941. The war, however, prevented further
explorations."7 Between 1920 and 1940, 57 wells had been drilled. O f these, 36 had
been drilled between 1920 and 1930 alone.118 Between 1941 and 1950, only six wells
were drilled.

Twenty-one wells were drilled in the Papuan Basin between 1950 and

I960.120
In March 1948, the APC moved its rig from Kariava to Hohoro, a large anticline
lying behind Orokolo Bay. Three wells were drilled there, but the company encountered
similar problems with mudstone as at Kariava, so it abandoned them.

In 1949, a test

well was drilled at Upoia. But this was also abandoned due to similar problems with
mudstone.122 Between 1957 and 1958, a small oil company named Papuan Apinapi drilled
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The World Bank, above n44, at p.225.
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a test well at Kaufana anticline to a depth of 1,021 metres, but it abandoned it after running
,

123

dry.
From late 1940s, exploration began to move towards what is now the Western
province of the Papuan Basin. The A P C drilled a stratigraphic well in M a y 1949 at W a n a
and completed it in September 1951 after reaching 1,050 metres.124 Farther west of W a n a ,
two wells were drilled at Omati, one in 1950 and the other in 1955. Both wells produced
gas and condensate, but they were abandoned because the gas was classified as non
commercial. " Drilling at Barikewa and Kuru between 1956 and 1957 discovered a large
gas reserve of about 500,000 million cubic feet, but no oil.126

It was estimated that by 1950, the APC alone had spent approximately 8 million
Australian pounds on exploratory work in the Aure Trough of the Papuan Basin.127 B y
1954, the A P C had spent 12 million Australian pounds. This means, the APC's operating
costs in 1954 was about 2 million pounds per month.128 B y 1940, the total estimated
exploration cost was 1,850,000 Australian pounds, and of this amount, 780,000 pounds
was accounted for by the A P C and Island Exploration Company. 129
These figures indicate that exploration costs were surmounting while a developable
field was yet to be discovered. Obviously, many companies were discouraged by then.
V a c u u m Oil C o m p a n y declared its intention to withdraw by the end of 1958 if no
commercial field was discovered.

Likewise, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which

was by then renamed British Petroleum (BP), also decided to leave.131 Before they left, a
test well drilled at Puri in July 1958 showed promising signs. Oil spudded, and by
123
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130
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Id., at p.9.
Ibid.; see also J. K. Bird and R. Seggie, "Barikewa and Iehi Gas Revisited" in Carman, above n33, at
p.551.
Ibid., Rickwood, at p.9.
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October 1958, the well was producing about 70 barrels of condensate a day (i.e. oil
recovered from wet gas after a process of condensation).132 B y early November 1958,
further treatment of the well allowed a flow of 1,000 barrels a day to be produced.
Unfortunately, by the middle of November 1958, the well produced water, so it was
abandoned. B P and Mobil (previously Stanvac) withdrew from the area, as they have
earlier decided to do.133 The results of the drilling between 1951 and 1960 were that, of the
21 wells drilled, five discoveries were made, of which one was of oil, one condensate (wet
gas) and three of gas.
The Commonwealth Government's petroleum interests in PNG did not end with its
decision to conclude its funding agreement with the A P O C in 1929. Rather, it was
maintained through appropriate policy and legal instruments d o w n the years. For instance,
when permits covering larger areas (20,000 square miles) were issued to Stanvac and Shell
through the Prime Minister's department in Canberra, John Curtin, the then Opposition
Leader, and later the war time Prime Minister, criticised the then Prime Minister, Joseph
Lyon, for issuing permit covering just 12,000 square miles to Oil Search, unlike the other
foreign companies.135 Mr. Curtin said that Stanvac and Shell "were foreign, monopolistic
and would not have the country's best interests at heart."136 H e concluded by saying that
Oil Search, a company made up of Australian shareholders, which was not associated with
any major oil company, had been doing excellent work and should have been granted a
larger area, or as large as the two foreign companies.
It was in line with that policy that the Australian Government subsidised the Phillips
Australian Oil C o m p a n y (as operator among others) to carry out explorations in the Gulf in
1967.138 In October of that year, Phillips commenced exploratory drilling offshore. There

132
133

Ibid.
Ibid.

134
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were nine wildcat wells,139 of which eight were completed by December 1968, and the
ninth by 1972.140 The total cost varied from well to well. The most expensive well was
about A $ 2 million. The daily operation cost throughout the period was A$23,800.141
In the 1950s APC surveyed teks in the Lake Kutubu area and Lavani Valley of what
is n o w Southern Highlands province.
Mendi and Tari.143

B P took up licences in 1967 for areas covering

In what is n o w Western province in 1968, A P C , Marathon,

Continental, Amoseas and Union Oil held onshore licences, while Phillips, Tenneco and
Signal held offshore licences.144 In June 1971, A m o c o , Australian Oil and Gas, and
Southern Pacific Petroleum obtained permits covering certain areas in the Trobriand Basin
of what is n o w Milne Bay province.145 After collecting marine seismic surveys between
1972 and 1973, two wildcat wells, Goodenough No.l and Nubiam No.l, were drilled in
1973.146 In the Trobriand Basin, no other wells had been drilled at that time except three
shallow test wells about 60 kilometres south-west of the Trobriand Island, drilled by Vogel
(Papua) Petroleum C o m p a n y Ltd between 1927 and 1928.147
148

drilled two wells in the Sepik area.

In 1973, General Crude

In 1973, Continental also drilled two wells at Lake

Murray in what is n o w the Southern Highlands province.149 P N G Petroleum drilled
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"Wildcat well" has its origin in the United States. Thefirstoil explorers drilling at night in the
early period of the oil industry's history would hear wildcats and bobcats screaming in the mountains
of Pennsylvania. From this the exploratory wells came to be known as "wildcat wells": see
Giuliano, above nl5, at p.46.
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Kanau-1 and Darai-1 wells in the Darai Plateau in 1975.150 Darai-1 spudded but it was
plugged and abandoned after the well was found to be saturated with water.151 In 1975,
Oceanic Exploration farmed into Shell's licences covering offshore areas in Bougainville
and drilled a well at Etoile.152

The foregoing section presents the scope of petroleum activities from 1911 to 1975.
The extent of exploration after independence up to the time of discovery and development
will be taken up in the next section. Before that is done, let us evaluate the preindependence petroleum law and policy, as reviewed above.

VII. EVALUATION OF PRE-INDEPENDENCE PETROLEUM LAW
AND POLICY
Australia's initial policy to reserve exploration rights to itself, and then the joint
funding of A P O C (now B P ) with Great Britain in the hope of controlling oil resources in
P N G , must be understood in the context of the colonisation process, where the Western
powers vied with one another in carving out zones and keeping each other out of their
sphere of influence.15' Since Australia at that time had no large oil company capable of
undertaking extensive exploration and development, B P was the logical choice because of
Australia's historical and maternal connections with Great Britain. The involvement of
Great Britain and the choice of B P can also be explained by looking at British oil policy,
and in the light of competition a m o n g the large international oil companies, which
effectively controlled the world's petroleum industry (outside the U S and U S S R ) at that
time.

150

151
152
153
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Darai Plateau", in Carman, above n33, p.337, at p.339.
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See Fadhil J. Al-Chalabi, OPEC and the International Oil Industry: A Changing Structure (London:
Oxford University Press, 1980) p.7 for similar views in relation to the old concession system - the
early legal arrangements between host governments and oil companies which provided terms very
favourable to the latter.
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Until the late 1960s and early 1970s, the international petroleum industry was
dominated by a very few vertically integrated154 multi-national petroleum companies.155
These companies are k n o w n as the "majors", "international majors" or simply the "seven
sisters" because of the fact that there are only seven of them. They are: Exxon (formerly
Standard Oil C o m p a n y of N e w Jersey),156 Standard Oil C o m p a n y of California (Socal),157
Gulf Oil Corporation,158 Texaco,159 Mobil (formerly Socony V a c u u m Oil Company), 1 6 0
British Petroleum (BP) 161 and Royal Dutch Petroleum C o m p a n y and Shell Transport and
Trading162 (Shell).163 Compagnie Francaise de Petroles (CFP), which had early interests in
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160
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162
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For a brief account on the school of thought on vertical integration of the oil industry see, Paul
Stevens, " A Survey of Structural Change in the International Oil Industry 1945-1984" in Hawdon,
infra, nl55, p.18, especially at pp.34-38.

The large international oil companies still dominate the petroleum industry, but not as exclusivel
as they used to before this period. See Lord Kearton, "The Oil Industry: S o m e Personal
Recollections and Opinions" in David H a w d o n ed., The Changing Structure of the World Oil
Industry (London: Croom Helm, 1985) p.l, especially at pp. 15-17.
Standard Oil of New Jersey changed its name to Exxon in 1972. Exxon, which has been the world's
largest refiner, is one of the survivors of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Trust, formed in January
1882 with his brother William, Henry Fagler, John D. Archbold and a few others. After the passage
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the U.S. Supreme Court, in M a y 1911, ordered the break up of the
Standard Oil into smaller companies.
Socal, a major Standard sister is known as Chevron.
Gulf was founded by Anthony Lucas with the discovery of the huge reserve at Spindle Top, Texas,
U S A in 1901.
Like Gulf, Texaco, whose original name was Texas Fuel Company, was formed after the Spindle
Top discovery in 1901.
Mobil underwent several name changes. It was first known as Standard Oil Company of New York
(Socony). Socony merged in 1931 with Vacuum Oil (founded by Matthew Ewing and Hiram
Everest) and became known as Socony-Vacuum. That name was changed in 1955 to Socony Mobil,
and, finally, in 1966, it became Mobil Oil Corporation.
BP began in Iran (formerly Persia) as Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It was changed to Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company in 1935 and to British Petroleum in 1954. B P was formed in 1901 by William Knox
D'Archy, an Englishman w h o wasfirstgranted a concession in Persia by the Shah that led to a
successful discovery and crude oil production.
Shell was formed in 1907 through a merger of Royal Dutch Petroleum, a producing company with
extensive interests in Indonesia, and Shell Transport and Trading, a marketing organisation founded
by a London banker, Marcus Samuel.
There are many references on these companies. I only cite a few here. Brossard, above nl7, chapter
3; Jenkins, above n88; Raymond F. Mikesell, Petroleum Company Operations and Agreements in
the Developing Countries (Washington D.C. : Resources for the Future, 1984) chapter 3; Kamal
Hossain, Law and Policy in Petroleum Development: Changing Relations Between Transnationals
and Governments (London: Frances Pinter, 1979) chapters 1 and 2; Edith T. Penrose and Peter R.
Odell, The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry
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the Middle East, as did the majors, and has widespread international operations with
various subsidiaries and affiliates, is sometimes included among the international majors.164
Five of the majors are American, B P is wholly British, and Shell, joint British (40 percent)
and Dutch (60 percent).

Naturally, BP and Shell were found in British and Dutch colonies while US
companies were in the United State's sphere of influence. Initially, the Latin American
countries were within the domain of the U S companies while Shell was in Indonesia and
B P in Persia (now Iran).

Because of the increasing importance of oil,167 and the fear that

oil would soon run out,

these companies were protected and encouraged by their h o m e

countries to acquire sources of oil supply in their respective colonies. However, while
other countries adhered to the doctrine of capitalism by allowing only their companies to
acquire and exploit oil resources, Great Britain not only encouraged and protected British
oil companies but also got itself involved by purchasing controlling shares in B P , making it
the first country in the world to be directly involved in the oil business.169 This was
prompted by the fear of U S companies, specifically Rockefeller's Standard Oil, of buying
out Anglo-Persian Oil C o m p a n y in Persia, which was in financial difficulties.170 The
British Parliament in 1914 approved overwhelmingly, by a vote of 254 to 18 the purchase
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968); Ed Shaffer, The United States and the Control of
World Oil (London: Croom Helm, 1983).
164

Mikesell, ibid., p.20.
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Brossard, above nl7, at p.23.
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Later, through political agreements, the "exclusion" policies were dropped, and much later, when the
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government.
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For example, in World W a r I, the British Navy, whose ships were powered by oil, had a distinct
advantage over the German Navy, whose ships were powered by coal. Because of this, Churchill
commented: "The use of oil made it possible in every type of vessel to have more gun-power and
more speed for less size and less cost." See H. O'Connor, The Empire of Oil (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1962) p.280.
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of a 51 percent controlling share in B P for 2 million pounds.171 Before that vote was
taken, Winston Churchill, w h o was First Lord of the Admiralty, and later, w h o became the
war-time Prime Minister, had told Parliament that:172
We must become the owners, or at any rate the controllers at the sources, of at least
a proportion of the supply of oil which w e require...and obtain our oil supply, so
far as possible, from sources under British control, or British influence.
It was in accordance with this policy that Great Britain and Australia sought to keep
other companies out of P N G , or if they were in, that British and Australian companies to
be preferred in order to keep the controlling power of oil sources in their hands.

Although Great Britain relinquished its political responsibilities in 1906, it did not
abandon its commercial interests. This was based on an economic philosophy first
propagated in the United States in 1893, which called for "colonisation without political
responsibility" or what I would call "economic imperialism". Carl Schurz, in a famous
article, "Manifest Destiny", written in 1893, argued that without colonialism of any kind,
the U S could attain its economic objectives.173 This philosophy has guided the U S
government in its pursuit of oil imperialism, even though it avoided taking direct interests
like Great Britain. In commenting on Carl Schurz's article, W . A. Williams noted:174
Schurz...had always accepted the necessity of market expansion while opposing
traditional colonialism. Exports, he had long argued, 'will save us from the so
m u c h dreaded...I fully agree...we cannot have too many'. But the United States
could obtain the required bases and ports 'without burdening itself with any
political responsibilities in the regions concerned.' Hence the proper policy was to
occupy the outposts 'until they are thoroughly pacified'; and then having obtained
the required economic and military footholds, withdraw. That would extend
freedom by 'exerting civilizing influences upon the population of the conquered
territories', and 'gain commercial opportunities of so great a value that they will
compensate for the cost of the war'.

Great Britain clearly intended to control the sources of supply of oil from sources under i
control or influence. This explains w h y s.15 of the Petroleum (Mining and Prospecting)
171
172
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Ibid.
Ibid.
Carl Schurz, "Manifest Destiny", written for Harper's in 1893 referred to by Shaffer, above n 163, at
p.8.
W . A. Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping
of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: R a n d o m House, 1969) p.365.
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Ordinance

1951 provided for permits, licences and leases to be issued to British

companies, associations or nationals, although Australia, and not Great Britain, was the
colonial power since Great Britain's departure.

Another aspect of pre-independence petroleum law and policy is that, owing to the
involvement of the Australian Government in oil exploration in P N G right from the
begining, and because of the fact that a commercial field was not discovered until after
independence, P N G has not suffered the disadvantages of the old concession system.
Briefly, the old concession system is the legal regime which governed relations between a
foreign oil company and the producer state, which provided very m u c h more favourable
terms to the former than the latter.175 T h e terms which were seen as causing grievances to
the producing countries have been catalogued as follows:176
(a) long duration of concessions;
(b)
absence of relinquishment provisions or, where such existed, failure to
comply with their requirements;
(c)
suspension of therightto tax;
(d)
discretion given to concessionaire to determine pace of exploration, and to
decide what areas should be developed and for h o w long the areas should
lie idle;
(e)
managerial decisions being exclusively in the hands of foreigners;
(f)
flaring of natural gas, and failure to re-inject the gas back into the reservoirs
to provide for greater ultimate recovery;
(g)
arbitrary pricing policies; and
(h)
adoption of accounting methods and procedures which had the effect of
reducing the "government take".
Before Australia partially relaxed its reservation for exclusive exploration, an
ordinance was already in place which obviously avoided m a n y of the disadvantages cited
above. H a d there been a commercial discovery, I a m of the view that the Australian
Government would have m a d e sufficient provisions to obtain a fair share of the revenue.
For instance, since the 1938-1939 ordinance was passed along those petroleum legislation
existing in N e w Zealand and Great Britain, the Australian petroleum ordinance for Papua
and N e w Guinea cannot be equated with those concessions existing in the Middle East and
Latin America.

For a detailed discussion on the nature of oil concessions, see Henry Cattan, The Law of Oil
Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa (Dobbs Ferry, N e w York: Oceana Pub. Inc., 1967)
chapter.2.; Shavarsh Toriguian, Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in the Middle East (Beirut:
Hamaskaine Press, 1972).
176

Hossain, above nl63, at p. 15.
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T w o further points need to be mentioned about the colonial policy. The first one is
is in relation to Australia's attempt to subsidise and encourage exploration efforts. T h e cost
of administration for the two Territories largely depended on Australian aid.177. Local
sources of revenue for the Administration comprised plantations and a few general
merchandising businesses based in the administrative centres like Port Moresby and Lae,
controlled by foreign interests.178 T o reduce the increasing reliance on aid, and in the hope
to establish a revenue base, Australia felt it necessary to exploit the natural resources such
as oil, which appeared to be promising due to the numerous occurrence of teks. Hence, the
policy to encourage and subsidise oil exploration, although over the years it proved
unsuccessful.

The second point is in relation to vesting ownership of all minerals and oil in the
C r o w n or the Administration. While more discussion on this topic will be taken up in
chapter 4, I would like to point out here that, because of the fragmented nature of the
country and the fact that some areas were blessed with rich natural resources while others
were not, the Administration thought it wise to collect all revenue from a centre and
distribute it equitably through planned and systematic delivery schemes.179 Thus, it w a s
for equitable distribution that the C r o w n or Administration acquired title to all mineral and
petroleum resources in P N G .

VIII. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER INDEPENDENCE
Exploration after independence was, and is still, concentrated in the Papuan Basin.
O n e reason for this is because geologists believe that, m u c h "of the world's oil reserves
occur in foreland tectonic settings adjacent to fold-trust belts", and the onshore Papuan
1 RO

Basin has this sort of structure and holds out to be most promising.

Also, the

For example, budgetary aid between 1946 and 1967 increased at the rate of 16.4% per annum: see
Desh Gupta, T. Denklin and C. Yala, Issues in Mineral Exploitation in Papua New Guinea
(National Research Institute (NRI) Discussion Paper No.85) (Waigani: NRI, 1995) p.2.
R. Garnaut, "The Framework of Economic Policy Making" in J. A. Ballard ed., Policy Making in a
New State: Papua New Guinea 1972-1977 (St. Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1981) p.159;
John Moses, "Imperial German Priorities in N e w Guinea 1885 - 1914" in Sione Latukefu ed., Papua
New Guinea: A Century of Colonial Impact 1884 - 1984 (Waigani: The National Research Institute,
1989) p.163.
Richard Bedford and Alexander M a m a k , Compensation for Development: The Bougainville Case
(Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 1977) pp.14-15.
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D. G. Osborne, "The Hydrocarbon Potential of the Western Papuan Basin Foreland - With Reference
to Worldwide Analogies" in Carman, above n33, at p. 197.
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production results obtained earlier in the area, such as Puri-1 well maintained exploration
interests.

However, this does not m e a n that explorations are not undertaken in other
geological basins. In the early 1980s, B H P Petroleum and partners carried out major
explorations in the North N e w Guinea Basin (NNGB). 1 8 2 They drilled three exploration
wells, namely, Puwani-1, Pulan-1, and Boap Creek-1 in the Aitape Trough between 1984
and 1985.183 In the R a m u Basin, Coastal Corporation drilled Tsumba-1 in 1984.184 In
total, about seven exploratory wells and 12 shallow stratigraphic test drills were sunk in the
1980s in the N N G B , but none has proved to be prospective.185 There were some
exploration licences granted in the 1980s,186 but the 1993 and 1994 annual reports on
petroleum activity in P N G published by the Department of Mining and Petroleum did not
indicate that there were prospecting licences covering the N N G B or other basins, other than
i on

the Papuan Basin.
But I would submit that there were prospecting licences in other
basins, including the N N G B .
In November 1980, Amoco obtained petroleum prospecting licence No. 27 (PPL
27) in the Southern Highlands within the Papuan Trust Belts where the gas at Hides was
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discovered.

B P Petroleum Development, Cities Services and Oil Search farmed into the

licence by contributing on an exploratory well (Lavani-1) between 1981 and 1982.190 In
1984, A m o c o and Cities Services withdrew and transferred their interests to B P , after
which B P held 95 percent interest and became the operator.191 After conducting geological
and seismic surveys between 1985 and 1986, B P and Oil Search (partner) drilled Hides-1,
which spudded on 3 June 1987.

Four drill stem tests were performed, and these

confirmed "an extensive gas accumulation at high pressure."193 B y the end of 1988, about
K31 million had been spent on exploration in P P L 27.194

In the 1980s, a number of companies farmed into licences held by the Australasian
Petroleum C o m p a n y (APC), for example, Gulf (now Chevron), which farmed in and
drilled a well at Kiunga.1
shareholder in A P C .

B H P Petroleum Company farmed in after Mobil retired as a

Pioneer International farmed in by acquiring 5 percent of A P C

from Oil Search.
Gulf and joint venture partners drilled at Juha, an area held by APC in the Southern
Highlands. O n 23 October 1983, Juha-1 spudded and produced 14.5 million cubic feet of
gas and 938 barrels of condensate per day, but the major owners, Gulf (50%) and B P
(35%), withdrew after assessing that production in such a remote area would not be
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A. M . Grainage, A. J. D. Hine and P. J. Brawley, "Discovery and Development of the Hides Gas
Field in Licence P P L 27, Papua N e w Guinea" in Carman, above n33, at p.539. The original licence
covered 94 graticular blocks. After expiration of thefirstterm, the licence was renewed for a term of
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commercial.
Oil Search was interested in the results and procured a farm-in
arrangement, and Gulf and B P allowed Pioneer International, A m p o l Exploration (a
Pioneer subsidiary) and Merlin Petroleum of San Francisco to drill a second well at Juha at
their sole cost in return for gaining equity from Gulf and B P in P P L 18 (now P P L 101),
and P P L 17 (now P P L 100). Juha-2 produced gas and condensate at twice the rate of
Juha-1.199 A further well, Juha-3, was completed by the end of 1985, and results from this
well confirmed the Juha-2 estimates.200

In 1985, Gulf (Chevron) and partner licensees of P P L 17 and 18 drilled a number
901

of wells at M a n a n d a and Iagifu.
Although there were abundant shows of gas at
Mananda, it failed to produce oil. At Iagifu the second test spudded on 8 December 1985,
but this was interpreted as insignificant. Further test wells, however, nullified this
interpretation when black oil totalling 8,000 barrels per day flowed.202 This was to become
Papua N e w Guinea's first petroleum field. It was discovered after more than 70 years of
persistent exploration and huge expense. Oil Search's estimated expenditure of A U $ 8 0 0
million from 1929, w h e n it first commenced exploration, to June 1986, w h e n oil was
found in commercial quantities at Iagifu, is indicative.203 The price paid for producing oil
could be in the billions, taking into account the costs of other companies.
A. Discoveries and Productions

There are two petroleum producing fields in Papua New Guinea. These are the
Kutubu Petroleum Project, which produces oil, and the Hides Gas Project, which produces
gas. Gobe is the third project which is scheduled to commence oil production by 1997.
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199

200
201
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203
204

Ibid.
Ibid. B P estimated the Juha reservoir to contain about 1.3 trillion cubic feet of gas and 75 to 100
barrels of condensate.
Ibid.
The partners are: Ampol Exploration, Pioneer International, BP, B H P Petroleum, Oil Search and
Merlin Petroleum of San Francisco.
Rickwood, above n33, at p. 13. See also James B. Price, "Kutubu Petroleum Development Project
Crude Oil Export System" in Carman, above n33, at p.581.
Rickwood, ibid.
PNG

Chamber of Mines and Petroleum Bulletin vol.2., No.l. (January - February, 1995) p. 14.
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The first petroleum development licence was issued to B P and Oil Search to
develop the Hides Gas Field in 1990.205 Gas from the two wells at Hides (Hides-1 and
Hides-2) is chiefly used to generate electricity for the Porgera gold project.206 The Porgera
Joint Venture has built a 4 2 m e g a watts ( 4 2 M W ) gas turbine at Nogotoli, about 8
kilometres from the Hides anticline. Gas from the wells is transported through pipelines to
the power station. From the power station, electricity is transmitted to Porgera, which is
207

some 74 kilometres away, by overhead lines.
The second petroleum development licence was issued to Chevron (operator and
90S
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formerly Gulf) and joint venture partners on 10 December 1990.
The first crude oil,
some 450,000 barrels, was exported to Japan on 3 July 1992. " The original estimate of
the Kutubu reservoir was 210 million barrels of oil. ' But after further tests, the proved
and probable reserve as at 22 July 1994 increased to 236 million barrels. " Initial
production began at 80,000 barrels per day (bpd).
In 1992, a barrel of Kutubu crude was selling at K20. On that basis, it was
estimated that 210 million barrels would generate K4,200 million in revenue over the life of
the project.212 Since the update of reserves as at 22 July 1994 proved to be 236 million
205

M a c Thomson and Bob Williams, "The Hides Gas Project Providing Electrical Power to the Porgera
Gold Mine" in IMPS Profile: Second PNG Petroleum Trade Fair: Profiles of the Trade Fair
Exhibitors and Other Useful Facts and Figures about the Petroleum Industry in Papua New Guinea
(Port Moresby: I M P S Research, 1993) p.25, at p.26.
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Department of Commerce and Industry, "Hides Gas - PNG's First Commercial Hydrocarbon Project"
(1991) 2 (2) Market Place: The Export Trade Magazine of Papua New Guinea 18.
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Mcintosh Baring, Papua New Guinea Resources Review (Port Moresby: March 1995) at p.68; B P
and Oil Search, Hides Gas Field: The First Hydrocarbon Development in Papua New Guinea (a loose
leaflet produced by B P and Oil Search, Port Moresby, undated). The agreement to supply gas is for
19 years.
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Thomson and Williams, IMPS Profile, above n205, p.46, at p.47.
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(1993/2) 28 (1) Petroleum Gazette 3; Paias Wingti, "Benefiting from the Resources Developments Looking Beyond Taxation" (keynote address by the then Prime Minister of P N G at the Conference
on Pacific Oil and Gas Tax Issues in Singapore, 18-20 January, 1993) at p.5.
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Frank Mills and Associates, The Kutubu Project: Ol Askim Na Bekim Bilong Kutubu Wei Projek:
Questions and Answers About the Kutubu Oil Project (Port Moresby: Frank Mills and Associates
Pty Ltd., undated and unpaged).

21 1

Department of Mining and Petroleum, "Kutubu Petroleum Development Project" (Port Moresby:
July 1994) p.5.

212

Mills and Associates, above n210.
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barrels, the expected revenue would be more. But given the fluctuating nature of crude
prices, such as the fall in 1994 from $20 to $12 - $13 per barrel, such expected returns m a y
not hold.
There are 38 wells in the Kutubu Project area, which covers Iagifu, Usano and
Hedinia.213 Three of these are primary wells, 31 producers, five gas injectors and two
water injectors.214 The wells are connected by pipelines to the central production facility
915

(CPF), where oil is separated from water and gas and is stored for shipment. Water and
gas are reinjected into the wells for reservoir pressure. Oil from the C P F flows through a
265-km pipeline to the K u m u l Terminal, which is located about 40 kilometres offshore of
91 f\

the Gulf province. At the terminal, oil is loaded into tankers for export.
Gobe Main and South East Gobe are located in the border area between Southern
Highlands and Gulf provinces. The discovery fields cover two licences. These are P P L
161 and P P L 56.217 Chevron Niugini, the operator of P P L 161,218 and Barracuda, the
operator of P P L 56,219 have agreed to unitise the two fields and produce oil from a
c o m m o n facility.220 Comparatively speaking, the Gobe reserves are smaller than Kutubu.

"Kutubu Petroleum Development Project, above n211, at p.5.
Ibid.
The C P F was designed for a daily capacity of 128,000 barrels of oil per day (BOPD), but actual
capacity has exceeded 140,000 B O P D , and the average was about 120,000 B O P D in thefirsttwo
years.
"Kutubu Petroleum Development Project", above n210, at p.5.
A I D A B , Papua New Guinea: The Role of Government in Economic Development: International
Development Issues No.33 (Canberra: Economic Insights Pty Ltd., June 1994) p.215.
The joint venture partners in P P L 161 are: Chevron Niugini (operator) 2 5 % ; B P 23.007%; Ampolex
21.233%; B H P Petroleum 12.5%; Oil Search 10.01%; and Japan (PNG) Petroleum Co. Ltd.,
6.25%.
The participants in P P L 56 are: Barracuda (operator) 2 0 % ; Mountain West Exploration Inc., 2.5%;
Nomeco P N G Oil Company 7 % ; Oil Search Ltd 2 0 % ; and Southern Highlands Petroleum Co. Ltd.,
50.5%. See PNG Resources Reporting on PNG's Petroleum, Mineral and Forestry Industries
(October - December 1994) p.10; See also C. Michael Marine (Gobe Project Manager). "Gobe
Petroleum Development Project", a paper presented at the Sydney Regent Hotel conference organised
by the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum in M a y 1995.
PNG Resources Reporting on PNG's Petroleum, Minerals and Forestry Industries (January - March
1994) pp. 13-14.
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W h e n Gobe commences production in 1997, the crude flow rate is expected to be at 50,000
221

barrels per day.

B. Gas Reserves

To date, Papua New Guinea's proven and probable gas reserve has been estimated
222

to be between 15 to 20 trillion cubic feet. Apart from the Hides Gas Project, gas is not
developed. However, successive governments have shown keen interest in developing this
huge gas reserve. In 1987, the Department of Minerals and Energy (now Mining and
Petroleum) was commissioned to undertake some studies on h o w best gas could be utilised
domestically.22 The study found that natural gas could be used as liquefied natural gas
(LNG), ammonia, urea, cyanide, methanol and for electrical generation. A m o n g these
994

choices, the study concluded that liquefied natural gas was the best option. A further
study was undertaken by an inter-departmental committee - the Committee on Natural Gas
Policy - set up by the National Executive Council ( N E C ) - whose principal task was to
review and draft a natural gas policy. That committee confirmed the 1987 conclusion that
the best way to utilise gas was in the form of LNG. 2 2 5 A number of international agencies
or groups contracted by the Committee on Natural Gas Policy to submit independent
opinions on P N G ' s national gas policy, which was being formulated, also supported the
view that gas should be used as L N G .
The only reservation, however, has been that the international LNG market is very
competitive, and it would be difficult for P N G to penetrate the already established markets.
There is already an abundant supply of L N G in the East Asian markets, as well as in North

22 1

PNG

Chamber of Mines and Petroleum Bulletin vol. 2. No.l. (January - February 1995) pp.13-14.

Papua N e w Guinea, 'Draft' Government Statement on Natural Gas Policy (Port Moresby: M a y
1995) p.l1.
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See Mick McWalter, "Towards a Gas Policy", a paper delivered at the Sydney Regent Hotel
conference organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum in M a y 1995, at p.2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
The international agencies or groups were: the Economic Advisory Group of the Australian National
University; the International Monetary Fund and Arthur D. Little Inc., which is described as one of
the "internationally reputed firms of energy consultants". See M c Walter, ibid.
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America, Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, to develop an L N G facility
at the cost of about $9 billion for the insignificant domestic market would be unviable.227

A natural gas policy was adopted in 1995, but separate legislation is yet to be
passed. In the meantime, the Petroleum Act Ch. 198 is still the governing legislation for
both oil and gas.

C. Refineries

While petroleum refining comes under the category of downstream activity and is
not subject to our study here, I would like to point out that the first two refineries are being
planned in P N G . O n e is planned at Motukea Island near Port Moresby while the second
one is proposed at Kopi in the Gulf province. The Motukea Refinery is estimated to cost
US$220 million.228 That refinery will refine about 40,000 barrels of oil per day.229 This is
more than P N G ' s daily consumption rate of 13,500 barrels of refined petroleum
210

products. The remainder is expected to be exported to Asia, South Pacific islands and
Australian markets.

IX. SUMMARY
From 1913, when drilling first began in PNG, up to the end of 1994, a total of 277
919

wells were drilled." U p to the end of 1994, the proven, probable and possible reserves
from this long history of exploration has been estimated to be 388 million barrels of oil
( M M B O ) , 200 million barrels of condensate and 15 trillion cubic feet of gas.233 Most of
these reserves have been found in the Papuan Thrust Belt. Comparing the success rate of
227

228

229

230

231

232

233

See Ian L. Rushby (General Manager, Global Gas B P Exploration), " P N G - The Best Potential to be
Asia Pacific's Next L N G Supplier", a paper presented at the Sydney conference, at p.l.
PNG Resources Reporting on PNG's Petroleum, Minerals and Forestry Industries (January - March
1995) p.18.
Ibid.
Id., atp.19.
Ibid.
Robin Moaina, "Recent Trends in Exploration and Development", a paper delivered at the Sydney
conference organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, p.20.
Id., at p.5.
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finding petroleum from exploratory wells in other countries like Malaysia, Indonesia,
Thailand and Vietnam with the success rate of finding oil in a new field in P N G , P N G has
914

has been put at 1 in 10.
However, "if successful wells are counted, this rises to just
over 1 in 4.3, or 2 3 % for commercial and non-commercial fields. Analysis of these
statistics further indicates that the rate of drilling a successful hole for oil in P N G is about
235

1:7, or 1 4 % , and for gas, 1:11, or 9%." " W h a t these statistics means is "that the reserves
found by each wildcat and successful well in P N G is relatively low, at around 13 million
B O E (barrels of oil equivalent) per well, behind countries such as Vietnam and the
Philippines."236
Despite the false hopes raised by the presence of oil and gas seeps, and initially
successful wells which turned out to be economically unviable, the exploration companies
persevered. Millions of dollars have been spent. For instance, the total exploration
expenses for 1994 alone were K 7 0 million, K 6 0 million in 1993, and a huge K 2 2 5 million
in 1990.237 The rewards of this effort and investment have been a moderate oil field
(Kutubu), and a small gas field (Hides) which has no market but one. Geologists say that,
based on current evidence from exploration results, it is unlikely that there will be a giant
91R
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oil field in the order of 1 billion barrels in P N G .
Yet, the irony is that exploration
interests have always been maintained, although in some years, for example, in the 1930s,
they appeared to have waned. Perhaps this is because
"Papua New Guinea represents an attractive country to invest in oil and gas
exploration and development. Exploration success rates are world class, especially
in the Highlands Fold Belt area, and are generally above those of its neighbours in
S E Asia."239
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Botten, above nl, at p.3.
Ibid.
Id., p.5.
Moaina, above n232, at p.5.
Botten, above nl, at p.7.
Id., at p.8.
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CHAPTER THREE
AN OUTLINE OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN PAPUA N E W

GUINEA

I. INTRODUCTION
The Petroleum Act Ch.198 of the Revised Laws (thereafter "the Act"), the
Petroleum Regulation 1989 and the Standard Petroleum Agreement (SPA) are the primary
legal framework for petroleum exploration and development in PNG. 1 The purpose of this
chapter is to present an outline of this legal framework. Pertinent sections of the general
tax legislation relating to petroleum taxation are essential, but they are not reviewed here
because they will be discussed in chapter six. Certain sections in other legislations which
m a y have some bearing, for example, the Central Banking Act Ch.138, which provides for
matters on foreign exchange regulations, are excluded. This chapter aims to provide a
general overview of the petroleum framework and policy considerations embodied therein
whilst some of the important and pressing matters are examined specifically in subsequent
chapters.

II. OBJECTIVES
In devising a legislative framework for petroleum, the overriding objective of a host
country is to provide a legal regime which ensures control over the rate and extent of
exploration and exploitation, but at the same time, includes some measure of compromise
to meet the fundamental requirements of oil companies which commit scarce exploration
and development funds in this traditionally high-risk industry. Control of the rate and
extent of exploration and exploitation is necessary to induce: (1) prompt and thorough
exploration of the licensed area; (2) ensure efficient development of any discovery so that
m a x i m u m ultimate recovery is achieved; (3) control the rate of production in accordance
with other national objectives, such as conservation in times of an oil glut and consequent

The current SPA was adopted in 1989.
Income Tax Act 1959, Part III, Division 10A, sections 163ZD to 165.
S. K. Date-Bah and Makbul Rahim, "Promoting Petroleum Exploration and Development: Issues for
Government Action" in Kameel I. F. Khan ed., Petroleum Resources and Development - Economic,
Legal and Policy Issues for Developing Countries (London: Belhaven Press, 1987) p.93.
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fall in price; and (4) secure a supply of crude oil for domestic markets at prices consistent
with national energy policies. Other objectives are:5
1. ownership and assertion of political sovereignty over petroleum in order to
exercise legitimate control over its exploration and exploitation;
2. attract risk capital investment and encourage exploration and exploitation by
providing terms and conditions which would ensure reasonable rate of return to
the investor;
3. maximise revenue flowing to the H C , or what is sometimes k n o w n as
"government take";
4. transfer of petroleum technology, training and localisation;
5. preference of domestic goods and services; and
6. protection of the environment.
O n the other hand, oil companies pursue the following objectives:6
1. appropriate fiscal terms which ensures a reasonable rate of return; a fast pay-out
time to enable a rapid cost recovery; and rapid amortisation rates over the
original investment;
2. long-term security of crude oil and gas supply, or suitable production splits for
the company;
3. fiscal and contractual stability;
4. sound and efficient management of operations without interference; and
5. safety, welfare and environmental protection.
It has been claimed that before the Petroleum Act Ch. 198 was enacted, thorough
research had been undertaken to carefully consider objectives such as these from both

See Kamal Hossain, Law and Policy in Petroleum Development: Changing Relations Between
Transnationals and Governments (London: Frances Pinter, 1979) pp.43-44; Kenneth W . D a m , Oil
Resources: Who Gets Whatl (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976) p.27; Honore Le
Leuch, "Contractual Flexibility in N e w Petroleum Investment Contracts" in Nicky Beredjick and
Thomas Walde eds., Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing Countries (London: Graham &
Trotman, 1988) p.81, at p.83; Rowland Harrison, "Developing Petroleum Legislation and Policies
for Hydrocarbon Exploration" in Jon Rodd and Anna Elaisi eds., Papers and Materials Presented at
the SOPAC-OIC Hydrocarbon Legislation and Policy Workshop: SOP AC Miscellaneous Report
143 (Port Villa, Vanuatu: S O P A C Secretariat, 1992) p.55; R. W . Bentham, "The International
Legal Structure of Petroleum Exploration" in Judith Rees and Peter Odell eds., The International Oil
Industry: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (London: The Macmillan Press, 1987) p.57, at pp.57-58.
Hossain, Dam, Le Leuch, Harrison and Bentham, ibid. See also Date-Bah and Rahim, above n3, at
p.94. Similar objectives of the host country and international oil company are enumerated in Alfred
J. Boulos, "Negotiating an E & P Agreement: Are There Mutuality of Interests with Host
Governments from and International Oil Company Perspective?" (1990) 12 OGLTR 414, at p.416.
Boulos, ibid. The other authors enumerate similar objectives.
These objectives will be taken up in chapter six, which examines petroleum taxation and royalty
provisions.
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points of view, and learn from the experiences of other countries.8 The 1976 Government
Statement on Petroleum Policy and Legislation ("White Paper" on which basis the
Petroleum Act Ch.198 was enacted) was based on ideas "very thoroughly researched, with
substantial input from the industry, petroleum consultants and international financial
institutions such as the World Bank. Great care was taken to learn from the experience of
other countries."9 Implicitly, therefore, the current policy and legislation is sound and
comprehensive, and probably free from major flaws which m a y be, or m a y have been,
experienced by other countries. This review will help us to assess this claim.

In relation to commitment to, and implementation of, the above objectives in PNG,
it has been observed that:

The State is committed to the development of these resources in a w a y which
maximizes benefits of petroleum production to the people of P N G while minimizing
social, environmental and economic costs. At the same time the State recognizes
the need to develop petroleum resources with international oil companies. It further
recognizes that to attract major overseas investors, it must offer a stable economic
and political environmental [sic] which allows the investor the opportunity to make
a reasonable return on exploring for and developing oil and gas resources in Papua
N e w Guinea.

III.

STRUCTURE OF

THE

ACT

AND THE SPA

The Petroleum Act has five parts, 131 sections ' and two schedules.12 Part I has
seven sections and covers preliminary matters. Part II, which contains sections 8 to 14,

Papua N e w Guinea, Government Statement on Petroleum and Legislation (White Paper) of 1976;
see the Foreword page.
See for example, Sydney Dobunaba, "Petroleum Policy in Papua New Guinea: Entering the
Development Phase" in Rodd and Elaisi, above n4, at p.121.
10

Department of Mining and Petroleum (DMP), Petroleum Policy Handbook (Port Moresby: DMP,
1993) at p.l.

11

Two sections, sections 31A and 33A, were added by adoption of the Mineral Resources Development
Company Pty Limited (Privatisation) Act 1996, amending the Petroleum Act.

12

As stated in chapter two, the Petroleum (Mining and Prospecting) Ordinance 1951 was the principal
law governing petroleum exploration and exploitation until 1977, when the Petroleum Act Ch.198
was enacted. However, before this Act was enacted, separate legislations existed for regulating
offshore exploration and exploitation. These legislations were: the Petroleum (Submerged Lands)
Act, Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Amendment) Act 1976 and Petroleum (Submerged Lands)
(National Seas) Act 1977. The Petroleum Act Ch.198 repealed and consolidated all those previous
legislations and governs both onshore and offshore exploration and exploitation.
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provides on matters relating to administration of the Act. Our first review on ownership
and management below will centre around these sections.

Sections 15 to 121 are found under Part III. As it can be seen, most of the 131
sections of the Act are found under this Part. There are ten divisions.13 A m o n g others,
Division 1 divides up the offshore and onshore territory of P N G into "graticular blocks"
which m a y be m a d e available for exploration.14 Divisions 2, 3, 3 A and 4 set out the terms
and conditions of exploration, discovery, acquisition of State interests and development,
respectively.15 Pipeline licences are covered in Division 5, while registration of tenements
and other instruments are provided for under Division 6.16 Questions relating to land and
property rights, such as compensation for surface rights, arising from exploration and
exploitation activities are provided for under Division 7.17 Other general matters and fees
and royalties are covered under the last three divisions.18 T h e remaining parts are devoted
to miscellaneous matters and transitional provisions, and, thus, of less significance for our
purposes.

The main purpose of the SPA is to provide finer details of the licensing provisions
without the need to amend the Act.

Furthermore, it is to provide some flexibility to allow

the government and oil companies to negotiate terms of individual projects under which the
investment is made, consequently ensuring predictability and certainty in the investment.20
S o m e of the terms which require certainty and predictability include fiscal provisions
covering predictable currency, tax and royalty rates, government undertaking not to
interfere with the investment (e.g. expropriation), local business participation and

A new division, Division HIA, was added by the Mineral Resources Development Company Pty
Limited (Privatisation) Act 1996.
Sections 15 - 17 are under Division 1.
Division 2, sections 18-27; Division 3, sections 28-31; Division 4, sections 32 - 44.
Division 5, sections 45-58; Division 6, sections 59 - 73.
Division 7, sections 74 - 85.
Division 8, sections 86 - 115; Division 9, sections 116 - 121.
John G. Grace and M a x Williamson, "Papua N e w Guinea Standard Petroleum Agreement: Its
Strengths and Weaknesses" [1991] The APEA Journal 502.
John Nonggorr, "Provincial Government Participation in Mining and Petroleum Developments"
[1991 Special Issue] Melanesian Law Journal 91, at p.103.
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preference of local goods and services, technology transfer and localisation, and
environmental obligations.

IV. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL22
Section 5 of the Petroleum Act deems petroleum to have been the property of the
91

State at all times. The power of the State to grant licences and regulate petroleum
exploration and development is based on this deeming ownership rights.24 N o one is to
prospect for, and recover, petroleum except those the State permits. Those the State m a y
9S

permit are the Director, w h o is to carry out prospecting and recover petroleum on behalf
of the State, and persons w h o have been granted licences under the terms set out in the
Act.26 If the State allows, it is possible for a person to carry out petroleum activities
(exploration, development and production) without obtaining a licence, but through a
transfer or farm-in arrangement.

But even such a person will be subject to the conditions

of the licence he acquires. A person w h o carries out petroleum activities by ways other
98

than these is guilty of an offence, which carries a fine not exceeding K50,000. In this
way, the State makes it impossible for any one to explore for, and exploit petroleum,
except on its terms and conditions.
In principle, the State, as owner, through its agents and instrumentalities, controls
exploration and exploitation of petroleum.29

In practice, however, the day-to-day

exploration and exploitation is controlled and undertaken by international oil companies
(IOC), subject to the terms and conditions of the Act and the S P A . The principal agent of
"' See sections E and F of the SPA.
22

Issues relating to ownership will be examined fully in chapter five.

23

Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 5 (1).

24

Samir Mankabady, Energy Law (London: Euromoney Publications, 1990) at p.38.
Petroleum Act Ch. 198, section 6. The Director is the head of the Department of Mining and
Petroleum w h o is well known as the Secretary.

26

Id., section 5 (2).

27

Id., sections 61 and 64.
9Q

Id., section 7.
29

I say in principle because control, in this sense, does not mean administrative regulation but the
actual day-to-day exploration and exploitation which licensees (large oil companies) perform.
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the State is the Department of Mining and Petroleum ( D M P ) . In some countries, like
Indonesia and Brazil, the national oil company is the principal agent.30 Since there is no
national oil company in P N G , the D M P performs functions that m a y be properly performed
by national oil companies.31 This means that the D M P performs administrative functions as
well as technical and scientific functions which national petroleum companies would
perform in other countries.32

The administrative function is performed by the Director, who is appointed by the
Minister,33 the Director's delegates,34 and the Petroleum Advisory Board (PAB). 3 5 The
P A B consists of the Director, as chairman, and four others w h o are appointed by the
Ifi

Minister. The function of the P A B is to advice the Minister on matters referred to it by
him/her, and/or on any other matters relating to the administration of the Act.37

From our review under this section, two points can be noted. First, it will be
recalled that under the pre-independence petroleum legislation, there were two advisory
bodies: the Oil Advisory Committee ( O A C ) and the Petroleum Advisory Board. While the
functions of the colonial P A B were the same or similar to the functions of the P A B under
the current Act, the O A C ' s function was to advise the Minister on technical and scientific
38

matters.
30

31

32

33
34
35
36

37

Perhaps to avoid duplication of functions and cut d o w n the size of the

See Zhiguo Gao, International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions (London:
Graham & Trotman, 1994) chapter 4 for Indonesia and chapter 5 for Brazil; For Indonesia, see also
Khong C h o Oon, The Politics of Oil in Indonesia: Foreign Company - Host Government Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
According to the then Finance Minister, Sir Barry Holloway in 1981, P N G is not interested in a
majority shareholding: [January 1981] Petroleum News 48.
Energy or petroleum departments perform administrative functions rather technical functions, like
undertaking exploration, development and production, performed by their oil companies.
Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 10.
Id., section 11.
Id., section 14. The Registrar is an example of a delegated officer of the Director.
Id., section 12. The current composition of the P A B consists of the Director as Chairman, two
other persons from the D M P , and one person from Department of Finance and Planning and one
from the Department of Provincial Affairs. The P A B meets from time to time to make
recommendations to the Minister on matters relating to petroleum exploration, including variations
to licence conditions and approval of work programs at the end of the 2 n d and 4 th years of the licence
term.
Id., section 14.

38

See sections 7 and 8 of the Petroleum (Prospecting and Mining) Ordinance 1938-1939.
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administrative bureaucracy, the technical and scientific functions performed by the O A C
may have been assimilated with the functions of the Director and the P A B under the current
Act.39

The second point is in relation to section 6, which provides for the Director to carry
out petroleum activities on behalf of the State. This section has wide and positive
implications for P N G . In a sense, it can be seen as similar to the provision under the preindependence legislation which stipulated for preferential treatment to be accorded to British
and Australian subjects in awarding permits, licences and leases. But in m y view, section
6 goes m u c h further than that. It is a provision which can be used to implement national
objectives which call for majority national ownership in petroleum developments.40 A s
Great Britain did in the North Sea oil fields,41 the Director's rights can be utilised by
citizens or the government through the Mineral Resources Development Corporation
( M R D C ) by reserving the most prospective areas in the country which are not subject to
licences, and developing them through joint venture arrangements with large international
oil companies. The D M P ' s large archive of precious geological data from the more than 70
years of exploration can be used in this respect instead of selling these records to foreign
companies only.

V. AREA
For purposes of allocating exploration acreage, PNG's onshore and offshore
territory is divided into geological blocks of 5 minutes latitude by 5 minutes longitude,
(which is approximately 9 k m by 9 k m ) . This creates 81 square kilometre (km^) blocks,
which are defined as a "graticular sections".42 W h e n a company applies for an exploration

The Act is not clear as to w h o performs scientific and technical functions previously performed by
the O A C , but because the D M P is staffed by scientists and technical people like geologists, I think
there is no need for a body such as the O A C .
Petroleum Act Ch.198, see section 1. Majority national ownership is an objective expressed by
most, if not all, oil producing countries.
Such a policy was adopted by Great Britain in developing its North Sea oil fields. B P and Shell
were preferred in allocating the most prospective areas. In fact, it has been alleged that the original
idea of the British government was to keep the whole North Seafieldsfor B P and Shell, but the
fields were too large for these two companies alone to undertake the massive development that was
required. For a detailed discussion on this, see D a m , above n 4, especially chapters 3 and 4.
42

Petroleum Act Ch.198, see sections 15 and 2.
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licence, it m a y acquire a m a x i m u m of up to 60 such blocks, or 60 graticular sections.43 If a
company requires more than 60 blocks and satisfies the Minister that special circumstances
exist to warrant a larger area, a m a x i m u m area of 200 blocks m a y be granted.44

The size of area which a government makes available for exploration differs from
country to country, but the factors which influence them in determining the size m a y be
same. O n e such factor is the perceived prospectivity; "that is, the probability that petroleum
reserves will be discovered in commercial quantities in the light of seismic data provided by
the government as well as future market conditions."45 Where there is a greater exploration
risk, the area is usually larger than where the perceived risk is less.46 However, from a
government's point of view, a smaller area is preferable, because this would enable a larger
number of oil companies to take up licences. This would generate more work and
expenditure commitments than a few oil companies with larger areas could afford to do.
And, consequently, this would effect thorough exploration.47 Moreover, ascertaining
prospectivity of a country on the basis of several geological data and interpretations from a
wide number of companies with different backgrounds and experiences would be better,
because they would tend to corroborate the results.

Another reason why a government would prefer small areas is for purposes of
equitable distribution. If a particular area is very prospective, it is likely that m a n y
companies would compete for a portion. Therefore, a smaller size would tend to ensure at
least most of the applicants have some interest in the area.

The fourth factor is the amount of rent which would accrue to the host government
at the bidding stage. Smaller areas means more areas available for licensing. This would
mean more rents for the government than a few large blocks would bring. For example,
rent was the very factor which influenced the British government to adopt the "auction
43

Id., section 19(1) (c).
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Id., section 19 (2).
Peter D. Cameron, "The Structure of Petroleum Agreements" in Beredjick and Walde, above n4,
p.29, at p.30.

This point was considered in the North Sea licensing rounds by Great Britain. See D a m , above n4,
at p.46.
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system" in the fourth licensing round for the North Sea fields, because this enabled it to
earn more revenue for a few blocks than it earned under the "discretionary system" during
the first three licensing rounds.50

At the same time, a government should also be mindful of administrative problems
it m a y encounter if the area is too small to be drillable. For example, a small area can create
administrative problems with unitization. ' In m a n y cases, as the G o b e fields in P N G
demonstrate, it is unlikely that oil and gas would lie under the same block of one licensee.
O n the contrary, it is likely to extend to other surrounding blocks held by different
licensees. If some kind of mechanism for coordinated recovery is not put in place,
competition a m o n g the various licensees could lead to inefficient recovery. Hence, the
need to develop as a unit. In P N G , the Petroleum Act provides for development of
S9

—

petroleum discoveries in different licences that have a c o m m o n reservoir as a unit. The
decision to develop as a unit can be arranged between the licensees themselves, or on the
motion of the Minister.54 Where the licensees themselves initiate the unitisation agreement,
they must lodge it for the Minister's approval.55
On the other hand, host government objectives, such as those above, must be
balanced with the interests and expectations of the IOC. The size of the area plays an
important role as an incentive.56 For offshore and frontier areas and in areas where no
discoveries have been made, the I O C would expect to be given large areas. S o m e
countries, for example, Egypt, Nepal, Thailand and India, have records for awarding larger

There are two kinds of bidding systems for licences: the "auction system", which is applied in the
United States and some other countries, where the highest bidder is awarded a prospecting licence,
and the "discretionary system", in which licences are awarded on the basis of work program and
expenditure commitment.
See D a m , above n4, at pp.37-38.
Ibid.
Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 43.
Id., section 42 (2).
Id., section42 (3).

56

Cameron, above n45, at p.30.
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areas than the average-sized areas one m a y expect to find elsewhere. P N G provides areas
larger than Egypt, Nepal or Thailand.57

There are two notable problems which could arise from offering very large areas.
First, in the event of a commercial discovery, it m a y be difficult to control the rate of
exploration in the discovery blocks. If the development is undertaken by one company or a
consortium, it will have the right to explore over a large area, which it m a y or m a y not
CO

exercise. If it elects not to conduct exploration, this can lock up potential areas which
could have been m a d e available for relicensing. Secondly, it is generally true that the larger
the area offered, the greater the risk that thorough exploration will not take place. A s
Cameron notes:
It is a mistaken assumption that by providing larger or more exploration areas,
greater exploration will result. W h e n Denmark awarded very large areas of onshore
and offshore acreage to single consortia, the results were highly unsatisfactory. A
total of 43 exploration wells were drilled between 1962 and 1983 when 74,000 k m 2
of acreage was relinquished. B y contrast, no less than 608 exploration wells were
commenced in the nearby U K offshore area in less than half that period (between
1973 and 1983).

So, the whole issue needs to be balanced, taking into account the various interests of th
host country and those of private oil companies.
In PNG, as seen earlier, a person may apply for a block or a number of blocks not
exceeding 60 blocks, but under special circumstances, the Minister m a y grant up to 200
blocks. This provides a lot of flexibility and choices for a prospective applicant. Since 60
blocks is equal to 4,860 k m 2 , an applicant is presented with the choice to take up any size
between 81 k m 2 and 4,860 k m 2 , depending on its financial position, m a n p o w e r and
technology and other peculiar considerations applicable to it. However, if it needs areas
larger than the m a x i m u m limit, it could apply to the Minister, stating its special reason or
reasons w h y it needs a larger area. Since 200 blocks is equivalent to 16,200 k m 2 , it can be
said that the area P N G offers is very liberal. Given the lack of infrastructure and high risk

Egypt 4,000km 2 ; Nepal 5,000 k m 2 ; India 25,000 k m 2 ; Thailand 7,500 k m 2 . In China and
Indonesia, it is not unusual to find areas larger than 20,000km 2 : see Cameron, above n45, at p.30.
But PNG's area is large, 16,200 k m 2 , second only to India.
Id., at p.31.
59

Ibid.
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of exploration, such a liberal size is necessary as an incentive. In this respect, it is m y view
that P N G acted wisely in providing areas that are not too small or too large, but a
reasonable size with provisions for flexibility to accommodate special circumstances.
VI. EXPLORATION

A. The Application Process for a Petroleum Prospecting
Licence

(PPL)

The right to prospect for petroleum is granted by a prospecting licence. Normally,
the Minister publicises in the National Gazette blocks that are available for exploration.60
A n application for a prospecting licence for any blocks published as such must be lodged
with the Director.61 In practice, all applications go to the Registrar of the department of
Mining and Petroleum, w h o first checks them to ensure that all requirements have been
met. If an application does not meet all formal requirements, or if further and better
particulars are needed, the Registrar (on behalf of the Director) m a y inform the applicant
accordingly, and request further particulars. If the Registrar is satisfied that everything is
in order, then the application is registered pursuant to section 60 of the Act. T h e Director
(actually, the Registrar as a delegate of the Director) then publishes the application in the
National Gazette so that any person w h o might be affected by that application can file his
objections against it within a period of one month.

At the end of the notice period (i.e. a

month), the P A B sits d o w n to consider the application together with any objections filed
against it.64 T h e P A B ' s recommendations are then forwarded to the Minister for his final
decision.
After considering the recommendation, the Minister informs the applicant that he is
prepared to offer a petroleum prospecting licence (PPL), or that he refuses to grant one.
50

Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 18 (2).
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Id., section 18(1).
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Id., section 19 (4).
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Id., section 19(5).
Before the P A B meets, various briefs m a y be prepared for the members to consider. Technical briefs
are always provided from the Petroleum Division of the D M P , but political and economic matters
may also be presented.
Petroleum Act Ch. 198, section 20 (1).
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Such an offer contains a draft of the proposed P P L with its terms and conditions, as
provided under the Act,66 and any other terms and conditions which the Minister thinks
appropriate.6 Since it is at this stage that the petroleum development agreement ( P D A ) will
be signed, a copy of the P D A will also be enclosed.68 The applicant is given a month to
respond as to whether it accepts or refuses to accept the offer. If a month in which to
consider the offer is too short, the applicant m a y request the Minister to extend the time,
which, if extended, should not exceed three months.

If the applicant accepts the offer it is

required to pay the first year's licence fee, which is K 1 0 0 for each block,70 and security
deposit of K50,000, being the amount recommended by the P A B in 1985, or in lieu of it,
a bank guarantee.72 After these conditions have been met, the Minister grants a PPL. The
Minister (in practice, the Registrar) then publishes in the National Gazette particulars of the
licence which has thus been granted.

If the applicant does not accep the P P L offer m a d e

by the Minister within the time stipulated, its application for a P P L lapses.74
Two matters which need to be considered here are, firstly, in relation to the efficacy
of the notice and, secondly, with respect to the composition of the P A B which considers
the application. Since the development agreement is signed at this stage, and this will affect
provincial governments and customary land holders in whose area the exploration and
exploitation will take place, consultation with them is crucial.
Because most customary landowners are illiterate and dwell in remote areas cut off
from Port Moresby, where the National Gazette is published and distributed, it is doubtful
whether the desired purpose of the publication is achieved. While a prolonged and
66

Id., section 20 (2) (a).
Id., see section 27.
Nonggorr, above n20, at p. 100.
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Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 20 (3).
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Id., sections 20(1) (a) (ii); and 116(1) (a).
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Chris Warrillow (Registrar), personal communication, January 1996. The Act only states that the
amount for security should be any amount the Minister thinks reasonable, but it should not exceed
Kl million: Petroleum Act, section 102 (a).
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D M P , above n 10, at p.4.
Petroleum Act, section 19 (6).
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Id., section 20 (4).
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cumbersome administrative procedure m a y be inconvenient to an applicant, I a m inclined to
think that one month is insufficient time for the filing of objections to a licence application.

Secondly, if there are objections, or any matter of concern lodged by the respective
landowners and provincial governments, the P A B is the only body which considers these
objections or matters of concern. This is done without the representations of the
landowners and provincial governments themselves. Because of this lack of representation
or consultation, provincial governments have complained that the legislation does not
provide adequate opportunity for effective and meaningful participation in the decision on
ne

whether or not a P P L should be granted.
After examining similar provisions for
provincial government participation in the decision-making process for granting a
prospecting authority under the mining legislation, Professor Nonggorr observes that
provincial government and customary landowner participation under the petroleum
legislation is even more limited.
In applications for a PPL, the opportunities for provincial government [and
landowner] participation are even more limited. There are no hearings and
consultations before the grant by the Minister of a PPL. The only instance where a
provincial government (or any person) m a y express any view is by filing an
objection to the application with the director (an office similar to that under the
Mining Act).. .The meagre opportunities for participation of provincial governments
[and customary landowners] in the granting of the P P L is of particular significance
because it is at this stage that the petroleum development agreement is signed
between the national government and the developer...
Recently, the government has attempted to remedy this defect by involving "host"
landowners and provincial governments in the decision-making process. This are
examined in chapter eight.
B. The Term of a PPL and What it Confers
The initial term of a PPL is six years, but this can be extended for a further period
of five years.77 The option to renew must be exercised not less than three months before

Papua N e w Guinea Premiers' Council, Mining and Petroleum Working Committee Report,
mimeographed, September 1988 (hereafter " M P W C Report") at p.39-41.
Nonggorr, above n20, at p. 100.
Petroleum Act, section 22 (a) and (b).
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the original licence is due to expire.78 Only half of the initial area is available for
extension.79 T h e surrendered part of the licensed area will then be m a d e available again for
relicensing.

Subject to the provisions of the Act and conditions in the licence, the right a

P P L confers is exclusive.81 In addition to the right to explore for petroleum, the licensee
m a y "execute such works as are necessary in the licence area, including the construction
and operation of water lines."82

The wording of the relevant provisions is phrased in such a way that "half of the
licence area", rather than "half of the blocks", are to be surrendered. This is of significance
to the licensee because, presumably, it will surrender those areas which it thinks least
valuable. But the licensee's discretion in prescribing the surrendered areas is limited by the
provision that the blocks it selects for renewal must have a c o m m o n side with another block
83

that is being renewed. T o the State, this is necessary, because w h e n the area is m a d e
available again for relicensing, the area should not be irregularly shaped or too small in
some parts, because this can cause administrative problems.
The provision for surrender or relinquishment is based on two justifications. First,
and perhaps less important, is that, without these provisions, a government would be
disposing of a substantial portion of prospective areas for a long period of time.84
However, through the surrender provisions, one half, perhaps the less significant half, is

Id., section 23 (3) (c).
Id., section 24(1) (b).
See Carl Dundas, "Work Commitments and Assignments Under a Petroleum Licence or Agreement"
in Rodd and Elaisi, above n4, p.194 at p.195.
Petroleum Act, section 21. For a discussion on the legal nature of a PPL, see Michael Crommelin,
"The Legal Character of Petroleum Production Licences in Australia" in Terence Daintith ed., The
Legal Character of Petroleum Licences: A Comparative Study (London: University of Dundee,
Centre for Petroleum and Mineral L a w Studies, and Energy and Natural Resources Committee of the
International Bar Association, 1981) p.60. Other articles in that book are also useful. A
comprehensive treatment of this topic is given by N. B. Banks, The Registration and Assignment of
Crown Mineral Interests with Particular Reference to the Canadian Oil and Gas Act (Working Paper
No.5) (Calgary: Faculty of Law, The University of Calgary, 1985).
Petroleum Act, section 21.
Id., section 24 (2) (b).
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D a m , above n4, at p.50.
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made available again for relicensing. The second reason is given by Dam in the following
,

85

words:
The more important justification for the surrender provisions is that they tend, like
the work program system, to induce an increase in the rate of exploration.' The
licensee has a strong incentive to determine within the first six years which portions
of each licensed area are the most valuable. The principal means of making such a
determination are his o w n exploration and drilling.
The success of the application for extension will depend very much on compliance
with the initial conditions of the licence. However, where special circumstances are shown
to have prevented total compliance, the Minister cannot refuse the extension.86 The
application procedure for extension is the same as that for the initial P P L application
process, as described above.
C. Criteria for Selection of PPL Applications
The principal criteria for selecting a PPL application are: (1) work program and
expenditure commitment; (2) technological capacity and technical qualifications of the
applicant; and (3) financial strength or availability of financial resources at the disposal of
the applicant.
In most agreements, the crux of a work program is the obligation to conduct
oo

seismic surveys as specified, and to drill exploration, or wildcat, wells. The precise
details would depend on individual circumstances.
However, in a typical work
programme, acquisition of some or all of the following data are normally included:
• aerial photographs;
• airborne magnetometer data;
85
Ibid.
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See Petroleum Act, see section 25. Normally, the P A B will meet to consider the application for
extension, as in the initial process.
Id., see sections 19 and 27 (2).
Cameron, above n45, at p.34.
Ibid.
Carl Dundas, "Safeguarding Petroleum Exploration Commitments" in Rodd and Elaisi, above n4,
p.200, at p.201.

76
•
•
•
•
•

•

field geological observations of hydrocarbon shows, macrofossils, rock
descriptions, rock sequence structural information and unconformities;
gravity data;
reflection seismic data;
satellite images;
well information, such as hydrocarbon shows, palaeontology, petrophysical
logs, sample and core lithology description, structural information, test results
and velocity survey; and
processing, interpretation, and evaluation of such data.

The question that developing countries like PNG may grapple with is whether to specify a
detailed work program and maintain a strict enforcement of its implementation or specify a
m i n i m u m work program and leave the licensee alone with a large measure of flexibility
over its implementation. Cameron notes that:91
In the past, governments have been willing to leave work obligations unquantified,
requiring only that a contractor conducts the programme with due diligence and
according to sound and accepted oilfield practices. The current practice is for the
petroleum agreement to require the contractor to perform specific tasks at intervals,
sometimes prescribing a m i n i m u m well depth and m i n i m u m expenditure for each
well (although the injunction to perform with due diligence m a y well remain).
Although the current trend noted by Cameron may be acceptable to the IOC in
countries where there is proven prospectivity, it m a y be a disincentive in countries that do
not have proven prospectivity. The question of prospectivity in P N G m a y be difficult to
determine, but, generally, P N G is considered to be prospective.

However, results from

past explorations reveal mostly gas or condensate accumulations which lie in remote
locations too expensive to be developed. Apart from the two marginal fields - Kutubu and
Gobe - a large field in the order of one billion barrels or more is yet to be discovered.

On

this basis, it m a y be correct to say that P N G is not as prospective as it is generally claimed
to be. If this is true, then should P N G opt for a flexible work program or insist on a
detailed one?

Cameron, above n45, at p.34.
See, for example, Peter Botten, "Petroleum Prospectivity of Papua N e w Guinea: Comparative Risks
and Rewards", a paper delivered at the Sydney conference organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines
and Petroleum in M a y 1995
93

Geologists predict that, based on current geological data, discovery of such a largefieldis highly
unlikely: ibid.
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T o answer that, first, w e must assess the extent to which P N G requires a work
program. Section 19 of the Petroleum Act, which prescribes the form of application for a
PPL, provides that "the application shall be accompanied by particulars of the detailed
proposals of the applicant for work and expenditure in respect of the block or blocks
specified in the application during the first two years of the term of the licence and an
outline of proposals for work and expenditure during the remaining four years of the
licence..."94 W h e n the Minister considers granting a P P L , the following form part of the
95

conditions of the licence:
(a) acceptable proposals for work and expenditure in the first six years of the
PPL;
(b)

the licensee to carry out the work and expend the amount specified in his
work and expenditure proposal during the first two years of the licence;

(c)

that at the end of every six months during the subsistence of the licence,
reports of operations undertaken so far to be furnished with the Director,
including a plan of the area prospected, and showing all available
information together with a program of his operations for the next
succeeding six months;

(d)

like (c), the same must be supplied for expenditures; and

(e)

at the end of each year the licensee must present a report on the
prospecting operations in the previous year and proposed operations for
the following year.

Similarly, if the applicant applies for extension, detailed particulars of work and expens
incurred in the first term must be provided.96 Moreover, the same conditions above apply
97

for the rest of the extended period.
There are provisions to vary the conditions in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth
year.98 This provides some flexibility to change the original exploration strategy if results
94

Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 19 (1) (d) (i).
Id., see section 27 (2).
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Id., section 23 (3) (d) (i).
Id., section 27 (2).
Id., section 27 (3).
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from the first two years' exploration warrant it. For instance, it would be irrational for the
government to insist on full compliance with the original conditions if two wildcat wells
drilled in the first two years are found dry. A s Chris Warrillow puts it: "What w e strive for
is to ultimately minimise expensive dry holes w h e n exploration finally culminates in the
drilling of a well - they being the one and only means of determining the presence or
otherwise of hydrocarbons." 99 This provides an "escape route" for a cost-effective
company which should not be unnecessarily penalised for not fulfilling its work obligations
with a lower than agreed expenditure.100

Moreover, an "escape route" may be provided for the licensee in the first two years
as well. This m a y be done by providing that the work obligation will not be performed if
certain things happen. In that respect, it is not abnormal to find in a P P L agreement that if a
commitment to drill a well to a stipulated depth encounters insurmountable technical
problems, or a commercial reservoir of petroleum is encountered at a lesser depth, the
licensee would be deemed to have completed the well.101 "Sometimes it is provided that if
any of the first two conditions occur early in the course of drilling a well to a stipulated
depth, a substitute well has to be drilled."102
With respect to enforcement, there are provisions for harsh penalties in the Act. If,
in the opinion of the Minister, the licensee has not complied with any conditions of the
licence, he m a y cancel the licence after giving the licensee a month's notice of his intention
to do so.103 Furthermore, the K50,000 security deposit m a y be forfeited.

The failure to

furnish reports to the D M P regularly, as required, is an offence which carries a m a x i m u m
penalty not exceeding K5,000.

Chris Warrillow, a note entitled "Petroleum Prospecting Licences (PPLs): The Evolution of a PPL",
made available to m e by the author, at p.7.
See Cameron, above n45, at p.36.
See Dundas, above n80, at p.201.
Ibid.
Petroleum Act, section 98.
4

Id., section 102.
Id., section 104.
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O n e can see from the foregoing that P N G provides a detailed work program and
expenditure commitment with some flexibility after the first two years. Provisions are also
there to closely monitor its implementation through the requirement to furnish reports every
six months. The penalties are clear and, perhaps, stiff enough to deter breach and coerce
full compliance. But, at the same time, the provisions to consider special circumstances
provide some breathing space for the licensee. If P N G were to opt for the alternative - very
limited specification of work and expenditure commitment - there are inherent problems,
such as failing to sink a well to a required depth to achieve the geological objective. A well
not drilled to its required depth m a y not be of m u c h use.106 If this is allowed to happen, the
objective for efficient exploration m a y be difficult to be realised. Thus, it is advisable to
retain the current regime because, although it requires a detailed work program and full
compliance, it nevertheless provides some measure of flexibility, thereby maintaining a
balance between the interests of the State and the licensee.

The other two criteria - possession of technology, etc., and financial capacity - may
be discriminatory to small companies which m a y not have as m u c h technology and
financial resources as the big IOCs. For example, a small national oil company wishing to
acquire a prospective field m a y be rejected in favour of a large I O C which has advanced
technology, large financial base and produces a massive work program.

Considerations of national interests in energy development; as required in some
countries like Australia and Canada, are not found in the P N G criteria.107 Nevertheless, it
is possible to include national interests by two ways. First, since the Minister has a wide
discretion to impose conditions which he thinks appropriate before he grants a licence, he
may stipulate, for instance, that explorations during the first two years must be undertaken
together with a national oil company. The I O C m a y be required to train the national oil
company, share technology and skills and exchange other skills and information. A s
incentives, the Minister m a y give special concessions, for example, waving the requirement
for security deposit of K50,000, or cancellation of the annual licence fee. The second way
is by adopting a deliberate policy to prefer national oil companies in allocating licences.
106
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Cameron, above n45, at p.34.
The "Canadianisation" policy introduced in the National Energy Program of 1980 by the Canadian
Government and the Australian policy that 50 per cent interest in any energy projects must be held
by Australians are well documented in D. L. Anderson, Foreign Investment Control in the Canadian
Mineral Sector: Lessons from the Australian Experience (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for Resources
Studies, Queens University, 1984).
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This policy would require restrictions on assignments and dealings to be relaxed so that
national oil companies can assign, transfer, deal with, or create working or non-working
108

interests with IOCs, providing one of the considerations in such dealings is the transfer
of appropriate petroleum technology, managerial skills, etc.

VII. DEALINGS IN PPLS
Generally, any government restricts dealing in a petroleum licence to take place.
This is because a government does not want a petroleum company to apply for a licence for
the purpose of selling it for profit. If a government was to permit "trading" of a petroleum
licence without restrictions, its policy objectives implemented through the licensing process
could not be achieved. It is for this reason that the P N G government does not wish to see a
company "trading" a petroleum licence, i.e. making a profit out of a dealing.109 This is the
advice the P A B and the Policy Division of the D M P give to the Minister.110 However,
some dealings m a y be allowed. This is because dealings in licences m a y have some
positive implications for the host country. A s Harrison observes: "Trading in licences
within the industry can have positive consequences and effects, in terms of turnover of
land, different perspectives, etc."

Division 6 of Part III of the Act provides the

procedures to be followed and restrictions and conditions under which any dealings in a
P P L m a y be allowed.

O n royalties, "working" and "non-working" interests and other interests which can be created in a
petroleum licence, read the following: H. Player-Bishop, "Financial Non-Working Interests in the
Resources Industry" [1990] AMPLA Yearbook 398; Walter L. Summers, "Transfers of Oil and Gas
Rents and Royalties" (1931) 10 (1) Texas Law Review 1; A. W . Walker, Jr., "The Nature of
Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas" (1931-32) 10 Texas Law Review 291;
Gerald L. J. Ryan, "Petroleum Royalties" [1985] AMPLA
Yearbook 328; R. A. Laws, "Petroleum
and Mineral Royalties in South Australia" (1985) 10 (3) AMPLA Bulletin 152; G. J. Davies, "The
Legal Characterisation of Overriding Royalty Interests in Oil and Gas" (1972) 10 Alberta Law
Review 232; Bryan R. Ernes, "Provincial Royalties and Credits" (1988) 27 (1) Alberta Law Review
51; W . H. Ellis, "Property Status of Royalties in Canadian Oil and Gas L a w " (1984) 22 (1) Alberta
Law Review 1; Craig W . O. Phillips and Martin F. Gibney, "Dealing With Royalty Interests"
[1993] The APEA Journal 418; Cameron Robinson, "The Nature of Mining and Royalties" in The
L a w Society of Western Australia, Royalties (Perth: The L a w Society of Western Australia, 1992)
1; and Eugene Kuntz, Classifying Non-Operating Interests in Oil and Gas (Calgary: Faculty of Law,
Calgary University, 1988).
Warrillow, above n99, at p.5.
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Rowland Harrison, "Safeguarding Exploration Commitments and Assignments" in Rodd and Elaisi,
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The Petroleum Act envisages two types of dealings: transfer of a P P L , and creation
of a legal or equitable interest in a licence. The transfer of a P P L must be approved by the
Minister."

The Minister m a y impose additional conditions, as he thinks fit, on the

PPL, 113 unless the transfer is between related companies, for example, between a parent
company and its subsidiary.114 The P P L transfer does not have any legal effect until it is
approved and registered.115 A n d finally, the Minister will not approve any transfer unless
the transfer is an absolute transfer of whole of the transferor's interest in the licence.116
In respect of creating a legal or equitable interest, it must be done by an
instrument," or else the whole assignment will be null and void.118 Secondly, the
assignment will have no force until it is approved by the Minister, either unconditionally or
subject to conditions, as he thinks fit, and upon registration.

In requesting particulars

about the proposed dealing, the Minister m a y require the financial details of the transfer to
be disclosed.120 It is an offence to defraud, or provide misleading information. M a x i m u m
penalties ranging from K2,000 to K5,000 are provided under this Division.
The prohibition against assignment or transfer without the consent of the Minister is
1 91

essential because of the nominal consideration for which licences are granted.
If
assignments were to be permitted freely, the amount received from sale of the licence m a y

Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 61 (1).
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Id., section 61 (11).
"As only written contracts can operate to transfer, assign, affect or otherwise deal effectively with
interests in petroleum tenements, the statutes generally refer to the generic term 'instrument', rather
than to specific types of contracts." David A. Ipp and David A. W . Maloney, "Dealing with
Interests in Petroleum Tenements" (1983) 57 Australian Law Journal 513 at p.514.
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be more than the amount a licensee expends in carrying out his work programme. 122 This
would amount to obtaining a licence for profit without any obligation to undertake the work
program. W h e r e the work commitment is fulfilled, the cost of that program will normally
be m u c h less than the value of the licence sold.123 "The consequence would be the very
"speculation" in licenses that the allocation criteria were intended to avoid. Moreover, it
would seriously undercut the ability of the ministry in charge to place the licenses in the
.,124
hands of oil companies that met the criteria laid d o w n for allocation."

In countries where majority national ownership of the petroleum industry is the
paramount consideration in allocating licences, the non-assignment policy is useful. It
prevents foreign oil companies from buying out all or most of the interests in the country.
In other words, it restricts national oil companies from selling off their interests to foreign
oil companies. A s D a m argues, more than anything else, the majority national ownership
policy was the most important factor which influenced the British government to adopt the
"discretionary system", as opposed to the "auction system", in allocating licences in the
North Sea fields, because under the discretionary system, the Minister had the power to
ensure that majority of the licences were awarded to British subjects.125 I would also think
that the requirement that dealings must be approved by the Minister gives him a useful tool
to implement such nationalistic policies.
For PNG, the justification for restrictions on transfer of a licence, or creation of
legal or equitable interests is, as noted above, to prohibit the buying and selling of licences
for profit. But as D a m notes: "Entrepreneurs have worked out other ways of avoiding the
non-assignment policy. O n e company raised capital on the basis of a plan for purchasing a
'carved-out overriding royalty' - that is to say, a right to receive a percentage of any
resources produced. The seller obtained cash for use in exploration, and the buyer received
a share of any resources found and produced."126 D u e to lack of evidence, it is impossible
to ascertain whether or not the non-assignment policy has been avoided in P N G . But
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Id., see chapter four. See also Oystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the
North Sea (London: C r o o m Helm, 1980) at p.45.
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D a m , above n4, at p.47.
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exploration reports show that farm-in and farm-out arrangements normally take place, and
it is hoped that this occurs under the limited circumstances permitted by the Act rather than
in breach of the non-assignment policy.127

A complete prohibition of assignment of petroleum tenements would be injurious to
the industry. Given the risky nature of the industry, a farm-out/farm-in arrangement is a
useful mechanism for a company to spread the exploration risks it assumes.128 This would
enable it to continue exploration in areas where it would otherwise have surrendered.129
This is beneficial to the host country.

O n e possible problem that could arise, though, is

that the farm-out/farm-in arrangement might prevent effective enforcement of the licence
agreement. This could occur where the assignee does not have adequate technology or
financial capacity to be able to carry out his assigned obligations, as required under the
original licence agreement. Therefore, w h e n an instrument of assignment is lodged for
approval, the Minister should ensure that the assignee would be able to honour the licence
agreement. In some cases, the government m a y require the assignor to provide in the farmout instrument that, if the assignee does not properly discharge his obligations under that
instrument, the interests should then revert back to the assignor, w h o will then discharge
those obligations.131 Because of high exploration risks and low oil prices, oil companies
m a y want to spread their exploration risks. Therefore, it is advisable to maintain a flexible
regime where assignments are allowed, while at the same time, proper checks are
maintained to avoid the negative aspects of assignments and/or transfer.

VIII. DISCOVERY AND APPRAISAL
In the event that the licensee discovers a petroleum reservoir,13 he must
immediately inform the Director.133 Furthermore, after three days of the discovery, the
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See chapter two of this thesis.
Dundas, above n90, at p.201.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Since the definition of "petroleum" includes natural gas, it also includes gas reservoirs.
Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 28 (1) (a).
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Minister must be furnished with particulars of the discovery.134 In practice, since licensees
are required to furnish daily reports of drilling results to the D M P , 1 3 5 a discovery will
hardly be a surprise.

By instrument, the Minister may request the licensee to undertake necessary steps to
determine the physical and chemical characteristics of the petroleum and to estimate the
quantity in the reservoir.136 But if undertaking further work to appraise the discovery is
technically or commercially unnecessary, or inconsistent with good oilfield practice, the
Minister will not enforce this provision against the licensee.137

The purpose of these provisions is to enable the government to ascertain whether or
not a discovery is "commercial". However, to m a k e that decision, the discovery field has
to be delineated and appraised. The question then is: h o w far should the government go in
deciding whether or not to appraise a field? Without labouring on this issue, it m a y suffice
to say that this decision should lie with the licensee, w h o has the resources, expertise and
technology. In fact, this is the conventional practice.138 But this might not be totally
satisfactory to the government. T h e Juha-1 case (in chapter 2) can be taken as an example.
Although the discovery well produced 14.5 million cubic feet of gas and 938 barrels of
condensate per day, Chevron and B P interpreted it as non-commercial and left. But Oil
Search thought otherwise and procured a farm-in arrangement and drilled two appraisal
wells which revealed gas and condensate accumulation at twice the rate of the discovery
field. This elevated the significance of the Juha fields. It would not have been so had it not
been for those appraisal wells. This illustration should give some hint as to w h y m a n y of
the discovery fields in P N G have failed to culminate in development.

At the same time,

it m a y go to explain w h y the government might want to be involved in requiring appraisals
Id., section 28 (1) (b). The information should include: (a) chemical composition and physical
properties of the petroleum; (b) the reservoir rocks or sand; (c) and other scientific information about
the discovery: see also section 28 (2).
135

Petroleum Regulation 1989, section 146.
Petroleum Act Ch.198, sections 29 (1). Non-compliance with directions under ss.28 and 29 is an
offence which carries a m a x i m u m penalty of K5.000.
137

Clause 3.1, SPA.
See Cameron, above n45, at p.38.
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For a summary of the number of discoveries as at 31 December 1994, see Table 6 in Robin Moaina,
"Recent Trends in Mineral and Petroleum Exploration and Development", a paper delivered at Sydney
Regent Hotel conference organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, M a y 1995.
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to enable it to determine the commerciality of a discovery field. Perhaps more appraisal
wells would have changed the initially perceived commerciality of those earlier discoveries
in P N G .

There are also other legitimate concerns of a host government if a licensee refuses to
undertake further delineation of the discovery field and decides that it is not commercial.
This concern is based on the fear that, if market conditions deteriorate, large I O C s m a y be
unwilling to declare marginal fields as commercial and exploit them, although to the
government, the fields m a y be valuable. A s Cameron observes: "These [i.e. discovery
and appraisal] contractual provisions have attracted attention in recent years due to adverse
market conditions for developing countries and also because of government fears that
marginal prospects and gas discoveries m a y not be developed by contractors, despite their
value to the host government. L o w oil prices and declining levels of investment have the
effect of defining more and more discoveries as marginal ones."140 Hence, the necessity
for the discovery and appraisal provisions.

In the same vein, problems may also arise with respect to assessment of a field's
commerciality. W h o assesses the field and on what basis? Obviously, the basis of
assessment will largely be influenced by sufficient knowledge of the geology of the
reservoir rocks or sands. But again, w e c o m e to the same problem above, that in the
absence of adequate geological information due to lack of additional information, an
informed decision cannot be made. Equally, world economic circumstances will influence
the decision on commerciality. For example: "The recession climate of the 1980s has
shown that contractors were willing to classify more and more discoveries of petroleum as
'marginal' or simply 'non-commercial'."

But because economic circumstances are not

static, a government m a y want to develop marginal fields in the hope that the economic
circumstances will change favourably. In that respect, a government m a y be justified to
question the assessment of commericality by the licensee.
On the other hand, if the licensee decides to appraise the discovery, they may need
more time. For instance, if a licensee makes a discovery in the tenth or eleventh year of his
extended term of his licence, he m a y be running out of time to m a k e further appraisal
drillings. In that case, section 26 of the Act states that the Minister m a y grant a further
Cameron, above n45, at p.37.
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extension of three years. If this three-year extension is insufficient, the licensee can app
again for extension, and the Minister m a y extend it again for the last time, for a year.142
This cumulative four-year period is the extent to which the Act allows with respect to
extension of licences over the discovery block. The Act does not provide any relief beyond
this period, even if significant progress has been m a d e but the licensee falls short of
determining its commerciality. This does not only inhibit the potential to discover
substantial commercial fields, but also m a y be a cause of concern for security of tenure
among licensees in respect of those discoveries that have been m a d e thus far. I submit that
further considerations should be given to this question.

IX. DECLARATION OF A LOCATION
If the licensee is of the opinion that a discovery is commercial, he has to request the
Minister to declare the discovery blocks plus eight other adjoining blocks of his choice a
"location".

The licensee m a y request the Minister to include additional adjoining blocks

if he thinks the reservoir goes beyond the borders of the location.144 Likewise, he m a y ask
the Minister to revoke the declaration in respect of a block or blocks.145

Where a location has been declared, the Minister may direct the licensee to
undertake commerciality and feasibility studies for its development within the period he
specifies, which should be two years or more.

But before he issues any direction, the

Minister should give ample time to the licensee to consult the State ( D M P ) as to the content
and schedule of such investigation and studies.

If the D M P and the licensee agree upon a

m o d e of feasibility studies, the Minister should not issue any direction inconsistent with
that feasibility agreement.
Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 26 (3).
Id., section 30 (2).
Id., section 30 (3). Note that a location will not include more than nine adjoining blocks at any
time.
Id., section 30 (3) (b).
Id., section 31(1). If the licensee does not apply for a development licence within two years or
further period as the Minister specifies, he will revoke the declaration of the location: see also
section 37.
SPA, clause 3.2.
Ibid.
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A feasibility study would normally include: (1) technical and economic feasibility
studies relating to the recovery, processing, and transportation from the location; (2)
proposed sites for facilities such as housing, location of town, airstrip, etc.; (3) labour
requirements; and (4) environmental impact studies.

The above provisions describe the steps that may be taken to assess the
commerciality of a field as well as the preliminary studies for possible development. It can
be seen that the licensee m a y be prepared to consult the State on the method to be used in
ascertaining commerciality. This is a positive indication, considering the fact that operating
companies normally tend to regard determination of commerciality as their prerogative.150
The problem with the Act is that it speaks in terms of declaration of "location" and
not "commerciality". A s such, commerciality is not defined either in the Act or the S P A .
Even the definition of "location" - "the blocks in respect of which a declaration under
Section 30 is in force"151 - is inadequate to be of any use. A definition is necessary
because: "Disputes m a y arise over the determination of commerciality. Each of the parties,
the host government as well as the oil company, may, for different reasons, consider a
discovery not commercial and therefore oppose a declaration of commerciality."

Some

host governments argue that without s o m e definition of commerciality written into their
contracts or legislation, they m a y have little protection from arbitrariness on the part of the
foreign investor.153 T o ameliorate such perceived arbitrariness, some H C s have included a
definition of commerciality in their petroleum legal framework. A n attempt to do this is
found in a Ministerial Regulation of the government of Thailand:
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For a detailed list, see Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 31 (2).
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See Peter D. Cameron, "Government - Company Relations After the Contract: Reconciling
Objectives and Strategies for Long-term Relations" in Kameel I. F. Khan ed., Petroleum Resources
and Development - Economic, Legal and Policy Issues for Developing Countries (London: Belhaven
Press, 1987) p.l 10, at p.l 11.
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Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 2.
Cameron, above n 150, at p.l 11.
Ibid.
Ministerial Regulation No.8 (BE.2514), as quoted in ibid. Cameron criticises this definition
because, one, a "pay-out" criterion such as this may appear stringent; it is extremely lenient since
most commercial wells will take only two to three years to pay-out; and, two, on the ground that it
is a toothless provision.
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The status of being commercial of a petroleum well means the productivity of a well
which, if used in producing crude oil, is capable [of yielding] within twelve years a
sufficient volume of crude oil which, based on the posted prices during the tests on
the productivity of the well, shall be of enough value to cover the cost of drilling
and equipping the well for production.
A Columbian contract provides a more general definition: "The existence of a commercial
field will be determined by the drilling, by [the oil company], within the proposed
commercial field, of a sufficient number of wells to permit a reasonable assessment of the
profitability of the field."155

Although most petroleum agreements provide a general definition of
commerciality,

it is not found in the P N G framework. Nevertheless, from the above

definitions, w e can say that the relevant factor in determining commerciality is whether the
volume of petroleum in the reservoir so far estimated can be commercially and viably
exploited on the basis of the existing world oil prices. However, since such a definition
m a y be implicit in the phrase "good oilfield practice", it is conceded that a specific
definition m a y not be necessary.
Where a host government is not involved in some form of participation as a joint
venture through its national oil company, or as a "carried equity" participant, the
commerciality issue can be solely determined by the oil company. If the oil company
thinks that it will be able to recoup its investment with reasonable return, it m a y go ahead
and decide that the field is a commercial field. However, if a government has a
participating interest, such decision must be m a d e jointly. There is, however, some
opinion that "[t]he host government should be involved in the declaration of a commercial
discovery even if it had not participated in the exploratory drilling."157 But, generally,
attempts to define commerciality in the basic petroleum agreement are usually
unsatisfactory, because it is impractical to m a k e a connection between daily production
from a well and flexibility.158 Therefore, "a large measure of flexibility is compatible with
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As quoted in Cameron, above nl50, at p.l 12.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id., at p.l 17.

89
the stipulation of m i n i m u m procedural requirements and also the usual obligation that the
company follow good oilfield practice in its operations." I59

For PNG, there is no obvious problem at present in this matter. However, in the
event of a dispute, it is likely that this will be determined by arbitration, as provided for by
the SPA:
Any Dispute between the State and any one or more of the Oil Companies shall be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules, as m a y be in force,
on the date of the Dispute of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
L a w (UNCITRAL).160

X. DEVELOPMENT
There are three circumstances in which one can apply for a petroleum development
licence (PDL). First, once a licensee forms the opinion that a developable field exists
within the blocks that have been declared a location, he m a y apply to the Director for a
petroleum development licence (PDL).

Commencing from the date w h e n the discovery

blocks were declared a location, this decision has to be formed within a period of two
years. But the Minister m a y extend this period if the licensee so requests.162 Second, if a
licensee satisfies the Minister that a commercial pool of petroleum exists in any blocks
within his licence that have not been declared a location, he m a y also be granted a P D L for
those blocks.163 Thirdly, but as a matter of principle only, any person w h o is not the
holder of a P P L m a y apply for a P D L in respect of any blocks that are not subject to a
licence (PPL or P D L ) , provided he satisfies the Minister that a commercial petroleum pool
exists.164 A n application under the third category m a y be refused outright by the Minister if
he decides not to treat it as an application under the first two categories.

Ibid. In the light of those guideline points Cameron provides at p.l 17, P N G ' s practice m a y be
accepted as satisfactory with respect to declaration of commerciality.
160

SPA, section G, clause 19.1 (a).
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Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 32 (1).
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Ibid.
Id., section 32 (2).
Id., section 32 (3).
165

Id., section 34 (2).
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A P D L application must be accompanied by a detailed development proposal, which
includes the construction, establishment and all facilities and services for and incidental to
the recovery, processing, storage and transportation of petroleum from the fields, as well
as the possible environmental impact assessment.166 Normally, the following kinds of
information will be included in modern development plans:167
1. estimates of recoverable reserves;
2. the development well pattern;
3. master design;
4. production profile;
5. economic analysis; and
6. time schedule of the development operations.'68
An environmental plan, as required by the Environmental Planning Act Ch.370,
forms an essential part of the development proposal. If the Director is not satisfied with the
development proposals lodged by the applicant, he m a y request further particulars, or ask
for amendments to be effected before the Minister actually considers the application.169
Similar to the approval of a P P L , the Minister informs the applicant that he is prepared to
166
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Id., see section 33. Detailed aspects of the technical and other requirements are enumerated under Part
V m of the Regulations and Clause 4 of the S P A .
Cameron, above nl50, at p.40.
Similar plans are found in a 1986 development proposal of a Danish Model Joint Operating
Agreement (JOA). That J O A stipulates that a development plan must include:
1. a description of the hydrocarbon deposit to be produced with detailed analyses and
evaluation of geological conditions, technical aspects of the reservoir and production and
economic factors;
2.
a production plan with particulars concerning the date of commencement of production
and the anticipated magnitude of the annual production for each year the deposit is planned
to be in production; and if the plan encompasses more than one deposit, such particulars
shall be given for each deposit covered by the plan as well as for the cumulative
production anticipated under the plan;
3.
a general description of the facilities planned to be installed including the number and type
of wells, and equipment for production, reinjection, measurement, storage and processing,
and of pipelines between individual parts of the facilities, as well as a more detailed
description of the transportation system planned for the produced hydrocarbons;
4.
a risk analysis for the planned facilities with a statement of measures to be taken to reduce
identified risks;
5.
a plant for the manner in which the development project is to be carried out, including a
time schedule and organised plan for the execution of the project; and
6.
a detailed description of any elements of uncertainty in the project with respect to
reserves, the time schedule, economies, etc., which m a y be necessary for an evaluation of
the project.
Danish M o d e ) J O A for Second Round (1986), Article 5.4.1. The Norwegian Model J O A for the
Eleventh Round (1987), Article 5.4.1 is similar. See Cameron, id., at p.41.

169

Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 33 (2).
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offer a P D L wholly on the basis of the applicant's proposals or subject to further
conditions, and provided all necessary fees, including a security deposit for compliance
with the conditions, are paid upfront.

If the applicant is satisfied with the terms and

conditions the Minister offers, he is required to accept the P D L within a period of three
months.

The Minister is not to refuse an application unless he serves on the applicant one
179

month's notice that he intends to do so. " Moreover, the Minister must give his reasons
171

w h y he refuses the application. This is intended to give ample time to the applicant to
m a k e changes to his proposals and rectify matters which m a y have been grounds for the
Minister's refusal. Even after correcting any anomalies, if the Minister is adamant in
refusing to grant a licence, the applicant can then refer the matter to arbitration.

The term of a PDL is 25 years. This may be extended for a further period of 20
years.175 Essentially, the conditions of a P D L are those development proposals which have
been agreed upon and accepted by both parties, and on which basis the development licence
was issued.176 A development licence confers an exclusive right to carry out exploration,
recover petroleum and sell or dispose of petroleum so discovered, and the right to execute
other necessary work incidental to the recovery of petroleum.177

During the transition from the declaration of commerciality to development, IOCs
m a y be concerned about their legal position and security of tenure in the discovery. Since a
P P L does not entitle them to acquire and sell petroleum so discovered, they have to rely on
the political goodwill of the H C to grant them a development licence to do that. At the same
time, they m a y want to have some guarantee in the general legislation or in the agreement at

Id., section 34.
Id., section 35 (1). The time period m a y be extended so it is quite flexible.
Id., section 35 (3) (a).
173

Id., section 35 (3) (b) (i).
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Id., section 35 (4).
Id., section 39.
Id., see section 42.
Id., section 38.
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the exploration stage that, in the event of a discovery, they would be entitled to a P D L . In
some countries, this concern is addressed by avoiding a two-stage system like the one in
P N G , and adopting a single contract which covers the exploration, development and
production phases.178 This eliminates the possibility of termination of the existing contract
179

at the end of the exploration phase.
In PNG, it can be seen in the review above that this concern has been clearly
addressed. First, the Minister has to award a P D L only in one of the three circumstances.
This comes d o w n to only two alternatives - either to grant a P D L to a P P L holder or to one
w h o does not hold a PPL. This choice again comes d o w n to one by operation of section
34 (2) (a), which clearly directs the Minister to refuse an application by one w h o does not
hold a PPL. Therefore, in actual fact, the Minister has no choice but to grant a P D L to the
holder of the PPL. Second, in deciding either to grant a P D L or not, the Minister's
decision is dictated to, or influenced by, only the applicant's development proposals. If he
intends to refuse to grant a P D L for any other reason, he is obliged to give the applicant not
less than one month's notice of his intention to do so, together with his reasons. This
affords sufficient time to the applicant to correct matters that m a y have led the Minister to
refuse the licence. If the Minister still refuses, even after amendments have been made, the
applicant can refer the matter to arbitration. In m y opinion, these provisions are sufficient
enough to guarantee the original P P L holders of a P D L in the even of a commercial
discovery.

The main reason why a HC does not want an automatic transition from the
exploration stage to development is because this gives it no control over the development.
Therefore, a separate licence is necessary to control the second phase of the industry in this
upstream sector. In P N G , a control, as such is exercised through the approval process of
the development plan and maintained throughout by the imposition of conditions under the
development licence. Moreover, it is at this stage that m a n y important matters are
1 80

negotiated. A m o n g others, these include participation of the State N o m i n e e

in the

I 78

Cameron, above nl50, atp.40.
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State Nominee is the legal entity of the State, which carries the interest of the State in the petroleum
project (Section A, clause 1 of the S P A ) . Since privatisation of M R D C , Orogen, the company
which holds 4 9 % of M R D C ' s interests in existing projects and which stands to acquire all interests
of the State, excluding those held for landowners and provincial government in future projects, has
equal rights and access to information as the Minister and the D M P : see sections 21-26 of the
Minerals Resources Development Company Pty Limited (Privatisation) Act 1996.
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project; training and employment of nationals; procurement of domestic goods and services;
the level of participation (if any) of provincial governments and customary landowners in
the project; and environmental matters.

XI. PIPELINE LICENCE
Although the Act requires a separate application for a petroleum pipeline licence
181

(PLL) and treats P L L separately, in practice, it forms a part of the development plan.
Therefore, application for a P L L is normally considered together with the application for a
P D L . The term of a P L L is same as the term of a P D L , that is, 25 years, subject to renewal
for 20 years.'

The right granted is essentially to convey petroleum from the discovery

fields to storage tanks, and from there to the point of sale to local refineries or to a sea port
for shipment.

The criteria for selection is similar to the criteria for selecting a PPL application, th
is, on the basis of w o r k and expenditure programs, and expertise and technical
qualifications. The only difference from a P P L application is in relation to the specific
particulars of the proposed pipeline, such as its size and capacity, design, etc. Similar
comments m a d e in relation to the selection criteria for a P P L application, that there is a
possibility of bias against small and inexperienced companies, particularly national
companies, m a y be applicable in this case. In fact, the public debate engendered by this
selection criteria, which favoured a large I O C against national entrepreneurs during the
184

granting of the second P L L in P N G , supports this point well.
Moreover, the opportunity to object or make comments by customary landowners
and provincial governments on a P L L application is also limited. This is because
essentially the same administrative procedures for scrutinising P P L applications apply to
PLL. The only opportunity to express their views is in the form of inviting objections to
the application for a P L L , the particulars and notice of which are published in the National

Under Division 5 of Part III, Petroleum Act Ch. 198.
2

Id., section 51.
Id., section 50.
4

For information on the pipeline ownership struggle, see Brian D. Brunton, The Struggle for the Oil
Pipeline in Papua New Guinea (NRI Discussion Paper No.68) (Waigani: N R I , 1992).

94
Gazette. ' Therefore, again, the comments m a d e in relation to P P L applications respecting
adequacy of the public notice equally apply here.

XII. PRODUCTION
Matters relating to petroleum production are scantily provided under the Act. In
fact, subsection (3) of section 4 4 is the only provision that gives s o m e directions on
production. It states that where petroleum is being recovered in a licence area, the Minister
m a y direct the licensee to take all necessary and practicable steps to increase or reduce the
rate of production, provided the production rate does not exceed the capacity of the existing
facilities in place. However, the Petroleum Regulation 1989 offer some guidance where
the necessary regulatory details on production are set out under Part VIII of the Regulation.
It covers various subjects from construction of facilities and health, safety and welfare
matters to efficient recovery of petroleum. For instance, section 264 (Regulation) provides
that, in order to prevent waste, the Director m a y direct the licensee to employ enhanced
recovery technology, such as injection of water or gas into the wells to exert reservoir
pressure in order to realize optimum recovery.

One of the principal reasons for the HC to maintain control over production is to
ensure that a petroleum pool is properly developed. For example, instead of flaring gas, as
done in the early years of the industry, current practice is to reinject it back into the wells to
maintain reservoir pressure and prevent environmental pollution. Another reason is that
once the reserves are reduced to a certain level, the remaining pool m a y be uneconomical to
recover. In other words, the decision for a thorough recovery will be influenced by
considerations of the overhead cost for production and the estimated return. In such cases,
a licensee m a y want to shut d o w n the wells and cease all operations. But a host
government would want to exhaust all reserves, as m u c h as current technology can go.
However, where the government is involved as a joint venture partner, as P N G is, then it
could be in the interest of both parties to wind up. This might generate a conflict of interest
for the government, so the best option for countries like P N G is to leave that decision with
the oil companies, which have the expertise to operate and recover petroleum pools in
accordance with "good oilfield practice".

Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 48 (3).
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XIII. ENFORCEMENT

PROVISIONS

It is one thing to have a descriptive regulatory framework like the one PNG has,
and quite another to enforce it. Particularly, a small developing country like P N G , dealing
with big IOCs, m a y face m a n y problems with enforcement of the law. O n e problem arises
because of the lack of sufficient qualified personnel and financial support. This section
does not seek to deal with that but merely reviews the enforcement provisions.
Enforcement of the Act is carried out by the Chief Inspector and other inspectors
appointed by the Minister.

Their function is essentially to ensure that the provisions in

the Act, and any other directions issued, restrictions imposed or orders m a d e under the Act,
are being complied with.187 The Chief Inspector and his officers have a wide range of
powers. These include the right to enter any area, building or machinery used in petroleum
activities and inspect them; take away any substance or sample, such as water, for testing
or analysis; and obtain documents relating to petroleum operations, which could be used
1 88

for purposes of their function.
They m a y also obtain records and statements from
witnesses, appear at or conduct inquiries regarding accidents, and help conduct
18Q

prosecutions for offences against the Act.
T o provide misleading information, or
obstruct the conduct of the inspector, is an offence which carries a m a x i m u m penalty of
K5,000. 190
If an inspector finds that breach of any of the provisions of the Act, or the
Regulation, or directions issued or restrictions imposed under the Act has occurred, he m a y
give an order or direction to remedy the breach.

If a person is not happy with such a

decision, he m a y appeal to the Chief Inspector. The decision of the Chief Inspector is final
and not subject to further appeal.192 But this provision offends section 55 (3) (b) of the
Id., section 110.
187

Id., section 111 (l)(g).

188

Id., section 111 (1).

189

Id., section 111 (l)(h).
Id., section 111 (6).
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Id., section 111 (2).
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Id., section 111 (4) (b).
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Constitution, which vests inherent power in the National Court to review administrative
decisions, such as those of the Chief Inspector. In fact, the National and Supreme Courts
have held in a number of authoritative decisions that a legislation of the National Parliament
cannot remove the inherent power of review of the National Court.193
J

Since the work and expenditure commitments, prescribed fees, security deposit,
and all other conditions in the Act and the S P A become conditions of the PPL, P D L and/or
P L L , it m a y be useful to see h o w breaches of conditions under these licences are dealt
with. Section 98 of the Act provides that where a licensee has failed to comply with (1) a
condition of a licence; or (2) any order or direction given by the Minister or Director under
the Act; or (3) any provisions of the Act, the Minister m a y serve a month's default notice of
his intention to cancel the relevant licence.

Copies of such a default notice m a y be served

on persons, such as a mortgagee w h o might be affected by the cancellation of the
licence.195 In the default notice, the matter of default will be specified so that the licensee
can remedy it.196 If, within a period of 180 days after the service of the default notice, the
licensee fails to remedy the default, or attempts have been m a d e to correct the default but
the State is not satisfied (example, payment of inadequate compensation), the Minister m a y
then serve a cancellation notice.

At least after 30 days after the cancellation notice, the
198

Minister m a y cancel the licence.
However, where the licensee contests the default
notice, or where the State contests the satisfactory performance of the remedy, the matter
will be submitted to arbitration.

A s stated earlier, arbitration will proceed in accordance

with the Arbitration Rules of the U N C I T R A L . 2 0 0

193

194
195
196
197
198
199
200

See Premdas v. The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1979] P N G L R 329. See also Reve
Mase v. The Independent State of PNG (1980 unreported) N260, per Narakobi, A. J., at p.3; and The
State v. The Independent Tribunal; Ex Parte Sasakila [1976] P N G L R 491.
Similar provision in section 26.1 of the SPA.
Ibid. Section 98 (2), Petroleum Act Ch.198.
Ibid., Petroleum Act.
Section 26.2, SPA.
Ibid.
Id., section 26.3.
Id., section 19.1.
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The inspectors are the ones w h o are involved in enforcing the provisions of the Act.
Therefore, implementation of the licence conditions will depend very m u c h on the effective
investigations of the inspectors. While the petroleum framework allows flexibility, it also
makes sufficient provisions for its enforcement. Since a dispute would not be in the best
interest of both parties, it would be wise for oil companies not to take advantage of any
weaknesses of the State enforcement machinery. At the same time, it is advisable that the
State maintains a cooperative spirit rather than an aggressive one in enforcing its licence
conditions.

XIV. SUMMARY
It is fair to say that the general legal framework is detailed in both the exploration
and exploitation phases of the industry. Also the framework makes sufficient provisions to
ensure prompt and effective exploration and exploitation. Moreover, it enables the
government to maintain effective control over exploration and exploitation of petroleum.
The provisions are also flexible enough to accommodate the interests of oil companies in
the industry. This allows r o o m for consideration of matters which m a y be of interest to
them. In that way, the interests of both parties can be balanced so that exploitation of
petroleum resources is undertaken from a mutual basis.

Another noticeable aspect of the general legal framework is that it is certain. This is
because the essential matters of the exploration and exploitation phases are clearly spelt out
in minute detail. This helps oil companies to determine what they would expect if they
decide to invest in the industry in the country. A n y elements of doubt, or the possibility of
unpleasant variations are eliminated because to vary any provision would require legislative
sanction. But at the same time, certain aspects which m a y require negotiation on a specific
project by project basis are dealt with by the SPA.

There are four matters of concern the above review reveals. First, there is a need
for some form of meaningful consultation with customary landowners and provincial
governments in processing applications for PPLs and, to a lesser extent, P D L s and PLLs.
This issue has been dealt with recently by the government, as w e shall later see in chapter
eight.

The second point is in relation to the question of some form of participation by
national entrepreneurs in the industry. T h e review reveals that national ownership or
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participation by national entrepreneurs is not a criteria for selection of P P L or P L L
applicants, although in m a n y countries, this is a paramount consideration. In m y view, this
clearly goes against the National Goals and Directive Principles of the Constitution. In
particular, those Goals which have been adopted and set out in the 1976 White Paper on
Petroleum Policy and Legislation as N o . 1 and 4, which call for citizens and governmental
bodies to have control of bulk of the economic enterprise and production, and economic
development to take place by the use of skills and resources available in the country, either
from citizens or the State, and not in dependence on imported skills and resources.201
Furthermore, P N G has rejected the pre-independence practice by Australia and Great
Britain to grant permits, licences and leases to Anglo-Australian subjects by failing to m a k e
similar provisions for P N G citizens.
The third point is in relation to exploitation of natural gas. It is advisable to adopt a
separate legislation for natural gas exploitation. A natural gas policy was released in 1995,
so it is hoped that a gas legislation will be introduced soon. Until that is done, the need for
a separate treatment of natural gas will remain. This is because natural gas has peculiar
characteristics, such as its physical existence in reservoirs, a m u c h higher risk in its
exploitation, and economic factors like market supply and demand.
The final point relates to the matter raised earlier, that oil companies may be
interested in keeping a discovery for a longer period than is provided for under the Act. In
m y view, this would be an incentive. This could encourage oil companies to undertake
more appraisals and, m a y b e lead them to change their original assessment in relation to
commerciality of a discovery.

201

See chapter one of this thesis.
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CHAPTER

FOUR

OWNERSHIP OF PETROLEUM IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA1
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of ownership in law is very crucial, because it determines innumerable
rights of the owner over property.2 Ownership itself consists of an amalgam of rights.3 In
Salmond's words, "[o]wnership in its most comprehensive signification, denotes the
relations between a person and any right that is vested in him. That which a m a n o w n s in
this sense is in all cases a right." Without limiting, ownership rights include the right to
use, the right to alienate, the right to assimilate, the right to pass title by succession, and the
right to claim title to something. Property includes all these rights and exists only in a
relationship of ownership.

Hence, ownership of property in petroleum determines the

right of the owner to explore for, bore holes and produce petroleum; the right to determine
h o w to use it or dispose of it once produced, or the right to transfer all or any of his rights
to others and receive rents and royalties.
In chapter three, we have seen that the State owns property in all petroleum in PNG
territory. W e have also seen the legislative regime which provides the mechanism whereby
the State transfers its petroleum property rights to oil companies by means of the licensing
instruments, but subject to conditions which ensure the realisation of its national economic
goals and objectives. This amalgam of property rights of the P N G State in petroleum and
minerals is being challenged by customary landowners. The crux of the challenge is that,

Because the ownership issue includes mineral as well as petroleum, discussions in this chapter will
include both resources.
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4 th ed., p.743, para.1227. For a concise definition and classification of
property, see: Paul Latimer, Australian Business Law (Sydney: C C H , 1995) chapter 3; For
philosophical discussions on the nature of property rights from different angles, see the various
contributions in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul eds., Property Rights (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
D. R. Denman, Studies in Land Economy: The Place of Property: A New Recognition of the
Function and Form of Property Rights in Land (Cambridge: Geographical Pub., Ltd., 1977) p.28.
J. W. Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) p.277.
Denman, above n3, pp.29-33; Latimer, above n2, at p.l 10.
Denman, id., at p.25.
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since petroleum and minerals beneath the land are encompassed by the definition of land
under customary law as well as the c o m m o n law, they o w n these resources by virtue of
their ownership of the top soil. Vesting in the State of their property rights in minerals and
petroleum by the respective legislation amounts to unjust deprivation of property, since the
State does not purport to pay them adequate compensation, as required by section 53 of the
Constitution, and, consequently, the vesting provisions would be without effect. Further,
since the mining and petroleum legislation seek to regulate on a right, that is, the property
rights in minerals and petroleum, the legislation must be seen to have complied with the
formal requirements of the Constitution under section 38. Failure to comply with these
requirements could render the vesting provisions of the respective legislation ineffective.
O n the other hand, the State maintains that it has valid legal grounds for owning these
resources.

The aim of this chapter is to explore these issues. As we shall see, some attempts
have been m a d e to have the ownership issue determined by the National and Supreme
Courts, but they have failed on technical grounds. A n y successful application and decision
in favour of customary landowners will have significant impacts on the mineral and
petroleum industry. However, this chapter does not seek to discuss any speculative
outcome of that nature. W h a t I will do, though, is, firstly, set out the legal basis and policy
justification for State ownership. This will be followed by an examination of the challenge
to the State's ownership by customary landowners on the basis of their ownership of the
top soil. The next section will go on to examine the constitutional arguments. The last
section will then determine current trends and developments on the ownership issue.
Appropriate conclusions will be m a d e in the end.

II. LEGAL BASIS FOR STATE OWNERSHIP
The first legislation to vest ownership in petroleum in the Crown in the Territory of
Papua was the Mining Ordinance 1911.7 This legislation divested customary landowners in
Papua of their property in petroleum for the first time. I refer to customary landowners as
owning property in petroleum because, before the 1911 ordinance, customary landowners
owned and appropriated petroleum according to customary rules, as seen in chapter two.
"7

The Legislative Council amended section 55 of the Mining Act 1898 of Queensland (adopted) to
insert a deeming provision (section 2), which stated that coal shale and petroleum have always been
the property of the Crown ; as reviewed in chapter two.
In m y area, the people have always used petroleum from natural seeps, and it is understood that in
other parts of P N G , too, customary landowners appropriated petroleum long before time
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Customary ownership rights in minerals had been divested in the C r o w n earlier by the
Mining Ordinance of 1907. Section 1 of that ordinance provided: "All mineral gems and
precious stones on or under native lands shall after the passing of this Ordinance be the
property of His Majesty."9 The general mineral legislation was the adopted Mining Act of
1898 of Queensland. That Act was adopted by the Mining Ordinance of 1899. The 1907
and the 1911 ordinances were promulgated to vest property in minerals and petroleum in
the Crown, because the adopted 1898 Act of Queensland did not do so.10 The principal
purpose of the 1898 Queensland Act (as adopted) was to regulate the rights of miners w h o
pegged their claims to mineralfieldsthey have discovered. In respect of gold and silver,
they have always been Crown minerals since the Case of Mines,11 and, as such, they were
merely given legislative force by The Gold Field Ordinance of 1888, adopted from
19

Queensland. " In N e w Guinea, the Mining Ordinance 1922 was the first legislation which
vested property rights in all minerals and petroleum in the Administrator.13 That ordinance
was replaced by the New Guinea Mining Ordinance 1928. In Papua, the 1907 mining
ordinance was replaced by the Mining Ordinance 1937. Since then, several amendments
were effected to those ordinances,

but property rights in minerals and petroleum

continued to remain vested in the Administrator or the Crown.
immemorial: see J. Burton, Axe Makers of the Whagi, Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University,
1984, pp.188-190.
The Mining Ordinance 1907 (Papua) was replaced by the Mining Ordinance 1937. Section 1 of the
1907 ordinance re-appeared as section 167 under the 1937 ordinance. R. S. O'Regan, Q C , in "The
Ownership of Minerals and Petroleum in Papua N e w Guinea: A Comment" [1992] QUTU
141, at
p. 143, says that section 167 of the 1937 ordinance was the first provision of this kind in Papua to
vest minerals in the Crown, but in m y view thefirstvesting provision was section 1 of the 1907
ordinance.
10

But C. E. P. Val Haynes argues that it is possible that The Gold Fields Ordinance of 1888, or the
Mining Act of 1898 may have impliedly appropriated minerals to the Crown: "The Ownership of
Minerals and Petroleum in Papua N e w Guinea: Milirrpum to M a b o and Teori Tau to Tumbuna
Tano?" (1994) 1 (1) The Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 33 at p.41.

11

Case of Mines (1568) 1 Plowd 310 at p.336; 75 E. R. 472.

12

13
14

But since the c o m m o n law was adopted subject to the circumstances of the Territory, was it
compatible with the customary rule that landowners owned these minerals?
See The Administrator, Territory of New Guinea Annual Report - 1921 - 1922, at p.98.
The Gold Field Ordinance was adopted together with the Mining Act of 1898 of Queensland by the
Mining Ordinance of 1899. The 1907 Mining Ordinance were replaced by the Mining Ordinance
1937. The 1922 Mining Ordinance was replaced by the New Guinea Mining Ordinance 1928 -1966.
The 1937 ordinance and the 1928-1966 ordinances were amended from time to time by the House of
Assembly in pursuance of the powers conferred by the Papua New Guinea Act 1949-1966. The
Mining Act Ch.195, which was recently replaced by the Mining Act 1992, consolidated the Mining
Act 1928-1966. W e have seen the history of petroleum ordinances in chapter two, so there is no
need to include that here.
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U p o n independence, the State of P N G inherited those resources property rights
from the colonial government or the Crown. Section 248 of the Constitution provides that:
"All property that was, immediately before Independence Day, vested in the body corporate
at that time k n o w n as 'The Government of Papua N e w Guinea' is, on that day, vested in
Papua N e w Guinea, and all rights and liabilities.. .of that body immediately before that day
are, on that day, rights and liabilities of Papua N e w Guinea."

Even if section 248 was absent, there is another instance in the Constitution which
confers a general right over natural resources in the State. This is found in section 2 (2) of
the Constitution, which declares that the State has permanent sovereignty over natural
resources within its territory.

That provision states that the sovereignty is, and shall

remain, absolute, subject only to international law obligations that are freely accepted by
P N G in accordance with the Constitution. The Constitutional Planning Committee ( C P C )
explained that this provision was m a d e to emphasise P N G ' s right to exercise effective
control over its resources and their exploitation as a free and sovereign nation.16
Some prominent lawyers in PNG interpret this provision as giving the State
absolute power (subject to international obligations freely accepted by P N G ) to legislate on
the natural resources in the country. But the views differ on whether this confers
proprietary rights in the resources or whether it is merely a declaration of the power to
legislate. In Peter Donigi's view, this provision does not give proprietary rights, but
18

"political sovereignty or the power to legislate only." O n the contrary, P o s m a n Kjsakiu
argues that it "was in exercise of that absolute power that the State through its legislative
arm decided under the ...Petroleum Act that ownership be vested in itself."19 Donigi
agrees, but in his opinion the petroleum and mining acts do not comply with s o m e

Constitution, section 2 (1), defines the territory of P N G .
CPC Report, chapter. 15, at p.3, cited in Brian Brunton and Duncan Colquhoun-Kerr, The Annotated
Constitution of Papua New Guinea (Waigani: U P N G Press, 1984) p.29.
Peter Donigi and Posman Kisakiu are two prominent lawyers who have debated openly on this issue
in
the media.
I8

Peter Donigi, Indigenous or Aboriginal Rights to Property: A Papua New Guinea Perspective
(Utrecht, The Netherlands: International Books, 1994) p.37.
Posman Kisakiu, "Resources and the Future of Customary Land in PNG" [April - June 1993] PNG
Resources Reporting on PNG's Petroleum, Mineral and Forestry Industries 75.
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constitutional requirements, and to the extent that they are inconsistent with the
20

Constitution, they are null and void.
The third source of legal authority for State ownership is found in the respective
mining and petroleum legislation. Section 5 (1) of the Petroleum Act Ch.198 states that
"...all petroleum and helium at or below the surface of any land is, and shall be deemed at
all times to have been, the property of the State." Likewise, section 5 (1) of the Mining Act
1992 provides: "All minerals existing on, in or below the surface of any land in Papua
N e w Guinea, including any minerals contained in any water lying on any land in Papua
N e w Guinea, are the property of the State."

Were the property rights in these resources inherited from the colonial government
under section 248, or were they acquired by those respective legislation enacted in exercise
of the State's sovereignty over natural resources under section 2 (2) of the Constitution!
After reviewing the history of mining and petroleum legislation in P N G in Peter Donigi v.
91

The State, B r o w n J. appears to hold the view that the State inherited property rights in
resources from the colonial government. Although this is not clear, it is inferred from his
statement that: "The actions then of all persons corporations and the State vitally interested
in mining whether gold or petroleum have been predicated by this continuing expression of
99

ownership in the State." W h e n he said this continuing expression of ownership, His
Honour was presumably referring to the 1907 mining ordinance and the 1911 petroleum
ordinance in Papua, and the 1922 ordinance in N e w Guinea, up to the present time.
O'Regan, Q C , supports this view. H e argues that although the post-independence mining
and petroleum legislation "purport to vest mineral and petroleum rights in the State they do
not do so. That had been done long before Independence in both Papua and N e w Guinea.
The sections [i.e. section 5 of both legislation] merely declare what has been the law for
many years."

If this interpretation is accepted, then the view that the State acquired ownership in
minerals and petroleum by legislation enacted pursuant to section 2 (2) of the Constitution
20

Above, n 18. W e shall examine more on this argument later.
21

22

Donigi v. PNG NCI00, at p.8.
Ibid.

23

O'Regan, above n9, at p. 144.
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m a y be weakened. This is because the vesting sections of the post-independence
legislation do not, in fact, vest minerals and petroleum rights in the State, but merely
declare what has been the law since the colonial days. In other words, the State used its
power under section 2 (2) to merely declare property rights that had already devolved to it
under section 248, as opposed to acquiring them in exercise of that power.

Further, the interpretation may also confict with the purpose and operation of the
Laws Repeal Act 1975, enacted by the pre-independence House of Assembly, which
repealed all pre-independence legislation. If the Laws Repeal Act, indeed, repealed all preindependence mining and petroleum legislation, h o w then can one contemplate that the preindependence legislation nevertheless continued!

This question can be dealt with by referring to the constitutional arrangements in
regard to pre-independence legislation. The repealed legislation were adopted and reenacted as Acts of the National Parliament by operation of section 20 (2) and (3), and
Schedule 2.6 of the Constitution.

So, it can be argued that, in as far as the pre-

independence mining and petroleum legislation were adopted, ownership vested in the
colonial government devolved to the Independent P N G State, and in as far as those
repealed legislation were re-enacted, the Independent State acquired ownership in exercise
of its power under section 2 (2) of the Constitution.
In any case, it is clear that the current Mining Act 1992 and the Petroleum Act vest
property in minerals and petroleum in the territory of P N G in the State. O n the balance of
legislative authority cited above that supports the view that ownership is vested in the State,
I concur with that view.

III. POLICY JUSTIFICATION FOR STATE OWNERSHIP
Three justifications are given for the State's ownership of minerals and petroleum.
The first reason is that, as the State is a corporate entity of the people of P N G , it is proper
that these resources are legitimately vested in itself to enable it to ensure equitable
distribution of benefits from their exploitation a m o n g every Papua N e w Guinean.

This

This issue will be explored further below.
See Ciarau O'Faircheallaigh, Mining and Development: Foreign Financed Mines in Australia,
Ireland, Papua New Guinea and Zambia (London: Croom Helm, 1984) p.220.
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policy was first raised by Henderson, Assistant Administrator for Economic Affairs, in the
pre-independence House of Assembly, w h e n responding to Paul Lapun's ( M H A )
presentation of the Bougainville landowners' demand for royalties and 40 percent of the
profit from the Bougainville mine (that was being developed) to be paid to them.
Henderson put it quite forcefully:
'Either the State owns the minerals or the private individual - there can be no
compromise... Once the principle of all the people owning the minerals is
compromised, there will be trouble... W e have done everything possible to protect
his (the owner's) rights but the minerals in this country belong to all the people.
They do not belong, nor should they belong, to the owner of the land - to a person
w h o has a good fortune to be sitting on top of a mineral.'
It appears that that policy has been incorporated into the second National Goal and
Directive Principle ( N G D P ) set out in the preamble to the Constitution. Goal 2 (3)
specifically directs that "every effort [must]...be made to achieve an equitable distribution
of incomes and other benefits of development a m o n g individuals and throughout the
various parts of the country..."
The second justification is that by owning these resources, the State can ensure that
exploration and exploitation of minerals and petroleum are carried out in a manner
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consistent with national economic development objectives. If it is owned by the
customary landowners, the State m a y not have the power to do that. For instance, the
government's desire for rapid development of backward areas by making resources
available through resources exploitation, the paramount reason for encouraging rapid
exploitation of resources in P N G , would be seriously constrained. Since customary
landowners represent sectoral interest and not national interest, it is proper that these
resources are owned by the people of P N G under the custodianship of the State, their
corporate entity.
The third justification is that minerals and petroleum are regarded as national
resources under the control of national governments in almost all countries of the world.

House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 1., No. 9, pp. 1503-4, quoted in R. Bedford and A. M a m a k ,
Compensation for Development: The Bougainville Case (Christchureh: University of Canterbury,
N Z , 1977) p. 15.
It was argued in the pre-independence House of Assembly that "every dollar of mineral revenue would
be needed by Port Moresby to finance the economic development of the Territory as a whole." See
O'Faircheallaigh, above n25, at p.220. This same argument is maintained even today.
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There m a y be exceptions in the U S and Canada, but the current trend is for the federal
governments of those countries to claim ownership to these resources in offshore areas and
public lands. Because these resources, particularly petroleum, are strategic resources, it
would not be in the best interest of a nation to leave them in the hands of its private citizens.
It is in line with this international trend that these resources are owned by the State.

IV. CHALLENGES TO THE STATE'S OWNERSHIP
The challenge to the State's ownership arises from the dual land ownership under
the legal system in P N G , and from dissatisfaction with government distribution of benefits
28

from mining and petroleum projects. The legal system in P N G recognises customary
ownership of land. This ownership is governed by customary rules and norms.
Customary land accounts for 99 percent of the land in P N G . 2 9 Therefore, it is not
surprising that most, if not all, of the mining and petroleum projects are being undertaken
on customary land. Customary concepts of land conflict with the Anglo-Australian (or
introduced) concepts of land. The ownership controversy arises from this fundamental
difference. Legal actions to challenge the State's ownership in the courts arose during the
latter part of the 1980s as a result of dissatisfaction with the government's distribution of
benefits to customary landowners. This will be examined in the second part of this section.
In the first part, w e examine the fundamental differences between the introduced concepts
of land and that under customary law, because this will help us to appreciate the customary
landowners' arguments.
There are four fundamental differences between the introduced concept of land and
land as embraced under customary law. Under the introduced law, first, land can be
owned by individuals. Second, land is a capital asset or a commodity, so the individual
can easily deal with it. Third, separate rights and titles can be created, and as a result, it is
possible for different individuals to o w n separate rights in the same piece of land.

Some

28

In P N G , the "alienated land", i.e. land owned by the State, is governed by legislation based on the
Anglo-Australian legal system; customary land or "unalienated land", is governed by custom.
29

The often quoted figure of 9 7 % based on the Commission of Inquiry Into Land Matters ( P N G 1973:
17, 45) is now said to be either an overestimation or out of date. In 1991, it was estimated that 9 9 %
is customary land: see Peter Lamour, ed., Customary Land Tenure: Registration and
Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea (National Research Institute (NRI) Monograph No.29)
(Waigani: NRI, 1991) at p.l.
In relation to the number of interests which can be carved out from land under the c o m m o n law, see
Avner Offer, Property and Politics 1870 - 1914: Landownership, Law, Ideology and Urban
Development in England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p.4.
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good examples are strata titles, C r o w n ownership of silver and gold, and, nowadays, State
ownership of all precious mineral and petroleum resources while the surface m a y be owned
by someone else.

Fourth, the definition and nature of land is viewed differently. For

instance, because land is an economic asset, it can be valued in terms of money, whereas
under customary law, this m a y not be possible.

Customary law, on the other hand, cuts right across these fundamental concepts.
First, land is owned by clans and not individuals. "Customary land is owned by a political
grouping such as a clan or a tribe."" While ownership is vested in the clan, individuals
have usufractuary (use) rights to grow food crops, hunt and fish and build houses.
Although trees and gardens planted by an individual are exclusively owned by him, every
clan m e m b e r has equal rights to collect nuts, fish and hunt, fetch water, or select sites to
build houses on communal land. This was correctly described by Hogbin in the following
words:
Every person...has the same rights as the other residents of his district - they all
hunt there and take the ochre, all seek the fruit and the berries, and all cut such trees
and plants as are from time to time needed. But although the growing trees are
c o m m o n property, a person w h o fells one establishes an individual claim...In the
same way, fruit after it is gathered and ochre w h e n extracted are personal
possessions. Those w h o take part in a hunting expedition share the meat among
themselves, but pigs not yet speared are the potential property of the future
expeditions.
Gardens and other property on land owned by different individuals may be
demarcated by target plants, drains, rocks, creeks and rivers or such other natural

Under custom, individual rights exist, but that is in as far as use rights is concerned; no separate
individual rights to the soil and minerals exist. H e who owns the soil owns what is beneath the
soil.
John Nonggorr, "Resolving Conflict in Customary Law and Western Law in Natural Resources
Development in Papua N e w Guinea" (1993) 16 (2) UNSW Law Journal 433, at p.437.
Ian Hogbin, in Ian Hogbin and Peter Lawrence, Studies in New Guinea Land Tenure (Sydney:
Sydney University Press, 1967) p.7.
In the Nipa, Mendi and Margarima districts (SHP), this is common.
This is common in the Tari, Komo and Koroba districts of SHP.
This is common in the Poroma and Nembi Plateau areas of SHP.
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features. Likewise, clan or tribal boundaries are clearly marked by natural features, such as
"crest of ridges, pathways, boulders, and ficus and other tall trees."37

Secondly, land is not an asset which can be valued in terms of money and
transferred. A potential buyer cannot deal with an individual clan m e m b e r or clan because
ownership is not vested in an individual but in the clan or tribe. N o individual can claim to
have the mandate of the clan or tribe to dispose of their tribal land. It is not like a
corporation under the introduced legal system, where the directors or managers of the
corporation are e m p o w e r e d to deal with the company's assets on behalf of the
shareholders. Customary law does not empower anyone, even the chief or leader of the
clan, to deal with land. Simply put, land is not transferable, or land is not a marketable
commodity.

Also, land cannot be transferred because the clan holds it in trust for future

generations.

Thirdly, separate property rights and titles cannot be carved out of the same land to
be owned by different individuals. This means that minerals and petroleum cannot be
separated from the rest of the land. This is w h y the Bougainvilleans found it hard to
"understand w h y minerals under their land should belong to the Administration..."40
Because of this fundamental difference, the Bougainvilleans kept opposing the
development of the Panguna mine, and a frustrated official was led to comment: '"No
amount of talking and reasoning on any subject whatsoever, will alter their thinking and
therein lies the basic problem. Once a decision is made by the people nothing no matter
h o w sound, sane and logical will be listened to, and unsound, insane and illogical
reasoning on their part will be used to defend their decision.'"

But to the customary

landowners, the concept of separate ownership of land from the minerals and petroleum is
insane, unsound or illogical, but the official failed to understand that.

Hogbin, above n33, at p. 18.
See G. M. S. Muroa, "Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights: A Papua New Guinea Experience" in
J. Aleck and Rannells eds., Custom at the Crossroads (Waigani: Law Faculty, U P N G , 1995) 81, at
p.82.
See Nonggorr, above n32, at p.437.
O'Faircheallaigh, above n25, at p.226.
Quoted in Bedford and Mamak, above n26, at p.21.
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Finally, the definition and nature of land is very different from that understood
under the introduced legal system. Land has social, spiritual and religious significance and
is bound up in the very existence and survival of Papua N e w Guinean societies. It is an
integral part of the people's culture. "[L]and is the heart of the well being and lifeblood of
J9

Papua N e w Guineans." W h e n s o m e N e w Irelanders were asked what land means to
them, they replied: "Land to us is very special. Our connection with land is somewhat
spiritual and natural. It is our most valuable asset; everyone owns land, uses it, eats out of
it, and is buried in it upon death. This relationship is neither individualistic nor really
materialistic. W e have an interest in anything found on or associated with the land. Land
to us means survival. It is our life."

A similar view of land which is often quoted is in

the following words:
Land is our life. Land is our physical life - food and sustenance. Land is our social
life; it is marriage; it is status; it is security; it is politics, in fact it is our only world.
W h e n you (foreigners) take our land, you cut away the very heart of our existence.
W e have little or no experience of social survival detached from the land. For us to
be completely landless is a nightmare which no dollar in the pocket or dollar in the
bank will allay; w e are a threatened people.
On the basis of the forgoing customary principles of land tenure, customary
landowners have challenged the State's title in minerals and petroleum since the inception
of the Bougainville copper mine. Since Bougainville was the first major mining project,
the Bougainville customary landowners were the first to challenge the State's ownership.
W h e n the Guava people of the Panguna area objected to the application for a prospecting
authority by C R A (the Australian subsidiary of Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation (RTZ)), and the
right of the Administration to grant the prospecting authority, the Mining Warden explained
that the mining legislation vested ownership of minerals in the Administration. The Guavas
denied the validity of the Administration's claim. Even a national m e m b e r in the House of
Assembly questioned w h y Papua N e w Guinea should "slavishly follow the customs of
other countries" to claim that what is on top belongs to the landowner and what is beneath
the Administration's.45 Despite their objections, C R A ' s application was successful.
42

John Waiko (MP), Land: Customary Ownership Control in Papua New Guinea and Australia
(Pacific Studies Monograph No. 18) (Sydney: Centre for South Pacific Studies, 1995) p.2.
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Sios Naibuka reported this from his interview with the N e w Ireland people of Sursurunga,
Tangalamet and East and West Papatar, in Richard Scaglion ed., Customary Law in Papua New
Guinea: A Melanesian View (Law Reform Commission Monograph No.2) (Port Moresby: L a w
Reform Commission, 1983) p.75.
44

Quoted from Waiko, above n42, at pp.2-3.
45

Bedford and M a m a k , above n26, at p. 14.
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The protest against the Administration's ownership continued. W h e n C R A ' s
prospecting authority was due for renewal, the Warden's Court conducted hearings in
several villages. In one of the hearings, it is reported that the people were totally against
CRA's activities. "Emphatic statements were made such as: '...we desire C R A to cease
their operations at once, in fact, this week...' and T claim to express the views of the
people, I do not want C R A to go on ... I would like you n o w to take a vote.'"47 But the
landowners knew that their protests were disregarded by C R A and the Administration, and,
thus, the Mine Warden's hearings were a waste of time. C R A was going to get what it
48

wanted irrespective of their wishes.
Frustrated by the blatant refusal of the Warden's Court and the Administration to
give due consideration to the protests, a group of landowners from Musinau w h o had
hunting rights in the prospecting area came upon the exploration camp and pulled it down.
The Administration responded by sending police to the area. Relationships between the
landowners and the Administration rapidly deteriorated.49 Landowners denied C R A
employees access to their land.

To ease the tension between the landowners, on the one hand, and the
Administration and the C R A , on the other, two company geologists submitted to the
Administration in Port Moresby to pay monetary compensation to the people for minerals
removed from their land.
to the Mining

Ordinance

In the June 1966 sitting of the House of Assembly, amendment
1928-1966 was made.

The amendment reasserted the

Administration's ownership and provided for the payment of $1.00 per acre per annum to
landowners affected by mining activities.

A n d a surface land use compensation regime

O'Faircheallaigh, above n25, atp.218.
Quoted in Bedford and Mamak, above n26, at p. 16.
48

Id., atp.18.

49

O'Faircheallaigh, above n25, at p.219.
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Id., p.220.

See Phillips' account in "Notes on Contact with Bougainvilleans in the Early Exploration Phase,
1964-1966", reproduced in Bedford and M a m a k , above n26, at pp. 151-160.
52

This amendment is contained in Bedford and M a m a k as Appendix 1.2.
See O'Faircheallaigh, above n25, at p.220.
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was also introduced."

This included five percent per annum of the unimproved value of

land to be paid to customary owners as occupation fees.55 Mr. Lapun, m e m b e r for South
Bougainville in the House of Assembly, argued for 20 percent of the mineral royalty and
40 percent of profits from the mine to be paid to the landowners. The Administration
argued that it would defeat the concept of State ownership of minerals and petroleum if
royalties were paid to customary landowners. Further, it was argued that payment of
compensation for surface rights and occupation fees would ensure that landowners were
not disadvantaged. M r . Lapun reduced his demand to five percent royalty, but this was
also defeated. But by November, trouble with landowners and the Administration and
company employees had escalated, so, in an effort to solve the stalemate, M r . Lapun reintroduced his five percent royalty proposal again. Again, the Administration refused, but
this time a number of members of the House were convinced that something had to be done
to settle the dispute, so they passed Lapun's amendment.56
Although various types of compensation and monetary benefits were paid to the
landowners, no amount of m o n e y could alter the people's thinking that land is not
alienable, or separable, from the minerals that lie beneath.

W h e n young generations led

by Francis O n a took over the leadership of the landowners' association, he demanded for a
massive K 1 0 billion compensation from the State. Although it is arguable that there were
other motives for this demand, one obvious reason is that this was an indirect w a y of
saying that land cannot be measured in terms of money because neither the P N G State nor
B C L would be prepared to pay this amount.
Despite this continuous challenge by customary landowners, the State always
maintained its justification for ownership of minerals and petroleum. In response to the

Mining Ordinance 1928-1966, section 53, provided: "(1) Compensation in respect of prospecting or
mining on private land shall be assessed in relation to the following matters:
(a) damage to the surface and improvements on the surface, including crops and economic trees;
(b) severance of the land from other land of the owner;
(c) loss of surface rights of way; and
(d) all consequential damage."
Mining Ordinance 1928-1966, sections 2 and 116B.
This account is detailed in O'Faircheallaigh, above n25, at p.221.
For an account of the various types and amount of compensation paid to landowners, see the
Appendixes in Bedford and M a m a k , above n26. Lapun's amendment was inserted as section 6 1 A A ,
Mining Ordinance 1928-1966.
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State's justification that it owns the minerals for equitable distribution a m o n g every Papua
N e w Guineans, the Bougainvilleans felt that they were being sacrificed to enrich others.
O'Faircheallaigh wrote of this as follows:58
They certainly had no loyalty to 'Papua New Guinea', and felt that revenue
generated by their cocoa and copra industries was already being used for the benefit
of other Papua N e w Guineans, while they themselves received little or nothing
from Port Moresby. Bougainvilleans simply could not understand w h y they should
make sacrifices so that others might reap the benefits.
There is some element of truth in this. Other Papua New Guineans who host
mining and petroleum projects continue to challenge State title in these resources because
the justification for State ownership, in particular, the equitable distribution policy, does
not appear to work in practice. It can be discerned from letters, opinions and statements, as
seen in chapter one, that there is a general resentment against State ownership of minerals
and petroleum, because to the customary landowners, they are making sacrifices for the
benefit of foreign companies and a few nationals, including politicians, w h o are in
positions of influence.59 In fact, it was this feeling, a m o n g other reasons, which led to the
court actions in the late 1980s which w e turn to n o w to examine.60
The first three court actions in the National Court and the Supreme Court were
taken, beginning in 1990, by Peter Donigi, w h o w a s then President of the P N G L a w
Society. In the first action in the National Court, Peter Donigi v. The State, the applicant
sought, as a customary landowner, declarations that the provisions of the mining and
petroleum legislation which vested ownership of minerals and petroleum in the State
amounted to deprivation of his property rights guaranteed under section 53 of the
Constitution and, hence, the question should be referred to the Supreme Court for
determination. That action failed on the ground, a m o n g others, that the plaintiff had no
known minerals and petroleum under his customary land, and, as such, he had no locus
standi.
CO

O'Faircheallaigh, above n25, at p.223.
For the benefits landowners are entitled to under the mining and petroleum regime, see K.
Ongwamuhana, "Ownership of Minerals in Papua N e w Guinea" [June 1991] Law Tok 37, at pp.3941.
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Id., at p.39.
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N108, O S No.207 of 1990, presided by Brown J.
Ibid., see p.2.
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The second attempt was made again in the National Court in Peter Dickson Donigi
v. Base Resources Limited.6* The facts of that case were that the applicant was entitled to
1.67 percent direct interest in a petroleum prospecting licence granted to Base Resources
Ltd. Base Resources Ltd agreed to transfer 10 percent interest in that licence to P N G
Petroleum Exploration Ltd, a company in which the applicant's family company, W i a n Pty
Ltd, was entitled to one sixth of the issued capital. Base Resources Ltd refused to transfer
the 10 percent interest in the licence to P N G Petroleum Exploration Ltd as agreed. The
applicant claimed that this amounted to unjust deprivation of private property protected
under section 53 of the Constitution and applied to have the Court enforce his rights
pursuant to section 57 6 4 of the Constitution. The Court dismissed the action on the ground,
among others, that the facts did not disclose the taking of his property by the State and,
thus, the action was ill conceived.
In the third action in Peter Dickson Donigi v. Base Resources Limited, the
applicant applied to the Supreme Court under section 55 (2) (b) of the Constitution for a
review of the National Court decision on his second action above.

The Supreme Court

dismissed this action on grounds that, first, the application was time barred, and, secondly,
no cogent or special circumstance existed to warrant the Court's using its discretionary
_. ,

68

power to grant leave to review.

V. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST STATE OWNERSHIP
The crucial issues raised by the above cases, which the courts could have
determined are:

The National Court Decision was handed down on 18 November 1991 and this is referred to in
Donigi v. Base Resources Ltd. [1992] P N G L R 110.
Section 57 of the Constitution provides for enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms under the
Constitution.
It was a private contract between the applicant and the defendant, and not a case of compulsory
acquisition of the applicant's property, which would come under the ambit of section 53.
[1992] PNGLR 110.
Section 55 (2) (b) provides that the Supreme Court has an inherent power to review decisions of the
National Court.
See n66, headnote, p. 111.
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1. whether under customary law, the customary landowner has ownership over
the whole of his land, including any minerals and petroleum found on or under
his land;
2. if the customary landowner is found to o w n minerals and petroleum, whether
that was lost upon the enactment of the 1907 and 1911 mining and petroleum
ordinances in Papua and the 1922 ordinance in N e w Guinea;
3. assuming that the customary landowner was divested of his minerals and
petroleum on or beneath his land under those ordinances, whether the adopted
pre-independence legislation are subject to the Constitution;
4. if the pre-independence adopted laws are subject to the Constitution, does
section 53 apply to pre-independence acquisitions?
5. whether section 53 of the Constitution applies to "deemed" acquisitions, like
those under mining and petroleum legislation; and
6. if section 38 of the Constitution applies to section 53, whether the vesting
provisions of the mining and petroleum legislation can be struck down.
Customary landowners claim that, by ownership of the surface, they own also the
natural resources on and below the surface.

This principle is analogous to the c o m m o n

law m a x i m cujus est solum ejus est uque ad coelum et ad inferous. They also assert rights
71

to marine and riverine resources. A m o n g others, the sea and waters provide fish and
valuable shells. The marine resources are exploited for domestic and commercial
79

purposes. Land provides forests for timber, areas for gardening, bush for hunting and
resources of medicinal and religious significance. Where there are oil seeps, they are put
to various uses, like body decoration and treatment of skin diseases.
69

70

71
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Where there is gold,

See Powes Parkop, "Customary Rights and the Forestry Act 1991" in Aleck and Rannells, above
n38, p.108.
In the light of the High Court decision in Geita Sebea v. The Territory of Papua (1941) 67 C L R
544, and Schedule 2.2 of the Constitution, it is possible to rely on this c o m m o n law principle as
well.
See Yoli Tom'tavala, "The Impact of Introduced L a w on Customary Marine Tenures in Papua N e w
Guinea" in Aleck and Rannells, above n38, at p.121.
Ibid.
For the various uses of natural resources and rights asserted, see Scaglion, above n43.
See chapter two. See also I. Hughes, " N e w Guinea Stone Age Trade: The Geography of Trade in the
Interior" in Terra Australia (Canberra: Department of Prehistory, Research School of Pacific Studies,
A N U , 1977) vol.3, p.106 at p.l 11, as cited in K Ongwamuhana and A. Regan, "Ownership of
Minerals and Petroleum In Papua N e w Guinea: The Genesis and the Nature of the Legal
Controversy (1991) 7 QUTU
109, at p.l 19.
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it is panned or mined for commercial purposes.

These rights have been asserted since

time immemorial. Since the Constitution recognises customary law as one of the sources
of laws of PNG, it, in so doing sanctions these customary rights over natural resources.77

Moreover, customary law finds its validity by virtue of its wide application and acceptanc
by 70-80 percent of the people who live in the rural areas and who own 99 percent of the
78

land and natural resources.
Against this argument, three arguments are advanced. First, some people are of the
view that customary landowners did not own minerals and petroleum because they were

not aware of their existence and commercial significance, and, further, that the concept o
land did not include minerals and petroleum until recent times. As Ongwamuhana and
Regan pointed out:
There is a view in PNG, fairly widely accepted within the mining industry, that
dismisses the customary landowners' claim to ownership of minerals as absurd on
the ground that local people did not k n o w about minerals before contact with
Europeans in very recent times. It is argued that the conception of 'land' in
traditional societies is limited to the surface which is used for farming, hunting and
gathering, fishing and burial. This concept of land does not extend to an interest in
sub-surface elements.
But there is overwhelming evidence which does not support this view. Ongwamuhana and
Regan quote extensively from Hughes and Burton80 that highlanders extracted oil and sunk
mines for minerals.
A study cited by Hughes suggests all known accessible occurrences of suitable rock
in the central highlands were quarried, and hence that 'the primitive miners were
aided by efficient prospectors'. Extraction techniques ranged from the very simple
to the highly sophisticated. Examples of the former include : use of bamboo
dippers to gather mineral water for salt production, use of a feather to soak oil from

For example, Mt. Kare and other alluvial mining in various places in the country.
B. W. Morse, "Common Roots But Different Evolutions: The Development of Aboriginal Rights at
C o m m o n L a w in Australia, Asia and North America" (1984) 12 Melanesian Law Journal 49.
Constitution, section 9 and Schedule 2.1.
John Nonggorr, "The Development of an 'Indigenous Jurisprudence' in Papua New Guinea: The
Past Record and Future Prospects" in Aleck and Rannells eds., above n38, p.68, at p.77.
Ongwamuhana and Regan, above n74, at p.l 18.
Burton, above n8.
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the surface of water, and 'scraping' lenses of metallic pigment from between other
strata of rock using fingers and bamboo spatula. The most sophisticated extraction
techniques were used to extract stone. Research by archaeologist John Burton
indicates that at the T u m a n quarries in Western Highlands, galleries (the so called
'room-and-pillar' technique) were used. At D o m in Simbu Province, shafts as deep
as 20 metres were sunk through soft rock to provide access to the seams of hard
rock required for access; cross braces were used to keep the walls apart and the
base of the shaft was gradually extended to 10 to 15 square metres.
Even without these reports, based on m y personal knowledge, our people have
used these resources since time immemorial. 82 Therefore it "is a misconception to start
from the premise that because Papua N e w Guineans did not k n o w h o w to mine minerals to
produce iron and steel, or carry out large scale mining operations, therefore they did not
'own' the mineral below the surface of land of which they were undoubtedly recognised to
be the owners."

Moreover, the nature of customary law is such that even if the question as to who
owned minerals and petroleum resources was left unanswered before, it is, nevertheless,
capable of deciding it as it arises now. In other words, because customary law has never
said anything on ownership of these resources, it does not m e a n that there was no
customary law applicable to it. This characteristic of custom was neatly described by Sack
as follows:

Id, at p. 119.
In saying this I fully subscribe to Peter Donigi's views in his book, above nl8, at pp.17-18, that:
"Foreigners who come to my country do so with a preconceived idea about my history which was
written by a foreigner. They then promote that idea as the truth and are not prepared to listen to
what I have to say. They change the burden of proof and place it on m e to prove the contrary to
what has been written by a foreigner. W h y do I have to bear the burden of proof?
If a foreigner wants to defend the written work of a foreigner, he must bear the burden of
disproving m y history according to m e . M a n y a time I hear foreign lawyers and mining company
officials put forward this question: H o w do you establish the given law of a given people in
Papua N e w Guinea? I do not k n o w the purpose of this question. I a m truly flabbergasted and
confounded by that question. A m I obliged to answer it just to please some foreigners' egostical
sense of righteousness? All I k n o w is that I know the customary law of m y people. The
foreigners m a k e it appear difficult in order to justify a foreigner making a complete study possibly financed by an Aid Donor or the World Bank - to identify the customary law in respect to
a particular issue at stake. It appears m y word alone cannot be accepted, by the courts of our land.
Yet w h o determines and applies customary law in every day situations?"
Haynes, above nlO, at p.70.
Peter Sack, Land Between Two Laws (Canberra: ANU, 1973) p.20. The author uses the phrase
"primitive law" to denote customary law, but I use custom because it is more neutral than primitive
law.
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[Custom] being an open system, it cannot be argued that no rights to rock outcrops
and patches of poor soil exist because the traditional law said nothing about them
(as could probably be argued in Western law). Although not yet defined, these
rights will be defined w h e n their existence becomes a practical issue. This
definition does not create n e w rights; they existed all the time, only in latent form.
[Custom] is all embracing as Western law, but whereas Western law is all active
law, [custom] comprises active as well as dormant law. It needs neither legislation
nor the help of judges to activate dormant areas, though it pays for this flexibility
with a - for Western lawyers - confusing lack of definiteness.
O n the foregoing basis, I think a court would be persuaded to find that customary
landowners had a legitimate title in minerals and petroleum before they were divested by
legislation.

The second argument is that property rights under custom were ceded to the
imperial powers upon annexation of Papua New Guinea. This is based on the assumption
that once a territory was annexed by Great Britain (whether by cession, settlement,
occupation or conquest) the common law feudal principles applied and the Crown assumed
the radical title to the land. Therefore, any customary property rights in minerals and
petroleum were extinguished at the time of annexation. But the legal history of Papua
cannot support that argument. When Commodore Erskine made his famous proclamation

over Papua as a British Protectorate in 1884, it is undoubtedly clear that the purpose was
.. .for the protection of lives and properties of the native inhabitants of New Guinea
and for the purpose of preventing the occupation of portions of that country by
persons whose proceedings, unsanctioned by any unlawful authority, might tend to
injustice, strife and bloodshed, and who, under the pretense of legitimate trade and
intercourse, might endanger the liberties and possess themselves of the lands of
such native inhabitants...
On the legal effect of Erskine's proclamation, Professor James has argued that the

annexation of Papua gave the Crown political sovereignty and not proprietary rights to the
87

land.

This argument appears to be cogent because the array of colonial land legislation
See John Mugambwa, "Land Disputes in P N G : A Colonial Legacy and Post Independence
Solutions" (1987) 15 Melanesian Law Journal 94, at p.95.
New Guinea Collection, UPNG, "The History of Papua New Guinea, Commodore Erskine's
Proclamation", published in a Supplement to the Queensland Government Gazette on 23 December
1884, quoted in Peter Donigi, above nl8, at pp.21-22.
R. W. James, Land Law and Policy in Papua New Guinea (Law Reform Commission Monograph
No.5) (Port Moresby: P N G L a w Reform Commission, 1985) at p.65. For similar views see also
the Nigerian case of Amodu Tijani v. Secretary for Southern Nigeria (1921) 2 A.C. 399.
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shows that customary property rights were well respected and protected.

In respect of

N e w Guinea, the position is no different. The Germans, "...like the British, chose to
preserve the land rights of the inhabitants of N e w Guinea."89 W h e n Australia took over the
administration, the status quo was preserved. The Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance
1921 expressly provided that customary law was to form a part of the N e w Guinea legal
system.90 The colonial practice of protecting customary land rights was not extinguished
upon independence, but, rather, entrenched in the Constitution and various legislation.91
O n the forgoing basis, it is submitted that customary rights to resources were not ceded to
the Crown or the Administration by reason of the annexations.

The third argument is that customary landowners, indeed, had legitimate claim to
minerals and petroleum, but that was lost w h e n the first ordinances divesting them of their
ownership was promulgated. This point is bundled up with the second issue posed above,
so w e should consider them together. Since the colonial powers exercised ownership
rights, such as issuing exploration or prospecting permits, up until these ownership rights
were handed over to the Independent State without challenge, except the Panguna
landowners' disputes, it would appear that customary landowners lost their titles then.
Assuming this to be the case, can the basic rights provisions of the Constitution, under
which section 53 is found, be applied to those pre-independence legislation?
Section 53 is found under Division 3 - Basic Rights - of the Constitution. This
Division has four subdivisions.

Subdivision A - Introductory; Subdivision B -

This explains why 99% of the land in PNG is now under customary tenure, and only 1% has been
alienated.
89

M u g a m b w a , above n85, at p.97.
90

Section 10 of that Ordinance provided:
"The tribal institutions, customs and usages of the aboriginal natives of the Territory shall not be
affected by this Ordinance and shall, subject to the provision of the Ordinances of the Territory
from time to time in force, be permitted to continue in existence in so far as the same are not
repugnant to the general principles of humanity."
Even the earlier German laws recognised customary land rights and sought to purchase from the
landowners where land was required for public purposes like building a town, etc.
91

This is supported by Eric K w a , w h o made an exhaustive review of all the pre-independence and post
independence land legislations and the constitutional arrangements, and concluded that the legal
system in P N G recognises and protects land and property rights under custom: The Environmental
Law Aspects of Forestry Resource Development in Papua New Guinea: A Critique, Master of Laws
(Honours) Thesis, (Centre for Natural Resources L a w and Policy, L a w Faculty, Wollongong
University, 1994) p.21.
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Fundamental Rights; Subdivision C - Qualified Rights; and Subdivision D - Enforcement.
Subdivision C has three sections; General (ss.38-41); Rights of All Persons (ss.42-49);
and Special Rights of Citizens (ss.50-56). Essentially, section 53 provides that, subject to
section 54 (special provision in relation to certain lands), "...possession m a y not be
compulsorily taken of any property, and no interest in or right over property m a y be
92

compulsorily acquired...""" However, where property is required for a public purpose, or
for a reason that is justifiable in a democratic society having proper regard for the rights and
dignity of mankind, then it m a y be compulsorily taken in accordance with an Organic L a w
or an Act of the Parliament.

Further, property m a y not be compulsorily acquired unless

the necessity or the reason for the acquisition can be shown to justify the resultant hardship
of the owner. 4 W h e r e property is compulsorily acquired under all or any of these
provisos, then "just compensation must be m a d e on just terms by the expropriating
authority, giving full weight to the National Goals and Directive Principles and having due
regard to the national interest and to the expression of that interest by the Parliament, as
well as to the person affected."

O'Regan observes that because section 53 speaks only prospectively, it cannot
apply to compulsory acquisitions which occurred before Independence Day, i.e. 16
September 1975.

"In other words, in order to establish the invalidity under s.53 of a

provision of an Act of Parliament it is necessary to show that the provision did indeed
operate to deprive a citizen of property and did so after 16 September 1975."97 Brunton
and Colquhoun-Kerr prefer this view. In their The Annotated Constitution of Papua

New

Guinea, they reason that section 38 (2) "is best read as expressing the intention that the
rights guaranteed under the Constitution in Subdivision C can be restricted only by the
deliberate act of an absolute majority of the m e m b e r s of the post-independence
Parliament."98
Constitution, section 53 (1).
93

Id., section 53 (1) (a).
94

Id., section 53(1) (b).

Id., section 53 (2).
96

O'Regan, above n9, at p. 142.
97

Ibid.

98

Brian Brunton and Duncan Colquhoun-Kerr, The Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea
(Waigani: U P N G Press, 1984) p. 142.
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Val Haynes appears to support O'Regan's view.99 H e explores several reasons
why O'Regan's view could be correct. The first reason is based on the words in section 53
(1) (a), which provides that the public purpose or the justifiable reason for which the
property is required must be "so declared and so described, for the purposes of this
section, in an Organic L a w or an Act of the Parliament..." Since only Organic L a w s and
Acts of the Parliament passed on or after independence can fulfill this requirement,
especially as the words in italics indicate, it would be impossible100 to expect a preindependence legislation which w a s enacted before the Constitution to meet the
requirements of section 53. ' The second reason is that the pre-independence legislative
body was not k n o w n as "Parliament", and as such, Parliament refers only to the postindependence legislative body established by section 99 of the Constitution. Accordingly,
only laws passed by the Parliament are subject to section 53.102 But he also acknowledges
that this reason might conflict with the other constitutional provisions and judicial opinions
(below) that pre-independence laws were adopted as "Acts of the Parliament".103 The third
reason is based on a reading of section 53 (2), which provides: "Subject to this section,
just compensation must be m a d e on just terms, by the expropriating authority, giving full
weight to the National Goals and Directive Principles..." H e points out that the difficulty
with this provision is that it is not clear whether the "expropriating authority" is to give
weight to the National Goals and Directive Principles ( N G D P ) at the time the expropriation
takes place, the time when the decision to m a k e the compensation is made, or at the time of
making the compensation; or, alternatively, it is the courts which must have regard to the
N G D P . 1 0 4 H e then suggests that if it is the "expropriating authority" which must have
regards to the N G D P , then section 53 is prospective. However, if it is the Courts which
are to have regard to the N G D P , then the possibility that section 53 applies only
prospectively is eliminated.

At the end of his analysis, he said: "Although there is no

clear cut answer to the question whether Section 53 operates in respect of pre-independence
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101
102
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Ibid.
H e uses the m a x i m lex non cogit ad impossibilia, id., at p.60.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id, atp.61.
Ibid.
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legislation, it is submitted that the better view is that it does."106 This submission is well
supported by the Constitution itself and several judicial decisions.

Schedule 2.6 (2) of the Constitution emphatically declares: "Subject to any
Constitutional L a w , all pre-independence laws are, by virtue of this section, adopted as
Acts of the Parliament..." Likewise, as w e have seen earlier, section 20 (3) also states that
pre-independence statutes are adopted as Acts of the Parliament, as prescribed by Schedule
2. Further, section 10, which provides for rules of construction of the laws of P N G , states
that all written laws (other than the Constitution itself) must be construed subject to the
Constitution. It is obvious then that the Constitution speaks for itself, that all preindependence laws adopted by virtue of Schedule 2.6 must be subject to the same
constitutional requirements as are post-independence enactments, and construed subject to
the Constitution. The fact that the Parliament established by section 99 of the Constitution
existed only after independence also lends support. This interpretation has been followed
by the courts in a number of cases.
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In Peter v. South Pacific Brewery Limited, Frost C. J. stated: "it is clear that the
adopted laws are subject to the same constitutional limitations as an Act of Parliament..."
1 08

In Minister for Lands v. Frame,
Kapi J (as he then was) also stated that preindependence laws must be construed subject to the Constitution. Kapi J maintained this
position in Milan Capek v. The Yatch "Freja" [1980] P N G L R 57 at p.61. The opinion of
the Supreme Court in The Ship "Federal Huron " v. Ok Tedi Mining Limited

follows the

same view. The Court was clearly of the view that the pre-independence laws were
repealed and re-enacted by way of adoption by the Parliament of the Independent State,
and, as such, they no longer remained pre-independence laws.

Val Haynes m a d e the

following observations as to the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in the O k Tedi case
as regards the position of the adopted laws:
This emphasis on a 're-enactment by way of adoption' rather than a 'continuation'
supports the view that pre-independence laws are subject to screening by the

Peter v. South Pacific Brewery Limited [1976] P N G L R 537, at p.541.
Minister for Lands v. Frame [1980] P N G L R 433, at pp.454 and 465.
[1986] P N G L R 5.
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Constitution, in particular the basic rights provisions. If they were merely a
continuation, then they would more easily be deemed to comply with the
Constitution or it would be easier to hold that they did not need to comply with the
Constitution. If, however, they are 're-enacted' by the National Constitution, then
it is easier to find that they came into operation after the Constitution and are thus
subject to it, in particular, the basic rights provisions.111
The question we have just examined is whether pre-independence adopted laws are
subject to the Constitution; the above analysis affords an affirmative answer. This is quite
different from the fourth question, which w e posed earlier, that is, whether or not the preindependence acquisitions would be subject to the scrutiny of the Constitution, in
particular, the basic rights provisions. In other words, does section 53 apply to preindependence compulsory acquisitions?

Minister for Lands v. Frame is a case which supports the view that section 53 is
applicable to post-independence acquisitions which have been effected under preindependence enactments.

But as to whether section 53 applies to pre-independence

acquisitions under pre-independence laws has never been determined.113 The mineral and
petroleum ownership issue hangs on the determination of this issue, since acquisition of
them occurred before independence by pre-independence laws.
There are strong arguments that section 53 does not apply to pre-independence
acquisitions. O n e argument is that, since there are adequate regimes in place which deals
with pre-independence acquisitions, section 53 cannot be an alternative regime.

O n the

basis of the Commission of Inquiry Into Land Matters' recommendations, the Lands
Department drafted policy statements and legislation which were designed to remedy
grievances relating to acquisitions m a d e during the colonial era. ' The Land Registration
Act 1977 is such a regime, which is designed to register land which the Minister
compulsorily acquires for public purposes upon payment of adequate compensation.

Haynes, above nlO, at p.55.
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[1980] PNGLR 433, per Kapi J (as he then was). See also Haynes, id., at p.59.

Haynes, ibid.
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Id., atp.62.
See J. S. Fingleton, "Policy-Making on Lands" in J. A. Ballard ed., Policy-Making in a New State:
Papua New Guinea 1972-1977 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1981) pp.212 -237.
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Therefore, section 53 should only deal with post-independence acquisitions and not preindependence acquisitions.

Secondly, the National Court decision in png Ready Mixed Concrete Pty Ltd. v.
The State show that section 53 does not apply to pre-independence acquisitions. In
interpreting the application of section 53, which the National and Supreme Courts have
subsequently supported and upheld in several cases, Miles J at p.409 said:
The Constitution , s.53, carries the heading: 'Protection from unjust deprivation of
property'. The detailed provisions of the sections itself vary markedly from the
Recommendations of the Constitutional Planning Committee. However, Ch.5,
paras 85-91 of the Committee's Final Report (Part I) m a k e it clear that what the
Committee was concerned with was the limitation on the power of government to
distribute wealth by means of the compulsory acquisition of property from citizens.
In its final form in the legislation the provision as to acquisition of property was
widened to include forfeiture, extinction or determination of any rights or interest in
property. The key word is 'compulsorily' which I think implies the exercises of
some power conferred by Statute on the State or an instrumentality of State. In m y
view the section is not directed at the decision of the court which adjudicates,
declares or determines pre-existing rights. The word 'deprivation' in the heading
sheds further light to the subject. A person is not deprived of property unless he is
stripped of something to which he is entitled. The judgement of a court which
determines that a person's claim to be entitled to possession is not recognised at law
or is recognised only to a limited extent (for instance until the happening of some
supervening event such as a contrary claim by someone with a better right) does not
deprive a person of that interest. O n the other hand the powers exercisable under
legislation such as the Land Acquisition Act 1974 (to which the Constitutional
Planning Committee referred) do have the effect of stripping the landowner of the
land to which he is entitled, and of substituting that right to land with a right to
compensation. Thus it is that s.53 (2) provides for just compensation to be m a d e
by the appropriating authority.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mile J's decision was approved and affirmed.117 The png
Ready Mixed case was also approved and applied by the Supreme Court in Manus
Provincial Government v. Tarsicus Kasou.m The question referred to the Court in that
case was whether the Minister for Forest's declaration of a "Local Forest Area" upon
request by customary landowners for purposes of exploiting timber resources on their land
under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, amounts to compulsory acquisition and, thus, be

subject to the scrutiny of section 53. The Court stated that the Minister's declaration do

[1981] P N G L R 396.
117

png Ready Mixed Concrete Pty Ltd. v. The State [1984] PNGLR 74.
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[1990] PNGLR 3.
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not amount to compulsory acquisition.

Further, it would be quite inappropriate to

consider that an agent (the Minister) appointed under the Act is an expropriating authority
for the purposes of just compensation.120 H e merely makes the declarations upon request
by the forestry owners - the customary landowners. In the applications by Peter Donigi as
cited above, the courts also considered the National Court's interpretation of section 53 in
png Ready Mixed v. The State to be correct.

In the light of the decision in png Ready Mixed Pty Ltd. v. The State, section 53
does not apply to pre-independence acquisitions. Acquisition of minerals and petroleum
had occurred before independence and, thus, the State merely inherited those property
rights from its predecessor, pursuant to section 248 of the Constitution.

There is yet another reason which, in my opinion, would prevent the application of
section 53. The vesting provisions of the mining and petroleum legislation are deeming
provisions, which is quite different from provisions which can be said to "compulsorily
acquire" property. The words "minerals and petroleum shall be deemed always to have
been the property of the State" cannot be said to "compulsorily" acquire property in
minerals and petroleum. B y use of these words, the State has, pursuant to its permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, vested in itself all property rights to minerals and
petroleum. These vesting provisions are justifiable, taking into account the N G D P , in
particular, Goal 2 (3) which calls for equitable distribution of income from the exploitation
of our natural resources. Therefore, since the State is the corporate body of the customary
landowners, and for that matter, the people of Papua N e w Guinea, no taking of private
property has occurred. W h a t the State has done is to declare that the c o m m o n property of
clans and tribes in minerals and petroleum will be vested in their corporate entity - the State.
In other words, only a change in n a m e from "tribe" or "clan" to "the State" has occurred.
Instead of leaving ownership of these resources vested the "tribe" or "clan" which could
number in the hundreds, it w a s put under only one name, the "State". If it can be
established that individuals had title to these resources, then it is possible to argue that the
State had "compulsorily" acquired their property rights. But since no individual could
make private claim under custom to land and the resources in the wild, unless individually
claimed for immediate personal use, the State had merely declared the customary position in
a statutory form. The words "shall always be deemed to have been the property of the
119

SCR No.3 of 1990, at p.3.
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State" is a translation of the fact that property in minerals and petroleum had always been
the property of the clans or tribes. In m y view, that does not amount to compulsory
acquisition of private property.

Another constitutional challenge to State ownership is based on section 38 of the
Constitution. Section 38 (1) states that for the purposes of Subdivision C (see above), a
law that complies with the requirements of this section is a law that is m a d e and certified in
accordance with Subsection (2), and that regulates or restricts the exercise of a right or
freedom referred to in this Subdivision to the extent that the regulation or restriction is
necessary - taking account of the National Goals and Directive Principles and the Basic
Social Obligations, for the purpose of giving effect to the public interest in defence, or
public safety, or public order, or public welfare, or public health (including animal and
plant health), or the protection of children and persons under disability (whether legal or
practical), or the development of under-privileged or less advanced groups or areas, or in
order to protect the exercise of the rights and freedoms of others. O r it must be a law
which makes reasonable provision for cases where the exercise of one such right m a y
conflict with the exercise of another, to the extent that the law is reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society having proper respect for therightsand dignity of mankind. Section 38
(2) provides that for the purposes of Subsection (1), an enactment must (a) be expressed to
be a law that is m a d e for that purpose, (b) specify the right or freedom that it regulates or
restricts, and (c) be m a d e and certified by the Speaker in his certificate under section 110
(certification of making of laws) to have been m a d e by an absolute majority.
What section 38 purports to say is simply that, although the Parliament has plenary
power to m a k e laws which restrict or regulate any of the qualified rights guaranteed in the
Constitution, such a law must be necessary and reasonably justifiable, taking into account
the list of points it enumerates, and must also conform to the form requirements under
subsection (2). Those w h o contend that section 53 applies to the vesting provisions of the
mining and petroleum legislation argue that the vesting provisions are also in breach of
section 38 of the Constitution. In other words, the mining and petroleum legislation are
laws which seek to restrict or regulate private property rights protected under section 53,
and, as such, those legislation must meet the requirements of section 38. Since they fail to
meet these requirements, the vesting provisions must be struck down.
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Val Haynes submits that the provisions of section 38 do not apply to section 53 and
that the argument based on section 38 (2) is misconceived.121 Brunton and ColquhounKerr also submit that not all qualified rights, which include section 53, are subject to the
requirements of section 38.'

Their reason is that only those sections under the qualified

rights division which expressly refer to section 38 are subject to that section.123 Against
these arguments, there are both judicial and academic opinions which contend that section
38 applies to all the qualified rights provisions.124 In view of the judicial decisions, authors
of the Mining Act 1992 attempted to comply with the requirements of section 38 (2), but
the Petroleum Act has not been revised yet. If the Petroleum Act remains as it is without
amendments to comply with section 38 (2), it is m y view that it will not be struck d o w n ,
because I agree with the argument that section 38 does not apply to section 53. This is
because section 53 expressly states that it is to be applied subject to section 54, and only as
provided for under that section. It does not expressly refer to section 38, as other sections
under the qualified rights do. If this view is wrong and if the vesting provisions are struck
down, then Parliament can always a m e n d the Act to comply with the requirements of
section 38, and this will not in any w a y affect State title in minerals and petroleum.

VI. CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS ON THE ISSUE
Three developments on this issue can be discerned from the current state of affairs
in the resources industries. One, due to the deteriorating economic situation, as depicted in
chapter one, the ownership issue could be strengthened. Because of the lack of basic
public services, customary landowners are expecting to improve their living standards from
the exploitation of their resources by assuming control and ownership of them. If the
State's claim to these resources purports to prevent them or hinder them from getting their
expected riches from the resources developments, then it is likely that they would do
Haynes, above nlO, at p.64.
The other sections are: ss.40, validity of emergency laws; 41, proscribed acts; 42, liberty of the
person 50, right to vote and stand for public office; 53, protection from unjust deprivation of
property; 54, special provision in relation to certain lands; 55 equality of citizens; and 56 other
rights and privileges of citizens: see Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr, above n98, at p. 141.
123

Ibid.
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Reference No 1 of 1977 [1977] P N G L R 362 at p. 366 per Frost C J; Premdas v. The State [1979]
P N G L R 329 at p.357 per Saldanha J; J. Goldring, The Constitution of Papua New Guinea (Sydney:
The L a w Book Company, 1978) p.233; Ongwamuhana and Regan, above n74, at p. 121; K.
Ongwamuhana, "The Art of Legislating for the Constitution" in R. W . James and I. Fraser ed.,
Legal Issues in a Developing Country (Waigani: L a w Faculty, U P N G , 1992) p. 183.
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everything they can to assert their ownership. M y o w n observation of the Gobe land case
illustrates this point. W h e n a clan in the Erave area of Southern Highlands province was
rejected by the land mediators and the District Lands Court as the principal landowners of
the Gobe oil fields for purposes of compensation payment for surface use and rights, they
have threatened to challenge the State over its ownership of petroleum under their
customary land.12' It is not clear at this stage whether or not that course of action has been
taken.

The second development is that the State's positive response to customary
landowners' demands for more economic benefits from resources exploitation to flow to
them appears to have a "watering d o w n " effect on the issue. The customary landowners
are happy for any resources development which promises them roads, health centres,
community schools, business opportunities, and the like, to go ahead rather then to hold up
its progress by lengthy court battle over ownership of minerals and petroleum. This is
clearly noticeable in the mining and petroleum projects in Kutubu, Misima, Porgera, Lihir,
Gobe and Tolukuma. The customary landowners in such project areas appear to be
prepared to protect and support the speedy exploitation of these resources.
The third trend is quite the opposite of the second observations above. Some elites
in the country and non-governmental organisations ( N G O s ) are trying to effect changes in
the resources legislative regime. At a meeting organised by the Constitutional Review
Commission in Port Moresby in January 1996, most of the speakers and commentators on
the natural resources regime appeared to favour customary ownership of minerals and
petroleum. In fact, emotional charges were raised against the mining and petroleum laws,
which are said to be inconsistent with customary principles. It was such emotional charges
and opinions, which brought about the recent changes to the provincial government
system. If this precedent is followed by accepting the views against the natural resource
regimes, and, consequently, changes in ownership is made, it would be m a d e by
government policy-makers and N G O groups by sponsoring legislative amendments, than
by customary landowners through a successful court challenge. In m y view, such a
change would be for the worse rather than for the better. I submit that the current regime,
with ownership vested in the State, should not be disturbed.

The land dispute there is fully examined in chapter five immediately below.
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VII. CONCLUSION
From the forgoing examinations, I am of the view that any legal challenge against
State title in minerals and petroleum in the courts cannot be sustained. The only threat to
State ownership is through deliberate legislative enactments which can be brought about by
the persuasion of powerful bodies such as the newly-established Constitutional Review
Commission, and the Constitutional Reform Commission, and provided current political
thinking changes with time. But it is unlikely that this will happen in the foreseeable
future. This is because the current policies of the State to involve provincial governments
and customary landowners to negotiate resources development projects and sharing of
benefits have, in m y view, greatly reduced any foreseeable changes to the existing legal
status.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COMPENSATION FOR DEPRIVATION OF LAND USE AND
SURFACE RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the law and policy relating to compensation payment to
private landholders for land use, damage to the surface and deprivation of surface rights
by oil companies carrying out petroleum operations in P N G . The main aim in here is to
pursue the argument that there is lack of transparent and uniform government policy on
compensation. Consequently, m a n y problems, like land ownership dispute between
rival clans, arise and in some instances, sabotage mining and petroleum projects. It is
therefore argued that transparency and uniformity be introduced by government policy,
but failing that, the current situation will only be exacerbated and if not, escalated.
The second section below reviews briefly the pre-independence petroleum
compensation regime to show that the current regime reviewed in the third section is not
different but a legacy of the past and, as such, fails to m a k e adequate provisions on
compensation consistent with and reflective of current thinking and practice. In the
fourth section, some examples of compensation in practice are outlined in support of the
argument that there is great disparity and lack of uniformity in compensation payments
as a result of lack of adequate and uniform government policy on compensation. T h e
fifth section reviews, in brief, the law and policy relating to mining for purposes of
comparative analysis. The sixth section looks at compensation for "economic trees" on
the basis of price guidelines provided by the Valuer General. The aim of that section is
to show that those official prices are at variance with the prices adopted in practice, and,
again, this goes to support the argument that there is no uniform compensation policy.
The seventh section examines the need for systematic identification and registration of
land ownership for effective distribution of compensation payments. Three case
examples are provided to show the nature of conflicts which can arise a m o n g clans
competing for compensation payments. The eighth section attempts to show that the
compensation issue is not a p h e n o m e n o n restricted to the mining and petroleum
industries but is an issue which transcends to other sectors of P N G economy and,
hence, the need for urgent government action. The final section provides a conclusion.
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II.

COMPENSATION

REGIME BEFORE

INDEPENDENCE

Before independence, the Petroleum (Prospecting andMining) Ordinance 19381939 (1938-1939 Ordinance) of both Papua and N e w Guinea, and later the Petroleum
(Prospecting and Mining) Ordinance 1951 (1951 Ordinance) m a d e provisions for
compensation to be paid to the occupier of private land for all damages sustained as a
result of exploration activities. The categories for which compensation was payable,
provided under section 80 (1) of the 1938-1939 Ordinance, and, later, under section 89
of the 1951 Ordinance, are:

(a) deprivation of possession of the surface of the land or any part thereof;
(b)

damage to the surface of the land or any part thereof, or to any
improvements thereon;

(c)

severance of the land from other land of the owner or occupier;

(d)

surface rights of way and easements; and

(e)

any consequential damage.

The petroleum tenement holder was required to pay compensation before the
very first drilling commenced.

There were two approaches to the payment of

compensation. One, the tenement holder had to negotiate with the private landholder to
determine and agree upon the amount payable. In this case, the agreement had to be in
writing, duly signed by both parties and lodged at the office of the Warden in order to
give legal force and validity. T w o , if such a private arrangement failed, the matter had
to be referred to the Warden's Court for settlement. Apart from the general categories
listed above, there were no other specific rules, rates or prices against which to
determine and calculate compensation. For this reason, it is argued that compensation
payment was arbitrarily decided.

Section 78, 1938-1939 Ordinance, and section 87, 1951 Ordinance.
Obviously, this worked in favour of the companies, because anything offered to an illiterate
population in remote areas in P N G at that time was received gratefully, no matter h o w little it
was.
See section 79 (2), 1938-1939 Ordinance and section 88 (2), 1951 Ordinance.
Section 78, 1938-1939 Ordinance, and section 87, 1951 Ordinance.
See R. Bedford and D. M a m a k , Compensation for Development: The Bougainville Case
(Christchurch, N Z : The University of Canterbury, 1977).
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III.

COMPENSATION
CH.198.

REGIME UNDER THE PETROLEUM

ACT

Section 81 is the only section in the Petroleum Act which provides for pecuniary
compensation to be paid to private landholders for deprivation of the use and enjoyment
of surface rights and damage caused to the surface by petroleum operations. O f the 11
subsections, only subsection (2) attempts to state in very general terms the broad
categories of land use, damage and surface rights for which compensation is required.
In so doing, it does not deviate from the pre-independence practice, and, thus, leaves
the situation unimproved. T o compare with the pre-independence list, the list under
section 81 (2) is enumerated below. A petroleum licensee shall pay compensation for
(a) deprivation of the use and enjoyment of land on which petroleum
operations are carried out except where such use and enjoyment has
been reserved to the State;
(b)

damages to the surface of the land or any part of it, or any
improvement on it, or to any trees, fish or animals;

(c)

severance of the land from other land of the occupier, owner or any
person interested in the land;

(d)

rights of w a y and easements; and

(e)

any other damage consequential on the licensee's use or occupation of
the land.

Subsection (3) extends compensation liability, as above, to land adjoining or in
the vicinity of land comprised in any licence. The rest of the section deals with
procedural matters on compensation, which are, again, not very different from the preindependence provisions. The licensee is required to enter into a written agreement
with the landowners on the amount of compensation payable and then have the
agreement lodged with the Director of the Department of Mining and Petroleum ( D M P ) .
In the event of a dispute, the matter is to be referred for determination by the Warden.

This meagre treatment of compensation gives rise to several problems. First,
categories under section 81 (2) are by no means exhaustive. M a n y things that form part
of or associate with land and which are important for customary landowners m a y be
omitted when considering compensation payment under each of the above categories.
For example, traditional medicinal plants or herbs, sacred sites, hunting areas, water
and housing materials, a m o n g other things, m a y be difficult to itemise, let alone
evaluation. T o itemise all the individual trees, plants and various uses of land could be
impractical. Therefore, in calculating compensation, one important consideration

132

should be the extent of reliance on land for sustenance and h o w m u c h the landholder
will be affected w h e n he is dispossessed or deprived of its use. In other words, the
general guideline for assessing compensation should be, as m u c h as m o n e y can do, to
put the landowner back in a position as if he has not been deprived of his dependence
on land for his sustenance.

Second, section 81 does not specify the prices, or at least the formula or rates,
which can be used to calculate compensation under each of those categories. The Act
envisages that the landholder and the petroleum operator will fix the value by
negotiation, but if that fails, the parties would have it determined by the Warden. The
only guideline rates or prices which m a y assist petroleum operators are prices for land
and "economic trees" provided by the Valuer General.

For several reasons, these guideline prices are often not followed. One reason
is because the official prices are usually considered low and not acceptable to customary
landholders.

Therefore, in an effort to establish harmonious relationship with

customary landowners, petroleum operators often follow what is called "payment for
peace" principle. The P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum describes this principle
in this way: "If the people are demanding K50,000 it is cheaper to pay them than it is
[for a project] to be shut d o w n for a day of dispute."8 But the application of this
principle creates two notable problems:first,such demands could continue and escalate
if landholders hold the view that companies can easily give in to whatever they demand
in return for peace, and, second, it sets a dangerous precedent that m a y be inconsistent
with government policies in this area, and one where other companies m a y not be able
and willing to follow.
Another problem with fixing prices for land arises from the customary concepts
of land as not a marketable asset, and that it is held in trust for future generations.
Attempting to fix prices for land which is bound up in the physical, cultural and
spiritual existence of customary landowners creates uncertainty as regards the question
For example, according to the Valuer General's 1985-1986 list, a remote agricultural land in the
Highlands was valued at K100 per hectare, which means rent for onefifthof this area would be
K 2 0 per year. K 2 0 per year for a piece of land where an exploration camp is set up would be
unacceptable to the traditional landholders.
P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, a position paper entitled "The Compensation Problem Mining and Petroleum in P N G " (undated) at p.2. See also Bedford and M a m a k , above n5, at
p.26.
P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, ibid.
<•>

In this case, government policy of fixing prices through the Valuer General's office.
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of fixing a conclusive and once-for-all price. This is compounded by the concept of
trust. This means that the compensation obligation of an operator continues to exist
throughout the life of a project. Payment to one generation does not relieve him of his
obligation for payment to subsequent generations that will be born.10

The third problem which is encountered is the differing value of land from
region to region, determined by population density. Where there is a high population
density, for example, Simbu province, the value of a piece of land will be m u c h higher
than the value of a similar piece of land where the area is sparsely populated.
Therefore, realistically, the pricesfixedby the Valuer General m a y be difficult to adhere
to in practice.

IV. COMPENSATION IN PRACTICE
Since neither the government nor the industry has any formally established rules
or guideline prices apart from those assessed by the Valuer General, companies tend to
assess and pay compensation for damage to the surface and improvements as they
occur. Pursuant to section 81 (4) and (5), m a n y companies have lodged written
compensation agreements with the Director of the D M P but, because of secrecy
provisions, it is difficult to obtain copies of them. However, a few copies had been
sighted and referred to by the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum in a number of
position papers, discussion papers and submissions." These show that different
companies have adopted different rates and categories in the absence of uniform official
or industry rates or ^prices.
Those agreements referred to indicate the different types of land use for
petroleum operations and indicate the categories used for payment of compensation.
The following examples of some of the categories used and amounts paid are taken
12

from a paper entitled "Mining Compensation in Papua N e w Guinea" by Dave Henton
obtained from the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum.

This problem was experienced at Bougainville.
The P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum has been voicing concerns on the need for land
reform and adoption of a uniform compensation practice. M a n y of their position papers,
submissions and reports have been kindly provided to m e by the Director.
The paper is dated 25 November 1988; (collected from P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum:
Port Moresby).
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Transit camp: About K75.00 per month has been paid for a transit camp where
rig parts and supplies were stored. The agreement does not give the surface area
actually occupied or the period for which the transit camp was to remain. Assuming
that the transit camp was to last a year, the amount of compensation payable would be
K900.00.

Base camp: For economic trees cleared for construction of a base camp, a lump
sum of K 1,000.00 has been paid. The actual area of the camp site and the type and
number of trees felled are not provided. This m a y indicate that the values of economic
trees provided by the Valuer General was not used.

Occupation of a camp site: About K200.00 per month has been paid for the
occupation of a camp site. Again, the duration of the camp and the area the camp
actually occupied have not been provided. At the rate of K200.00 per month, a total of
K2,400 would be the amount payable in a year.

One agreement showed a one-off payment of Kl,200 for bush trees cleared for
a base camp, fuel d u m p and explosive magazine and K250.00 per month for occupation
and damage on three exploration sites. There were no indications of the number of
trees felled and the surface area actually occupied.

Drill site: For a drill site of approximately 10 hectares, a rent of Kl,500 has
been paid for a year. Also K 3 0 0 for water rights and K1,000 for bush compensation
have been paid in the same year.

Drill rigs: A government officer, without indicating the areas or period covered
by the payment, assessed the rents for drill rigs, water rights and damage as follows:
Areas Drill rig rent Water rights Damage
1
2
3
4

K900.00
K800.00
K800.00
K600.00

K400.00
nil
K300.00
K200.00

K400.00
K400.00
K500.00
K300.00

Source: Dave Henton

V. COMPENSATION REGIME IN THE MINING INDUSTRY
The compensation regime in the mining industry is not any different, although
some improvements have been m a d e by the Mining

Act 1992. The general

compensation regime under the Mining Ordinance 1928-1966 had identical categories
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for assessment of compensation as those under the Petroleum Act.13 During the
Bougainville copper development, the inadequacy of that regime, for example, the
exemption of some of the rights which required to be compensated for, and inadequate
compensation due to low official rates, caused discontentment and grief to the
Bougainville landowners. Numerous compensation claims had been referred to the
Wardens Court.14 A s a result of these complaints, two notable changes were made.
First, the concept of "occupation fee" was introduced and effected by the enactment of
the Mining Ordinance 1966, which specified that five per cent of the unimproved value
of land be paid as occupation fee.

Second, five per cent of all the royalty payable to

the Administration was directed to the owner of private land.16
This regime remained even after independence. The occupation fee of five per
cent was brought under section 32 of the Mining Act, Ch.195. This is equivalent to
17

K2.50 per hectare per a n n u m and currently this (K2.50) is the norm in rural areas.
Similarly, section 173 of that Act provided that a m i n i m u m of K5.00 per hectare per
year be paid by holders of mining tenements. The difference between these two forms
of payment is that under a prospecting authority, only land actually occupied attracted
the occupation fee, whereas under a mining tenement, all land within the tenement was
considered to be occupied.
In comparison, section 81 (2) (a) of the Petroleum Act which requires a licensee
to pay compensation for deprivation of the use and enjoyment of the surface, or any
Mining Ordinance 1928-1966, see section 56. The categories were exactly the same.
These have been documented by Bedford and M a m a k , above n5, at pp. 12-13.
Section 2 5 H of that ordinance provided:
"(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)

The holder of a prospecting authority is liable to pay, in addition to any
compensation in accordance with Section 56 of this Ordinance, an occupation fee to
the owner of any private land within the area of the authority for any deprivation of
possession of the surface caused by or arising from the prospecting operations of the
holder.
Subject to subsection 3 of this section, the occupation fee is five percentum per
annum of the unimproved capital value of the land of which the owner is from time
to time deprived, as assessed by the Warden.
The unimproved capital value shall be calculated in accordance with the Lands
Ordinance 1962-1966.
The minimum payment under this section is one dollar per acre per year."

See Bedford and M a m a k , above n5, at p. 16.
P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, from an unpublished and undated note.
A tenement is defined in the Mining Act 1992 to mean (1) an exploration licence; or (2) a
special mining lease; or (3) a mining lease, or (4) an alluvial mining lease; (5) a lease for
mining purposes; (6) a mining easement (s 2(1)).
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part of it or any rights customarily associated with it, is equivalent to the occupation fee
payable under the Mining Act. The only difference is, unlike the Mining Act, no
formula or rate for compensation is given.

Likewise, section 102 of the Mining Act Ch.195 is identical to section 81 (2) of
the Petroleum Act. Section 102 provided that holders of prospecting authorities or
mining tenements shall pay compensation in relation to (1) damage to the surface and
improvements to the surface, including crops and economic trees; (2) severance of the
land from other land of the owner; (3) loss of surface rights of w a y and (4) all
consequential damage.

Since the repeal of the Mining Act Ch.195 and enactment of the Mining Act
1992, some improvements have been made. Unlike the previous Act, which dedicated
only a section, the 1992 Act provides one whole part - Part VII - containing seven
sections on compensation alone.

O n e of the notable improvements is the extension of

the general categories under which compensation is payable. These are set out here for
20

comparative reasons:
(a) deprivation of possession or use of the natural surface of the land;
(b)

damage to the natural surface of the land;

(c)

severance of land or any part thereof from other land held by the
landholder;

(d)

any loss or restriction of a right of way, easement or other right;

(e)

the loss of, or damage to, improvements;

(f)

in the case of land under cultivation, loss of earnings;

(g)

disruption of agricultural activities on the land; and

(h)

social disruption.

The 1992 Act stresses that compensation is payable for only those loss or
damages specified above and not as consideration for permitting onto the land for
exploration or mining purposes, or in respect of the value of minerals which is mined,
or by reference to any rent, royalty or other amounts assessed in respect of the mining
of the minerals.21 This provision was m a d e to dispel notions held by landholders that
Mining Act 1992, sections 154 to,160.
Id., section 154(2).
Id., section 154 (4). Subsection (5) provides that it is an offence to agree to pay compensation
for any of these prohibited matters, for which the penalty is a fine not exceeding K10,000 or 2
years imprisonment, or both.
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they were receiving compensation for these prohibited matters as well, particularly for
the value of minerals. However, unlike the former Act, the new Act does not provide
any rates for reference or as a guideline in calculating compensation payable under the
categories enumerated. Therefore, determination of h o w m u c h to be paid under those
categories is still left in the hands of the landholder and tenement holder to negotiate and
. 22

arrrve at.
A.

Compensation

in Practice

Out of the Bougainville experience, other mining projects have tended to
categorise land use into four general heads. The O k Tedi gold and copper mine, being
the second major mining project, naturally followed the Bougainville precedent, but
with some changes m a d e necessary by changed circumstances. The O k Tedi practice
was, in turn, adopted by Porgera and Misima gold mines. The four general categories
these mining projects have adopted are: (1) general disturbance, called "bush and
nuisance", for which a base rate is paid per hectare within a Special Mining Lease
(SML); (2) additional amounts of bush and nuisance paid for land that is cleared only;
(3) for land which is cleared and used which, to the landowners, m a y be lost, and, (4),
for damage. The highest rate is paid for land that is lost through the mining process,
such as the area destroyed by open cast mining.
The amounts paid for Porgera and Misima per hectare per year show that the
same categories do not necessarily attract the same amount in all mining projects. A s the
table below shows, Porgera pays higher amounts than Misima. This means that the
rates adopted or amounts paid differ from project to project, although the four
categories of land use remain the same.
Land Use Category Misima Porgera
Bush and Nuisance
Cleared Land
Damaged Land
Lost Land

(Kina per hectare per year)
5.00
'
10.00
10.00
7.50
10.00
15.00
10.00
17.50

Source: Dave Henton

However, the royalty rate payable to landholders has been increased 20 per cent: section 173 (5).
But this was not new, because this has been in existence under provisions of the Organic Law
on Provincial Governments.
2.1

P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, from various unpublished notes and position papers and
submissions.
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Since the land compensation provisions under the petroleum regime and the
mining regime are similar, it is submitted that a rate or formula applicable to both
industries should be adopted. A uniform rate or formula is desirable for consistency as
well as a measure to stamp out or prevent any complaints from landowners arising as a
result of the disparity in the compensation payment practice.

VI. COMPENSATION FOR ECONOMIC TREES AND PLANTS
As alluded to above, the only official price guidelines which exist are those
provided by the Valuer General for land and "economic trees". Although these prices
only serve as guidelines, the Valuer General recommends them to be adopted and
adhered to at all times unless influenced by local conditions, such as scarcity or
abundance of the subject tree or plant which m a y affect the price. O n e major problem
that petroleum operators face is that, because the phrase "economic trees" is not
defined, which trees and plants are economic and which are not remains unclear. T h e
P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum argues that if all trees and plants are included,
then counting them before land is cleared presents insurmountable practical problems.
This presents huge practical difficulties. Sample tree counts in one Highlands
area suggest a value of about K3,000 per hectare for trees alone, excluding selfseeded bamboo, pitpit, can, tanket, and edible tulip. With these included the
bush value per hectare would at least double, giving a ludicrous compensation
value for uninhabited, unutilised virgin bush. The Valuer General provides little
guidance for the average explorer.
Although the Valuer General's list gives some indication as to which are
economic trees and which are not, it is not by any means exhaustive. Further, the
Valuer General's guidelines indicate that companies are expected to measure and count
every tree for the purposes of fixing compensation. This is indicated by the Valuer
General's guideline dated 1 January 1995. According to that guideline all trees with a
diameter of 6 centimetres are small trees; those with a diameter of 15 centimetres are
deemed m e d i u m trees; and those with a diametre greater than 30 centimetres are deemed
mature trees. The diameter is to be measured at a height of about 1 metre above the
ground level. A n y tree which does not reach 1 metre is not subject to compensation
claims. Because of practical difficulties in counting them, petroleum operators appear
to prefer to m a k e lump-sum and one-off payments rather than for every tree and plant
after counting and measuring them one by one.
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P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, above n7, at p.2.
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The Valuer General's guidelines give petroleum operators a lot of discretion in
fixing prices. This is allowed because of a number of inherent practical difficulties that
may be faced. For instance, the value of a particular tree or plant in one location m a y be
higher than the value in another location.25 The following table shows the prices as set
by the Valuer General and the prices actually paid in Misima and Porgera for economic
trees and plants. The table demonstrates h o w prices set by the Valuer General can be
varied to suit local circumstances. The table also demonstrates the fact that it would be
practically impossible to adhere to a uniform formula or rule when values of a particular
economic tree or plant vary from one area of the country to another area.
Item
Sweet potato (mound)
Coconut palm (conventional)
Ton tree (hardwood)
Breadfruit
Sago (edible)
Pandanus (edible)

Valuer General
K02.00
K10.00
K04.00
K03.00
K05.00
K03.00

Msima
K02.50
K25.00
K10.00
K05.00
K30.00

nil

nil

K12.00

Porgera
K06.00

nil
K10.00
K05.00

Source: Dave Henton

In Bougainville, compensation was paid in Australian dollars. The rates for
coconut palms, cocoa and coffee trees were $2.00 and $1.00 per tree respectively.
Since the prices of these crops were high in those days, it is not surprising that many of
the landowners complained that the amount that were paid were inadequate. After an
action by some dissatisfied villagers which eventually ended up in the High Court of
Australia, the rate for a coconut tree was increased to $25.00, whilst a cocoa and a
coffee tree received $13.50 each.

VII. IDENTIFICATION OF LANDOWNERS FOR COMPENSATION
PAYMENT
A major problem that often arises is not in relation to prices and amount of
compensation payable by companies to the landowners but between landowners as to
who is entitled to compensation payments.

The obligation to identify and record the landowners and beneficiaries of
compensation in a mining or petroleum project area is left to the companies. Although
personnel from the Department of Mining and Petroleum ( D M P ) are involved, they

For example, a tree in a remote area which is unlikely to be harvested in the foreseeable future
may be of less value than the same type of tree located, say, near Port Moresby.
26

See Bedford and M a m a k , above n5, pp.28-30.
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appear to support the work of the companies. The companies are left to establish their
o w n contacts and identify the landowners, and organise them into business groups or
associations for purposes of paying compensation monies into a trust account owned
and operated by corporate entity of the landowners. For example, the Kutubu Joint
Venture (KJV) has identified, recorded and registered 111 landowning groups in
Kutubu and Kikori. Royalties and other forms of compensation payments are
deposited into the accounts of these landowner group entities.

The problem that often arises is that during the initial stage of exploration, some
individuals fraudulently represent themselves to the exploration team as the principal
landowners w h o are entitled to receive compensation. This happens, particularly, in
very remote areas where almost all the local inhabitants are uneducated and, thus, are
not able to communicate with the company staff at the site and use middle parties as
interpreters, or where the actual landowner is absent at the material time of the
exploration.

Once the real landowners become aware of such trickery, either animosity
against the exploration company and spokespersons arise, or court battles m a y ensue
for determination of the title. T o create a harmonious working relationship, it is of
paramount importance that companies identify the rightful landowners at the outset. If
an element of doubt and distrust is sowed in the minds of the local people, though it
may not be the fault of the company, problems m a y arise out of it which m a y eventually
destroy the progress of a project.

The following case studies from three project areas will demonstrate how
persons other than the actual landowners claim compensation payments and highlight
other points that have been m a d e above.

To maintain the good corporate name of a company in the eyes of the local community is
important. For example, C R A , after the Bougainville crisis, is regarded by m a n y people as a
bad company which causes trouble and, thus, cannot be trusted. This view is held among m a n y
Huli people w h o have been interviewed in relation to the Mt. Kare mine. The Mt. Kare alluvial
gold mine was awarded to C R A but after a serious destruction of the company camp, which
included the burning of a helicopter, among others, C R A relinquished the alluvial gold mining
rights to the local landowners. Similarly, B H P is being distrusted as a company which does not
care about environmental protection because of its continued pollution of the O k Tedi and Fly
River systems. O n the other hand, Kutubu landowners highly regarded Chevron Niugini as a
good company because its operations have less environmental impact, and also, it provides
many social benefits. The reality is that C R A and B H P , like Chevron and other major mining
and petroleum companies in P N G , provide social and economic benefits to the local villagers
around their mining operations. The difference, however, is in the nature of mining. Mining
requires large areas of land and leave greater impact on the environment than petroleum
operations. Because of ignorance, this difference is not appreciated, and hence, the different
perceptions of these companies.
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A.

Kutubu

During the exploration stage of the Kutubu oil fields on Iagifu and Hedinia
ridges, a sub-clan of the Fasu tribe named "Yaferaga" clan, claimed title to the whole of
Iagifu ridge, including those areas owned by the "Sanemahia" clan, while the "principal
landowner" was in Port Moresby, where he was working as a government employee.

It is true that the Yaferaga clan owns the Hedinia ridge and part of the Iagifu
ridge where most of the Kutubu oil rigs are located. However, rigs 7x and 9x on Iagifu
ridge were falsely claimed by the Yaferaga clan. The Yaferaga clan received all
compensation monies for those two rigs.

The principal landowner of the Sanemahia clan, Mr. Kapi Nato, was working in
Port Moresby as a Major in the Corrective Institute Services at B o m a n a , Port
29

Moresby. O n his retirement, he went h o m e and disputed the ownership of the land
where rigs 7x and 9x were located. O n failing to resolve the dispute by mediation, the
matter was taken up in the Local Lands Court at Mendi to have the title settled pursuant
to the Land Dispute Settlement Act Ch.45.

The Sanemahia clan was more concerned about title to their land rather than
pecuniary benefits falsely claimed by the Yaferaga clan. Thus, among other things, the
Sanemahia clan's principal submission was for the court to declare title to the land at 7x
and 9x in their favour. They were prepared to waive their rights to reimbursements of
the compensation monies so far received by the Yaferaga clan. Substantive evidence,
including naming of the caves in which M r Nato and his father used to live and hunt,
the boundaries that they set, the plants (bamboo and tangets) they grew, and even the
stumps of trees they fell, were neatly documented and tendered as evidence of
ownership.

The Local Lands Court, however, acted against the weight of this evidence, as
the District Lands Court later found upon appeal,30 and divided the land and all rents
and royalties which were due equally among the two clans.

The facts of this case are based on m y personal knowledge because I have been involved in it
right from the beginning.
Mr. Kapi's father was a fierce warrior and chief of the Sanemahia clan, and he personally owned
the Iagifu ridge by living in caves, planting crops, making boundaries and hunting there.
Kapi Nato v. Samai Kei, Appeal Case No.9 of 1992, in the District Land Court of Justice in
Mendi.
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This decision was influenced by considerations that if the court interrupted the
monetary benefits the Yaferaga clan had enjoyed and were enjoying, and if one clan
became a total loser whilst the other clan won, there would be serious interruptions to
the whole Kutubu project. Hence, to avoid such a potential problem from arising, both
parties had to be accommodated by dividing the land and benefits equally. The Court
however, ignored the fact that the Yaferaga clan owned most of the rigs on their land
and, as such, they were receiving more benefits than the Sanemahia clan. The Court
also ignored the submissions of the Sanemahia clan to waive their right to claim
compensation which had already been paid to their opponents, since their interest was
not the monetary benefits but title to their land.

Upon appeal to the District Lands Court, the land at Iagifu 7x and 9x and the
immediate surroundings was awarded to the Sanemahia clan. The appellants waived
their rights to have all previous compensation monies reimbursed in order to prevent
inter-clan rivalry or warfare.

B. Paua31
Paua is an isolated area located between north of Kutubu, south of Tari and
west of Nipa. The people in Paua are Huli speakers, but they can also speak Angal
Heneng, the Nipa - Mendi dialect. British Petroleum (BP) drilled some wells there,
costing about K 3 0 million in 1994-1995.

Since most of the people are uneducated by reason of their isolation from
government services, like schools, they lacked the skills and courage to communicate
with company staff on the exploration team in identifying and registering the
landowners w h o were entitled to compensation. But even before they could talk to the
exploration team, some distant relatives living in Nipa, Kutubu and Tari came and
spoke in their stead, and presented themselves as the principal landowners.

Two clans, namely, Webo clan, represented by a person living in Nipa, and
Hugu clan, represented by a person living in Tari, are at this time of writing, disputing
the ownership of the land at the well rig at Paua. This dispute is complicated by distant
relatives and traditional trading partners w h o support either side of the claim and w h o
would like a share of the benefits.
The facts in this case are based on my personal knowledge and interviews. The parties in this
case are related to m e , and I have been closely involved in all that has developed in this matter.
Paua is a village close to mine, and m y people have traditional trade links as well as intermarriages and relatives living in both villages.

143
During mediation, land mediators decided that 50 percent of the land and
benefits be given to the W e b o clan, whilst the H u g u clan got 25 percent and the
remaining 25 percent went to Paru clan, a sub-clan of the Hugu clan.

During an interview, the Hugu clan leader stated that he is the principal
landowner and the W e b o clan has only a right of way and easements to the traditional
hunting routes.

H e also said that he reserved the right to determine h o w m u c h of the

benefits he would like to allot to the Paru clan, since they come under him and it is not
for the court or any mediator to determine h o w m u c h they get. Although he appears to
be able to come to a compromise, the fact that the mediator recorded the W e b o clan as
the principal landowners annoyed him so m u c h so that he was considering an appeal
against the mediator's decision.

On the other hand, the leader of the Webo clan denied those claims. To them,
the W e b o clan is the principal landowner, and the H u g u clan was merely invited as a
neighbour to share in the benefits as a sign of goodwill. If the H u g u clan persists on
having all the benefits or on being declared the principal landowners, they will be
pushed out completely and given nothing at all.

This matter is not settled. The case firstly demonstrates that involvement of
distant relatives and traditional trading partners w h o wish to share in the compensation
benefits complicate land ownership issues. Secondly, it demonstrates the difficulty in
identifying and registering landowners during the exploration stage and, thus, the need
to register landowners before exploration.
C. Gobe34
Gobe, located between Erave of Southern Highlands and Gulf province, is the
second oil field in P N G , which will come into production in 1997. The development of
Evidence adduced and independent sources confirmed this.
The H u g u clan leader complained that two of the three mediators were not from the local Huli
area and, thus, they were not well versed with the custom. The Land Dispute Settlement Act
requires that all mediators must be from the local area, well versed with the custom. Secondly,
he claimed that mediators did not declare anyone as the principal landowner, and it was after his
departure that the word " W e b o clan is the principal landowner" appeared in their decision. I have
read the mediation document, which stated that the parties have agreed and acknowledged that
W e b o clan is the principal landowner, but this is the very statement that the H u g u clan leader
denied.
The facts on G o b e are, like the other two cases, based on m y personal knowledge because of m y
association with the landowners through personal relationship. The facts were gathered from
informal in-house discussions.
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the field has been delayed by a chronic land ownership dispute between traditional
landowners.

The Gobe dispute involves politics and, in that regard, is quite complicated and
different than the other disputes. However, it is not different from other disputes in that
it involves close and distant relatives and neighbouring villages.

The political aspect of the dispute is that the former member of Parliament (MP)
for Kagua-Erave 5 was unseated in the 1992 general elections by his mother's clan, the
"Bogasi" clan, by supporting a rival candidate. The Bogasi clan are principal owners of
the Gobe fields. In revenge, the former M P vowed to punish them by disputing the
Gobe land ownership. H e has, in fact, done this, but after a bitter and lengthy court
battle, a decision was finally handed d o w n in favour of the Bogasi clan.

The phenomenon which is evident in all three cases is that the local landowners
know w h o the principal landowners are, but their claims are simply to take a bite in the
compensation payments and royalties, among other benefits, or purely as a form of
revenge for traditional reasons. This is not surprising because, in a subsistence
economy like the rural areas in P N G , compensation payment is the only source of
income which engenders envy, jealousy and competition.

VIII. UNREASONABLE COMPENSATION DEMANDS FROM
LANDOWNERS
There is an emerging trend for landowners to claim unreasonably high
compensation payments from the government and/or companies for land use or land
damage after the original compensation payments have been received. The K 1 0 billion
demand in Bougainville or the environmental damage claims like that made on O k Tedi
are classical examples. Such claims are not limited to mining and petroleum companies,
but also extends to other companies which do businesses on land leased from
customary owners. Compensation claims are also m a d e to the government, which
Soso T o m u , the former M P for Kagua-Erave, was in Parliament for 10 years. His relatives
complained that he did not give them any services, such as roads, health centres and community
schools, so they unseated him by refusing to vote him in again. Mr. T o m u , therefore, took
revenge by disputing the ownership of his uncles' land (i.e. his mother's brothers' land). The
leader of the principal landowners, the Bogasi clan, and Mr. T o m u are first cousins. In fact, Mr.
Tomu's mother died when he was still an infant, so the leader of the Bogasi clan's mother nursed
him and raised him up as her o w n child. Since his o w n brothers and sisters did not vote for him
and, as a result, he lost, Mr. T o m u wanted to punish them by disputing the Gobe land.
Andrew Strathern, "Compensation: What Does It Mean?" (1993) 1 (1) Taimlain: A Journal of
Contemporary Melanesian Studies 57.
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establishes public facilities like schools, hospitals and telecommunication receivers or
transmitters, power lines and so on.

There are many reasons for the "excessive" or "inflated" demands which are
made on mining and petroleum companies. O n e reason has to do with the very
semantics of the word "compensation". In traditional societies, particularly in the
Highlands, compensation is defined as an on-going process of dispute settlement
between litigant parties, not by violence or imposed punishment but by a voluntary
payment, or gift, which is seen as providing a substitute or replacement in wealth goods
for that which was lost or damaged in an earlier phase of a dispute.37

With this notion of compensation, the people view land lost as a total loss and
do not take into account as a benefit the compensation which has already been received.
Or, as in Bougainville, those w h o are demanding compensation are n e w generations
which were not party to previous agreements under which compensation was paid.
W h e n older generations w h o owned land pass away, land is transferred to younger
generations w h o emerge as n e w landowners, w h o begin to see that their land has been
lost while they received no compensation for it. Compensation received by the older
generations or those w h o pass away is discounted. The traditional concept of
compensation as a process and not a one-off payment is, therefore, right at the heart of
many conflicts.
The second reason arises from the people's belief that minerals and petroleum
beneath the land are theirs.

O n this premise, compensation is understood as a "sale"

of their resources and not for land use and surface damage, as defined in the legislation
examined above.

Since the people hear about the huge money involved in developing

an oil field or mine a copper or gold deposit, the huge compensation demands, to them,
are not unreasonable amounts. A s mentioned above, section 154 (4) of the Mining Act
1992 clearly repudiates this notion, but the Petroleum Act makes no similar provision.
Thirdly, the people often forget the benefits they are enjoying as a result of a
mining or petroleum operation. For example, the royalties they receive, technology and
skills transferred through training and localisation programs, infrastructure

Section 154 (4) (b) of the Mining Act 1992 is a provision which counters this perception.
Ibid. A s a Papua N e w Guinean, I have often heard people commenting that what they are
demanding is "peanuts" (meaning very little) compared to how much the mineral and oil are
worth.

developments and so on in areas like Kutubu, Porgera or O k Tedi, where none of these
things ever existed.40

Further, there is a widespread confusion over compensation paid for land use
and damage and community assistance and business development programs
implemented by some companies as a gesture of goodwill and in accordance with their
public relation policies. Payment under the latter category is regarded as compensation
as well. This gives the impression that the landholders are entitled to both forms of
payment. A s the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum points out, explorers are often
told: '"Right, you've given us the cash, n o w where are the aidposts, schools and jointventures'", a practice which sets an unfortunate precedent which small companies m a y
not be able to follow.

IX. CONCLUSION
Determination of the prices for damage to trees, rivers and fish or the surface
land, and rents for rigs and c a m p sites are left to the companies. Apart from the Valuer
General's guideline prices for land and economic trees and plants, the government has
not made any apparent attempt to provide a comprehensive treatment of this matter,
although problems in this area are becoming increasingly complicated.
In an interview, a staff of the Department of Mining and Petroleum (DMP)
stated that determination of compensation for land use and damage to the surface are left
to the companies and landowners to work out. The Department is only involved if and
when there is a dispute as regards the amount of compensation paid, which is then
referred to the Warden. It is suggested that involvement of the D M P personnel before
any exploration commences to systematically identify and register landowners should
be seriously considered.

It has been shown that prices fixed and compensation paid by petroleum
companies are higher than those paid by mining companies. Further, w e have also seen
40

Kutubu, for example, was virtually cut off from Mendi, the provincial headquarters, but the
Kutubu Joint Venture has constructed a highway from Mendi to Kutubu. M a n y villages in the
area have been connected by roads. M a n y people have been given business management
training. Bougainville Copper Mine had trained many in technical/mechanical skills at its
technical college at Arawa. All the major mining and petroleum companies have sponsorship
programs where many students attending high schools, colleges and universities in the country
are sponsored.
41

P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, above n7, at p. 1.
January 1996.
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that the amounts paid by companies within both industries vary considerably. It is
suggested that the lack of a uniform rule or formula applicable to both industries m a y
cause serious problems. Although there has not been any noticeable problem in this
regard, one potential problem is that landowners w h o host mining operations m a y
demand similar compensation packages as those offered by petroleum companies.
Even within the petroleum industry, there is a likelihood for claiming higher
compensation payments if one company pays higher than the other. Thanks to the
secrecy of compensation agreements, this problem has not arisen.

To deal with the emerging trend of landowners making unreasonable
compensation demands, which is threatening the progress of the industry and the
country as a whole, it is submitted that the government should step in to deal with the
matter instead of leaving it in the hands of the landholders and companies to deal with
themselves. In that respect, I would suggest that through legislation, a Compensation
Commission should be established. The Commission's function, a m o n g others,
should be to assess and set limits to the amount of compensation which m a y be
claimed, and then extinguish rights to any future claims. Such a legislation should
make provision for treating future compensation demands as a criminal offence which
may be punishable by imprisonment.
The other problem that has been seen is that of identifying the true landowners.
The task of identifying landowners is left entirely in the hands of companies. O n e of
the problems faced by the companies is that, often, persons other than the true
landowners or "middle" persons mislead company officials by presenting themselves as
the true landowners. This sort of problem leads to land disputes which hold up projects
like Gobe; or enrich the wrong party and clans could lose land, like that at Kutubu; or
cause inter-clan rivalry, like the one which is developing at Paua. For the sake of
investment security, harmonious company and community working relationship and
smooth progress in development, there is a need for the government to systematically
register land-owning groups before any compensation is actually paid.
It is submitted that either a Compensation Commission, as suggested above, or
a Surface Rights Board, like that in Canada, be established to deal with these matters.
If this proves impossible or impractical, then it is submitted that a set of prices, values
or formula should be introduced, to apply to both mining and petroleum companies.

For information on the Canadian Surface Board see J. D. Carter, C. Carter and R. Carter,
"Compensation for Surface Rights in Alberta" (1985) 23 (3) Alberta Law Review 435.
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Further, the amount which one can claim should be reduced and limited and future
claims for the same land be extinguished.
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CHAPTER SIX
PETROLEUM FISCAL ISSUES

I. INTRODUCTION

There are many fiscal objectives and priorities of a host country (HC) with regard to
petroleum exploitation. The first objective is to obtain m a x i m u m financial return. The
second objective is to encourage thorough and effective exploitation of the resource.2 The
third objective is to allow reasonable return to the investor commensurate with the
investments and risks it undertakes. T h e third objective should ensure that the overall
fiscal package makes investment attractive and worthwhile.

Where the priority of the HC is to obtain thorough and effective development of the
resource, the fiscal terms have to be less onerous than those under a regime which
prioritises revenue maximization. Normally, in countries where the petroleum potential is
relatively u n k n o w n due to little seismic and geological work, the priority is to attract risk
capital to conduct effective exploration in order that geological data m a y be collected and
eventually establish commercial reserves. In this case, the H C has to m a k e several
concessions so thatfiscalterms are more favourable to the international oil company (IOC).
"This includes limiting provisions for capturing higher profit potential such as additional
profit tax and price caps and the expensing of costs for speedy and o p t i m u m

A good summary of these are enumerated in Alexander G. Kemp, "Economic Considerations in the
Taxation of Petroleum Exploitation" in Kameel I. F. Khan ed., Petroleum Resources and
Development - Economic, Legal and Policy Issues for Developing Countries (London: Belhaven
Press, 1987) p.121, at p. 122. See also Raj Kumar, "Taxation for a Cyclical Industry" (1991)
Resources Policy 133, at pp. 134-135.
Kameel I. F. Khan, "Petroleum Taxation and Contracts in the Third World - A L a w and Policy
Perspective" (1988) 22 (1) Journal of World Trade 67, at p.68. In P N G , the 1976 Government
Statement on Petroleum Policy and Legislation (at p.7) and the 'Draft' Government Statement on
Natural Gas Policy (March 1995 at p. 10) expressly state "maximization of revenue" as the principal
objective of the P N G government.
i

Kamal Hossain, Law and Policy in Petroleum Development: Changing Relations Between
Transnational and Governments (London: Frances Pinter, 1979) p.33.
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development." In so doing, the H C reduces the risks inherent in undertaking petroleum
operations. For oil importing countries, especially those with a shortage of foreign
exchange, this m a y also be necessary to encourage rapid exploration to find domestic
supplies and, consequently, save costs and reduce imports.

In designing a fiscal regime, a state has to have some knowledge of the economic
objectives and investment strategies employed by IOCs. This is because an "efficient
system has to accommodate elements of the requirements of both parties." The principal
objective of IOCs is to conduct their operations in a w a y which ensures long-term post-tax
profits.6 In pursuit of this goal, they conduct detailed economic analysis on which basis
decisions as to whether or not to commit investment funds in a project are made.
Alexander K e m p enumerated the following as the yardsticks widely employed in the
industry:

(a) payback period in money-of-the-day period (MOD) terms;
(b)

payback period in real terms;

(c)

m a x i m u m (cumulative) cash exposure in M O D terms;

(d)

m a x i m u m (cumulative) cash exposure in real terms;

(e)

real net present value ( N P V ) at zero discount rate;

(f)

real net present value at a discount rate reflecting risk of project;

(g)

real internal rate of return;

(h)

real profit/investment ratio (real N P V at project discount rate/real P V ) of
project investment costs.

Khan, above n2, at p.70.
Kemp, above nl, at p. 121.
Id., atp.123.
Ibid.
"Net present value converts the future cash flows for an investment opportunity into an equivalent
value at a particular point in time - the present (or year 0). Net present value can only be calculated
if w e know the discount rate.. .Generally speaking, the correct discount rate is the weighted cost of
capital from all sources, or the m i n i m u m acceptable rate of return of the particular firm." See
Australian Mineral Foundation ( A M F ) , Economic Evaluation in the Petroleum Industry, Workshop
Course 672/90 (Adelaide: A M F , 15-18 M a y 1990) p. 13.
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K e m p explains that the use of the payback period indicates the investor's concern with
recouping his initial investment. "Calculation of m a x i m u m cash exposure indicates concern
at the total scale of his fund at risk. Calculation of the net present value at zero discount
rate indicates interests in the aggregate amount of cash surplus likely to be generated by the
project. Use of a positive discount rate to find the net present value indicates that the
investor is interested in the time value of m o n e y 9 as well as the scale of the project. Thus
the timing of the outflows and inflows of cash are of great interest to him. Choosing the
discount rate to reflect the risk of a project entails higher rates the greater level of perceived
risk. Such a procedure discriminates against projects the greater the time span before the
receipt of the main income flows. Use of the internal rate of return again indicates concern
for the time value of money."

Although many objectives of a HC and an IOC may appear to overlap in practice,
conceptually they differ in several significant respects. The general advice is that in
designing a tax system, the H C must ensure that balance is maintained between the
competing interests. This chapter examines h o w P N G attempts to do this by examining
itsfiscalregime in the light of the various types of fiscal instruments H C s adopt.

II. FISCAL INSTRUMENTS

Generally, fiscal instruments designed to maximize financial returns to a HC fall
under three categories. These are pre-production charges, charges based on production,
and taxes imposed on net income from production. Economists normally refer to the
19

revenue collected under each of these categories as "economic rent".

Economic rent is

"Time value of money is used to express and compare the cost of capital and the return on
investment. The cost of capital is therefore, a function of the amount of money invested, the length
of time before compensation is received, and the interest on this money." Id., at p.6.
K e m p , above nl, at p.123.
See Daniel Johnston, "Fiscal Terms and Petroleum Licenses: The Global Market", a paper presented
at the Oil & Gas Production -Sharing Contracts, Concessions and N e w Petroleum Ventures in the
Asia - Pacific Basin conference organized by Institute for International Research, Houston, Texas,
28-30 April, 1993.
Khan, above n2, at p.70; R. F. Mikesell, "Profitability and Risk in Third World Petroleum: The
Host Government Perspective" in Khan, above nl, at p. 157; Ross Garnaut and A. Clunies Ross,
Taxation of Mineral Rents (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) p.3; Alexander G. K e m p , Petroleum
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defined to m e a n "the total gross revenue at the international market price for a single field,
minus operating costs, total investment and, where oil is sold overseas, transportation
costs." ' The following sections examine each of these three schemes of revenue collection
as adopted by H C s and those applied in P N G

A. Pre-production Payments

Pre-production charges are more burdensome to IOCs than the two other forms of
payments, because these payments are unrelated to profit or any income base.14 In some
cases, they are paid even before exploration commences or a commercial reserve is
found.1 They have the effect of drying up investment funds. Pre-production charges can
have enormous influence as an incentive or disincentive to investment in the industry. The
timing of the charges can have significant impact: the earlier the imposition, the greater the
burden.16 Although such impositions are normally counted as investment costs to be
reimbursed from producing fields, they will be lost entirely where there is no commercial
production.17 Further, the variability of the charges is also important. Where investment
costs are high, stable charges tend to reduce the profitability of marginal fields and even
discourage effective development. But where the charges are flexible and slide with the
rate of production, the tax burdens m a y become less onerous.

Rent Collection Around the World (Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada: Institute for Research on Public
Policy, 1987) p.5.
Khan, above n2, at p.70. Garnaut and Clunies Ross define it in their book, above nl2, at p.3 as
"the value of the product when all necessary costs have been deducted." A. G. K e m p provides a
similar definition in his book, above nl2, at p.5 as "returns accruing to a factor of production in
access of its transfer earnings".
Khan, above n2, at p.70.
David R. Tillinghast, "Taxation and Royalty Problems: Royalty and Taxation Issues in Petroleum
Operations" in International Bar Association (IBA), Energy Laws 1981: Seminar Organised by the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Section on Business Law - Proceedings vol.2 (London:
IB A , 1981)p.251,atp.254.

IS

Ibid.
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The number and types of pre-production payments vary from country to country,
but the c o m m o n types are (1) signature bonus; (2) discovery and production bonus; (3)
area or surface rental fees; (4) bidding and information fees; and (5) provision to benefit the
national economy.

1. Signature Bonus
In P N G , signature bonus is not required. In countries where signature bonus is
charged, it is paid at the time of signing the contract before the commencement of
exploration.
upwards."

It is a one-off payment and normally ranges from one million U S dollars
T o the investor, signature bonus is a cost which reduces the profit. Since

companies tend to use a high discount rate in countries where exploration risk is high, it
91

affects the current net value of a project. T o the H C , signature bonus is a source of
foreign exchange and helps to defray the administrative costs associated with running a
29

petroleum industry. Although this m a y be true, D a m cautions that it acts as a disincentive
to developing acreage, especially in low profitability areas.23 In similar vein, Khan warns
that this form of payment should be discouraged or made only a discretionary payment.24
P N G would do well not to seek imposition of this type of payment in the future.

2. Discovery and Production Bonus
In m a n y petroleum contracts, it is stipulated that discovery bonus be paid upon
discovery of a commercial field and production bonus if production exceeds a specified
volume. Imposition of such charges is designed to share immediately in the rewards of a
production well or a bonanza strike.

However, "such payments or gross income sharing

m a y mean that marginal field profitability could be threatened or companies m a y defer
Signature bonuses are usually found in production-sharing arrangements, as in Indonesia.
Khan, above n2, at p.71.

K. W . D a m , Oil Resources - Who Gets What Howl (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1976) p.141.
Khan, above n2, at p.71.
Ibid. These charges range from one to five million U S dollars.
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optimum exploitation of resources if profits are not sufficient."26 But, generally speaking,
these charges m a y not be more onerous than signature bonus because, since these
payments are m a d e after discovery, they can be defrayed once production commences.
Under the P N G regime, there are no discovery and production bonuses.

3. Area or Surface Rental Fees
Exploration and development contracts m a y require IOCs to pay area or surface
rental fees for each unit of land held for exploration or production purposes. The basic
concept behind these payments differ from country to country, but its historical function is
to induce relinquishment so that companies m a y readily give up those areas which they do
not wish to explore and develop, and by so doing, terminate charges based on those
areas.27 While such payments m a y not be large and m a y not be an important source of
economic rent for the H C , it, nevertheless, contributes in s o m e ways to defray
administrative costs. F r o m the investor's perspective, they are viewed as risk investments,
no matter h o w small they m a y be, since they contribute to the total overall investment. In
P N G , area fees are represented by the exploration and development licence fees,28 whilst
surface rental fees are those paid to private landholders as rents for occupying their land, as
examined in chapter five.

4. Bidding and Information Fees
Companies m a y be required to pay certain fees before they are eligible to submit
9Q

bids for exploration acreages or enter into contracts. Bidding fees are those fees which
accompany an application for exploration licence, whilst information fees are those paid for
-ir\

geological information kept by the petroleum agency of the H C .

Where the H C keeps

geological information from previous reconnaissance work, it m a y make it a pre-condition

See Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.257. For example, in Norway, according to the Royal Decree dated
8 December 1972, the surface rental fees were 2,000 kroner per k m in the second year, 15,000 kroner
in the tenth year and 30,000 kroner thereafter.
Generally, see chapter three. Exploration licence fees are set at K 1 0 0 per block (Petroleum Act
Ch.198, section 20 (2) (a)), while development licence fee is K50.000 per annum.
Khan, above n2, at p.72.
M)

See K e m p , above n 12, at pp.87-93 for the different types of bidding systems.
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for the bidders to purchase it in order to qualify to bid.31 For frontier areas where
geological information is not available, the successful bidder m a y be required to obtain the
same at his o w n expense and then provide it to the H C , which m a y sell it to future
bidders.

Selling of geological information helps the H C to recoup its cost for geological

work if it has undertaken exploration.

However, for a company, its costs m a y not be

recouped if no commercial discovery is made. Because of restrictions imposed in the
contract, a company cannot sell geological information it acquires to the H C .

In PNG, there are no bidding fees as a pre-condition for bidding, except fees for
exploration and development licence.

In respect of geological information, it is not

mandatory for oil companies to purchase it. In the absence of any geological information in
respect of the areas they want to explore, they m a y be compelled to purchase such
information on their o w n volition. The only expense which might be of some concern to
IOCs is the requirement for " m i n i m u m expenditure". It is normally stipulated that "if the
total expenditure is not made, the investor must pay the difference between the agreed
expenditure and the sums actually spent.""

This requirement is provided to induce

thorough and rapid exploration and is not necessarily a means of economic rent, but to the
IOCs, it is, nevertheless, a pre-production cost. Such costs m a y m a k e exploration and
development unattractive w h e n taken together with other pre-production payments. But in
m y view, the "minimum expenditure" and exploration and development licence fees under
the P N G regime are not too burdensome.

5. Provisions to Benefit the National Economy
The final form of pre-production payments is under provisions which require the
investor to comply with certain obligations to benefit the national economy, such as training

Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.256. For example, this policy was adopted by the Chinese government
in relation to the Yellow Sea and Pearl River Basin of the South China Sea.
Ibid.
See above n28.
See Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.256. But sufficient time is given to IOCs to consider exploration
offers, and once accepted, the program forms part of the contract, so failure to perform what they
agreed to do would amount to breach of contract. The P N G provisions on this are very flexible,
with a lot of exceptions built into them, so I think this should not be too onerous to IOCs.
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and employment of nationals, provision of infrastructures, purchase of local products and
services

and supply of oil at lower prices for domestic markets. S o m e of these

obligations m a y be impossible to be performed until c o m m e n c e m e n t of commercial
production, but others m a y be performed during the exploration stage. These obligations
are not fiscal devices for capturing economic rent but further other general economic
objectives of the host state.

T o the investor, such expenses are unrelated to profitability,

and, thus, increases the cost of a project.

In PNG, the obligation for socio-economic development forms an important part of
petroleum contracts. The Standard Petroleum Agreement under section F provides, among
others, for training and localisation, procurement of domestic goods and services, and
business development.

However, there is no requirement to supply oil to the domestic

market at lower prices. K h a n suggested that, while such socio-economic development
should not be discouraged, "provisions requiring the purchase of local goods and services
and the construction of local plants should...be made flexible."39 H e said that where there
is an obligation to supply local markets with oil, this could amount to taxing the investor if
the price paid by the state is lower than the international market price.40 Khan's suggestion
to relax provisions for socio-economic development m a y not be appropriate for P N G
because of the absence of infrastructure such as schools, roads, electricity, water supply
and health services in remote areas where the projects are located. There is a tremendous
need for such infrastructures for customary landowners and, in general, the rural
population. Therefore, I would suggest that to provide investment incentives, the
government should look elsewhere and not in this area. In that respect, the "tax credit

But some economists comment that developing countries "have limited scope for local purchase of
supplies", especially highly sophisticated technology for the mining and petroleum industry: see R.
Garnaut and A. C. Ross, "Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and the Taxing of Natural Resources Projects"
(1975) 85 (338)77ze Economic Journal 272.
Khan, above n2, at p.73.
See clauses 14-15, Standard Petroleum Agreement. A full discussion on this is taken up in chapter
eight.
Khan, above n2, at p.73.
40

Ibid.
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scheme", under which investors are given tax rebate on the cost for providing
infrastructures, is a laudable policy.41

B. Payments Based on Production

These payments are based on production and not on the profit earned from the sale
of production. Royalty is the most popular and traditional form of payment for the right
granted to extract petroleum. A s such, the obligation to pay royalty becomes due from the
first day of production until the end of the life of a field. Historically, royalties were
imposed in the form of a specified amount per unit of production (for example, x kina per
barrel or per ton).

This practice has diminished and n o w the typical formula is to fix

royalty as a percentage of the value of production.44 In some countries, the royalty
percentage is fixed by legislation, whereas in other countries, it is left to be negotiated and
determined contract by contract, depending on whether the production is onshore, offshore
in shallow waters, or deep waters.

In PNG, section 118 of the Petroleum Act fixes the royalty rate at 1.25 percent of
the well-head value of all petroleum produced from a field. The well-head value is the
value of petroleum determined in accordance with the "norm price" set by the Minister
less any cost attributable to processing and transportation between the well-head and the
point of export or delivery.

In 1996, the government increased the royalty rate by 0.75

Under the "tax credit scheme", investors may provide infrastructures to the local people. The costs
are reimbursed by way of tax rebate by the National Government.
Royalty is not a tax on profit but a payment for the right to extract the resources in question: see
Matthews v. Unicory Marketing Board of Victoria (1938) 60 C.L.R. 263, per Latham C J . at p.276.
See also Khan, above n2, at p.73.
See Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.258.

The Minister determines the value of petroleum produced from a development licence after
considering information furnished by the licensee and other relevant material under section 117 and in
accordance with Schedule 2 of the Petroleum Act Ch.198. In the case of petroleum produced for
export, the value is determined at the point of export, and in the case of petroleum not intended for
export, at the point of delivery to a refinery or processing facility in P N G .
47

Petroleum Act, section 118 (2).
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percent. N e w petroleum projects which develop in 1996 and thereafter will be subject to 2
percent royalty, but there is a tax rebate on the 0.75 percent.

If royalty rates are high, they are likely to have negative impacts on investment
interests. "The most obvious possibility is that a high royalty will m a k e a field which was
viable on a pre-tax basis uneconomic after the royalty has been levied."48 Companies m a y
be discouraged to develop marginal fields, particularly in areas where exploration and
development costs are high, because royalty is calculated before these costs are deducted.
Another distorting effect of a high royalty is the incentive given to abandon a field
prematurely.

Since host governments are interested in effective and thorough

development, such an outcome would not be in their best interests. It is fairly obvious that
companies cannot be expected to carry on if production costs exceed expected revenue,
especially towards the end of a project's life, when the rate of production is declining, but
the royalty rate remains static.

In some countries, attempts have been made to alleviate such distorting effects by
introducing royalty rates which slide with the volume of production. For example, in
Norway, w h e n production is less than 40,000 barrels per day (b/d), an 8 percent rate
applies; and w h e n production is between 40,000 to 100,000 b/d, the rate is 10 percent on
total production.51 A similar but more sophisticated sliding-scale royalty - the Progressive
Incremental Royalty - which allows a payment only after a fixed rate of return to the
investor, is applied in Canada. Recent contracts in China and Ghana show provisions for
sliding-scale royalty payments.53 Sliding-scale royalties appear to be popular among m a n y

K e m p , above nl, at p. 128.
Studies conducted in the U S show that royalty payments result in reduced efficiency through
premature abandoning offieldsand discouraging investment in the secondary and tertiary recovery.
See Mikesell, above nl2, at p. 164.

Khan, above n2, at p.74.
"

Ibid.
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countries because of the belief that this is the best form of royalty payment, which
minimises the distorting effects on the cashflow of a project.54

In addition to the negative effects high royalty rates can have on the cashflow and
net present value of a field, the second important consideration should be its deductibility as
a tax credit. A s K h a n points out: " U S investors are reluctant to invest in countries using
royalties because the Internal Revenue Service does not allow a tax credit for these
payments. This significantly affects a project's attractiveness, since double taxation serves
to reduce the income of an investor."55

PNG's royalty rate was fixed at 1.25 percent in 1977 when the Petroleum Act was
promulgated. N o attempt has been m a d e to increase this rate despite demands to do so by
customary landowners and provincial governments w h o are direct beneficiaries.56 This
stability clearly demonstrates the government's interest to provide investment incentives.
Moreover, it appears that arguments from the industry against any increase in the royalty
en

rate have been well taken. Although one might argue that the rate was increased by 0.75
percent in 1996, there is a rebate on this amount, so the investors do not suffer any
additional royalty obligations. T h e 0.75 percent increase was a tactic used by the national
government to appease local landowners and provincial governments, w h o demanded an
increase in the royalty rate. The only difference, if any, would be that the rebate is claimed
from the income tax payable to the national government whereas the 0.75 percent royalty is
paid before exploration and production costs are deducted for purposes of income tax

Previously, 20 percent of mining and petroleum royalties were paid to customary landowners from
the project area while 80 percent was given to the provincial government concerned: section 67,
Organic Law on Provincial Government. J. Nonggorr, "Provincial Government Participation in
Mining and Petroleum Developments" [1991 Special Issue] MU9\, at p.97. For example, the
Memorandum of Agreement Relating to the Kutubu Petroleum Project Between the Independent
State of Papua N e w Guinea and the Southern Highlands Landowners, clause 6 provides that 20
percent of the royalties will be paid to Kutubu landowners while 80 percent will be paid to the
Southern Highlands provincial government. In 1995, the Organic Law on Provincial Government
has been repealed, and replaced with the Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Governments.
Under section 98 (5) of the latter law, however, all royalties are paid to the landowners.
57

See P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, Position Paper on Mineral Ownership and Equity (15
March 1990, loose leaf), which argues against even any slight increase of the royalty rate.
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calculation.

In other words, the difference is only in timing of the payment. P N G ' s

royalty rate is one of the lowest in the world and, as such, s o m e of the economic
distortions associated with high royalty rates are avoided.

C.

Taxation: Payments

Based

on

Net

Income

Virtually all countries in the world have some form of corporate income tax.59
Petroleum corporations are normally subject to this tax. The first production-sharing
agreement in Indonesia did not provide for income tax, but because the U S companies were
denied tax credit for the profit-oil share accrued to Pertamina, Indonesia's national oil
company, income tax was introduced into subsequent agreements.60 Even under riskservice contracts, investors are generally expected to pay income tax.61

To IOCs, income tax is the least onerous tax, because this is levied on the net
income or profit.

It does not affect the profitability of a field in the same w a y as fixed

payments on production or pre-production payments do.3 In fact, if properly designed,
the investor can capture the lion's share of the yield on productive oil-fields.64 In addition,
income taxes qualify for U S tax credits and, thus, the possibility of investor from that
country suffering double taxation is removed.

In PNG there are two types of taxes imposed on the net income or profits from
petroleum operations. These are corporate income tax, which is the primary tax levied at
58

But processing and transportation costs m a y be allowed in calculating royalties.
See K e m p , above nl, at p. 130.
Ibid.
Risk-service contracts are arrangements under which the I O C becomes a contractor to the national oil
company for exploration and development of petroleum for the payment of certain fees.
K e m p , above n 1, at p.74.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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50 percent, and additional profits tax (APT), also set at 50 percent. A P T is levied once a
positive threshold rate of return is triggered.66 Income tax, taken literally, means what
comes to a person (or wider taxable unit) during a period,67 or simply a tax on income.68
Income tax is assessed according to the provisions of the Income Tax Act 1959.

Since income tax is based on net income, the determination of the tax base broadly
requires a two-step process. First, a determination must be m a d e of the gross revenue
derived by the investor. This determination is also necessary for calculation of royalty.
Second, in computing taxable income, it requires costs to be taken into account, which in
turn requires substantive rules governing the allowance of both current and capital expenses
and administrative procedures for monitoring the expenses claimed. "As a result, an
income tax, though flexible and potentially high-yielding, is a very difficult type of fiscal
regime to administer."6

Below, some of the issues associated with the assessment of

income tax under these two processes are discussed. These include allowances and
deductions, ring-fencing or non-consolidation of income, pricing and the A P T .

1. Pricing
T o determine the gross revenue derived by a company, H C s provide rules to
determine the price at which a barrel of oil is sold. This is not the actual price which the
investor concerned m a y realize but an artificial price which helps the H C to compute
income tax and royalty. In determining the price, revenue m a y be deemed to have been
derived upon the earliest of (1) delivery of petroleum within the host country, (2) export of
70

the petroleum, or (3) sale. There are two important reasons w h y a H C determines its
o w n price. First, the world oil market is volatile and oil prices arefixeddaily by interaction
between the supply and demand of stocks.71 Also, crude prices vary between "spot" prices
Further discussion of this tax will be taken up below.
R. Neild, Taxation Policy in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: Institute of National Affairs, 1980)
p.7.
T. Sentheyval, Students Guide to Papua New Guinea Income Tax (Boroko: Nades & Associates,
1989) p.9.
69

Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.259.
7

"

Ibid.
Pierre-Noel Giraud, "The Equilibrium Price Range of Oil: Economics, Politics and Uncertainty in
the Formation of Oil Prices" (1995) 23 (1) Energy Policy 35, at p.42.
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and prices under term contracts. Because of this, it is difficult to set a universal reference
price or standard price which the H C m a y use. Host governments feel that their revenue
base should not be dictated to by private arrangements of the company to sell petroleum on
either of these markets.72 Secondly, and perhaps more important, is the "transfer-pricing"
problem.

Since most petroleum companies are large, vertically integrated enterprises, usually
the sell of production derived in a host country is a sale by one subsidiary to
another subsidiary in the same affiliated group. Transactions of this kind can give
rise to price manipulations, since the group as a whole - unlike the host country suffers no economic loss if the inter-subsidiary transaction takes place at an
artificially low price. Moreover, because large multinational oil companies have
widespread operations throughout the world, sales m a d e by a producing company
to a wholly unrelated buyer m a y be carried out at an artificial price which is
compensated for by a parallel transaction taking place elsewhere between other units
of the same enterprise.

T o avoid these problems, four pricing devices have been developed. These are: (a)
the "arm's-length" price; (b) the "posted" price; (c) the "net back" price and (d) the
"reference" price or "norm" price.

a. The Arm's-length Price
The "arm's-length" price is the price negotiated by two parties that are equal and
75

independent of, or unrelated to, each another. This is the traditional mechanism used by
host countries to determine the price of oil sold to related companies. This form of
Ibid. In P N G , crude price is set at the point of entry into a domestic refinery or at the point of
export: see Petroleum Act Ch.198, section 117.
For detailed discussions on transfer pricing, see B. D. Brunton, "Prices, Mining and Taxation in
Papua N e w Guinea" (1978) 6 MLJ 5; D. L. Anderson, Foreign Investment Control in the Canadian
Mineral Sector: Lessons from the Australian Experience (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for Resources
Studies, Queens University, 1984) p. 14; and D. P. Quint, "Assault on Multinationals: French and
American Reallocation Provisions" (1974-1977) 50 Notre Dame Lawyer 662, at p.665.
Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.260. Tillinghast notes as an example a report issued by the US Internal
Revenue Service, which disclosed a series of complicated sale and re-sale transactions (referred to as
"daisy chains") which were entered into by unrelated U S oil companies on artificial terms in an
apparent effort to avoid price regulations in the U S .
See Brunton, above n73, at p.39.
76

Ibid.
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pricing is well accepted as a device against transfer-pricing and applied to companies in
other industries which are subject to income tax. However, there are inherent problems in
its application. It requires extensive investigation of comparable transactions, which m a y
be beyond the means of small developing countries like P N G to administer. Even then,
where comparative information is collected, there m a y be ambiguities, especially where
transactions have been undertaken between two unrelated companies. 77 Despite these
obvious administrative difficulties, the "arm's length" device is still retained because there
is no generally recognised substitute, for income tax purposes, in other industries.78
However, in relation to assessing petroleum income tax, m a n y countries have abandoned it
in favour of other devices. This became possible because "petroleum business involves an
enormous number of similar transactions in a single primary commodity (or single group of
primary commodities) [and hence creates], a circumstance which makes it possible to set
generally applicable prices to an extent not feasible across the whole range of industries and
79

types of commercial transaction."

b . The Posted Price
Perhaps the best k n o w n substitute for the "arms-length" price is the "posted" price,
which is the price deemed to have been received by a company on the sale of petroleum.
The actual price realized m a y not be equal to the deemed price adopted by the H C for
purposes of income tax calculation. In case companies are unwilling to agree to posted
prices, host governments m a y , by law, compel them to sell petroleum at prices so
determined.80 In principle, posted prices m a y be wholly arbitrary, and in practice, they
Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.260.

The posted price upheaval in the 1970s and early 1980s is telling. In September 1970, Libya raised
its crude price from $2.23 to $2.53 per barrel. In April 1971, again Libya negotiated with oil
companies to increase oil price from $2.55 to $3.45 per barrel. In January 1972, six Persian Gulf
O P E C members increased their posted price by 8.49 percent (to which oil companies agreed) to
compensate for devaluation of the U S dollar in 1971. In October 1973, six Persian Gulf nations
announced the increase of their posted price by 170 percent. In December 1974, O P E C set the
Arabian Light marker crude price at $10.12 per barrel. In September 1975, O P E C increased the
posted price to $ 11.51 per barrel. In December 1976, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate (U. A.
E.) announced oil price increase of 5 percent whereas the rest of O P E C members announced a 10
percent increase. In December 1978, O P E C announced oil increase at an annual rate of 14.5 percent
beginning with 5 percent increase in Lanuary 1979, and additional increases in 1 April , 1 July , and
1 October 1979. In June 1979, O P E C increased the Saudi Marker crude price to $18.00 per barrel.
In December 1979, Saudi Light was set at $24 per barrel and Libya announced an increase to $30.00
per barrel. Saudi crude price was raised by $2.00 to $26.00 per barrel in January 1980. In June
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have tended to be higher than the prevailing market prices for like petroleum.81 Although
this mechanism m a y appear to be appealing to host governments because of the large
measure of control over pricing they can retain, it is necessary not to disregard the concerns
of oil companies.82

c . The Netback Price
The "netback" pricing system, essentially, refers to the price of crude oil that is
derived, after subtracting the cost of refining and transportation, from the sale of its
products.83 Netback was first adopted by Saudi Arabia in 1985 in its effort to increase
production by making its crude competitive in the world market.84 "This mechanism had
the same effect as price discount. It helped to increase the liftings of Saudi crude, and it
was soon adopted by other oil producers."

This method of pricing brought about

fundamental changes to the timing of crude oil transactions. In the past, prices were
determined at the time of loading for shipment. After 1985, however, prices are
determined upon arrival of the crude at its designated refinery, or after it has been refined.
This in turn has led to a chain of other complicated reactions. First, the netback system
•

0*7

removed the refiners' risk to price volatility, and n o w the price risk lies with the sellers.
Whether the seller is the host country or an oil company, it can incur substantial losses if

1980, all O P E C members except Saudi Arabia and U. A. E. raised their posted prices to $32 dollars
per barrel. These increases show the enormous power of H C s to set crude prices arbitrarily.
Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.260.
The unilateral increases in prices in the 1970s and early 1980s had dramatic effect on the world
petroleum industry; one of which is the curtailment in investment activities in developing countries
and frontier regions.
Australian Mineral Foundation ( A M F ) , Macro Economics of Petroleum and Strategic Planning,
A M F Workshop Course 670/90 (Adelaide: A M F , 14 July 1990) p.22.
But netback pricing of terms sales was practiced by Libya and Iran in the early 1980s, although only
to a limited extent: see Hossein Razavi, The New Era of Petroleum Trading: Spot Oil, Spot-Related
Contracts, and Futures Market (Washington D C , The World Bank, 1989) p.31.
A M F , above n83, at p.22.

*7

Ibid.
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the crude price falls.

T h e crude price based on the netback system keeps changing with

the constantly changing products market. Secondly, the netback pricing concept is clear,
but the basic parameters like product prices, refining costs, date of valuation, etc. greatly
differ from contract to contract, and, as such, a uniform price m a y be difficult to fix.89 But
the positive contribution is that it has a stabilizing effect, because w h e n the price of s o m e
products go up, the lower prices of other products will bring it d o w n to stabilize and fix the
price at a particular point.

d. The "Norm" Price
The pricing system used in P N G is the "reference" price or "norm" price.91 This
method of pricing falls somewhere between the arm's length system and the posted price
system. A succinct description of this system is found in the following words: 92

Under such a system, a periodic determination is made of representative prices for
petroleum produced in the host country. This determination seeks to establish a
representative market value for the petroleum by reference to world (or in s o m e
cases relevant regional) prices, taking into account differences in the terms of
various types of sales agreements. Normally, a single reference or n o r m price is
established for sales taking place in each given period, regardless of the conditions
of sale (e.g., whether sales are m a d e on a spot or term contract basis).

It is generally believed that the reference or norm price system is the most neutral of
the four systems of pricing.

This is because, first, the reference price system attempts to

avoid m a n y of the administrative difficulties of the arm's length system by eliminating the
need to inquire into every particular transaction or series of transactions that has taken
place. Secondly, it attempts to avoid the potential distortion inherent in the posted pricing
system, that prices are almost unilaterally and arbitrarily decided, and seeks to set prices at

Razavi, above n84, at p.35.
A M F , above n83, at p.22.
Ibid.
See section 177 of the Petroleum Act Ch.198.
Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.261.
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least at market prices.94 Thirdly, the seller does not avail itself to price risks by totally
surrendering its power to determine prices to the buyers and to market forces, as is done
under the netback pricing system.

The neutral feature of the reference or norm price is m a d e more apparent by the
process adopted for determining price in the event of a dispute as regards the correct price.
Where oil companies question the fairness of the norm price set by the host government,
provisions are m a d e by contract or legislation for those affected to produce economic
information and argument as to w h y it is unfair.95 If the host government fails to give due
consideration to such arguments, the contract or legislation m a y further provide for
determination by arbitration. In P N G , the arbitration tribunal m a y be an impartial body,
such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade L a w , or a judge. B y
contrast, the arm's length and posted pricing systems reserve the final decision to be m a d e
97

by the host government.

The forgoing shows that P N G has chosen the most neutral pricing system to
98

determine its tax base to levy income tax. The next process to be examined is the rules
and types of allowances or deductions available to allow investors to recover exploration,
development and administration costs, and capital expenses before income tax is imposed.

Ibid.
95

Ibid.
See the Standard Petroleum Agreement, section G, clauses 19 and 20. In fact, the first norm price
set by the Minister was rejected by the oil companies as higher than the actual price they realized.
Tillinghast, above nl5, at p.261.
However, in January 1996, senior officers from the Internal Revenue Commission reported that the
Minister had not yet determined the "norm price" so companies submitted the price on their o w n
estimates for royalty calculation to the Department of Mining and Petroleum, and for tax purposes to
the Internal Revenue Commission.
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2 . Assessment

of Taxable

Income

and Allowable

Deductions

The Income Tax Act 1959 (ITA) provides that income tax of 50 percent be levied on
the "taxable income" from operations of a petroleum field.99 The taxable income 100 is
calculated by subtracting from the gross, or "assessable" income 1 0 1 all allowable
deductions. Allowable deductions102 include expenses incurred in producing assessable
income 103 which are not of private, capital or domestic nature. In addition to allowable
deductions, there are provisions for depreciation of plant and pre-production capital
expenditure. First, let us deal with the law on allowable deductions.

a. Exploration Costs
For purposes of assessing allowable costs, the ITA separates exploration costs
from development costs. It is necessary that, first, w e consider exploration costs. The
ITA defines "exploration" to mean "exploration for the purpose of discovering petroleum in
Papua N e w Guinea, and includes geological, geophysical and geochemical surveys,
exploration drilling and appraisal in relation to such petroleum, but does not include
development drilling or operations in the course of working a development licence."104 The
Generally, see Division 10A of the Income Tax Act 1959.
Section 4 (1) of the Income Tax Act defines taxable income as.. ."the amount remaining after
deducting from assessable income all allowable deductions and includes taxable additional profits
from mining operations and taxable additional profits from petroleum operations."
The 1995 budget expanded the definition of "assessable income from petroleum operations"
retrospectively from 1 January 1988 to include refined products produced in the course of operations
by reference to "fair market value" of those products.
Allowable deductions means deductions allowable under the Income Tax Act: see s.4 (1).
Assessable income means all the amounts that, under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, are
included in the assessable income. Assessable income from petroleum operations means:"(a) assessable income derived from the sale of petroleum, at a price ascertained by reference to
the norm price, obtained from petroleum operations carried on by the taxpayer; and
(b)
assessable income derived from the carrying out of petroleum operations including rents
or interest derived by the taxpayer in the course of carrying out those operations; and
(c)
assessable income from royalties, other forms of profit-sharing income and any other
income derived by the taxpayer from or in connection with the carrying on of those
operations by him or by another person,
but does not include the proceeds of sale of petroleum which the State has agreed to forgo in favour
of a taxpayer to meet the State's accumulated liability (other than for interest) under an agreement
between the State and the taxpayer relating to petroleum operations carried on by the taxpayer."
KM

Id., section 164 (1).
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question is: to what extent are exploration expenses allowed? If a company has incurred
exploration expenses for 50 years before a commercialfieldis discovered, will all the costs
during those years be allowed? W h a t expenditure items are allowed and what are not? Are
exploration expenses allowed to be fully recovered in the early years of afield,or are they
spread out evenly throughout the entire field life? Are exploration expenses incurred in
other licence areas allowed to be carried over to the development licence? These are
significant questions for both the investor and the H C , which w e will attempt to address.

The first rule is that all exploration expenses are allowed to be carried up to 11 years
only.1

This means that if commercial discovery is m a d e and production begins after 50

years of hard exploration, expenses from year 39 to 50 will qualify for deductions. The
rest, that is, from year 1 to 38 will not qualify. Interest on loans incurred prior to the issue
of a development licence are not deductible, even if it w a s incurred within the 11 year
period. " If the exploration phase is not demarcated, exploration costs would surmount
and even exceed the expected returns from a field. If this happens, the revenue to the
government would seriously be imperiled. Moreover, it m a y be administratively difficult to
assess expenditures in those years iffileshave not been properly kept.

The question as to whether 11 years is a long time has not been considered
anywhere. Perhaps, given the high risk nature of the exploration industry, it m a y be
necessary to retain it, even if it does appear to be long.

The second rule is that exploration expenditure ends at the time when the
101

development licence is issued. This is necessary to separate the exploration phase from
the development phase so that expenditures can be clearly apportioned for tax purposes.
Another reason, and perhaps more important, is for purposes of the different rules which
apply in deducting costs: exploration expenditure is deducted outright whereas capital
108

expenditure is armortised over the lesser of life of the petroleum field or eight years. ' The
See Ernst & Young, Taxation of Petroleum Projects in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: 1992)
p.4
l 6

".

Id., at p.6.
Personal communication with a senior staff of the Internal Revenue Commission (Port Moresby:
January, 1996).
Ernst & Young, above nl05, at p.4.
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cut off date can become contentious at times if it is not clearly determined. T i m W a d e 1 0 9
reports a decision of the Commissioner of Taxation of Australia which states that the
exploration phase of a petroleum project ceases w h e n a decision by the board members of a
company to develop a field is made, after having established that there is sufficient quantity
of resources and that it would be economical to carry out the petroleum operations.110 The
Commissioner said this is a question of fact.111 T h e Commissioner further stated that it is
not necessary that this intention is formally documented, and the fact that a production
licence has not been received does not alter the character of the expenses incurred after that
decision has been made.

W a d e criticised this decision as impractical.113 I concur,

because a decision to develop a field has to be formally documented and declared to mark
the end of the exploration phase, rather than to hold that the exploration phase has ended at
the time the opinion to develop a commercial field was formed. There is no obvious
problem in this regard in P N G .

The third rule is that the amount deducted in any particular year should equal the
"residual exploration expenditure" divided by four, or by the number equal to the life of the
project in question, whichever is less.

This deduction cannot exceed the difference

between the company's assessable (or gross) income and its allowable capital
expenditure.

This is designed so that tax loss in any particular year is not created.116

The ITA gives a very broad definition of "allowable exploration expenditure". It
states that "...a reference to allowable exploration expenditure in relation to a petroleum

Tim Wade, "Exploration Sustaining Development - Taxation Considerations" [1993] The APEA
Journal 423.
The case is IT 2642.
Id., para. 30.
Ibid.
Wade, above n 109, at p. 425.
See the definition of residual exploration expenditure in section 164F of the Income Tax Act.

See Ernst & Young, above nl05, at p. 14. For the definition of allowable capital expenditure, se
Income Tax Act, section 164A.
Ernst & Young, above nl05.
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project is a reference to so m u c h of the allowable exploration expenditure of the taxpayer
(a) prior to the date of issue of the Petroleum Development Licence relating to the
project..." and "(b) for the purposes of exploration pursuant to the prospecting licence from
which that Petroleum Development Licence was drawn which includes exploration
expenditure undertaken after 1 January 1990 in another prospecting licence to the extent the
Departmental Head of the Department responsible for minerals and energy matters certifies
that such expenditure has been undertaken to delineate a petroleum deposit in the
prospecting licence from which that Petroleum Development Licence was drawn." "7

Some tax experts interpret this provision to encompass the following expenses:118

1. expenses on the purchase of petroleum right or information which the purchaser
and vendor have agreed to designate as exploration expenditure;
2. expenditure in another P P L or P D L so long as the project m e m b e r has
permanently given up its rights in respect of that other area;
3. expenditure in another P P L m a y qualify if the Department of Mining and
Petroleum certifies the purpose of this expenditure was to delineate a petroleum
deposit in the P P L in question; and
4. that the transferred expenditures as in above are subject to the same time limit of
11 years as if they were incurred in the P P L leading to the P D L .

"It is possible under the present income tax legislation, for example, to transfer
expenditure incurred in exploring on another P D L or P P L entirely, to a successful
discovery as long as the rights to that other licence are permanently given up."

From

this, it can be said that the extent to which exploration expenses are allowed in P N G is
wide and generous enough to attract continued exploration. However, unlike most
countries where exploration expenses are written off on a 100 percent basis in the first
year,120 the third rule above suggests that P N G provides a four-year period within which to
recover exploration costs. While the cost recovery period depends on the economic

Income Tax Act, section 164A.
Ernst & Young, above nl05, at p.7.
Ibid. But this is subject to a continuity test in the case of a company.
K e m p , above n 1, at p. 133.
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objectives of each host country, a general statement from an incentive viewpoint is that a
fairly fast recovery of these costs is appropriate.

b. Capital Expenditure
T w o questions which naturally arise in determining capital allowances for income
tax calculation are: (1) which costs are included for purposes of computing the allowance;
and (2) what method of recovery should be provided and over what period of time should
the recovery be effected? Normally, the tax legislation of the H C would define the scope of
allowable capital expenditure, and the method of recovery.

In PNG, the ITA makes provisions for deduction of capital expenditures incurred in
carrying out "petroleum operations". The I T A defines "petroleum operations" to m e a n
operations in P N G for the purpose of recovering petroleum and activities ancillary to those
operations that are directly related to the transport of the petroleum recovered to a port or to
a point of dispatch from a port or other terminal, but does not include exploration.121
Capital expenditure incurred by a company in carrying out petroleum operations is pooled
separately, and a deduction is allowed each year for the residual expenditure divided by
eight, or the number of years of the remaining life of the project, whichever is less.
Section 1 6 4 A of the I T A provides a somewhat exhaustive list of allowable capital
expenditure. Generally, these include (1) the cost of constructing plant in relation to the
production of petroleum; (2) cost of general administration and management of the project
incurred after the issue of a P D L but before production for commercial purposes; (3) a wide
range of infrastructure costs such as provision of water, meals, electricity, communications
to the site, accommodation for employees, facilities for health, education, law and order
and recreation; (4) feasibility and environmental studies, provided they have not been
included as exploration expenditures; and (5) costs for transportation of crude oil, including
storage and stabilization facilities, pipelines, tanks, pumping stations, ports and terminals.

In many countries, certain types of capital expenditures may be characterised as
current expenditures. This is done to allow accelerated recovery of costs as an incentive to
investors.122
Income Tax Act, section 4(1).
Tillinghast, above nl5, at pp.262-263.
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c. Accelerated Depreciation
Since the timing of cost recovery is of great economic importance to investors, a
H C m a y provide, as an incentive, speedy recovery of costs that are of capital nature. For
the recovery of costs for machinery and equipment which remains the property of the
company, costs are usually recovered through depreciation allowances, which treat as an
expense in each year of the physical useful life of the asset a ratable portion of its cost.123
Generally, H C s m a y adopt one of two rules of depreciation. These are "straight-line
depreciation" or "accelerated depreciation". In countries where the first rule is followed,
the period of depreciation is based upon the expected physical life of the asset. A pro rata
portion of the cost is allowed in each year of the life of the machinery or equipment.

In

countries where the second rule is adopted, the assumption is that the asset will have a
shorter life-span than its real physical life, and so allowance is m a d e in early years for a
larger than pro rata portion of the cost involved.

In P N G , accelerated deductions are available for residual exploration and residual
capital expenditures during the "investment recovery period"

123

if the net income in any one

Ibid. Machinery and equipment which becomes the property of the host government do not have a
physical "useful life" to the petroleum company. Such costs are typically treated as current
expenses, to be allowed for income tax purposes in the year incurred. If not, they m a y be capitalized
and recovered pro rata over the estimated production period of the field involved. O r they m a y be
capitalized and recovered over a period arbitrarily selected, without regard to the expected production
period.
Ibid.

125

126

Ibid.
The "investment recovery period" is the period commencing with the year of income in which
commercial production, beyond what is merely incidental to the development of the project, first
starts and ending in the year of income that the sum of the company's:
1.
taxable income from petroleum operations;
2.
deductions allowed under Division 10A of the Income Tax Act; and
3.
normal depreciation deductions
less
the sum of petroleum income tax paid in relation to that development licencefirstexceeds the initial
capital investment of the taxpayer. Initial capital investment is defined under s.164 (1) as:
"the sum of allowable exploration expenses incurred up to and including thefirstyear of income
production;
the sum of allowable capital expenditure incurred up to and including thefirstyear of income
production; and
the cost of plant acquired and used in the operation before the end of the first year of income
production and subject to the option of depreciation under normal rules." See Ernst and Young,
above nl05, at p.19; also see the Income Tax Act, section!64 (1).
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year of a project is less than a target income.

Simply defined, the investment recovery

period is the period during which an operator's cash flow from the project has not covered
its initial capital investment.128 The net income here is, basically, the cash flow for the year
199

with interest payable and receivable removed. The target income is set at 25 percent of
the initial capital investment incurred to develop the project, or a proportional amount in the
1 ^0

first year of production. " For example, if the initial capital investment of a project is
K 8 0 0 million, the target income at 25 percent would be K 2 0 0 million. The accelerated
deduction allowed, if the project does not meet its target income, is the least of (1) the
amount required to reduce the income tax payable for the year to achieve the target income,
(2) the residual exploration and capital expenditure deductions available, and (3) the written
d o w n values of normally depreciated plant and the remaining taxable income of the
131

operator.

3. Ring-fencing
The ring-fence principle protects the income tax base by providing that expenses
incurred in other exploration licence areas not related to the development licence cannot be
1 ^9

offset against taxable income from the P D L . ~ This policy m a y also be applied to restrict
consolidation of income from production, refining and marketing, or to separate various
areas of operation, for instance, onshore and offshore, or from contract to contract.

The

rationale behind this policy is to prevent the loss of potential revenue to the host
government from taxes or have it reduced because of capital allowances.

A n d further, a

government m a y not want to defer tax payments. "Deferral would m e a n a higher internal

Ernst & Young, above nl05, at p.8.
Ernst & Young, PNG Taxation Law and Practice (Port Moresby: 1996) p. 142.
Ernst & Young, above nl05, at p.8.

Khan, above n2, at p.76.
Ibid. In P N G , some changes were introduced by the 1995 budget to relax the ring-fencing rules by
providing that the definition of "petroleum project" will be determined by regulation by the
Commissioner General, with the consent of licensees.
1.14

See K e m p , above n30, at p.96
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rate of return to the investor. Taxable profits should therefore appear at a very early stage
in the cashflow."135

PNG applies the ring-fence principle, and income tax is assessed on a project by
project basis. T w o criticisms are m a d e against the ring-fence policy. First, taxes paid
under a ring-fenced system do not qualify for U S tax credits; only taxes paid on combined
or consolidated earnings qualify for credit, so there is a possibility of U S companies being
taxed twice on the same income.136 This could discourage U S companies from investing in
P N G . Secondly, by defining the net income restrictively by ring-fencing, the government
shows that it is not interested in sharing commercial risks of unprofitable areas. "In other
words, the state wants to share the risk, or offer tax incentives, in areas which prove
profitable and not accept part of the cost of unprofitable projects."137 If exploration interest
is waning, this sort of image has to be improved.

D. Resources Rent Tax

Many countries impose special taxes on exceptionally high post-tax profits accruing
to the taxpayer if they are above what is considered to be reasonable return on the
investments. Such a tax is designed to give effect to the H C objective to capture for the
public as large a proportion as possible of the benefits generated. Perhaps the most popular
special tax on post-tax profits in recent years is the resources rent tax ( R R T ) or additional
13R

profits tax (APT), as is k n o w n in P N G .
Ross Garnaut and Anthony Clunies-Ross, w h o
first introduced this tax into the world, provided the following definition:139

The Resources Rent Tax is briefly a profit tax that begins to be collected when a
certain threshold internal rate of return on total cash flow has been realised. The
Khan, above n2, at p.76.

In Australia, it is known as resources rent tax: see Ted Hattersley, "An Analysis of Australian
Petroleum Taxes" [1991] The APEA Journal 463, at p.467.
i.w

Garnaut and Ross, above n36, at p.277. The authors have later expanded the resources rent tax in
that article in their book Taxation of Mineral Rents, above n!2.
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starting point for assessment is an annual quantum called "net assessable receipts",
which is simply the sum of all receipts in respect of the establishment and operation
of the project, less the s u m of all corresponding payments. In the terminology of
this paper, net assessable receipts in any year are simply the excess of all
"assessable receipts" over "deductible payments" in the year.
The principle of Resources Rent Tax is to take a threshold rate of x% (it might be
1 0 % or 1 5 % for instance) as an interest rate, and each year calculate the value of net
assessable receipts from the beginning of the project accumulated at that interest
rate. The process involves in each year raising the accumulated value at the end of
the previous year by the interest rate, and adding to this the current year's net
assessable receipts.
A positive accumulated value would...indicate that an internal rate of return in
excess of x % on funds committed to the project had been realised, and the excess
would be taxable at a % (which might be 5 0 % ) .
In order to avoid double taxing, the positive net accumulated value for any year on
which the Resources Rent Tax had been assessed would be deducted from the
assessable receipts of that year for the purpose of calculating the net accumulated
value for tax purposes in future years.

In P N G , the A P T is imposed at the rate of 50 percent after the companies have
recovered their investments, including a reasonable rate of return. The accumulated net
cash receipts value is determined by using a compounding process which commences in the
year in which exploration expenditure commences. In that year, the amount equals the

aggregate value of net cash receipts to that point. In each subsequent year, the amount of
accumulated value of net cash receipts is calculated using the formula:

F x A(100% + R) + B
E
Where
A = the accumulated value of net cash receipts at the end of the previous year of income
B = the net cash receipts of the year of income
R = the accumulated rate set at 2 7 %
E = the mean of the average of the daily published buying and selling rates of P N G currency against
U S currency during the year of income prior to the one for which the calculation is being made (in
Kina per $US).
F = the same as E, except taken for the current year.

Provisions on A P T for petroleum are found under sections 165 to 165C of the Income Tax Act.
Calculation of A P T for mining is covered under sections 163Y to 163ZC of the Income Tax Act.
For mining, A P T applies only to special mining lease, which are large mining projects. Thus,
small to medium mining projects are not subject to the additional profit tax.
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Since calculation of A P T is complex, it is explained with the aid of the two worked
examples below.141

Example One
A petroleum development licence (PDL) is granted within six years of issue of a
petroleum prospecting licence (PPL); for example, the P P L was granted in 1985 and the
P D L in 1989.

The petroleum project incurred expenditure from the date of issue of the PPL in
1985 and up to 1989. The accumulated value of the net cash receipts was K 1 0 0 million.
There were no receipts during the next year of income, but eligible expenditure of K 3 0
million was incurred the year ended 31 December 1990.

Therefore, the net cash receipts as at 31 December 1990 are: NCR = K100 million
+ K 3 0 million = K 1 3 0 million.

This amount carried forward into the next year of income is the net cash receipts up
to 31 December 1990, plus an accumulation rate of 27 percent, as set out in section 165 (1)
of the IT A. Therefore, the accumulated value of net cash receipts carried forward equals
K130 million x 1 2 7 % = K165.1 million.

If, in the 1991 year of income, the net cash receipts are positive, then the APT will
apply. If receipts during 1991 equal K 2 5 0 million, eligible expenditure in the same year is
K 7 0 million (including income tax), accumulated value of net cash receipts brought
forward equals K165.1 million, the calculation of A P T will be as follows:
N C R = K 2 5 0 m - (K165.1m + K 7 0 m ) = K14.9m ( positive amount). Therefore,
A P T = K 14.9m x 5 0 % = K7.45m.

Ml

These examples are based on information and examples kindly provided by a staff of the Internal
Revenue Commission during an interview in January 1996.
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Example T w o
This time let us assume that the P D L is granted six years after the issue of a PPL;
for example, the P P L was granted in 1981 and the P D L in 1987.

The net cash receipts from 1981 to 31 December 1988 are K150 million. (This is
not the accumulated value of N C R but the actual net outlays since the issue of the PPL).
The P D L was granted in 1989, and outlays for the year ended 31 December 1989 is K 5 0
million, the calculation is:

Total NCR up to 31/12/1989 = K150m + K50m = K200m. Therefore, the
accumulated value of N C R as at 1 January, 1990, is K 2 0 0 m x 1 2 7 % = K254m.

If in the 1991 income year, the net cash receipts are positive, then the APT will
apply. Let us say the receipts during 1991 are K 3 5 0 m and eligible expenditure (in 1991,
including income tax) is K70m.

The accumulated value of net cash receipts brought forward is K254m. APT will
be calculated as follows:

NCR = K350m - (K254m + 70m) = K26m (positive amount). Therefore,
A P T = K 2 6 m x 5 0 % = K13m.

In PNG, the Internal Revenue Commission (IRC) believes that APT in both mining
and petroleum projects is very unlikely to be triggered in the foreseeable future. " This
conclusion is based on prices of gold, copper and oil, which appear to be stable and which
are likely to remain at that for some time. Even if prices rise, it is likely to be moderate.

From interviews and notes provided by a staff of the Internal Revenue Commission in January 1996.
From mining, the government earned through A P T from Bougainville K 17,357,000 in 1974,
K20,401,000 in 1979, Kl 1,566,000 in 1980 and K23,242,000 in 1988. See Desh Gupta, Political
Economy of Growth and Stagnation in Papua New Guinea (Waigani: U P N G Press, 1992) p.204.
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A P T from petroleum m a y only be triggered if the current price of $ U S 15 per barrel rises to
«/P11
nvpr $
<CTTQOn
-_,•barrel.
K n - J ,43
well over
U S 2 0 per

The main argument against the A P T is that since the government is able to capture
exceptionally high profits through its equity participation, the A P T is not necessary.144
Against this argument, however, there are two advantages from the investors' point of
view. Firstly, investors are attracted by the fact that the State shares significantly in the
project risks. "The tax itself is not levied until the threshold rate has been achieved, so the
investor can have a full capital recovery plus profit return."145 Hence, A P T does not m a k e
any project unprofitable. Secondly, A P T is self-adjusting: it changes automatically to allow
profitability to the investor, regardless of the price, field size, production and cost
conditions. "For this reason the tax is neutral. It allows a maximisation of economic rent
from the project."

III.

SOME

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROBLEMS

For PNG, like any other similar developing countries, problems centre around
administration of the tax regime on net income. Three c o m m o n problems for P N G are: (1)
the complexity of the tax regime; (2) lack of manpower; and (3) the possibility of tax
evasion and transfer-pricing. In relation to the first point, the P N G tax regime has been
criticised for being similar in nature to the Australian tax system, which has been devised
for an advanced economy. 147 A s such, a tax system devised for an advanced economy is
complex and, for the most part, difficult to administer in a developing country like P N G .

Ibid.
144

145

P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum has put up this sort of argument.
Khan, above n2, at p.79.
Ibid.

147

I4H

Neild, above n67, at p.4.
Ibid.
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The second problem is generally acknowledged, and that is that there is a lack of
qualified manpower. 149 The Commissioner of Taxation stated that because of the lack of
resources, it is impossible to undertake a 100 percent audit of any particular project or
company. 1 5

Because of this lack of manpower, someone has likened the P N G tax

authority to "an emperor with no clothes".151 If the taxation services are undermanned, the
integrity of the taxation regime is endangered.152

In relation to the third problem, the general belief of the Internal Revenue
Commission is that, because of the nature of companies in the natural resources sector, tax
evasion or avoidance is not likely to occur.

The joint venture partners keep an eye on

one another so that no one partner benefits through transfer-pricing, or other methods of
tax evasion or avoidance.1

Further, this view is reinforced by the fact that the petroleum

price for income tax purposes is calculated based on the "norm" price determined by the
Minister for Mining and Petroleum.

However, in 1994, the norm price set by the

Minister was higher than the actual price that buyers were willing to pay for the Kutubu
crude. Because of this, the companies were not able to follow the norm price, and the
Internal Revenue Commission had to rely on the estimates submitted to it by the
156

companies.

Personal communication with a senior staff of the Internal Revenue Commission, January 1996.
James Loko, Commissioner of Taxation, "Mining and Petroleum in Papua N e w Guinea - A n
Internal Revenue Commission Perspective" (a paper delivered at Regent Hotel conference on
"Mining and Petroleum Investment in Papua N e w Guinea" organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines
and Petroleum) at p.l 1. In 1995, the Internal Revenue Commission was not able to collect the
correct amount of tax from mining and petroleum because companies were not able to fully lodge
their tax returns.
Neild, above n 67, at p.39.
Id., at p.3
Loko, above nl50.
Ibid.
The Minister for Mining and Petroleum determines the "norm price" in accordance with Section 117,
Petroleum Act Ch. 198 and Schedule 2 of the same.
156

Interview with a staff of the Internal Revenue Commission in January 1996.
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Continued reliance on the estimates submitted by companies alone could create
suspicion of transfer pricing practices. Transfer-pricing m a y be defined as manipulation of
either input or output prices in such a fashion as to reduce reported profits and, hence, host
country tax payments.157 This can be achieved by manipulation of book-keeping entries.

The entries may represent either expenditure or revenue items. For example, a
parent company m a y sell a patent to an overseas subsidiary at a price in access of
the market value. In the books of the subsidiary the sale is recorded as an
expenditure incurred in the course of business and is tax deductible. T o the parent
company the excessive mark-up on the sale represents a repatriation of profit from
the subsidiary. Similarly items of revenue can be manipulated to achieve tax
advantages. For example, the parent company located in a low tax jurisdiction m a y
require a subsidiary in a high tax jurisdiction to undercharge w h e n the subsidiary
sells its products to the parent, so that on a global basis the business can gain the
m a x i m u m advantage from the low rate of tax applicable to the parent.158

There are many ways of shifting income and expenditure between related
companies in the sense described above. The classical methods are by providing loans or
cash advances against future sales, performance of services such as management fees,
inter-company royalty payments for access to parent-developed technology and computer
systems, marketing fees, use of tangible property, transfer or use of intangible property,
and sales of tangible property.

This is largely done by manipulating the prices at which

such products and property are shipped, or services rendered, between subsidiaries and
parents, and vice versa.

Experiences from advanced economies like Canada, United Kingdom, Australia
and the United States, where complicated mechanisms are put in place to monitor transferpricing, support the theory that transfer pricing exists but is hard to identify. A Canadian
study found that transfer-pricing is potentially serious in the mineral industry, but
concluded that it is difficult to establish.161 Brunton notes that the use of interest free loans

See Anderson, above n73, at p. 13.
Brunton, above n73, at p.6.
Anderson, above n73. See also Brunton, ibid.
Anderson, id., at p. 14.
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between U S parent companies and subsidiaries abroad has been a long-standing practice.
In British Imperial Oil Co. v. F.C.T.,

Higgins J. found that a parent company in

London and a subsidiary in Australia could easily hide the profit of its Australian business
by, for example, increasing the prices of the goods sent to Australia.164 Further, Starke J.
commented in that case that, in fact, it is no secret that income tax has been avoided by
parent companies outside Australia and subsidiaries in Australia.165 Since the P N G Internal
Revenue Commission relies on the estimates submitted by companies, h o w will it be able
to verify every tax statement and receipts w h e n it lacks the m a n p o w e r to do that? If
transfer-pricing is practiced between developed nations and goes undetected, one can only
imagine h o w vulnerable a developing country like P N G is.

IV. SUMMARY

Pre-production payments are the most burdensome to investors because these are
not imposed on profit, and in the event that there is no commercial discovery, they cannot
be recovered. Generally, the pre-production payments in P N G m a y not be as onerous as
they are in other similar countries. There are no signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus and royalty bonus. The area and surface rental fees are not as high as
those paid under the auction system. The discretionary system provides for modest licence
fees, which are necessary to defray administrative costs and encourage thorough and rapid
exploration and development. They are not designed for economic rent collection, as done
under the auction bidding system.

Payments based on production is the royalty which has been imposed at 1.25
percent. While high royalty rates m a y deter investment, this low rate is unlikely to do so.
Although this rate has been increased by 0.75 percent to 2 percent recently, there is a tax
rebate on it.

Brunton, above n73, at p.6.
(1926-27) 38 C.L.R. 208.
Id., at p.209.
Id., atp.214.
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Payments based on net income are generally welcome by investors, even if the rates
are high. The real incentives lie not in the rate but in the definition of the income tax base.
The wider the tax base and the earlier the recovery period, the more attractive it is to
investors. T h e problems for P N G lie in administration where it is conceded that
opportunities exist for large oil companies to capitalise on the weaknesses of the State. I
submit that for the sake of good corporate image, companies should not exploit those
weaknesses. In any case, for the tax authorities to put too m u c h reliance and trust on the
companies in such a commercial relationship is risky. The State should attempt to improve
its manpower capacity and improve other areas of weaknesses.

Finally, additional profit tax is neutral. Its imposition cannot affect investment in
any significant sense. In fact, it is m y opinion that this is the best fiscal instrument to
capture exceptionally high profits without jeopardising the interests of the investor.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
PRIVATISATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMNENT
CORPORATION AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Most, if not all, petroleum producing countries participate to some degree in the
exploitation of petroleum resources in their territories with foreign oil companies. T w o of
the principal reasons for government participation are, first, to maximise revenue, and
second, to control the activities of foreign oil companies to further other national objectives,
particularly the need to acquire necessary skills and knowledge so that nationals can take
full control in future petroleum exploration and exploitation.
For these and other purposes, the PNG government participates as a joint venture
partner by reserving the right to acquire a m a x i m u m of up to 30 percent equity in large
mining projects, and 22.5 percent in petroleum projects. These interests are held and
managed by Mineral Resources Development Corporation ( M R D C ) , a company wholly
owned by the State. The State's exploration and development costs are "carried" by the
foreign companies. Their costs are reimbursed from the State's share of return. This
means that the State realizes profits only after its carried costs have been fully reimbursed,
with interest at commercial rates. The State's equity interests in existing projects are as
shown in the table below.

i

The State decides whether it will hold equity or not at the time a development proposal by the
project developer is lodged for government approval. Prior to that, the State's position on equity is
not determined.
Large mining projects are those that are governed by special mining leases ( S M L ) .

i

Bougainville closed in 1989, but it is included here merely to indicate the amount of equity interest
thte State held. There are m a n y projects in the pipeline, and exploration is continuing, so the
statistics m a y change in the future.

184

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Project
Bougainville
O k Tedi
Misima
Porgera
Kutubu
Lihir
Gobe

Equity (in % )

20
30
20
204
17. V

15°
22.5'

Because M R D C does not explore for or develop resources in its o w n right, it cannot be
considered as a government-owned mining or petroleum company, but merely a holding
company to carry the State's equity.
In keeping with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Q

engineered economic structural adjustment program, a partial privatisation of M R D C was
effected by the passage of the Mineral Resources Development Company Pty Limited

(Privatisation) Act 1996.9 This has significant adverse implications on policy justific

Five percent was "carried" and sold to the Enga Provincial Government and the Porgera landowners.
See clause 6 of the memorandum of agreement ( M O A ) relating to the development of the Porgera
gold mine project between the State and the Porgera Landowners, and the M O A between the former
and the Enga provincial government. The 15 percent of the 20 percent equity, which the State owns
now, was purchased after forced re-negotiation of the initial mining development agreement in March
1993.
The Kutubu and Kikori landowners and Gulf and Southern Highlands Provincial Governments
bought 5.4 percent of the State's initial 22.5 percent equity, and of this, 3.15 percent is held equally
by the Kutubu landowners and Southern Highlands Provincial Government. The landowners' and the
two provincial governments' equity was carried together with the State's equity.
It is difficult to know how much equity in Lihir was given to the Lihir landowners from the State's
30 percent equity because neither the M O A between the State and the N e w Ireland Provincial
Government, nor the M O A between the latter and the representatives of the landowners, the Lihir
Mining Area Landowners Asociation and the Nimarmar Development Authority, provide any
information on the equity arrangement. The only information on equity is that the N e w Ireland
Provincial Government opted for infrastructure in lieu of equity: see the M e m o r a n d u m of Agreement
Relating to the Lihir Gold Mining Project Between the State of Papua N e w Guinea and the N e w
Ireland Provincial Government, clause 4.
It is not yet determined how much equity interest the relevant landowners and provincial
government(s) will be given.
The economic structural adjustment program was introduced to bail PNG out the cash flow crisis it
experienced beginning in 1994. For more information on the causes of the cash flow crisis see,
Desh Gupta, The Exchange Rate Issue and the Cash Flow Problem in Papua New Guinea: Some
Self-inflicted Wounds, N R I Special Publication No.21 (Waigani: N R I , 1995).
u

No.3 of 1996, certified on 22 M a y 1996.
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for government participation, particularly, the objective to control and allow participation
by nationals in the industry and maximise revenue. The aim of this chapter is to examine
these implications.

II. PRIVATISATION ARRANGEMENTS
Under the Mineral Resources Development Pty Limited (Privatisation) Act 1996
( M R D C Privatisation Act), the State and M R D C entered into an option agreement ( O A )
with Orogen Minerals Limited10 to sell to the latter 49 percent of the State's interests held
by M R D C in current mining and petroleum projects and in future projects which are not
required for the benefit of landowners and provincial governments." While M R D C retains
51 percent in Orogen, 49 percent was offered to the public, both in P N G and overseas in
1996.12 For purposes of this public offering and in accordance with the O A , Orogen has
acquired, with effect from 1 September 1996, 15.75 percent direct interest in Kutubu and
20 percent interest in Misima. 13 B y 1 October 1996, it acquired the State's right to
purchase 15 percent in Porgera, which had been acquired after re-negotiation of the Porgera
mining contract in 1993.

Orogen has also acquired 6.81 percent equity interests in

Lihir.15 In future petroleum projects, beginning with G o b e and thereafter, Orogen has the
option to acquire 20.5 percent equity interests, while in mining projects it can take up to 25
percent.
The MRDC Privatisation Act amended the Petroleum Act Ch.198 and inserted a
new division - Division IIIA - to provide for the rights of the privatised company, Orogen,
the State and M R D C , as stipulated in the O A . Section 31 A , the section under this n e w

Orogen is claimed to be a wholly-owned subsidiary of M R D C , incorporated for purposes of the
privatisation scheme.
The Option Agreement is attached as a schedule to the MRDC Privatisation Act 1996.
See Orogen Minerals Limited Prospectus (Port Moresby: 1996) p.25.
The 15.75 percent interest in Kutubu was in consideration for the issue of 144, 700, 000 shares at
par and the 20 percent in Misima was in consideration for the issue of 16, 985, 000 shares at par:
id., at p.24.

Ibid. Of the State's initial 10 percent, 5 percent was sold to the landowners and the Enga Provincia
Government.
Ibid.
The Option Agreement.
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division, provides that, notwithstanding any provision of any other division, or the terms
of any agreement m a d e by the State, Orogen, M R D C and the State shall each have the right
to acquire and transfer a participating interest in a petroleum project in accordance with the
0 A.

Further, without limitation, the conditions of any petroleum prospecting licence, the

terms of any agreement m a d e by the State in relation to a petroleum prospecting licence,
and the conditions of any petroleum development licence or pipeline licence granted in
relation to a petroleum project m a d e after the M R D C Privatisation Act shall recognise and
provide for the exercise of those rights in the OA. 1 8 Section 3 1 A (2) provides for the
State's interest to be held either by M R D C or Orogen, as agreed under the O A .

Where a proposed developer lodges an application for development of a petroleum
field, the Minister for Mining and Petroleum or the Director (Secretary) is required to give
Orogen written notice of the receipt of such application.19 Orogen then m a y request the
proposed developer to submit to it, or allow it to have access to, such information
concerning the application and the applicant's proposals in as far as it requires them for
purposes of determining whether it will exercise its option under the OA. 2 0 This implies
that Orogen's interests will be carried by the foreign oil companies. A proposed developer
is required to disclose relevant information to Orogen's employees, any adviser or expert
21

contracted by Orogen.

W h e r e the proposed developer reckons certain information is
99

confidential, it m a y require Orogen or its employees not to disclose it. The Minister shall
not grant a petroleum development licence to an applicant withoutfirstinforming Orogen of
his/her intention to do so.
Section 28 of the MRDC Privatisation Act attempts to control the ownership of, and
dealings in, shares in Orogen. Section 28 (1) (a) provides that the articles of association of
Orogen shall provide for the imposition of restrictions on the issue, transfer and ownership
Petroleum Act, section 31A (1) (a), (as amended) by section 22 of the MRDC Privatisation Act.
18

Id., section 3 1 A (1) (b).
Petroleum Act, section 33A (1), (as amended) by section 24 of the M R D C Privatisation Act.

20

Id., section 3 3 A (2).
Id., section 33A (4).
Ibid. Penalties for disclosing confidential information are: a fine not exceeding K10,000, or
imprisonment for four years, or both.
Petroleum Act, section 35 (10), (as amended) by section 25 of M R D C Privatisation Act.
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(including joint ownership) of shares in Orogen so as to prevent a person from having
relevant interests in shares in the company that represent, in total, more than 15 percent of
the total nominal amount of the issued share capital of the company. Paragraph (b) further
provides that the directors of Orogen will have the powers to do anything to enforce the
requirement of paragraph (a) by restricting the transfers of shares, removing or limiting the
voting rights of a share holder, refusing to register shares, and to ensuring that the head
office of Orogen is always located in P N G . Subsection (2) states that any resolution or
special resolution which purports to go against these requirements will be of no effect. It is
quite clear that the purpose of this provision is to restrict any individual ownership of
Orogen.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE PARTICIPATION
There are several significant implications for State participation as a result of the
partial privatisation of M R D C .

First, the partial privatisation of M R D C annuls the

fundamental policy justifications (i.e. maximisation of revenue and assertion of national
ownership and control) for government participation in mineral and petroleum
developments. Second, it strengthens private sector arguments against government
participation. Third, it provides a ground for landowners and provincial governments to
step up pressure on the national government for increased equity participation. The
following sections attempt to discuss these ramifications.

A. On National Ownership and Control

One primary justification for government participation in mining and petroleum
exploitation in P N G is in accordance with the national economic objectives, which call for
citizens and governmental bodies to (1) control buck of the economic enterprise and
production, (2) take effective measures to control and participate in the exploitation of
natural resources and (3) allow economic development to take place by the use of skills and
resources available in the country, either from citizens or the State, and not by imported
skills or resources.24 W h a t these goals really call for is simply exploitation of P N G ' s
natural resources by citizens using local skills, technology and capital.

See Goals 1-3 of the National Goals and Directive Principles in the Preamble to the Constitution,
and also objectives 1, 3 and 4 of the March 1976 White Paper on Petroleum Policy and Legislation
at p.5.
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T o do this without foreign assistance would perhaps take several decades. The
conventional practice, especially among developing countries like P N G , is to allow foreign
investors to develop these resources under conditions which would allow transfer of
necessary skills and technology and provide manpower training so that, in the future, the
host country can develop these resources by itself without having to rely on, or on an equal
footing with, foreign investors. O n e of thefirststeps in that direction is by providing for
the host state to be involved in the actual day-to-day management of development of the
resources as a joint venture partner. This will enable it to acquire "inside" knowledge
through its participation at board meetings. In this respect, the final objective of the five
primary objectives of M R D C expressly states that the intent and purpose for which M R D C
was incorporated is to allow full participation in the management of mining and petroleum
developments by Papua N e w Guineans.25 In stating this, P N G has stepped in the right
direction to follow a path well established by other petroleum-producing countries.

Many countries, both developed and developing, have similar aspirations like PNG
for national control and ownership of petroleum operations. T o further that, m a n y types of
legal arrangements have been developed. The joint venture is the most c o m m o n vehicle
under concession regimes, but their type and nature differs from country to country.
Under production-sharing arrangements and risk-service regimes, the arrangements m a y be
different." Generally speaking, joint ventures under concession regimes m a y fall under
three categories. These are: (1) equity joint venture, (2) contractual joint venture, and (3) a
97

joint venture which combines features of both (1) and (2).
The earliest joint venture, between the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and
A G I P Mineraria (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli) of Milan, Italy, a subsidiary of E N I
(Ente Nationale Idrocarburi), provides a good example of an equity joint venture. In brief,
the essential characteristics of that equity joint venture show that the relationship between
the host state, through N I O C , and the foreign oil company, A G I P , were established
through an independent joint stock company in which both partners held equal shares

Principal objective (e) of M R D C ; Mineral Resources Development Company, a leaflet obtained
from M R D C head office in Port Moresby, at p.l.
Details of these types of regimes are provided in chapter nine.
For details on these types of joint ventures, see Kamal Hossain, Law and Policy in Petroleum
Development: Changing Relations Between Transnational and Governments, (London: Frances
Pinter, 1979) pp.121-138.
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(50/50).

The ownership of petroleum exploration and production rights was vested in the

joint stock company. The joint stock company was to sell crude oil to the equity joint
venture partners on terms and conditions acceptable to it. Half of the board of directors
were nominated by N I O C , while the other half were nominated by AGIP. The chairman of
the board was appointed by N I O C and the vice-chairman by AGIP. 2 9 The technical
management of the joint stock company, as well as all exploration programs, were
performed by A G I P . A G I P financed NIOC's share of exploration costs. In the event that
no commercial discovery was made, A G I P carried all the risks.30

Examples of contractual joint ventures are shown by the agreement between NIOC
and the Pan American Oil C o m p a n y of 24 April 1958 and the 17 January 1965 agreement
between N I O C , A G I P , Philips and the Oil and Gas Commission of India.31 Contrasting
this joint venture and thefirstequity joint venture, Hossain observes that:
Under a contractual joint venture (or joint structure) the partnership is not
constituted into a joint stock company, and thus does not assume a separate
corporate entity. The relations between the parties are governed by the terms of the
partnership contract. The petroleum produced is not jointly owned. Each partner
owns a 50 per cent undivided share, and thus directly owns its o w n share of the
production... "
In a contractual joint venture, management is entrusted to a joint stock company,
which has no balance sheet and which is not subject to taxation.33 However, exploration
costs and initial development costs of the host state or national oil company are carried by
the foreign partner. A slight difference, though very significant to the host state, is that the
host state directly owns its share of production. O n the basis of this, it is m y view that
PNG's equity participation can be regarded as a contractual joint venture, because each

The joint stock company was called SIRIP (Iran-Italian Petroleum Company: Article 2, AGIPN I O C Agreement dated 24 August 1957, original copies published by Petroleum Legislation
Company ed., Middle East: Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts (Original Texts), vol. I -1959,
(New York: Gordon H. Barrows, 1958), at p. Iran D-3.
Id., article 4, A G I P - N I O C Agreement.
Id., article 8.
These agreements are found in Petroleum Legislation Company, above n28.
Hossain, above n27, at p. 127.

v

Id., at p.128.
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joint venture partner is entitled to its o w n share of production, equivalent to their share
holding, and, further, their relationship is governed by the joint venture agreement.

Early examples of joint ventures with special features are provided by some Saudi
Arabian joint venture agreements. The Saudi Arabian agreement with Libya-Auxirap dated
4 April 1965, provided that the latter was to carry out explorations at its risk, and in the
event of a commercial discovery, the former had the option of 4 0 percent equity
participation. Their interests were to be carried by a joint operating company, which would
embrace all facets of operations, including downstream activities such as refining, transport
and marketing.

Similarly, the agreement between A G I P and Petromin, Saudi Arabia's

national oil company, dated 21 December 1967, provided that Petromin would have the
option to acquire 30 percent equity in the event of a commercial discovery.35 A G I P was to
be reimbursed from Petromin's share of returns. The management of the company was
entrusted to a Saudi Arabian non-profit making company in which both parties were to
subscribe shares in proportion to their equity holding.36 These special features m a y be
noticed in the P N G practice. There is a joint venture company not subject to tax. The State
reserves the option to acquire 22.5 percent equity in any commercial discovery. A n d
foreign partners carry the State's exploration risks.

Indonesia's production-sharing regime provides another type of arrangement,
developed essentially to allow government control of petroleum operations and direct
ownership of a share of production. This arrangement is different from the Middle East
concession agreements under which joint ventures have been developed. The essential
features of the Indonesian production-sharing regime are that, firstly, Pertamina,
Indonesia's national oil company, is vested with the right to explore for, and exploit, all
•a-y

mineral and petroleum resources in Indonesia. Secondly, all foreign oil companies are
mere contractors to Pertamina. This means Pertamina is responsible for the management of
the petroleum operations. The contractor is appointed as the exclusive company to conduct
petroleum operations, with its capital, technology, manpower and equipment at its sole
M

Id., atp.131.
Id., at p. 132. Petromin had a licence from the Saudi government which was assigned to AGIP,
which is the subject of the agreement.

,6

Ibid.
For an historical account of Pertamina and its formation, see Robert Fabrikant, "Pertamina: A Legal
and Financial Analysis of a National Oil Company in a Developing Country" (1975) 10 Texas
International Law Journal 495.
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risk."

However, it is responsible to Pertamina for such operations. Its costs are

reimbursed out of production, popularly k n o w n as "cost oil".39 Thirdly, their legal
relationship is merely contractual "contractorship", and as such, the foreign oil company
has no ownership in its share of production - it only has a "contractual" right.40 M a n y
countries have followed this Indonesian model.

Some Latin American countries appear to favour "risk-services" contracts. The
essence of a risk-service contract is that the foreign oil company agrees to provide all the
risk capital and services for exploration and development.41 It is remunerated in cash or
buy-back oil, or both. This contractual device w a s developed out of the desire of
developing countries to "assure m a x i m u m national control over petroleum development
while at the same time having a m i n i m u m level of foreign involvement."42

The various arrangements above show attempts by developing countries to directly
o w n and participate in petroleum development in their o w n territories. Hence, P N G is not
alone in expressing its desire to transfer majority control of resources exploitation to
nationals. The developed world too had, and still have, ambitions to control and o w n
petroleum resources not only in their countries, but also in other parts of the world,
especially in developing countries. In fact, their quest for control and acquisition of
petroleum resources dates long before the coming into existence of the developing world.
A n d they indeed took control of petroleum resources in m a n y parts of the world until
governments of oil producing countries devised n e w legal arrangements to get involved.
For comparative purposes, it is necessary that w e reflect on some of those developments.
The British Government was the first government to participate directly in
petroleum business, by purchasing 51 percent controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil
C o m p a n y (now British Petroleum) in 1914.43 Previously, the British Government was
Zhiguo Gao, International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions (London:
Graham & Trotman, 1994) p.73.
Khong Cho Oon, The Politics of Oil in Indonesia: Foreign Company -Host Government Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p.44.
Gao, above n38, at p.73.
41

Id., at p. 105.

42

Ibid.
See Ed Shaffer, The United States and the Control of World Oil (London: Croom Helm, 1983) p.42.
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only involved indirectly through its companies, n o w k n o w n as Shell and B P , in the Middle
East and the Far East.44 B P and Shell (British/Dutch owned) controlled 100 percent of
production in the Middle East and a 90 percent share of production in the Far East by
1929.

British oil hegemony was maintained through deliberate policy which prevented

U S oil companies from entering its sphere of influence until late 1920s and early 1930s.
The British Government's policy was "motivated by balance of power interests and clear
military interests in oil for naval purposes."46

It was inevitable that other western powers would follow Britain's example in
questing for direct participation in petroleum exploitation. The first World W a r and the
expanding industrialisation underscored the importance of oil. Not surprisingly, the
French President Clemenceau and one of his cabinet ministers observed that oil is "as
necessary as blood" 7 and "more precious, more penetrating, more influential in the world
48

than gold itself." O n this belief, the French Government pursued a policy similar to
England's after the war ended. "It bought shares in C F P (Compagnie Francaise des
Petroles) in order to guarantee for itself a portion of that company's reserves in Iraq."49
From then on, C F P expanded to other territories and soon established itself as the eighth
major oil company in the world.

The United States Government pursued a policy essentially designed to secure
foreign sources of oil for U S companies through diplomacy.50 Since most, if not all,
petroleum development in the U S and in U S controlled territories were undertaken by U S
oil companies, it was not a cause of concern for the U S government to formulate policies to
ensure that exploitation of petroleum resources within its territories were undertaken by U S

For example, Britain sent m e n with gunboats to guard Anglo-Persian Oil Company's property
against attacks by marauding tribesmen in Persia.
Hans J. Bull-Berg, American International Oil Policy (London: Frances Pinter, 1987) p. 142. The
Middle East countries are: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
The Far East refers to the British colonies in the far East Asian region, such as Indonesia, Burma,
Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Singapore.
Ibid.
Shaffer, above n43, at p.42.
Ibid.

5(1

These are examined by Bull-Berg, above n45.
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oil companies. W h a t was of concern, however, was to secure exploration accreages for its
oil companies in territories (like the Middle East and Indonesia) controlled by Great Britain
and other European powers. T o further that, the U S adopted what became known as the
"open door" policy. Through diplomacy, the U S government managed to persuade the
British and Dutch governments to "open doors" to U S oil companies in territories held by
them, especially in the Middle East and Indonesia. T o reciprocate for not opening their
areas of influence to U S oil companies, the U S did likewise by "shutting its doors" to
British and Dutch oil companies. For instance, the passage of the Minerals Leasing Act
1920 was to implement this principle of reciprocation. "Because of the discrimination that
American oil corporations experienced in British and Dutch controlled areas outside
Europe, the act contained reciprocal measures pertaining to United States soil."51

The US government attempted to participate directly by promoting a national oil
company. The first m o v e was m a d e in 1920 in the Senate to establish a state-owned
United States Oil Corporation, but it was defeated.52 A year later leading oil companies
took the initiative to form an American Petroleum Corporation, which was to operate
abroad with governmental backing. This also failed when consumer interests, small oil
companies, a large segment of the industry and, particularly, the State Department, refused
to support it. W h e n these attempts failed, the U S government pursued the open door
policy. It succeeded in opening up the Middle East in 1928, w h e n the Iraqi Petroleum
Company (IPC) was formed to exploit oil resources in Iraq between British, French and
American oil companies. Subsequently, U S companies acquired concessions in other
Middle East states. Since then, American policy concentrated on protecting those interests.
It still pursues this policy today.

When oil was found in the 1960s in the North Sea region, Norway and Great
Britain incorporated the Norwegian State Oil Company (Statoil) and the British National Oil
Corporation ( B N O C ) , respectively, to participate in its exploitation. The Norwegian
government established Statoil in 1972 with the object to "engage, either alone or by
Id., at pp. 158-159.
Id., at p. 159.
Ibid.
The 1991 Gulf W a r and a legislation passed by the U S Congress in 1996 prohibiting foreign
companies from investing in Iran over and above a specified amount of U S dollars could be seen as
protecting U S oil interests veiled with economic sanction against terrorism.
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participation in and cooperation with other companies, in exploration for and production,
transport, refining and marketing of petroleum and derivatives thereof, and other activities
which are naturally related thereto".55 D a m provides three reasons for the establishment of
Statoil." First, Statoil was established to facilitate the "desire for a more active government
role in the exploration for, and production of, oil."5 T h e second reason was because of
the government's greater ability to control a public body than a private company in matters
such as rate of production and pricing. "This factor appealed to those in N o r w a y w h o
sought direct control over the economy beyond the oil industry, especially because the
offshore oil industry bulked so large in such a small country."58 The third reason was
beyond the realm of economic explanation - it is for prestige, national pride, rivalries with
contiguous nations and the like.

It is m y view that these justifications should be adopted

in P N G , although it m a y be difficult because the government is pursuing a policy contrary
to its adopted policies.

BNOC was created in response to public outcry against what they claimed as the
North Sea wealth being given away to international oil companies.60 Because of this,
unlike before, government policy shifted to "a m a x i m u m effort at exploration and
development, combined with a good representation of British interests." ' The government
provided that B N O C should have 51 percent interest or more, either alone or together with
69

another state corporation or subsidiary, in any licence. "The private companies were
asked to offer B N O C an equity stake higher than 51 percent."6 Compared with this
British policy, the P N G policy to acquire 22.5 percent equity to be held by the State for the
people of P N G is far too small. Even then, this 22.5 percent has been partially privatised,
55
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Kenneth W . D a m , Oil Resources: Who Gets What Howl (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1976) p.63.
Ibid.
Id., at p.64.
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Ibid.
Id., at p.65.
Id., at p.9.
Oystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (London: Croom
Helm, 1980) p.45.
Id., p.56.
Ibid.
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further reducing the stake in petroleum projects held by the State. In m y view, this is
contrary to public outcry in the country.

Japan, Canada, Italy and many other developed nations have formed national oil
companies to participate in the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources. In
Canada, successive governments have been concerned about the domination of Canada's
oil and gas industry by American companies. In 1980, the Canadian government
introduced the National Energy Program (NEP), which adopted radical measures to ensure
majority interests in these industries were held by Canadians.64 The N E P was adopted in
response to a report of the Canadian Standing Committee on External Affairs and National
Defence of the House of C o m m o n s (the W a h n Report, as it became known). That
committee wrote:
The committee believes that the large number of American based multinational
corporations operating in Canada pose special considerations as compared to
domestically owned firms - in the leverage they possess in negotiating concessions
from governments, in their ability to avoid host government planning and policy
measures, in the possibilities open to them for price fixing, in the formation of
cartels, in market allocations, in tax shifting, in the extra-territorial intrusion of
foreign laws which m a y accompany their activities and in the general disinclination
to permit Canadians to o w n the majority of voting shares in the Canadian
companies. Accordingly, it is imperative that multinational corporations be
supervised particularly carefully by the commission.65
How true this is for PNG. Large international firms have the leverage in
negotiating concessions from the government. They have the ability to avoid government
planning and policy measures in price fixing, in environmental policy matters, in the
formation of cartels, in market allocations, in tax shifting, and in extra-territorial intrusion
of foreign laws which m a y accompany their activities.
PNG does not have a national oil company or private national companies
participating in the industry. M R D C had the chance to further the objectives of national

See David L. Anderson, Foreign Investment Control in the Canadian Mineral Sector: Lessons From
the Australian Experience (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for Resources Studies, 1984) esp. at pp.4243.
Quoted from the Wahn Report in Anderson, id., at p.28.
The O k Tedi sponsored legislation, the Compensation (Prohibition of Foreign Legal Proceedings)
Act 1995, which prohibits citizens from making environmental compensation claims in a foreign
court, can be seen as one of these influence the committee feared.
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ownership and control. But this has been driven into oblivion. Yet, national ownership
and control of mineral and petroleum resource developments remains an important objective
for every nation. Even Australia, whose companies dominate the mining and petroleum
industries of P N G , has a clear policy to keep majority interests in minerals and petroleum
in Australia vested in Australians. That policy began with Prime Minister Whitlam's
speech of 29 October 1973 at the Australia-Japan Committee meeting:
We believe that overseas capital must continue to play a significant role, in
partnership with Australian capital, in our future economic growth...However, in
some special energy cases, which I shall mention shortly, w e do have a particular
objective of 100 percent Australian ownership...Uranium is one of these energy
sources and w e have an objective of full Australian ownership in development
projects involving uranium. W e also regard this as a desirable objective in oil,
natural gas and black coal.
Since that speech, necessary policies and legislation have been developed to
implement that objective. Australia n o w has an effective policy, which requires mining
and petroleum companies to have at least 50 percent Australian interests, and that the
majority of the voting members on the board of directors be Australian citizens.69

PNG's resources are being exploited so rapidly by multinational companies that
P N G is not able to keep pace with it in as far as training of nationals is concerned. It was
generally believed that the government's participation through M R D C would provide
opportunities for nationals to acquire necessary skills and technology to exploit mineral and
petroleum resources by Papua N e w Guineans. However, this is unlikely to happen
because 49 percent of M R D C ' s stake in the current projects and future projects has been
sold to private interests. Further, the current rate of resources exploitation is so rapid that
by the time nationals acquire the necessary skills, technology and resources to develop
these resources themselves, there might be none left. This will, without doubt, create
70

serious problems for P N G for m a n y years to come.
Quoted in Anderson, above n64, at pp.59-60.
The Foreign Take-Over Act 1975
Anderson, above n64, at p.98. See also R. H. Allan, J. P. Nieuwenhuysen and N. R. Norman,
"Government Intervention in the Economy of Australia" in Peter Maunder ed., Government
Intervention in the Developed Economy (London: Croom Helm, 1979) pp.41-71.
It is useful to note that the ownership of minerals and petroleum debate and the court challenges (see
chapter 4) in P N G were sparked by the government's refusal to grant the Kutubu pipeline licence to
some national entrepreneurs w h o applied for it. The nationalistic sentiments exchanged during the
ensuing debates have been well documented by B. D. Brunton, The Struggle for the Oil Pipeline in
Papua New Guinea, N R I Discussion Paper No.68 (Waigani: NRI, 1992). Bougainville had a small
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Against this somewhat pathetic background, arguably three positives appear. First,
M R D C is still a majority shareholder in Orogen, and as such, it would be possible to
influence and direct Orogen's operations to be consistent with the desire to train nationals to
acquire necessary knowledge and skills. Second, the partial privatisation allow private
citizens to participate directly in mineral and petroleum exploitation by taking up the
ordinary issued shares. This gives a better opportunity for nationals to participate than for
M R D C to keep all the equity interests. Thirdly, the combined equity interests in M R D C
and Orogen are still largely vested in Papua N e w Guineans.71

B . On Maximisation of Revenue

Another primary justification for the government's acquisition of equity interests in
mining and petroleum projects is to maximise revenue accruing to the country from
developments of these resources. This is reiterated as thefirstprimary objective of M R D C :
79

"to maximise both the value and profit from current investments." It is often argued that,
as owner of the resources, the State should get a greater share of the profits than is
available through the tax regime.

This justification m a y no longer be valid, since 49

percent of the State's interest in equity is held (or will be acquired in future projects) for
private interests represented by Orogen. In m y view, keeping that 49 percent in profitable
projects such as Porgera, Kutubu, Lihir and G o b e held by M R D C would have brought
more revenue to the government for several years than the one-off payment received from
sale of the 49 percent in M R D C . 7 4
origin like that until it blew up, and its consequences are too obvious to document. In my view,
this issue is very important for P N G to address early and seriously.
In m y view, section 28 of M R D C Privatisation Act would go to ensure that majority ownership of
Orogen is vested in Papua N e w Guineans.
72

M R D C leaflet, above n25, at p. 1.
See G. Hancock, "State Equity Participation in Mining and Petroleum Projects in Papua N e w
Guinea" in R. Rogerson ed., Proceedings of the PNG Geology, Exploration and Mining Conference
1994, Lae (Melbourne: The Australian Institute of Metallurgy, 1994) p.280, at p.281.
The National daily newspaper on the Internet dated 24 January 1997 reported that the floating of
shares of M R D C raised K73.4 million, whilst Orogen raised K227.5 million. O f the K73.4
million, M R D C paid K13.2 million to cover cost of the float; K14.3 million went to EFIC
(unknown) for loan repayment; K18.3 million went to Porgera landowners and the Enga Provincial
Government in proportion to their interest in Porgera; K4.5 million went to Misima landowners and
the Milne Bay Provincial Government. What remains in the account of M R D C is the remainder K23.1 million.
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C.

O n Equitable Distribution

As examined at some length in the next chapter, the State gives certain percentage of
its equity interests to landowners and host provincial governments. However, non-mineral
or petroleum producing regions depend on the government to share what it retains with
them through annual budgetary allocations. While revenue from equity interests accruing
to landowners and host provincial governments remains unaffected, the other Papua N e w
Guineans have been deprived of 49 percent of the interest, which the State holds on their
behalf. Further, the 49 percent is vested in those few w h o are able to acquire shares in
Orogen, whereas those w h o could not afford to buy shares have been left out of that
portion of the State's interests completely. This conflicts with the policy of equitable
distribution of revenue from resources exploitation.

Experiences of privatisation of public assets in developing countries like India show
that "privatisation...create[s] n e w owners only a m o n g the relatively rich sections of the
society."75 The vast majority remain poor. "This implies that in a poor country the sale of
public assets does not have the same impact as it does in a developed economy like that of
Britain."' There is no guarantee that it will be different in P N G . P N G would have done
well to consider seriously the likely consequences of privatisation in developing countries
before partially privatising M R D C .
D. On Investor Perceptions

Foreign investors in the mining and petroleum sectors have been arguing against
"carrying" the State's equity interests in mining and petroleum projects.77 Although they
welcome s o m e form of government involvement because this insulates them against
political risks, they argue that to carry the State's exploration and development expenditure
78

and risk is a disincentive to investment.

While the State reimburses exploration and

Prajapati Trivedi, "What is India's Privatisation Policy?" (1993) 28 (22) Economic and Political
Weekly 71.
76

Ibid.
Several position papers from the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, which were kindly
provided to me, make this argument.
See John Nonggorr, "Economic Development Contracts and Investment Security in Papua N e w
Guinea" [1992] AMPLA Yearbook 686, at pp.703-704; 706-712.

199
development expenditures from its share of revenue from a project, in the event that no
development occurs, the entire risk is carried by the foreign investors.

Now that MRDC is partially privatised, I submit that the State should not continue
to allow mining and petroleum companies to carry Orogen. Orogen should be allowed to
finance its interests directly, commencing from the exploration stage, like other mining and
petroleum companies. Even if it is argued that it is not Orogen but the State's interests held
by M R D C that are carried, it is Orogen which holds direct interests and stands to participate
in mining and petroleum developments. If the State, nevertheless, maintains its carried
policy, as it appears to be doing from reading of the amendments effected in the Petroleum
Act by the M R D C Privatisation Act as outlined above, this will have negative impacts on
future investments in the industry.

E. Demands for Increased Equity by Landowners and Provincial
Governments

If it turns out that the majority of the shares in Orogen are held by foreigners, or
citizens from non-resource developing regions, it is possible for landowners and host
provincial governments to apply pressure on the national government to give them greater
equity than they have under current arrangements.
A case in point is a recent experience with the Kutubu landowners. When partial
privatisation of M R D C was debated, Kutubu landowners demanded that the national
government give them the option first to purchase the amount that was being privatised
79

from its Kutubu interests. They argued that instead of floating the 15.75 percent acquired
by Orogen to be floated to the public, they should be given the optionfirst,and then let
SO

Orogen offer to the public the remainder which they could not afford. They were
confident that, given the opportunity, they could purchase the amount they requested.
While it is unclear h o w this demand was dealt with, it indicates the willingness of
landowners to purchase substantial equity in resource projects in their area.

This is based on m y personal knowledge.
Personal communication with Alexander Palai, at Granville Motel, Port Moresby, in January 1996.
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F.

O n Oil as a Strategic Resource

Oil is a strategic resource, not only because it is able to generate revenue for a
country and increase its balance of payments and foreign reserves, but also because it can
be used as a political tool to further other national objectives.81 In times of war, a secure
supply of oil determines victory; for example, the Allied Powers in the Second World
S2

War.
In peace times, it can be used to control escalating oil prices by having an
alternative domestic source of supply. It can be a very helpful tool in planning economic
growth of a nation. Because of this strategic importance, most oil-producing countries
seek to retain ownership over a substantial amount of oil supply within their territories.83
One w a y in which this is done is by promoting national oil companies in exploring for and
developing petroleum resources on equal basis with foreign oil companies.

In PNG, petroleum policy is generally jumbled with hard rock minerals policy,
and, consequently, the strategic and specific roles oil can play are, in m y view, not well
appreciated. This is indicated by the lack of a national oil company or a corporate body of
that nature, separate from a body like M R D C , to hold and manage State petroleum interests
separately from mineral interests. However, if the same body, like M R D C , holds the
State's petroleum and mineral interests, they should be kept separate and treated differently
from mineral interests. In this respect, it would have been wise had the State kept its
petroleum interests in M R D C intact while privatising only mineral interests.

Kl

H2

K.I

Gao, above n38, at p.l.
See Daniel Yergin, The Price: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1991), which provides an interesting account of how wars were fought over oil. See also
J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments - An Account of the International Oil Industry in
its Political Environment (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967) p.255.
Alexander G. K e m p , Petroleum Rent Collection Around the World (Halifax, Nova Scotia: The
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987) p.6.
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IV.

CRITICISMS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPATION

Government equity participation has been criticised, particularly by those within the
industry, for a long time for several reasons.

A summary of these criticisms is provided

below to evaluate them against the justifications for government participation.85

1. It diverts public funds away from areas with high social returns, such as
education, health and essential infrastructure projects which are unlikely to
attract private funding.

2. It requires commitment of scarce, qualified government personnel away from
infrastructure development projects to protect the government's investment in
the mine or petroleum project. Given the fact that the government does not have
engineering and management capacity to undertake infrastructure development,
putting its scarce personnel in the public sector is better than keeping them in the
mining and petroleum sectors to administer the State's equity.
3. The extra manpower required to administer the State's equity is an added cost,
which must be factored against returns from the equity holdings.

4. The government puts itself in a position of conflict as both a promoter and
regulator of a company's activities, thereby forcing it to compromise either its
interests as a shareholder or the public interest as a regulator.

5. Equity holding exposes the government to risk, the same as other commercial
ventures involved in the industry.

6. Financial obligations do not end once the State's exploration and development
costs have been refunded. T h e government is not absolved from paying
additional equity once called upon to do so, as experienced in O k Tedi.

See Hancock, above n73, at pp.282-283; John Tilton, John Millet and Richard Ward, Mineral and
Mining Policy in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: Institute of National Affairs, 1986) pp.42-43.
K5
Kfi

Ibid,
Shareholders were called upon to pay additional equity as a result of a re-structure of equity which
increased the State's interest from 20 percent to 30 percent.
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7. T o maximise revenue, taxation is more certain than dividends from equity
87

participation. A s O k Tedi has demonstrated, dividends depend on
profitability, and they m a y not accrue from marginal projects.
8. Because the additional profit tax (APT) would capture exceptional profits from
highly profitable ventures, equity is not necessary.

9. Finally, it is a disincentive to investment.

Against such arguments, particularly one to six, Professor Edith Penrose warns:
There is danger in emphasizing the very short-run needs of developing countries
and ignoring the m e d i u m and long-term cost of foreign capital. It is true that
development is "urgent", but it m a y unavoidably take a long time, and there is as
yet no adequate ground for asserting that the really "critical years" are "now" rather
than later, w h e n strains m a y be heavier. Hence, it m a y be necessary to guard
against permanent foreign control if m a x i m u m benefit from foreign investment in a
particular industry is to be obtained.
There is no doubt that the PNG government has earned substantial amounts of kina
through dividends from its equity interests in mining and petroleum projects. For example,
of the total revenue which accrued to the State from Bougainville through taxation, royalties
on

and dividends, 20 percent w a s from dividends. The only mine which is yet to pay any
dividends on the government's ordinary shares is O k Tedi. Hence, equity paticipation is an
attractive w a y for the government to maximise revenue. But it has been argued that equity
comes at a price.

First, equity is actually purchased, although at a price lower than its full

market value. Second, government equity participation reduces the incentives to attract
investment. Without paying these prices, the government can capture through taxation
what it could earn in dividends.91

O k Tedi has yet to pay dividends on ordinary shares.
Edith T. Penrose and Peter R. Odell, The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The
International Petroleum Industry (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968) p.245.
m

Tilton and others, above n85, at p.42.
Id, at p.44.

"

Ibid.
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In relation to the desire to assert some form of control and facilitate technology
transfer etc by participating as an equal partner with privatefirms,it is often argued that this
is basically a political reason, to be assessed through political processes.92 However, it has
been argued that this justification has lost m u c h of its appeal over the years in developing
countries for two reasons. These are:
First, the tension and conflict between foreign mining companies and host
governments have greatly subsided. Second, and perhaps of even greater
importance, newly independent states, such as Papua N e w Guinea, have clearly
demonstrated to their o w n people and others their sovereignty and control over their
,

9

3

mineral sector.
While this finding could be true in as far as the issue of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources is concerned, it does not address the issue of exploiting natural resources
using local skills, technology and resources. These issues are significantly different: it is
one thing to assert political sovereignty over natural resources which are being exploited by
foreign firms, and it is quite another to exploit the same by local expertise and capital.
W h a t is at stake is economic patriotism as well as economic sovereignty. "The former
concept relates to the issue of 'foreign ownership' per se while the latter focuses on the
notion of control and the locus of decision making."

In m y view, these are the crucial

reasons for government participation. However, the partial privatisation of M R D C
conflicts with these justifications. T h e partial privatisation of M R D C strengthens the
arguments against government participation. Since the government's decision to partially
privatise M R D C is not to consistent with its equity participation policy, I submit that the
government should not participate in equity in future projects anymore.

VI. SUMMARY
Government participation in mineral and petroleum exploitation is, in accordance
with P N G ' s policy, to maximise revenue and acquire managerial skills and knowledge,
with the ultimate aim to exploit these resources using local expertise, technology and
resources. M R D C was incorporated to further these objectives. However, with the wave
of privatisation of government assets that w a s ushered in with the economic adjustment

Anderson, above n64, at p. 17.
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programs sponsored by the World B a n k and I M F , partial privatisation of M R D C was
effected under the M R D C Privatisation Act. The implication of the partial privatisation of
M R D C is that it conflicts with the stated government policy objectives for natural resources
exploitation. It also conflicts with other government justifications for equity participation.
These implications strengthens the private sector arguments against government equity
participation in mining and petroleum projects. The State should hence withdraw its equity
participation policy. The objective to maximise revenue can be done through imposition of
appropriate tax.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
"DEVELOPMENT FORUM" IN NATURAL RESOURCES
M A N A G E M E N T IN PAPUA N E W GUINEA
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the Bougainville crisis in 1988-1989, feasibility studies for
development of m a n y major mineral and petroleum projects were being undertaken.
Proposals for development of the Misima gold and silver mine was submitted in April 1987
and production commenced in 1989. Proposals for development of the Porgera gold mine
was submitted to the National Executive Council ( N E C ) for approval in 1989. Proposals
for development of the Hides gas project and Kutubu petroleum field were expected to be
submitted in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Feasibility studies of the Lihir gold deposit and
the G o b e petroleum reservoir were being undertaken, and development proposals were
expected to be submitted sometimes in the mid 1990s. There were other smaller projects
for which either feasibility studies or delineation work were being undertaken to determine
their prospectivity and commerciality for possible development. The success of these and
future projects, and the stability of the O k Tedi gold and copper mine, which was being
challenged from the environmental front for its lack of a tailings d a m and consequential
pollution of the O k Tedi and Fly River System, was being seriously threatened by what
was developing at Bougainville. It became clear to the government and potential project
developers that success in any resource exploitation would depend very m u c h on
maintaining good relations with landowners and provincial governments. This required
identification of the causes of grievances among the Bougainville landowners and the North
Solomons Provincial Government, and addressing them effectively to prevent similar
developments in relation to those other projects. The causes of the Bougainville crisis were
already m a d e obvious from grievances expressed by the North Solomons Provincial
Government and Bougainville landowners to be: (1) loss of land; (2) dissatisfaction over
distribution of revenue from the mine; (3) lack of participation in the project; and (4)
environmental destruction.2 However, before the crisis was complicated by other issues
These include Mt Kare alluvial gold mine, Wapolu, Hidden Valley, Wild Dog, Tolukuma, Wafi,
Wild Dog, Eddie Creek, R a m u and Laloki mineral prospects. For further information on these
mineral developments and prospects see, Jackson Rannells, PNG: A Fact Book on Modern Papua
New Guinea, 2nd ed., (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp.97-98.
For a detailed discussion on these claims see, John Nonggorr, "Foreign Investment in the Mining
and Petroleum Sectors of Papua N e w Guinea: Benefit Sharing and Customary Land Issues" in
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later, the crux of the initial conflict arose over loss of land and distribution of benefits from
the mine.

The landowners and the provincial government were dissatisfied with the

amount they received. They felt that since they "sacrificed" the land on which the mining
was being carried on and, at the same time, suffered devastating environmental destruction,
they should receive benefits commensurate with these sacrifices. Because the national
government failed to deal with these grievances initially, they built up over the years and
led to the armed rebellion and consequential closure of the mine.

Provincial governments and landowners which were expecting mining or petroleum
development in their regions were given enormous power by the Bougainville situation to
step up pressure on the national government to demand participation in resources
development and request more benefits to flow to them than existing arrangements allowed
for. Provincial governments and landowners from other regions which did not expect
mining or petroleum resource exploitation in their regions offered support because they felt
that if resources are exploited in their regions in the future, they too would benefit under
improved arrangements. T h e provincial government demands were presented to the
National Executive Council ( N E C ) in the form of a submission prepared by a Mining and
Petroleum Working Committee established at the 11th National Premiers' Council
Conference in 1988.4

Meanwhile, another development during the 1980s was the increasing tendency for
government ministers to be directly involved in bureaucratic decision-making of
government departments. This happened as a result of the overall decline in bureaucratic

Euston Quah and William Neilson eds., Law and Economic Development: Cases and Materials from
South East Asia (Singapore: Longman, 1993) p.343, at pp.349-353.
See D. Gupta, The Law and Order Crisis in Papua New Guinea: An Economic Explanation (NRI
Seminar Paper No.l) (Waigani: The National Research Institute (NRI), 1991). Between 1978 and
1987, cash benefits from B C L was distributed as follows: 60 percent - to the national government
(in taxes, fees and dividends); 35 percent - to foreign shareholders; 5 percent went to the North
Solomons Provincial Government; and 0.2 percent to the local landowners in royalty payments:
see John Connel, "Compensation and Conflict: The Bougainville Copper Mine, Papua N e w Guinea"
in John Connel and Richard Howitt eds., Mining and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia (Sydney:
University of Sydney Press, 1994) p.54

The establishment of this committee was partly necessitated by the new mining legislation (now the
Mining Act 1992), which was being drafted, because they felt that this gave them a good
opportunity to incorporate their submissions formally in the new Act.
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efficiency." Particularly in relation to minerals and petroleum exploitation, the relevant
ministers were not properly advised so that they could m a k e appropriate decisions.6 This
meant that a number of ministers would m a k e "off the cuff decisions or statements
regarding mineral developments which could produce unfortunate results.7 In an effort to
rectify the situation, the Department of Mining and Petroleum ( D M P ) felt the need to
provide briefs and advice before the responsible minister m a d e a decision on an issue, but
such briefs or advice at times went against the opinion or action of the minister concerned.
This gradually led to the feeling that the D M P was "in the pocket of the developer", and
consequently, relations between politicians and bureaucrats became strained.8

These two developments gave impetus for the DMP to propose a "development
forum" at which the national government, provincial government and landowners would
meet to discuss all issues concerning development of a major project before proposals for
development is submitted by the proposed project developer to the N E C forfinalapproval.
Previously, the O k Tedi agreements were negotiated by relevant departmental heads and
final versions were sent to the N E C for approval. N o w , because of the political suspicion
that surrounded bureaucratic approval of resources exploitation, the policy was changed for
politicians to be involved in direct negotiation while skilled government personnel were to
provide necessary advice. W h e n this proposal was revealed to a n e w government which
came to power under the Prime Ministership of Rabbie Namaliu in 1988, it received
unanimous support. That became the genesis of the development forum process.

This chapter examines the development forum process and its outcome as a
government solution to address the issues of participation and benefit sharing between
landowners and provincial governments raised by the Bougainville crisis. These two
issues are isolated because it is felt that if landowners and provincial governments
participate in the decision-making process regarding development of a project, they could
then discuss the other two issues regarding land and environment, and settle by agreement
how they can be compensated for them in the form of benefits. In relation to the strained
relationship between politicians and bureaucratic personnel, it will be shown that it is
Notes from John Millet, Director of the Institute of National Affairs (unpublished paper dated
October 1992) p.7.
Ibid.
7

Ibid.

K

Ibid.
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sufficient to get them directly involved in negotiating project development contracts through
the development forum process. The ultimate objective is to show that because of the
development forum, huge benefits are n o w m a d e available to landowners and provincial
governments in resources-producing regions, unlike before. However, it will be argued
that what is required is proper management of those benefits.

II. ARRANGEMENTS FOR BENEFIT-SHARING BEFORE
INTRODUCTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT FORUM
It is helpful to set out a brief outline of the arrangements for participation and
benefit-sharing from resources exploitation between landowners and provincial
governments on the one hand, and the national government on the other, as a background
to the development forum. Before the development forum process was introduced in 1989,
provincial governments and landowners had virtually no means of participating in mining
and petroleum developments under the mining and petroleum legislative framework and
constitutional arrangements.
(OLPG),

Under the Organic L a w on Provincial Governments

mineral and petroleum resources came under "concurrent" legislative powers

where the legislative jurisdiction was shared between the two tiers of government.11 For a
concurrent subject, either the national government or a provincial government could enact a
law for it if none existed. However, where a law of the national Parliament ruled on a
concurrent subject, a provincial government had no power to enact a similar law for the
same matter. If a legislation of the Parliament conflicted with a provincial law on a
"concurrent" matter, the former prevailed.

Since the respective mining and petroleum

legislations were already in place, provincial governments had no power to introduce their
o w n legislation for these resources. Enga, for instance, requested that it be given

J. Nonggorr, "Provincial Government Participation in Mining and Petroleum Developments" [1991)
Special Issue] Melanesian Law Journal 91. See Richard Jackson, "Not Without Influence: Villages,
Mining Companies, and Government in Papua N e w Guinea" in John Connell and Richard Howitt
eds., Mining and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1991) p. 18,
at p. 19.
The Organic Law on Provincial Governments (OLGP) was repealed and replaced by the Organic Law
on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments ( O L P G L L G ) in 1995. The O L P G L L G
has replaced the provincial government system with the regional M e m b e r of Parliament of each
province as the Governor (equivalent to Premier under the old system) and presidents of each local
council area as provincial executives.
See sections 27 and 28 of the OLPG.
12

Id., section 28 (1).
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legislative power for small-scale alluvial mining operations, but this was vehemently
rejected because the D M P felt that this could introduce lack of uniformity into the
industry.

The mining and petroleum legislations provided no avenues to involve

landowners and provincial governments in the formal process of scrutinising applications
or to consider development proposals. The only way, though indirect, was by way of
objections to applications for explorations and development which were considered by the
mining or petroleum advisory board.14

In terms of financial arrangements, no special benefits flowed to landowners and
provincial governments from minerals and petroleum exploitation, except those provided
for under the normal provincial budgetary arrangements.15 The principal source for a
province's budget was the National Government, through m i n i m u m unconditional grants
( M U G ) , 1 6 conditional grants,17 derivation grants18 and proceeds of national taxation
transferred to the province from which it was derived.19 The last item essentially
comprised the 1.25 percent royalties from minerals and petroleum, and royalties from
90

timber andfishproduced in the province. The M U G was a legally guaranteed amount,
provided to be spent on provincial projects without control from the National
91

Government.

The conditional grant was designed as a means to control or influence

The 1988 Premiers' Council Mining and Petroleum Committee report and the 1990 Review
Committee of the same were of the view that provincial governments should have legislative power
over small-scale alluvial mining or in the interim, it should be regulated by them under delegated
power, but the Department of Mining and Petroleum strongly opposed it. See Harry Derkley, "Enga
Experience of Participation in Mining Developments: A C o m m e n t on Nonggorr" [1991 Special
Issue] MLJ 125 at p. 127.
See Nonggorr, above n9, at pp.97-100. After the development forum, however, a delegate of the
provincial government is n o w included in the composition of the mining and petroleum advisory
boards: see section 11 of the Mining Act 1992.

The provincial budget primarily comprised (1) liquor licence fees, sales taxes, court fines, land ta
head tax, etc., (2) transfers from the national government comprising unconditional grants from the
derivation grant and proceeds of certain national taxation; (3) loans and investment and commercial
income (if any): see generally Part X of the Organic L a w on Provincial Government (OLPG).
See section 64, OLPG. The national budget for minimum unconditional grant in 1988 was K48.5
million from a total of K245.9 million allocated for provincial governments generally.
Id., section 65.
Id., section 66.
Id., section 67.
21)

Id., section 67 (2).
Y. P. Ghai and A. J. Regan, The Law Politics and Administration of Decentralisation in Papua New
Guinea (NRI Monograph 30) (Waigani: National Research Institute, 1992) p.238. Over the years,
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national policies implemented in the provinces.

Under the derivation grant, the National

Government was required to give 1.25 percent of the value of products exported from the
province.23 This was originally intended as an incentive to encourage the provinces to
participate in export-oriented enterprises.

Provincial governments and landowners were not satisfied with these

arrangements. Among others, the first ground was the absence of any formal participatio

in the decision-making process relating to resources exploitation, even though they would
be affected as a result of activities that were to be undertaken on their land.25 Second,
perhaps more important, was dissatisfaction over the amount they were allocated. The
financial benefits landowners stood to receive were: (1) one-off compensation payments

and land rentals, and (2) 5 percent of the 1.25 percent (0.625 percent) royalty. Royalties

paid to a province were deducted from the derivation grant, so the derivation grant was no
an additional payment. A province which produced many resources stood to get a greater
derivation grant than one with a few or no resources at all.

Initial complaints against lack of participation and benefit-sharing came from the
North Solomons Provincial Government and the Bougainville landowners who hosted the

first major mining project in the country. The people in the area objected to the propose
the MUG was increasingly controlled by the national government, contrary to the established
arrangements: see A. J. Regan, National Government Control of Funding of Provincial Activities
(IASER Discussion Paper No.55) (Waigani: IASER, 1988) p.23.
Ghai and Regan, id., at p.250.
Since the replacement of provincial governments with provincial and local-level governments, all
royalties are to be paid to the landowners: see section 98 (5), O L P G L L G . In relation to other
financial arrangements, see sections 98 to 101 of the O L P G L L G .
Ghai and Regan, above n21, at p.251. For a detailed analysis of the nature and operation of these
financial provisions, see chapter 7, pp.233-282.
For example, at a public convention organised by the Constitutional Review Commission in
January 1996, a speaker stated of the grievances of the Panguna landowners thus: "Landowners never
participated in the Panguna mine. W h e n landowners went to the national government with their
grievances, they were referred to the company (i.e. Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL)). W h e n they
went to B C L , they were referred back to the national government. W h e n they went to the North
Solomons Provincial Government, it referred them either to the national government or B C L . The
people had no avenue in which to express their views."
2fS

O L P G , section 66.
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mine during the initial exploration stage.27 Without giving due consideration to these
objections, the colonial government went ahead and granted a special mining lease to
Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia ( C R A ) . The people were not invited to participate and
discuss issues relating to benefits which might accrue to them from the mine or the likely
environmental impacts. The only benefits they received were in the form of one off
compensation payments for loss of land and surface rights like hunting,fishing,and sacred
sites. D e m a n d s for greater benefits were m a d e before the mine was developed. For
example, Mr. Paul Lapun, Bougainville representative in the House of Assembly, moved a
motion in 1966 in the House that the people be paid 20 percent of the royalty due to the
government, but the motion was defeated and an amended motion for 5 percent was
passed.

When the North Solomons Provincial Government (NSPG) was formally
established in July 1974, it was invited to participate in the August - October renegotiation
of the mining agreement. Although that negotiation achieved most of what the national
government demanded - removal of special tax provisions and imposition of an additional
profit tax - no provision was made for direct provincial government participation.28 W h e n
legal arrangements for the provincial government system were negotiated in 1976, out of
which developed the Organic L a w on Provincial Governments ( O L P G ) , the N S P G and the
9Q

national government failed to discuss benefit-sharing and participation in the mine.
Legislative power sharing and financial arrangements under the O L P G , as seen above,
were adopted after that negotiation, but, again, it appears that no attempt was m a d e to
address benefit-sharing and participation in resources exploitation.

After these

opportunities were missed:
Matters came to a head in 1981 when North Solomons sought substantial increases
in mineral royalty rates, equity participation in mining projects and inclusion as a
party to mining project agreements, all as part of its demand to the national
government for inclusion in the renegotiation of the mining agreement between
Bougainville Copper Ltd and the national government...The North Solomons

Ciarau O'Faircheallaigh, Mining and Development: Foreign Financed Mines in Australia, Ireland,
Papua New Guinea and Zambia (London: Croom Helm, 1984) pp.218-228; 235-237.
Nonggorr, above n9, at p.93.
2y

Ibid.
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Provincial Government received some support from the national Premiers' Council
in 1982 ( P N G Premiers' Council Resolution P C 10/5/82).30

Because the national government failed to deal with these demands early, pressure built u
over the years and led to the crisis and closure of the mine. W h e n proposals for
development of other major projects, like Porgera which opened up in early 1989, were
submitted for government approval, the North Solomons precedent was likey to be
followed.

Pressure on the national government demanding for direct equity participation

and increased benefits intensified. The outcome of this was the development forum which
w e n o w turn to examine.

III. THE FORUM PROCESS
The idea of a development forum was first conceived by the DMP during the
negotiation of the Sixth (Ok Tedi) Supplemental Agreement in 1986. W h e n the Sixth
Supplemental Agreement was negotiated, two matters were brought to the attention of the
chief negotiators of the relevant government departments, w h o had also been involved in
negotiating the previous agreements.

Firstly, developments in Bougainville and public

opinion dictated that provincial governments should be included in negotiating future
agreements. Secondly, politicians tended to distrust bureaucratic processes in negotiating
those agreements, and final draft agreements submitted for approval were received with
suspicion.

T o remedy the first problem, the Fly River Provincial Government was

included in negotiating the Sixth Supplemental Agreement. This was to be a litmus test for
future negotiations. T o solve the second problem, the D M P formulated a plan to include
politicians to negotiate mining and petroleum agreements instead of the heads of relevant
departments, as previously done for the first six O k Tedi agreements.

Ghai and Regan, above n21, at p.257. The national government and North Solomons Provincial
Government never reached agreement on these matters, despite the fact that the 1974 renegotiated
agreement provided for review every seven years.
Similar problems as those that developed in the late 1960s in North Solomons developed at O k Tedi
in the mid-1980s - see D. Hyndman, "Mining, Modernization and Movements of Social Progress in
Papua N e w Guinea" (1987) 21 (3) Social Analysis 20.
These departments were: Department of Minerals and Energy, n o w Mining and Petroleum;
Department of Finance and Director of the National Planning Office.
Notes from Millet, above n5, at p.7.
14

Ibid.
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W h e n the Misima development proposal was negotiated in 1987, the necessity for
including provincial governments and landowners had already taken hold. T o pursue this
idea, the D M P , under its Project Coordination Branch,35 increasingly involved Misima
landowners by disseminating information about impacts of the mine. However, this
information related mostly to the impacts on their lifestyles, land and the environment. The
people never requested equity participation or queried on benefit-sharing arrangements.
They were happy to leave these issues to their provincial government to negotiate on their
behalf.36

In the original development forum proposal, the DMP envisioned that the forum
members would consist of the Minister for Mining and Petroleum (as Chairman), the
Minister for Finance and Planning, the Minister for Environment and Conservation, the
national m e m b e r of Parliament ( M P ) of the project area, the premier of the province, the
provincial m e m b e r of the area, and the provincial secretary. However, because of the
significance of the forum, the D M P felt that the presence of the Prime Minister, as
Chairman, and the Deputy Prime Minister, as Deputy Chairman, was necessary. W h e n
this proposal was submitted to the N E C , it was unanimously accepted and approved. B y
1988, the development proposal for the Porgera gold project was about to be negotiated.
The D M P explained the forum concept to the Porgera landowners. The landowners, unlike
the Misima landowners, questioned w h y they were left out. After further discussions, it
was agreed that the landowners should have three representatives, one of w h o m would
represent the local government council of the mine area.

The development forum process is conducted in the following manner:
1. The proposed developer submits to the Minister for Mining and Petroleum
feasibility studies, which includes environmental impact statements, and
proposals for development of the mine or petroleum reservoir.
2. The Minister tables these documents in the N E C .
The Department employs a project coordinator to liaise between the project developer, the national
government departments and provincial government, commencing from feasibility stage onwards.
For a detailed review of the procedure and role of project-coordinators, see D. Dalton, "Papua N e w
Guinea: Resources Legislation and Policy" [1988] AMPLA
Yearbook 112.
Notes from Millet, above n5, at p.5.
"

Id., at p.7.

M

See Nonggorr, above n9, at p. 105.
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3. The Prime Minister then distributes these documents to relevant ministers and
their departments, and the provincial government concerned, with a request to
prepare position papers. Meanwhile, landowners would be informed of when
the development forum will be convened so that they m a y have sufficient time
to identify and prioritise what developmental projects should be requested from
the national government and the project developer.
4. After position papers have been prepared, the Prime Minister (as Chairman)
convenes the development forum. Other participants of the forum are: (a) the
Deputy Prime Minister (as Deputy Chairman); (b) the Minister for Mining and
Petroleum (as Secretary); (c) relevant ministers and their support staff w h o have
been requested to prepare position papers; (d) the provincial governor (formerly
premier); (e) representatives of landowners; and (f) representatives of the
project developer.
5. The forum considers the position papers. The project developer m a y be
requested to present an overall brief of the proposals. Through a process of
dialogue, the developer m a y be requested to m a k e amendments to the
proposals. The discussion ends w h e n agreement is reached on all matters
concerning the project.
6. The final agreement is then submitted to the Attorney-General's Department to
incorporate it as a mining development contract or petroleum development
agreement for signing by the government and the project developer.
The issues discussed at this forum relate to participation in equity, royalties,
infrastructure developments, training and localisation, procurement of goods and services,
preferential terms of employment of local people, local business participation, project
security and environmental impact. Generally, the national government and the proposed
project developer require the provincial government concerned and landowners to guarantee
that the project will be protected and secured while they undertake to provide those
developmental benefits and privileges requested.
The forum process was first used in negotiating the Porgera gold project in 1989.
In an apparent attempt to break the stalemate at Bougainville, the Porgera package was
offered to the North Solomons Provincial Government and the Bougainville landowners,
but it was rejected. The O k Tedi and Misima agreements were "renegotiated" with a view
to incorporate terms and conditions similar to those adopted in Porgera. The Porgera
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agreement became a model for future projects. The forum process is n o w an established
government policy, which will be followed in future projects.39
Although the development forum established a new and significant trend in the
decision-making process for major mining and petroleum developments, some
commentators are of the view that it falls far short of what the provincial governments and
landowners requested.40

Provincial governments and landowners called for "full"

participation as "equal partners" with the national government as signatories to the mining
development contract ( M D C ) or petroleum development agreement (PDA). 41 The Working
Committee set up by the national Premiers' Council in 1988 recommended that the
respective mining and petroleum legislations be amended to provide that a M D C or a P D A
will only be signed after a certificate of approval has been lodged by the relevant provincial
government, affirming that adequate consultation has taken place and proper arrangements
have been made concerning infrastructure, business development, supply and procurement,
training and localisation and environment, and, further, that the N E C is satisfied that
adequate consultation has taken place between the provincial government and
landowners. 42

This recommendation was rejected. A s it exists now, provincial

governments and landowners are not signatories to a M D C or a PDA. 4 3 Nevertheless, as it
will be seen below, the development forum enabled several significant benefits to flow to
landowners and provincial governments.

39

Mining Act 1992, section 3.
Derkley, above nl3, at p.131.
Enga Provincial Government, Proposals for the Porgera Project (Wabag: Kristen Press, Madang,
1988) quoted in Derkley, ibid.

42

Papua N e w Guinea, National Premiers' Council 1988 and Mining and Petroleum Working
Committee Report (Port Moresby: September, 1988) at p.33, quoted in Derkley, ibid.
Accordingly, a project developer has no contractual relationship with landowners and provincial
governments to provide infrastructure and other benefits the national government undertakes to
provide through the project developer. This can create enforcement problems: provincial
governments and landowners cannot enforce their agreement with the national government against
the project developer if the project developer fails to comply with its obligations. The provincial
government and landowners have to rely on the national government to enforce them. The same is
true for the project developer: it has to rely on the national government to enforce obligations
imposed on the landowners and provincial government to protect the project.
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IV.

THE O U T C O M E OF THE FORUM

Although host provincial governments and landowners are not signatories to a
M D C or a P D A , they are signatories to a series of agreements known as M e m o r a n d u m of
Agreements ( M O A ) or M e m o r a n d u m of Understanding ( M O U ) . In relation to Porgera,
there are three M O As: one between the national government and the Enga Provincial
Government; another between the national government and the landowners; and one
between the provincial government and the landowners. With respect to the Kutubu
project, there are four M O U s . T w o are between the national government and the Gulf and
Southern Highlands Provincial Governments. The other two are between the landowners
of Kutubu and Kikori on the one hand, and the national government on the other. For
Misima, there are two M O As; one between the national government and the Misima
landowners, and the other between the national government and the Milne Bay Provincial
Government. For Lihir, there are also two agreements; one between the national
government and the N e w Ireland Provincial Government, and the other between the N e w
Ireland Provincial Government on the one hand, and the Lihir Mining Area Landowners
Association and the N i m a m a r Development Authority on the other, the latter two as
representatives of the landowners.

In this network of agreements, the national government undertakes to ensure that
financial benefits and social services flow to the host provincial governments and
landowners, while, at the same time, the environment is protected. O n e significant
outcome of the forum is to give options to provincial governments and landowners to take
up equity in the project. Another attempt to meet provincial government and landowner
demands is by a slight increase in the 1.25 percent royalty rate. A third benefit is by way
of provision of infrastructure through (1) a tax credit scheme, (2) provision of special
support grants and (3) through the "public investment program". A fourth w a y is by a
preferential policy in providing employment, education and training of persons from the
project area. The fifth benefit is participation in business opportunities arising from the
project. Finally, but not the least, there are benefits through social programs outside of a
M D C or P D A on the initiatives of a project developer.
Details of these benefits are provided below to appreciate the nature and scope of
benefits that can be contributed to the people from resources development. I will attempt to
show that although adequate revenue accrue to landowners and host provincial
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governments, and for that matter, P N G as a whole, as a result of the development forum,
mismanagement of these benefits create economic problems for P N G .
A. Equity Participation

A significant benefit enjoyed by landowners and provincial governments is through
dividends from equity participation. In the Porgera agreement, the national government,
which initially acquired 10 percent of the total equity in the Porgera gold project, offered 5
percent to the Enga Provincial Government and the Porgera landowners.44 Under the
M O A s between the State on the one hand, and the Enga Provincial Government and the
Porgera landowners on the other, the equity options were arranged to be purchased in this
manner: the first 0.25 percent was to be purchased within 12 months of the grant of the
Special Mining Lease (SML). The next 2.2 percent was to be purchased within six months
of commencement of commercial production, and the final 2.55 percent during the period
of one month following the fifth anniversary of the grant of the SML. 4 5 It was reported
that the Enga Provincial Government and Porgera landowners have completely exercised
their options by November 1995.

The following table further elaborates the share-

holding arrangement.

Share holder

Shares in percentage

P N G State

20 ( 1 5 % acquired in 1993)

Enga Provincial Government

2.5

Porgera Landowners

2.5
25

Total

In Misima, the provincial government and landowners were given the option to buy
5 percent of the State's 20 percent equity interest on similar terms and conditions as in
Porgera.

They refused and, instead, opted for special grants and infrastructure

developments. Their decision was influenced by two matters: first, to purchase equity was
expensive, given the short period of the mine life of just 10 years; and second, because
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Relating to the Development of the Porgera Gold Mine Project
Between the Independent State of Papua N e w Guinea and the Enga Provincial Government (EPG),
clause 6.1., and the M O A Between the State and the Porgera Landowners, clause 6.1.
Id., clause 6.2.
The Saturday Independent, 4 November 1995.
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infrastructure would remain for generations, whereas pecuniary benefits cannot.47 The
national government then agreed to provide the following package:
(i) an immediate K250,000 government grant to upgrade roads on Misima
island;
(ii)
a grant of K50,000 for the setting up of a landowner company to operate
at the mine in related business ventures;
(iii) a credit guarantee support of K500,000 a year for three years to enable the
company to be established; and
(iv)
a special support grant equal to 1 % f.o.b. value of production from the
mine.
In relation to the Kutubu project, the Southern Highlands Provincial Government
and the Kutubu landowners were given the option to buy 1.575 percent equity each of the
State's 22.5 equity interest, while the Gulf Provincial Government and the Kikori
landowners were offered 1.125 percent each.49 The following table shows the share
holding arrangement.

Share holder

Shares in percentage

P N G State

17.1

S H P Government

1.575

Kutubu Landowners

1.575

Gulf Provincial Government

1.125

Kikori Landowners

1.125

Total

22.5

Similar equity offers as in Porgera were made to the Panguna landowners as part of
the government's attempt to solve the problem there, but it was rejected. Also equity
arrangements were entered with the O k Tedi landowners and the Fly River Provincial
Government.

In 1996, the national government introduced a new policy to award 5 percent "free"
equity in large mining projects to landowners, and 2 percent free equity in petroleum

See Nonggorr, above, n2, at p.356.
Ibid.
M O U Relating to the Kutubu Petroleum Project Between the Independent State of Papua N e w
Guinea and the Southern Highlands Landowners, clause 5.4.
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projects.' Under this policy, I a m of the view that Lihir landowners were given 5 percent
"free" equity in the Lihir project.51
B. Royalties

The other major source of financial benefit flowing to provincial governments and
landowners is in royalties. A project developer is obliged to pay 2 percent royalty on the
f.o.b. value of minerals exported, or the same percentage on the wellhead value of
petroleum, to the national government.52 Every M O A and M O U show that the national
government undertakes to transfer all royalty payments to the provincial government
concerned, and the provincial government in turn undertakes to ensure that 20 percent is
paid to the landowners.

Because of lessons learnt from the Bougainville experience, the

national government ensures that a certain percentage of the royalty is kept in trust accounts
for future generations in project areas. Section 98 (5) of the Organic Law on Provincial
Governments and Local-Level Governments 1995 provides that all royalties shall be paid to
the landowners. However, subsection (7) of section 98 qualifies subsection (5) by stating
that existing royalty arrangements before the coming into force of this Organic L a w are not
to be affected.54 This means that all royalties from projects which commenced development
after 1995 will be paid to the landowners concerned.

This is to be equally funded by the national government and the joint venture partners of a project.
The national government announced that Gobe landowners would be thefirstto earn "free" 2 percent
equity in the G o b e project: The Independent, 10 M a y 1996. It is not clear at the m o m e n t whether
the 5 percent equity is to c o m e from the State's 30 percent equity in mineral projects, or 5 percent of
the total equity in a mining project. Also, with respect to petroleum, it is not clear whether the 2
percent equity will c o m e from the State's 22.5 percent equity, or 2 percent of the total equity in a
petroleum project. M y o w n assumption is that the 5 percent and the 2 percent will c o m e from the
State's 30 percent and 22.5 percent equity in mining and petroleum projects, respectively. If this is
the case, then 5 percent of 30 percent will represent 0.015 percent of the total equity in a mining
project, whilst 2 percent of 22.5 percent will amount to 0.0045 percent of the total equity in a
petroleum project.
51

The MOA relating to the Lihir gold mining project between the State of PNG and the New Ireland
Provincial Government, and the M O A between the latter and the Lihir landowners do not show the
equity holding arrangement, unlike the the Porgera M O A s and the Kutubu M O U . Thus, the equity
holding arrangement regarding Lihir between the State and the landowners is not known.
There is a tax rebate to the developer on 0.75 percent of the royalty. This means a developer
withhlods 0.75 of the income tax payable to the national government.
See for example, clause 6 of the Kutubu MOU, above n49.
54

The Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments was certified on 19
July, 1995.
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Compared to the small population living in remote areas where the projects are
located, the amount of revenue from royalties can be quite substantial. For example, based
on the total reserves in the Kutubu fields, the initial royalty calculation was put at K 4 5
million over the entire life of the project.

The Kutubu landowners and Southern

Highlands Provincial Government had received K 3 2 million in royalties by the end of
1995. 56

In 1993 and 1994, the O k Tedi mine paid royalties of K4,639,299 and

K6,694,566, respectively.57

In these two years, Porgera paid K5,117,284 and

K4,930,785 while Misima paid Kl,558, 797 and Kl,729,961, respectively.58

C. Infrastructure Developments

There are several government policies through which infrastructure developments
can be channeled. The three most popular ones, as indicated earlier, are the "tax credit
scheme" (TCS), the "special support grant" (SSG) and the "public investment program"
(PIP).
According to Imbun, the TCS was initially conceived by Victor Botts, former site
manager and later managing director of Placer Niugini, operator of the Porgera gold
project, in an effort to provide tangible benefits to the local people by retaining and
expending a certain percentage of tax payable to the national government.

T w o reasons

were given for this proposal:
First, the mine wanted to avoid a possible build-up of anti-PJV [i.e. Porgera Joint
Venture] grievances, which might climax in a Bougainville-style uprising by
service-starved and disgruntled Engans, w h o considered their lack of development
to be PJV's concern. Second, whatever taxes were paid to the national
government, it was highly possible that "whatever the projects put back into the
province was either going to end up at the wrong place or never get there at all."60
Department of Mining and Petroleum (DMP), Kutubu Petroleum Development Project (a brief
report on Kutubu: Port Moresby, 22 July 1994) at p.8.
56

The Independent, 10 M a y 1996, at p.30.
Above n55, at p.8.

58

Ibid.
Benedict Imbun, " W h o Said Mining Companies Take and D o Not Give?: The Mining Companies'
Role of Social Responsibility in Papua N e w Guinea" (1994) 2 (1) Taimlain: A Journal of
Contemporary Melanesian Studies 27, at p.39.

60

Ibid.
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It w a s observed that "of the initial several million kina which was paid to the national
government as taxes in 1989 to 1991, a sizable amount was allocated to Enga province but,
to the dismay of bulk of the Engans, nothing significant occurred in the province.. ."61 The
reason w a s because "most of the provincial leaders have been implicated in corrupt
practices involving millions of kina", and this lead to the suspension of their provincial
government twice.62 Initially M r . Botts' proposal w a s opposed by s o m e national
government ministers, but because of the deteriorating situation at Bougainville and the fear
of similar rebellion in other project areas, the national government agreed to adopt it.

It is now an established government policy that a project developer may provide
necessary infrastructure in the project area and have its costs reimbursed from tax payable
to the national government. The tax credit is levied at a rate of 0.75 percent of the taxable
(gross) income in a particular year of income.63 If the total development costs cannot be
recovered at this rate , then the balance is to be carried over to the next year of income. The
Porgera Joint Venture (PJV), perhaps as being the first to initiate the T S C , gives first
priority to infrastructure projects, followed by educational projects, and then agricultural
projects.

B y the end of 1993, the P J V had built several roads and airstrips, at an

estimated total value of over K5,609,000, and spent over K201,000 on education; about
K21,000 on health; over K19,000 on agriculture and about K233,000 on other community
projects.

Other project developers also provide public infrastructures under the T C S .

The TSC can be criticised on the ground that it reduces the taxable income of the
national government, which m a y be expended equitably throughout the whole country
under its national budgetary programs. Since the State maintains that it owns the resources
to ensure equitable distribution of revenue and infrastructure development, the T S C m a y
be seen to go against this goal in concentrating infrastructure and resources in areas where
other benefits are also being enjoyed.

Demands have been made to increase this rate but the national government has refused to do so.
Imbun, above n59, at p.40.
Ibid. These amounts exclude expenditures on continuing projects or projects that have been
suspended.
O'Faircheallaigh, above n27, at p.220.
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However, there are two positive aspects which outweigh this criticism. First, as
noticed in Enga, there is the danger that taxes paid to the government m a y not trickle d o w n
to the local area in the form of tangible benefits such as infrastructure. This can create, as
the P J V feared, animosity against project developers and lead to similar hostilities as at
Bougainville. Secondly, the T S C is a practical scheme which implements P N G ' s objective
to rapidly develop the rural areas through exploitation of its natural resources.

The special support grant (SSG) is a grant to the host provincial government, to be
used on provincial projects and programs.67 A M D C or a P D A normally contains a
provision stating that 1 percent of the f.o.b. value of minerals or the same percentage of the
well-head value of petroleum will be paid to the provincial government.68 In the four
M O U s relating to the Kutubu project, it is provided that the Southern Highlands Provincial
Government ( S H P G ) will receive 7 0 percent of the one percent (0.7 percent) whilst 30
percent (0.3 percent) of the same goes to the Gulf Provincial Government. 69 The national
government undertakes to ensure that 20 percent of the S S G received by the S H P G is spent
in the Kutubu area.

The S S G is paid quarterly, based on estimated annual well-head

value, and adjustments are m a d e annually against the actual well-head value realized during
that year.71 This type of arrangement also applies in other mining and petroleum projects.

The national government also has a policy to direct funds specifically earmarked for
infrastructure under the "public investment program" (PIP), unlike the S S G for the
undefined purpose of "provincial projects and programs". In the M O U between the
Kutubu landowners and the national government, the latter agreed to direct funding
requests for infrastructure development and upgrading of existing facilities through normal
79

budgetary processes under the PIP.

—

This is in addition to the undertaking to fund

See, for example, Kutubu M O U , above n49, clause 4. The agreement does not define "provincial
projects and programs" but it could be road projects, school projects, etc.
For example, id., clause 4.2. The M O U defines "wellhead value" as defined in section 118 (2) of the
Petroleum Act Ch.195.
Ibid.
Id., clause 4.4.
Id., clause 4.5. In mining, it is on the f.o.b. value of minerals exported.
72

Id., clause 8.2.
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infrastructure projects requested by the landowners listed in Schedule 1 to their M O U . 7 3
Maintenance of these infrastructures is to come from the SSG. 74
Implementation of the provisions for infrastructure is monitored by a committee.75
This committee comprises representatives from the Department of Mining and Petroleum
( D M P ) , the relevant provincial government, landowners, and the project developer. The
committee is chaired by an officer from the Department of Finance and Planning (DFP). In
the M O U between the State and the Southern Highlands landowners, this committee was
to, within six months, produce project costings and justifications, receive advice on which
project the Kutubu Joint Venture (KJV) can assist with, and prepare a timetable for
construction.

D. Training, Employment and Localisation

It is normal to see training, employment and localisation clauses in any mining or
petroleum agreement. In P N G , one of the conditions of a special mining lease or a
petroleum development licence which forms part of the M D C or the P D A is that preference
for employment will be given to nationals. Further, that nationals will be trained in all
spheres of the industry and that positions will be localised. The development forum has
expanded this concept to provide that "preference" must, firstly, be given to those from the
project impacted area, then from the province and, lastly, from other parts of the country.
There are several reasons why landowners and provincial governments push for
this preferential treatment. First, jobs created by resources projects m a y be the only
opportunity to earn cash in remote areas where the projects are located. Therefore, they
would like to take the chance to earn cash for themselves first, before others are
considered.77 Second, because they o w n the land, they are entitled to enjoy any benefits
arising from it. Third, because of nepotism in the formal public sector, it is difficult to get
Id., clause 8.4.
Id., clause 8.5.
Provisions for such a committee m a y be found in a M O U ; for example, see id., clause 8.6.
76

Ibid.

77

Richard Jackson, "Not Without Influence: Villages, Mining Companies, and Government in Papua N e w
Guinea" in John Connell and Richard Howitt eds., Mining and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia (Sydney:
Sydney University Press, 1991) 18, at p.22.
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employment.

Therefore, once job opportunities are created in their area, it is a w a y to

"payback" for being victimised by nepotism practices, applying the "eye for an eye"
principle. Fourth, since m a n y temporary, manual jobs such as clearing forests, setting up
camps, supplying food, etc do not require special training or skills, landowners feel that
they are capable of doing these themselves, instead of people from other areas coming to
work on their land.79 Fifth, landowners to prevent the introduction of harmful influences
or diseases on the local culture by employees from other areas.80 Project developers have
accepted these agreements to keep the landowners happy so that they can in return support
and protect the project.

There is a Training Levy program under which the national government requires
project developers to implement training and localisation obligations.

Training,

employment and localisation is monitored by a committee chaired by a representative from
the Department of Labour and Employment.

This committee is m a d e up of one

representative each from relevant government departments, the host provincial government
and landowners, and the project developer. O n behalf of the committee, the project
developer is required to submit half-yearly reports regarding implementation of its training,
employment and localisation programs.

Such a report should include problems

encountered (if any), positions filled and the number of landowners and other Papua N e w
Guineans employed.

See an article on this by Hengene Payani, "Equality and Participation in the Papua N e w Guinean
Bureaucracy" (1994) 2 (1) Current Issues 27.
In Gobe, landowners from Samberigi village of Erave District of Southern Highlands Province
destroyed company camps at the rig site for employing people from the Kikori area (Gulf Province)
to clear forests and do other manual jobs which, they complained, they were capable and entitled to
do because the development was taking place on their land.
This was the primary consideration for the "Misima for Misimans" policy adopted by the Misima
Mines Pty Ltd: see Ian Lewis, "Communication - The Misima Story" in R. Rogerson ed.,
Proceedings of the PNG Geology, Exploration and Mining Conference 1991, Rabaul, (Melbourne:
Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 1991) p.213, at p.215.
The landowners' protection of a project is important because if they are not happy, progress in
development can be seriously hampered. T o the landowners, protection of a project is like protecting
"the goose that lays the golden eggs".
See Kutubu M O U , above n49, clause 10.3.
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Project companies have undertaken education and manpower training seriously by
making huge financial donations to further these goals.83 They train their employees in
technical fields and provide in-house training.

They also provide scholarships at various

secondary, technical and higher educational institutions in the country. For instance, the
K J V had spent, as at June 1994, about K5,500,000 on educational training other than
scholarships.85 The KJV's scholarship commitment is about K250,000 per annum. 86
Other mining and petroleum companies provide similar educational schemes.

E. Procurement of Goods and Services and Participation in
Business Opportunities by Local Entrepreneurs

This type of requirement is normally imposed by host governments on mining or
petroleum investors. In P N G , a M D C or a P D A m a y provide that the project developer
should award contracts firstly to businesses owned by landowners, and then to
entrepreneurs from the province, and, finally, to entrepreneurs from other provinces. For
the supply of materials, equipment and goods and services to a project, contracts must be
offered in that order: only if there are no local entrepreneurs can the project developer look
87

elsewhere. Even then, a project developer is encouraged to help develop local businesses
for purposes of awarding contracts arising from the project development. The K J V has, in
this respect, assisted the following landowner companies in their development and
operation:

1. Iagifu Oil and Gas
2. Peripi Development Company

For example, many large mining companies have supported the establishment of the Department of
Mining Engineering at the University of Technology at Lae. Highlands Gold Ltd donated K50,000
to fund equipment purchases for the Highlands Gold Computing Laboratory; C R A Minerals donated
K60,000 to fund equipment purchases for C R A Geology Laboratory; O k Tedi Mining Ltd gave
K100,000 for the O k Tedi Mining Laboratory; and Placer Niugini gave K50.000 towards equipment
purchases for the Placer Niugini Mine Planning Laboratory: see S. Bordia, "Establishing a Mining
Education Program in Papua N e w Guinea" in Rogerson, above n79, p.218, at p.219.
See Lewis, above n79, at p.216.
D M P , above n55, at p.9.
Ibid.
Kutubu M O U , above n49, clause 9.
M

.

Ibid.
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3. Foe Digaso Oil Company
4. Fasu Development Corporation
5. Ikobi Kasel Pera Company
6. R u m u Development Corporation
7. OtoiaPtyLtd.
8. Willawong
9. Ido Forest Pty Ltd.
10. Kikori Oil Investments (owned equally by the 5 Gulf province landowner
companies).

By June 1994, the KJV had awarded about K155 million worth of contracts to
landowner companies and P N G businesses. Out O f this, about K 9 0 million worth of
contracts were awarded to the above landowner companies.90 The contracts were for
various projects and services like catering, in-field trucking, lease of heavy equipment,
camp maintenance, security, bush camp construction, provision of sawn timber and road
construction. About K 4 5 million went to subcontractors, salaries and expenses to P N G
businesses. A n estimated K 2 0 million went in purchase orders to P N G businesses.
Overall, the total expenditures for the Kutubu project in related contracts exceeded K 4 0 0
million, and this amount has been injected into the P N G economy. ' About K 2 0 million
Q9

worth of contracts were still in operation with landowner companies in 1994.
Similarly, Porgera, Ok Tedi and Misima have made important contributions in
encouraging local commercial activities. O k Tedi has established a trust fund through
which financial benefits are channeled to the 101 villages along the O k Tedi and Fly River
System. The purpose of the trust deed was to "use the income with a view to limiting
poverty, increasing education facilities, providing social welfare, infrastructure facilities
and amenities, and for identification and development of rural and non-rural commercial
ventures" for the benefit of the landowners.93 The P J V makes substantial contributions
(K4 million) annually to the Porgera Development Authority (PDA), a body established by
D M P , above n55, at p. 10

Imbun, above n59, at p.33.
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the Enga Provincial Government to oversee the development of Porgera district. This is in
addition to the Enga Provincial Government's annual contribution to the P D A of about half
a million kina.4 The Misima Mines Ltd has set up a fishing company that revolves around
a processing vessel fitted out with freezers, ice-making equipment and processing
facilities.

On its part, the national government has also put important policies in place to
encourage local business development. In this respect, it provides landowner companies
and other local businesses with technical, financial and legal assistance through the Small
Business Development Corporation (SBDC). The S B D C was established as a commercial
arm of the Department of Trade and Commerce. 96 The S B D C helps landowners and other
local entrepreneurs to incorporate companies, draw up cash flows, and gives general
education on sound business management. The national government gives guarantees to
obtain domestic loans. It also provides K500, 000 interest free loans to help landowners
start up their companies. This loan is an advancement from the special support grant.

Like other committees above, the national government has established a committee
to monitor implementation of these programs. This committee is sometimes referred to as
the "supply and procurement of materials, equipment and services committee"
(SPMESC). 9 8 The S P M E S C , chaired by a representative of the Department of Commerce
and Trade, is m a d e up of one representative each from the Department of Mining and
Petroleum, the mining or petroleum company, the landowners and the provincial
government. The function of the committee is essentially to monitor the supply of goods
and services to the project, and where necessary, m a k e recommendations for better
implementation of the scheme. The national government requires project developers to
See Imbun's article for the list of projects funded by the PDA from such funds received.
See A. Stevens, "Land Matters and Business Development Associated with the Misima Mine" in
Rogerson, above 79, p.304, at p.309.
The S B D C was established in 1992. Its existing programs include training on small business
management through workshops, publication of small booklets on h o w to manage a business etc.
Recently, aid donors see SBDC's importance and are making contributions to it. Example, Australia
gave K1.8 million and the United Nations Development Program pledged to give K l 15,000 (The
National, 15 M a y 1996) p.6.
This information is based on personal communication with the First Assistant Secretary,
Commercial Division - Projects, of the Department of Trade and Commerce in January 1996.
Personal communication with the Chairman of the Supply and Procurement of Materials, Equipment
and Services Committee of the Department of Trade and Commerce in January 1996.
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lodge quarterly reports on behalf of the S P M E S C on the implementation of the scheme.
The reports should include (1) the particulars of the successful tenderers, particulars of the
items supplied and reasons for awarding of the contract, and (2) a list of landowners and
other unsuccessful tenderers and the reasons for not awarding the contract to them.99
F. Other Benefits Outside a MDC or a PDA

The table below shows some of the projects and the value provided under the
KJV's Social Works Program in the Kutubu and Kikori areas in 1992. Some of these
projects were funded under the various government schemes, such as the tax credit
scheme. Others were voluntary assistance provided by the KJV.
N a m e of Project

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Value
Kina
Pimaga Health Centre - upgrade
240,000
Sub Health Centres, Kaipu, Kantopo, Waro
356,000
Pimaga & Nipa Police Stations
121,000
Rural Police Stations
75,000
Village water supplies
394,000
Air transportation, shipping construction materials, 337,000
etc.
Kikori wharf & access to airstrips
37,000
Gulf & S H P w o m e n centres
149,000
Police - Rapid deployment unit, etc.
190,000
Hedinia Aid Post - upgrade
88,000
N e w Aid Posts - Kaiam, Kemei, Ero & Baina
94,000
Community Schools upgrades - Inu, Waro, Kaiam, 314,000
Ero
N e w Community Schools - Kantopo, Kopi, Ero, 208,000
Veiru
Rural Airstrip - Kantopo, etc.
179,000
Kaiam Business Centre (used by landowner
40,000
companies)
Pimaga - Gesege road
114,000
Sports facilities - Hedinia & Yo'obo
35,000
Miscellaneous - management, supervision, transport 590,000
cost

in

j

Source: The Kutubu Joint Venture, 1992

Other companies provide social services and benefits in addition to what they are
required to provide under their respective agreements. PJV's "community facilities grant"

Kutubu M O U , above n49.
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under which K 4 million is paid to the P D A , and O k Tedi's trust fund fall under this
category.

V. REGIONAL CLAIMS ON REVENUE FROM RESOURCES
EXPLOITATION
Regional tensions have been created by unequal distribution of benefits from
resources exploitation as seen under the above schemes.100 Generally, it is accepted that
royalties and compensation payments are rightly m a d e to the owners of land. W h a t is
criticised, however, is the concentration of infrastructure developments and preferential
practices in employment, training and business participation and other social benefits in the
resource producing provinces. Firstly, it is generally felt that employment should be
competitive on the basis of merit, and not ownership of land or other criteria. Secondly,
business participation should be based on proper tender procedures, without
discrimination, so long as all or a majority of the shares in the tenderers are owned by
Papua N e w Guineans. Thirdly, social benefits should be distributed equally. For
instance, resource companies tend to award attractive scholarships to those from the
resource developing provinces. This creates ill feelings and envy a m o n g other P N G
students.

At the government level, provinces which lack resources development do not
benefit from the outcome of the development forum. They depend only on the various
government grants as outlined at the outset. Therefore, these provinces feel that they are
being unfairly treated by the resources-producing provinces and the national government.
This is because:
People from non-mineral-producing regions feel that they have historically carried
the n o w mineral-producing regions and it is unfair that the former are not
reciprocating by sharing their new-found wealth more fairly.
I submit that the benefit-sharing arrangements under the development forum
process goes against the national policy for equitable distribution. In other words, it
contradicts the State's justification for vesting ownership of minerals and petroleum in
itself. While the development forum process and its outcome are significant improvements
See Nonggorr, above n2, at p.358.
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in sharing revenue between landowners and provincial governments, the majority from the
non-mineral and petroleum producing regions are treated unfairly. Since these resources
are equally o w n e d by every Papua N e w Guinean through the State, revenue from their
exploitation should be shared equitably. Likewise, job and business opportunities should
be made competitive among every P N G citizens.

VI. MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
Although huge financial benefits are made available to landowners and provincial
governments as a result of the development forum, social and economic indicators do not
show any real progress in the improvement of living standards and the economy as a
whole.102 The editorial of the Post-Courier, 25 September 1996, said:103
The great majority of the Papua New Guinean workers cannot [even] afford to buy
n e w clothes for their children each fortnight, pay for their outstanding fees,
electricity and other public utility bills, let alone save for a rainy day.
If it is difficult for workers in the formal sector who earn cash fortnightly, how
m u c h more difficult it is for the vast majority w h o live in rural areas w h o depend on the
informal subsistence economy without any fortnightly cash income. Because of this and
the deteriorating infrastructures and low living conditions of most people in P N G as
portrayed in chapter one, public opinion tends to view mining and petroleum companies as
"ripping them o f f of their natural resources.

Kennedy appears to support this view by

saying that " P N G ' s 'boom' has occurred in the profit margins of some companies,
whereas the government had a $ U S 6 billion debt blow-out in 1994 and the people are no
better off."105

However, in the above sections of this chapter, I have attempted to show

that this perception is far from the truth, because mining and petroleum companies provide
huge benefits to the country. Distribution of cash benefits from B C L between 1978 and
1987, for example, shows that the national government received 60 percent of the financial
See T. Denklin and W . Iamo, "The Cooperative Decentralisation" (1995) 3 (1) Current Issues 17, at
pp. 19-20.
10.1

Post-Courier, 25 September 1996, p. 10.
An anonymous writer under the pseudonym of "Fed Up", Post-Courier, 30 August 1996, p. 10.
Martin Yakem Sapala, Post-Courier, October 3 1996, at p. 10.
105

Danny Kennedy, "Development or Sustainability at Kutubu, Papua New Guinea?" in Rich Howitt,
John Connell and Philip Hirsch eds., Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peoples - Case Studies
from Australasia, Melanesia and Southeast Asia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996) p.236,
at p.239.
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benefits in the form of taxes, fees, and dividends, whilst 35 percent went to foreign share
holders; 5 percent went to the North Solomons Provincial Government; and local
landowners received 0.2 percent.106 Clearly, the total benefits received by Papua N e w
Guineans is greater than those received by foreign shareholders.

In my view, one of the major contributing factors to PNG's regressing economy
exemplified by the 1994 $ U S 6 billion debt blow-out despite the huge financial resources
accruing from natural resources exploitation is, mismanagement. There are m a n y ways in
which financial benefits from natural resource exploitation are not managed wisely. O n e
way in which resource revenues are mismanaged, is by the national government, especially
politicians, by spending money on items and projects that have not been budgeted for, or
by overspending their budget limits.107 I hold a similar view of provincial governments.108

I am also of the view that landowners do not manage resource benefits wisely. My
view is based on a number of personal experiences. For instance, I have noticed m a n y
landowners in the Kutubu and Mt. Kare areas investing their money in setting up trade
stores and purchasing motor vehicles to ferry passengers or tipper trucks to utilise in
construction projects. These are, perhaps, the only ways they knew how, and where, to
invest their money. Since m a n y of these people are not educated, they have limited
knowledge and choices of business investment and sound management. Therefore, it is
not surprising that they disregarded the risk that during tribal fights, as often happens in the
highlands provinces, trade stores become favourable targets for enemy arsonists. In this
respect, m a n y trade stores set up with money earned from the construction of the Kutubu
Acess Road were burnt d o w n in a tribal fight at Poroma district. Hundreds of kina was

Connell, above n3, at p.54.
This view is based on a personal communication I had with a senior staff member of the Department
of Finance and Planning at Waigani in January 1996. In several letters to the view point column of
the Post-Courier and The National, PNG's daily newspapers, and The Inpendendent, PNG's weekly
newspaper, similar views are expressed. For example, someone under the pseudonym of "Fed UP",
said the following in the Post-Courier, 25 September 1996, at p. 10, in response to the Prime
Minister, Sir Julius Chan's 20 Independence Anniversary message to the people of P N G :
That's because the likes of you and your predecessors before you, from September 16, 1975 to this
day have mismanaged and grossly corrupted this beautiful country by stripping it of its wealth and
denying its people fair development. Consequently this country is in the mess that it is in now.
This view is based on my personal knowledge of the Southern Highlands Provincial Government. I
have also had discussions on management of the province's finance with a senior staff of the
provincial treasury in March 1997.
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used to w a g e that tribal fight by purchasing illegal home-made guns, and hiring motor
vehicles to bring in manpower and fighting equipment.109

In relation to motoring ventures, the unsealed, dilapidated roads can tear and wear
their vehicles out quickly even before the purchase costs are recovered. Moreover,
demands for their use m a y be seasonal, depending on availability of contracts or
passengers, and, as such, the vehicles m a y not be as effectively used as they ought to be or
originally were intended. W h e r e spare parts are required, they m a y be difficult to obtain
since they have to come from Japan or Australia.110

I have also noticed that only a few people benefit from resources exploitation. For
example, in Kutubu, the Fasu and Foi landowners depended on two m e n to manage the
two "umbrella" companies of each tribe. The result was that, in the first five years of
operation, the two managers and their immediate family members received more benefits
than the rest of the landowners. They did not properly account for their management of the
umbrella companies to the rest of the share-holding landowners. O n e of the managers
unsuccessfully contested in a national election. It was believed that money from the
concerned landowner company was used tofinancethat election campaign.

Another problem arises from pure extravagant attitudes. This was clearly shown
during the peak period of the Mt. Kare "gold rush" between 1988 and 1990. There was a
"buying spree" in the local towns of unwanted items, even luxury cars by high school
teenagers. Added to this are the traditional obligations, particularly in the highlands areas,
to pay compensation obligations, feasts and other ceremonies which demand unnecessary
expenditures of cash earned from their finite resources.

Revelation of the fact that the

Kutubu landowner companies were not able to account for over K 1 2 million given by the

A leader of a landowner company spent thousands of kina earned from spin-off contracts in the
Kutubu project in buying arms, hiring choppers and motor vehicles for use in his tribal fight.
Another landowner company "managing director" went bankrupt after misusing over K100, 000
given to set up his business as a result of his involvement in an unsuccessful political campaign.
A case on point was a Kutubu landowner who had earned huge sums from compensation payments,
which were invested in the purchase of a fleet of buses which broke down within a few years of
operation.
Using resources money to fund political campaigns, especially in the highlands, is one way money
is seen to be spent unwisely. A person's position as a "big m a n " in a landowner company is the
leverage to attain political position, although many have failed after having spent thousands of kina.
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K J V in spin-off businesses between 1992 and 1993 clearly establishes the gravity of this
problem."2 S o m e landowners have gone bankrupt after squandering their oil money. 113

Whatever reason there may be, one thing is clear for our purposes: the national
government has good policies which provide enormous benefits to provincial governments
and landowners, unlike before - thanks to the Bougainville crisis and the development
forum. Also, project developers have good intentions to implement such policies, even
over and above those they are legally required to provide in an effort to gain community
support for their activities. W h a t is required, I strongly believe, is sound management of
resources revenue. T o do this, it requires appropriate training and education of the
landowners.

VI. SUMMARY
The development forum is essentially a political forum at which differences between
the national government, provincial government and landowners are discussed in an effort
to avoid another Bougainville-style crisis arising in other resource developing regions.
Since the crux of the Bougainville crisis arose as a result of dissatisfaction over distribution
of revenue from the mine, the focus of the development forum tends to be revenue-sharing.
This leaves out important issues like equitable distribution. Regional claims for equitable
distribution requires serious consideration because this can create, a m o n g others,
regionalism and fragmentation between resource-producing regions and regions that are
not.
In mineral and petroleum developing regions, the people are making more and more
demands for benefits over and above what they are already receiving.114 This is supported
by other Papua N e w Guneans w h o do not see the trickle-down effect on the economy from
the resources exploitation. T h e landowners' demands are m a d e because a substantial
portion of the benefits flowing to them are enjoyed disproportionately by a minority, as the
The Independent, 19 January 1996, p. 12.
This is based on m y personal knowledge. The amazing thing is that most of the landowner share
holders or creditors have never instituted bankruptcy proceedings because of ignorance of such a
remedy, or simply for fear of "payback" consequences.
'l4

For example, in late 1995 and early 1996, the Kutubu landowners demanded the national government
to increase their equity from 7 percent (i.e. 1.575 percent) to 10 percent, (i.e. 1.7325 percent): see
The National, 17 January 1996, p.l 1; — 2 5 January 1996, p.15; Post-Courier, 4 January 1996;
The Independent, 19 January 1996, p. 12; Post-Courier, 18 November 1995; — 1 7 November 1995,
p.21.
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Kutubu case demonstrates. Another reason is, because of a lack of appropriate education,
coupled with law and order problems, their cash is squandered before it is committed in
any useful investment. At the national level, the national and provincial governments,
particularly politicians, are seen to be "misusing" a lot of money. I a m of the view that,
unless Papua N e w Guineans learn to manage their revenue from resources exploitation
wisely, the country will become poorer than it is at the end of the resources boom.
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CHAPTER

NINE

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S
PETROLEUM F R A M E W O R K
I. INTRODUCTION
International petroleum frameworks can be put under four general categories.
These are: concession regime, production-sharing contracts, risk-service contracts, and a
hybrid of these three.1 T h e P N G regime comes under the first category. M a n y people in
P N G have questioned whether the P N G petroleum framework is suitable and appropriate
for the country.2 They often imply that other petroleum arrangements, such as the
production-sharing or risk-service contracts, are better than the one P N G has.3 The aim of
this chapter is to analyse the essential characteristics of concession regimes like P N G ' s ,
production-sharing contracts and risk-service agreements to show that what is important is
not the n a m e or the legal framework but the content and what the host government is able to
achieve under the particular petroleum framework it has.

The second section below provides definitions of these three petroleum legal
frameworks. T o give some perspective, the third section provides a short account of the
earliest petroleum legal framework, the "old concession contract", which applied in
developing countries. Then it goes on to review h o w it was modified and improved to the
present framework - the "modern concession contract". The fourth section looks at the
essential features of the modern concession contract. Because Indonesia was the first
country to develop the production-sharing contract which has become popular among many
developing countries, the fifth section outlines Indonesia's model production-sharing
contract. A summary of the general features of a production-sharing contract are provided
at the end. Brazil has m a d e the risk-service contract system famous since it decided to end
its oil monopoly in 1976. A s a result, Brazil's risk-service contract serves as a model for
Some say there are only two major petroleum arrangements, and these are the concession system and
the contract system: see G. H. Barrows, "Trends in Petroleum E & P Contracts Worldwide" (1992)
7 OGLTR 171.
Statements to this effect were made at a public convention organised by the Constitutional Review
Commission in January 1996 at Granville Motel, Port Moresby.
See, for example, the statement of the Opposition Leader, Honourable Roy Yaki, in The National,
19 January 1996, at p.9.
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m a n y countries. For this reason, it is reviewed in the sixth section, with a summary of the
essential characteristics at the end. T h e seventh section evaluates the main objectives of
host governments and h o w they are implemented under each of these three systems. All
these reviews and evaluations are undertaken with express or implied references to the
P N G regime.

IL DEFINITIONS
The earliest petroleum framework is the concession system. Early concession
contracts are often referred to as "traditional concessions" or "old concessions" to
distinguish them from modern concessions. The word "concession" comes from the Latin
word concessio, which means to permit or to allow.4 Since concession covers a host of
other legal relationships, it is generally agreed that it is difficult to give a restricted
meaning.

With respect to a petroleum concession, however, it m a y be defined as, in

Toriguian's words, "the grant of a privilege, usually exclusive but not necessarily so, to
conduct an economic enterprise for a defined period and usually within a defined area."6
But this definition omits the consideration for which the concession is granted. The
missing links to this definition are supplied by Cattan when he says: " A n oil concession is,
in essence, a contract between the State and a concessionaire whereby the latter acquires the
right for a term of years to search for, produce, own, export and sell any petroleum which
is discovered in return for a financial consideration payable by the concessionaire to the
State."7 This definition omits "a defined area" within which the concessionaire has rights
to explore for, and if found, produce petroleum. G a o attempted to combine both
definitions by stating: "...oil concession...may be defined as an agreement from a state to
permit a foreign company to develop its oil reserves on an exclusive basis in a defined area
during the duration of the agreement. The terms of the concession ordinarily include a
variety of auxiliary rights to the oil company and provision for royalty payment to the host
country." F r o m these definitions, one could say that a concession is an exclusive right
Zhiguo Gao, International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions (London:
Graham and Trotman, 1994) p. 11.
5

Id., at p. 12.
Shavarsh Toriguian, Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in the Middle East (Beirut: Hamaskaine
Press, 1972) p.34.
Henry Cattan, The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa (Dobbs Ferry, N e w
York: Oceana Pub., 1967) p.20.
Gao, above n4, at p. 12.
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and privilege granted by a country to a foreign oil company to explore for, develop and
produce petroleum under terms and conditions as agreed between them, and in return for
financial considerations which are usually in royalties.

A production-sharing contract may be defined as a contract under which a host
government contracts a foreign oil company to explore for and produce its petroleum
resources for a consideration given in the form of a specified share of the production.
Unlike under a concession system, title in petroleum (even the contractor's share) is not
granted to the foreign oil company until at the point of sale.

A service contract is similar to a production-sharing contract in that a foreign oil
company is merely a contractor to the host government. The company m a y be required to
explore for and produce petroleum for service fees, which m a y be paid in cash or in kind in
the form of a certain share of production for the risks taken and services rendered.

III. THE EARLY CONCESSION SYSTEM
The early concessions were characterised as very simple and more favourable to
international oil companies (IOC) than the host government. Although each concession
differed from country to country, "they all followed the same general pattern and embodied
similar conditions." This clearly reflected the imbalance in the bargaining positions of the
contracting parties.

The concessionaire had rights to very large areas compared to contemporary
practice. In some cases, they covered whole countries. For examples, Iran's 1901
concession to D' Archy covered 500,000 square kilometres (km^). The Arabian American
Oil C o m p a n y (Aramco) concession of 1933 covered 371,000 km^. The Iraqi Petroleum
C o m p a n y (IPC) concession of 1925 covered 445,000 k m ^ .

Concessions covering

Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, O m a n and the United Arab Emirates practically included the whole
territories. The duration was for long term, usually between 60 to 75 years. A summary
of the areas and duration of some of those early concessions are given in the table below.

Source: id., at p. 13. See also Kamal Hossain, Law and Policy in Petroleum Development:
Changing Relations Between Transnational and Governments (London: Frances Pinter, 1979) pp.24.
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Name of Concession Effective Date Area (km2)

Duration

Date of Expirv

D'Archy

60
75
60
60
75
75
65

1961
2000
1993
1999
2009
2014
2018

IPC
Aramco
Aramco supp. agr.
KOC
ADPC
ADMA

1901
1925
1933
1939
1934
1939
1953

500,000
445,000
371,000
496,000
6,000
whole country
all offshore

The concessionaire had exclusive control over the rate and extent of exploration and
exploitation. The host government had no control at all. It was only entitled to a modest
royalty, fixed at four shillings gold or three rupees per ton of crude oil produced." The
fiscal terms were also modest, and fixed rigidly for a long period of time. There w a s
virtually no control over the recruitment of expatriates, and import of goods and machinery.
Property rights in petroleum were effectively vested in the concessionaire. T h e
concessionaire determined h o w m u c h to produce and at what rate a barrel was to be sold.
The IOC's investment decisions were determined by the economics of supply and demand
of petroleum products in the industrialised world, and not the national interest of the host
country.
This meant that the considerations which dictated the size of investment and
investment plans in the concession areas were ultimately linked to the needs of
economic growth in the industrialized world as reflected in world oil requirements.
In other words, the concession system by its very nature supported the dualistic
structure of producing economy, which meant that the oil sector in the host country
was cut off from the development of the national economy and rather closely linked
to the world economy.
Host governments came to realise that large areas, or sometimes whole territories,
were locked up by one or two companies, effectively shutting out potential investors. This
meant denying themselves of potential revenue. Since the duration w a s for several
decades, any hope of opening up the locked areas within a short time was not possible.
Had the areas been developed rapidly, the chances of a commercial find and development
would have brought early revenue. But this was simply not possible.

Four shillings gold at $ U S 3 5 per ounce amounted to $ U S 1.65, and three rupees per ton to 8 cents
per barrel: Gao, ibid.
Fadhil J. Al-Chalabi, OPEC and the International Oil Industry: A Changing Structure (London:
Oxford University Press, 1980) p.7.

Indeed, developed countries like the United States ( U S ) and England had
concession regimes too. And it was them who transplanted their laws in the developing
countries.13 A s Blinn and others note:14
This state of affairs is hardly surprising since U.S. oil companies - and British
companies for that matter - have extended their activities into the international arena
at the beginning of the century; in so doing, they naturally carried with them their
customary forms of business organization as well as legal concepts and frameworks
derived from tried U.S. practice.
But the concessions in developing countries were quite different from what the U S or Great
Britain had. The difference is revealed by the earliest US oil concession, granted to
'Colonel' Drake, dated 30 December 1857, which was worded as follows:
'Demise and let' all the lands owned or held under lease by said company in the
County of Vanango, State of Pennsylvania, 'to bore, dig, mine, search for and
obtain oil, salt water, coal and all material existing in and upon said lands, and take,
remove and sell such, etc., for their o w n exclusive use and benefit, for the term of
15 years, with the privilege of renewal for the same term. Rental, one-eighth of all
oil as collected from the springs in barrels furnished or paid for by lessees. Lessees
m a y elect to purchase said one-eighth at 45 cents per gallon, but such election,
w h e n made, shall remain fixed. O n all other minerals, 10 percent of the net profits.
Lessees agree to prosecute operations as early as in the spring of 1858 as the season
will permit, and if they fail to work the property for an unreasonable length of time,
or fail to pay rent for more than 60 days, the lease to be null and void.'15
Mikdashi points out that Drake's lease, being the first lease granted before any oil was
produced in the US, "appears to give the American private lessor (by comparison with the

Middle East government lessors in the first half of the twentieth century) attractive ter

with reference to royalty or share in net profits - given the limited size of land leased

short duration of the lease and the full uncertainty of discovering oil in the United Stat
Similarly, Stocking compared the US concessions with the Middle East concessions and
said:

Gao, above n4, at p.l 1.
Keith W. Blinn, Claude Duval, Honore Le Leuch and Andre Pertuzio, International Petroleum
Exploration and Exploitation Agreements (London: Euromoney Publications, 1986) p.44.
Quoted in Zuhayr Mikdashi, Transnational Oil: Issues, Policies and Perspectives (London: Frances
Pinter, 1986) p.5.
Id., at pp.4-6.
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The prodigal nature of the Middle East concessions can be more readily appreciated
by comparing them with the United States' policy in granting oil leases on public
lands. Our federal policy has been designed to prevent monopoly exploitation of oil
lands. Federal laws limit the area covered by exploration permits (not more than
246 080 acres in any one state, except Alaska, where the limit is 300 000 acres).
They limit the area a prospector m a y lease after the discovery of oil to one-fourth of
the lands embraced in the prospecting permit with a m i n i m u m of 160 acres. They
limit the terms of a lease to twenty years. They require that three-fourths of the
acreage covered by an exploration permit, to which the original lessee has
preferential right, be leased by competitive bidding with a m i n i m u m royalty of 12.5
per cent. They require that lands located in a k n o w n geological structure of a
producingfieldbe leased by competitive bidding in units of not more than 640 acres
[1 square mile /2.59 square kilometres]. They limit the duration of a lease resulting
from competitive bidding tofiveyears or as long as oil or gas is produced in paying
quantities.
Developing countries which experienced the disadvantages of the old concession

system gradually introduced changes into existing contracts or entered into new contracts
with better terms and conditions. The first move in this direction was made by Venezuela

in 1943, when it imposed taxes for the first time in addition to royalties.18 The net effe
this was that the Venezuelan government received 50 percent of revenue from a commercial
field. In 1950, Saudi Arabia and the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) renegotiated their previous agreement to provide for a 50/50 profit split.19 "Within two
years, the equal profit sharing principle had been grafted onto almost all oil concession
.. »20

agreements.
In 1952, the Iraqi government and Iraqi Petroleum C o m p a n y (IPC) entered into a

new royalty agreement which reflected the equal profit sharing principle by providing tha

the former would have the option to take either 12.5 percent of the net oil production or
71

cash equivalent at posted prices.

This choice between "cash or kind" was soon adopted

George W . Stocking, Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy (Nashville:
Vanderbilt University Press, 1970) p. 130, quoted in Mikdashi, ibid., at p.4.
See the Law of Hydrocarbons of Venezuela of 1943 in Petroleum Legislation Company ed., South
America: Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts, vol.2. (New York: Gordon H. Barrows, 1967)
p.Venezuela A22-32.
See Petroleum Legislation Company ed., Middle East: Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts,
vol.1 - 1959 (New York: Gordon H. Barrows, 1958) p.Saudi Arabia A61-64.
Gao, above n4, at p. 15.
See Article 3 of Agreement between Iraq and Iraqi Petroleum Company, Mosul Petroleum Company
and Bashra Petroleum Company dated 3 February 1953 in Petroleum Legislation Company ed.,
Middle East: Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts, vol.2. (New York: Gordon H. Barrows,
1958) pp. Iraq Dl-15.

241

by most petroleum producing countries. Increased bonus fees in the form of signature
bonus, discovery bonus and production bonus were first introduced in the 1950s.22 T a x
holidays granted under earlier agreements were abolished. Saudi Arabia m a d e the first
m o v e in this direction when it passed a legislation in 1950 to impose income tax on an oil
company's profit at a rate of 20 per cent.23 Not surprisingly, other countries followed suit.

Host governments then began to assume greater control in petroleum exploration
and exploitation. Three important areas of control related to pricing; participation in, and
management of, petroleum operations; and control over the rate and extent of exploration
and production. Since revenue to a host government under the early concessions w a s
through royalties calculated on the basis of volume of production, there was no need for
control on crude oil prices. Concessionaires determined the price of crude oil which was
sold to their affiliates. However, w h e n income taxes were imposed, host governments
introduced posted prices to determine income tax as well as royalties based on the value of
crude output. Petroleum companies initially protested against host government interference
in petroleum pricing, but they eventually gave up as a result of overwhelming support by
powerful cartels of producing countries, like O P E C (Organization for Petroleum Exporting
Countries).

After securing changes to financial arrangements, host governments provided for
participation in the day-to-day management of petroleum operations and direct ownership
of specified shares of crude produced.25 In 1968, O P E C declared participation as one of its
main objectives.

T h e 50/50 equity participation in Iran, seen in chapter seven, is an

example of this n e w developments. Government participation began to crack the monopoly
held by foreign oil companies in matters of decision making, management and control over
exploration and production.

Gao, above n4, at p. 15.
Royal Decree No. 17/2/28/3321, reproduced in Petroleum Legislation Company ed., Middle East,
above nl9, at pp.Saudi Arabia A66-73.
For details see M . Tanzer, The Energy Crisis: World Struggle for Power and Wealth (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1975).
See comment, "From Concession to Participation: Restructuring the Middle East Oil Industry"
[1973] New York University Law Review 775.
O P E C Resolution X V I 90, June 1968, and O P E C Resolution X X I V 135, July 1971, in Petroleum
Legislation Company ed., Middle East, above nl9, at pp.OPEC Cl-2 and Kl.
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Other controls were asserted by imposing obligations on the concessionaires,
particularly in relation to improvements in relinquishment provisions and work obligations.
Relinquishment provisions were first found in the IPC concession agreement of 1925.
However, these were not implemented successfully. In 1948, the A r a m c o concession
incorporated a program of relinquishment of offshore areas which required the
concessionaire to surrender large portions of the concession areas it did not wish to explore
in accordance with the prescribed time intervals.27 Since then, the requirement for
compulsory and progressive relinquishment of areas not needed for exploration were
incorporated in n e w concession agreements.

W o r k obligations were unknown in early concession contracts. The first work
obligations was imposed by the Libyan Petroleum L a w of 1955, which stipulated for the
concession holder to spend a specified m i n i m u m amount of m o n e y per square kilometre
each year." "This practice was soon followed worldwide and has become a c o m m o n
condition of new petroleum arrangements."29

Thirdly, the formation of O P E C in 1960 and a number of United Nations ( U N )
General Assembly resolutions strengthened and legitimised host governments' push for
absolute ownership and control over petroleum exploitation within their territories.30 These
developments significantly improved the old concession system.
Gao, above n4, at p. 16.
The Libyan Petroleum Law No.25 of 21 April 1955, in Petroleum Legislation Company ed., North
Africa: Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts vol.1. (New York: Gordon H. Barrows, 1959)
p.Libya A 8 .
Gao, above n4, at p. 16.
The first pertinent UN General Assembly resolution is Resolution No. 626 (of 1952), which
provided that: "The right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth is inherent in their
sovereignty." After ten years, the General Assembly adopted, on 14 December 1962, Resolution
No. 1803, entitled "Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources", which provided that: "The
right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their wealth and resources must be
exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State
concerned." This was reinforced in 1966 by Resolution N o . 2158, which provided that: (1) foreign
capital in developing countries should receive host government supervision and be used in the
interest of national development; (2) recognise the right of developing countries to secure and
increase their share in the administration of enterprises which are fully or partly operated by foreign
capital and have a greater share in the advantages and profits derived therefrom on an equitable basis;
and (3) that foreign investors exploiting developing countries' natural resources should undertake
proper and accelerated training of national personnel in all levels and in all fields connected with such
exploitation. O n 12 December 1974, the U N General Assembly adopted Resolution N o . 3281,
entitled "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States", which provided that: "Every State has
and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all
of its wealth, natural resources and economic activities": see Blinn, above nl4, at pp.29-31.
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IV. THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
CONCESSION CONTRACTS31

MODERN

The demise of the old concession system does not mean that its basic tenets are
absent in modern concession agreements. On the contrary, the old system has been
improved to remove the disadvantageous provisions and actively involve the host
government in all spheres of operations in the industry. The following definition of a
modern concession contract (MCC) by Gao explains this appropriately:32
The MCC is an agreement which retains the basic legal format of the traditional
concession, but which has significant modifications to the features of its prototype
which worked to the disadvantage of the producing country. Likewise, the M C C
authorizes a foreign oil company to explore for and exploit the country's petroleum
reserves and transfers considerable discretion over most facets of the development
to the company. Thus, the term "modern" not only suggests a n e w era in which the
contracts are concluded, but also refers to the incorporation of n e w trends into the
contract and an attempt at a rational development of the country's natural resources.
The term also denotes the fact that foreign companies are m a d e to assume an
obligation to take into account the relevant political, social and economic interests of
developing countries that were overlooked under traditional concessions.
Specific particulars of MCCs may differ from country to country. But there are

general features which are present in every MCC. The following characteristics are largel
drawn from K W Blinn and others in their International Petroleum Exploration and
Exploitation Agreements, chapter 4, pages 54-68.33

First, a concession grants exploration and exploitation rights to an international oil
company (IOC) to explore for, and upon discovery of a commercial reservoir, develop,

produce and sell petroleum. In most countries, the exploration and exploitation phases are
separated. Ownership rights to petroleum are granted at the second phase, as in PNG. The
consideration given for the grant of a concession is royalty fixed either by legislation
individually negotiated agreement at a certain percentage per barrel of crude produced.

It is generally agreed that modern concessions are those concessions which have been granted in the
1950s and thereafter, or after the Second World War: Blinn, id., at p.61; Gao, above n4, at p.55.
Gao, id., at pp.29-30.
Blinn, above nl4.
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Second, the concession area is limited, often by demarcating the national territory
into blocks. Concessions are granted to a specified number of blocks. Provisions are
m a d e for progressive relinquishment of areas not required for exploration. The size of
blocks is determined principally by the prospects of the area and the need to attract foreign
investment.

Third, duration of the concession is limited, with the possibility of extension if
further exploration is programmed to be carried out, or if production is still continuing.
The tendency of m a n y countries in recent years has been to reduce the areas and duration of
concessions. For example, in a 1980 agreement between A b u Dhabi and an IOC, it was
stipulated that: "The term of this Agreement shall be a period of thirty-five (35) years from
and after the Effective Date. The Government shall have the right to terminate this
Agreement.. .if the company shall fail to discover crude oil in commercial quantities within
eight years of Effective Date."

Fourth, the IOC is required to train and employ nationals. The host government
m a y have some measure of control in monitoring the implementation of this obligation. In
the absence of skilled local workforce, the concessionaire m a y employ foreigners, but
subject to regulatory controls of the host government. For example, in P N G there is a
committee chaired by a representative from the Department of Labour and Employment,
which monitors the employment of workforce in mining and petroleum projects.
Fifth, the host government may impose various forms of financial benefits to accrue
to it. These payments m a y be required to be paid before production, or based on
production or after production. These are normally in the form of licence fees, signature
bonus, royalty, production bonus, dividends from equity, income tax on the IOC's profits
and special taxes on windfall profits. The various payments m a d e payable to the P N G
government, seen in chapter six, provide good examples.
Sixth, modern concession agreements provide for the IOC to provide the host
government periodic information regarding all levels of operation in the industry. A s a
result, host governments are better informed under modern concession agreements than
they were under the old concession system.

M

Quoted in Blinn, id., at p.63.
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Seventh, host governments exercise considerable control over activities of IOCs.
This is done in various ways: by requiring m i n i m u m exploration expenditure and work
programs, participation in decision-making and approval of exploration costs, and through
the requirement for periodical reporting at all levels of operations.

Finally, most modern concessions provide for the host government's equity
participation. Particularly in the Middle East, government participation has been increased
gradually to 60 per cent, and in larger producing areas, they are even m u c h higher.35 In
other countries, participation m a y be 50 percent or 51 percent, as in Tunisia, or 22.5
percent, as in P N G .

V. INDONESIA'S PRODUCTION-SHARING CONTRACT (PSC)
Indonesia is generally acknowledged as the country which introduced the PSC.36
This was effected by Mining of Petroleum and Natural Gas Law No.44 of 1960. The P S C
was developed in response to the disadvantages presented by the old concession regime
which was imposed by the Dutch Parliament under the East Indies Mining Law of 1899.
However, before that law was enacted, the first concession was granted in 1882, and the
first commercial discovery was made in 1885. The 1899 mining law was re-enacted as the
Mining Ordinance for Netherlands East Indies on 1 October 1930. This law remained until
it was replaced by L a w N o . 44 of 1960 by the independent government under President
Sukarno.

L a w No.44 declared that: "Oil and natural gas mining is only conducted by the

State and the State company is authorized to engage in oil mining on behalf of the State."31
The existing concessions granted under the 1899 law were transformed into "contracts of
work", under which the foreign operators became contractors to state oil enterprises.
"However, for a time the n e w contracts did not change the conditions under which the

Id., at pp.67-68.
Id., at p.69 points out that Bolivia used the concept of production-sharing in as early as the 1950s.
For a short history on Indonesia's petroleum arrangements, see Gao, above n4, at pp.59-64;
generally, chapter 4. See also Khong Cho Oon, The Politics of Oil in Indonesia: Foreign Company
- Host Government Relations (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986) pp.41-50; Robert
Fabrikant, "Production-Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry" (1975) 16 Harvard
International Law Journal 303.
R a y m o n d F. Mikesell, Petroleum Company Operations and Agreements in Developing Countries
(Washington D C : Resources for the Future, 1984) at p.60.
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former concession holders operated."39 Perhaps this was largely attributed to the absence
of a national petroleum policy.

National petroleum policies were not established until the overthrow of Sukarno
and his replacement in 1966 by General Suharto, w h o served as acting president until he
was elected president in March 1968.40 Dr. Ibnu Sutowo, w h o later became president of
Pertamina, Indonesia's national oil company, devised the production-sharing contract
under L a w No.44. The first P S C was signed between Pertamina and Independent
Indonesian American Petroleum C o m p a n y in 1966.41 The basic principles of that P S C
which, as was then established, and which have since been followed, are as follows:42
1. Pertamina has responsibility for the management of petroleum operations, and
the contractor is responsible to Pertamina for the execution of such operations,
in accordance with provisions of the contract.
2. The contractor provides all the financing and technology required for the
operations and bears theriskof production costs.
3. During the term of the contract, total production after allowance for operating
cost is divided between Pertamina and the contractor in accordance with
provisions of the contract.
4. The contractor must submit annual work programs and budgets for scrutiny and
approval by Pertamina.
Although these basic features remain, additional changes have been made, for example,
with respect to the production-sharing ratio, the method of calculating production costs and
arrangements for payment of income tax.
The basic principles of Indonesia's first generation PSCs, from 1966 to 1976, were
retained in the second generation PSCs, from 1976 to 1988. The only provisions which
differed related to cost recovery and profit sharing. Under the first generation P S C , cost

Oon, above n37, at p.41.
For a succinct survey of the evolution of Indonesia's PSCs from 1966 - 1993, see Gordon Barrows,
"Production-Sharing in Indonesia, 1966 to 1993: Evolution and Trends" (1993) 11 (1) OGLTR 3.
Mikesell, above n38, at p.60.
See Barrows, above n42, for these changes and additions from 1966 - 1993.
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recovery w a s limited to 4 0 percent of production.45 The remaining 60 percent of
production, k n o w n as "profit oil", was shared between Pertamina, 65 percent, and the
contractor, 35 percent.46 Since Pertamina paid tax obligations of the contractor, the 35
percent was "a clean share", that is, equivalent to a net profit.47 However, up to a
m a x i m u m of 25 percent of the 35 percent profit oil was required to be supplied to the
domestic market, for which a fee of $0.20 per barrel was paid.48 W h e n oil prices increased
in the early 1970s, this split was increased to 70 to 30 in favour of Pertamina.49

The second generation PSC from 1976-1988 allowed for full cost recovery,
without a ceiling. The remaining profit oil was split 85 to 15 percent in favour of
Pertamina.50 At this time, the United States Internal Revenue Services (IRS) issued rulings
to the effect that it would not recognize tax paid in kind under production-sharing
arrangements by U S oil companies to host governments.51 The result was that U S oil
companies stood to pay tax twice (in the host country and at h o m e ) because the U S IRS
would refuse to give tax credits. This meant that instead of Pertamina paying tax on behalf
of the contractor, the contractor had to pay tax out of its share of production. T o enable
this, a contractor's share of profit oil was increased from 15 percent to 34.0909 percent.
W h e n the then prevailing Indonesian income tax of 56 percent was levied on this amount,
thefinaloutcome was that the contractor still had a net profit of 15 percent.53
The third generation PSC from 1988-1993 introduced further changes to the
production-sharing arrangements, although the basic legal principles remain the same. The
85 percent government take has been reduced to 75 percent for special frontier areas and
pre-tertiary layers.54 For frontier areas and small field conventional areas, the government
45

Barrows, above n42, at p.6
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

4'J

50

Ibid.
Ibid.
See Blinn, above nl4, at pp.255-257.

52

Barrows, above n42, at p.6.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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take is 75 percent and 80 percent, respectively.55 Income tax was reduced from 56 percent
to 48 percent. This means that the production share for a contractor is 28.8462 percent
instead of the previous 34.0909 percent.56

This shows that while the basic legal framework remained, except for a few minor
changes, major changes occurred in the fiscal provisions. However, these fiscal changes
were necessitated by changing circumstances in the oil industry.

It is helpful to examine the main features of Indonesia's model PSC of 1977 and
compare them with the P N G concession regime. I hope that this will give a more detailed
understanding of the features of a P S C . It must be borne in mind that actual contracts
differ in several respects from the model contract. It must also be noted that the details of
the Indonesian regime are embodied in the model contract, whereas in P N G , these are fixed
by legislation (as seen in chapter three). The features of the Indonesian model P S C of
1977 outlined below are based on a summary of the same by R F Mikesell in his book
Petroleum Company
65.

Operations and Agreements in the Developing Countries, pages 62-

57

A. Scope

The Indonesian State's petroleum rights are assigned to Pertamina. Pertamina is
responsible for managing operations under the contract. The I O C , or contractor, is
responsible to Pertamina for the execution of such operations in accordance with the
contract. The I O C provides all financial and technical requirements to undertake such
operations. Risks in carrying out the operations are entirely borne by the contractor.58 In
P N G , the licensee or I O C is responsible for undertaking both management and operations
of petroleum activities. However, the licence m a y require that the Department of Mining
and Petroleum be periodically informed of all operations that are being undertaken. In
relation to provision of finance and technology and bearing risks, the two regimes are
same.

Mikesell, above n38.
Id., at p.62.
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B. Term

The term of a contract is thirty years. If no petroleum is discovered at the end
initial six years, the contractor may terminate the contract. However, if it wants to
continue, and so requests, Pertamina may extend it promptly for two years. The contract
automatically terminates if no oil is found after the extension. If petroleum is found and
Pertamina and the contractor determine that it is commercial, then development can proceed
in that particular portion of the contract area. Meanwhile, explorations can continue in
other portions of the contract area.

In PNG, there are two separate phases - the exploration phase and the development
phase. Under the Indonesian regime, these phases do not appear to exist, except that it can
be implied that the exploration phase is demarcated by the provision that if no oil is found
within six years, the contractor may choose to terminate the contract or extend it for two
more years, after which the contract terminates automatically. This means the aggregate
exploration term in Indonesia is eight years. The term for development will then be 22
years. In P N G , the initial exploration term is six years, but the extended period of another
five years gives an aggregate total of 11 years. The initial term for development in P N G
is 25 years, and this can be extended for further periods of 20 years.

It is obvious that

PNG's terms are longer than those of Indonesia.
C. Surrender of Areas

One quarter (25%) of the areas are to be surrendered on or before the expiration o
the initial three-year period. Another 25 percent is to be surrendered at the end of the sixth
year. O n or before the eighth year, the contractor is to surrender all the areas except an area
less than 7,200 k m 2 , or 40 percent of the original contract area, whichever is less.62 The
surrender provisions in P N G are somewhat similar; only half of the original licence area is
available for extension.

Petroleum Act Ch.198, sections 22, 25 and 26.
Id., section 39.
Mikesell, above n38, at p.63.
Petroleum Act, section 24.
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D . Expenditures

The contract stipulates that operations must begin within six months after the
effective date of the contract. In the first five years, the amount spent must not be less than
the following:

Yearl
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5

US$3.7 million
US$4.7 million
US$1.9 million
US$3.3 million
US$1.9 million

In the first year of operation, at least one well must be drilled. A n y amounts spent in
excess of the m i n i m u m amount m a y be carried into the following year. O n the other hand,
expenditure less than the stipulated amount must receive Pertamina's approval, and then the
difference must be offset in the following year.64

The PNG regime does not stipulate the minimum amount a licensee has to spend. It
is up to the licensee to specify h o w m u c h it is prepared to commit when applying for an
exploration licence.

If the Minister accepts the proposed minimum expenditure and grants

a licence accordingly, it forms an essential condition of the licence.66 The licensee must
then expend the m i n i m u m amount it proposed.

A s in Indonesia, expenditures in excess

of the m i n i m u m amount can be carried forward; or if expenses are under the m i n i m u m
amount, the difference must be balanced by expenditures in subsequent years during the
subsistence of the licensee. However, this must be approved first by the Director. The
Minister m a y cancel a licence for failure to commit the specified m i n i m u m amount.
Indonesia, an exploratory well in thefirstyear is an essential condition.

64

65

66

67

Mikesell, above n38, at p.63.
Petroleum Act, section 19.
Id., section 20.
Id., section 27.
Id., section 98.
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E. W o r k P r o g r a m and Budget

Contractors are required to prepare work programs and a budget of operating costs
for the duration of the contract and have them approved by Pertamina. Pertamina reserves
the right to revise the work program or recommend changes to be effected.69 The P N G
practice is very similar. The Department of Mining and Petroleum ( D M P ) must approve
work programs, and if, in their opinion, certain changes should be made before the issue of
a licence, they m a y require this of the licensee.70 W o r k programs for subsequent years are
required to be submitted at least a year in advance.71 Extension of licences depends largely
on the successful implementation of work programs of previous years.72
F. Compensation and Production Bonuses

For geological and other necessary information provided by Pertamina, the
contractor must pay $5.1 million within 30 days after the approval of the contract by the
Indonesian government. In the event of a commercial discovery, the contractor must pay
Pertamina $5 million when production from that field averages 25,000 barrels per day
(bpd) for 120 consecutive days; and $10 million after daily production from the contract
area averages 75,000 bpd for 120 consecutive days. These payments m a y be deducted
from income tax, but they should not to be included in computing operating costs in
73

calculating output shares.
In PNG, geological information may be purchased from the DMP, but their prices
are not fixed by contract or the licence. The amounts are modest, intended only to defray
administrative expenses rather than as a form of significant revenue, as in Indonesia. There
are no discovery or production bonuses.

Mikesell, above n38, at p.63.
Petroleum Act, section 20.
Id., sections 19 and 23.
Id., section 23 (3) (d) (i).
Mikesell, above n38, at p.63.
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G.

Rights and Obligations of the Contractor

The contractor's obligations are to: (1) advance all funds necessary for execution of
the approved work program; (2) submit to Pertamina all reports on geological, geophysical,
drilling and production results; (3) prepare and carry out training of Indonesian nationals in
all sphere of operations; (4) give preferences to suppliers of Indonesian goods and services;
(5) pay Indonesian corporate tax on net income, as defined, and on interest and dividends;
and (6) comply with its commitment to supply domestic market oil requirements. The
contractor's rights are: (1) the right to sell, assign, transfer, or convey some or all of its
rights to any affiliated or non-affiliated company, provided prior approval is granted by
Pertamina; and (2) the right to export its share of crude oil and keep abroad proceeds from
its sale.

These rights and obligations are essentially the same as those in PNG, apart from a
few obvious exceptions. The first is that the management authority in Indonesia is a
national oil company, whereas in P N G , it is a government department. The second
exception is that no requirement to supply oil for domestic needs exists in P N G . Thirdly,
the licensee in P N G practically sells all petroleum, although, in theory, the State's share of
production m a y be dealt with by the State itself.75 In other words, there is no production
split.

H. Calculation of Amount to be Supplied to Domestic Market
A complicated formula is used to calculate certain portions of the contractor's share
of crude oil, which it has agreed to sell to the domestic market at prices lower than the open
market price. This is calculated as follows: the total quantity of crude oil produced from
the contract area, times the ratio of that quantity to the entire Indonesian production by all
other companies, times 34.09 percent; or 25 percent of the crude oil produced from the
contract area times 34.09 percent , whichever is the smaller amount. The share for the
domestic market is to be sold to Pertamina at 20 U S cents per barrel at the f.o.b. point of
export. However, for the first five years, the price for the domestic supply is to be same as

75

Clause 9 of the Standard Petroleum Agreement (SPA) indicates that the P N G state can be able to
deal with its share of production.
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export price.

In P N G , there is no parallel provision since there are no requirements for

the supply of crude oil for domestic needs.

I. Share of Output
The contractor is to recover all operating costs out of sales proceeds.77 The crude
that remains is to be shared between Pertamina and the contractor, the former receiving
65.9 percent while the latter receives 34.1 percent.78 A s seen in chapter six, the tax rules in
P N G provide for recovery of operating costs out of sales proceeds, but this is for income
tax calculation purposes rather than for sharing the crude product. Nevertheless, once the
crude is sold, the result would be the same.

J. Marketing

The contractor is to market all the crude from the contract area. However,
Pertamina reserves the right to take its share of crude oil in kind to sell it at a higher price, if
it can.7 Similar arrngements exist in P N G . In principle, the State is entitled to take its
share of crude oil in proportion to its equity participation and market it itself. In practice,
marketing is undertaken by foreign oil companies nominated by the State.80
K. Investment Credit

As an incentive, it is provided that the contractor may recover an investment credit
amounting to 20 percent of the capital investment cost required for developing crude
production facilities. The investment credit m a y be recovered out of gross production in
the earliest year before any tax is calculated. T o qualify for investment credit, however, the
quantity of crude oil for Pertamina and 56 percent of the quantity to which the contractor is

Mikesell, above n38, at p.63.
Operating costs consist of the following: (1) current-year noncapital costs; (2) current-year
depreciation for capital costs and (3) current year allowed recovery of prior year's unrecovered
operating costs: id., at p.64.

See S P A , clause 9.

254

entitled should represent not less than 49 percent of the cumulative production over the
project's life.

This is an incentive peculiar to Indonesia. T h e P N G regime provides its

o w n peculiar incentives, just like any other petroleum producing country.82 Incentives
depend on the circumstances of the country, like prospectivity, the need to attract foreign
investment etc.

L. Natural Gas
Pertamina is entitled to 31.8 percent and the contractor, 68.2 percent, if natural gas
is produced and marketed. This sharing is required only after the contractor has recovered
83

its operating costs. In P N G , a natural gas policy is being formulated, and a separate
legislation from the Petroleum Act Ch.198 is expected soon. Until that is done, the natural
gas policy is similar to crude oil in that the P N G State is entitled to royalties, taxes, and if it
elects to participate, dividends from net profits. Once Pertamina's share of 38.1 percent is
sold, the final outcome is revenue to the Indonesian state. This is not different from the
P N G regime. T h e only difference m a y be that Pertamina obtains natural gas supplies
which can be used for its purposes, or marketed cheaply domestically.

M. Pricing
The price for crude sold to third parties is to be determined by reference to the net
QA

realized f.o.b. price by Indonesia. But the price for crude sold to other than third parties
is to be determined by using the weighted average per unit price received by the contractor
and by Pertamina from sales to third parties. If Pertamina can obtain higher prices for the
"operating cost oil" which the contractor is entitled to, the contractor either has to match
Pertamina's price or permit Pertamina to sell that portion of the crude. If this happens, then
the contractor is reimbursed on the basis of the higher price. Giving of discounts or
85

commissions to affiliates by contractors is prohibited.

P N G ' s crude oil pricing is with
Sri

reference to the "norm" price. This has been adequately discussed in chapter six.
81

Mikesell, above n38, at p.64.
For example, exploration areas are fairly large, comparatively speaking, and the term of a
prospecting licence and development licence is long compared to Indonesia.
Mikesell, above n38, at p.64.
Since 1989, price is determined based on the realized market price: see Barrows, above n42, at p.6.
Mikesell, above n38, at p.64. In P N G , clause 12.2 of the S P A appears to imply that no such
restrictions are imposed if oil is bought on f.o.b. basis from P N G .
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N.

Title to E q u i p m e n t

As soon as any equipment purchased by the contractor lands at any port in
Indonesia, it becomes the property of Pertamina. The only exceptions are those hired from
third parties, or owned by sub-contractors to the contractor.87 There is no comparable
provision under the P N G regime. However, there are provisions that the P N G State will
have access to, and can m a k e full use of, facilities and infrastructure provided by the
licensee for its purposes. A n d at the end of the production life of a field, they m a y be
acquired by the State.88

O. Arbitration

In the event of a dispute which Pertamina and the contractor cannot solve amicably,
it is to be referred to arbitration. Each party is to appoint an arbitrator, and the two
arbitrators are to appoint a third, neutral arbitrator. If the two arbitrators dispute
appointment of the third arbitrator, then he or she is to be appointed by the president of the
International Chamber of Commerce. The arbitration shall then be conducted in accordance
with the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. A s w e have seen in
chapter three, the P N G regime provides for arbitration to be conducted in accordance with
the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade L a w
(UNCITRAL).89

P. Employment and Training of Indonesian Personnel

The contractor is required to employ qualified Indonesian personnel in all of its
operations. Moreover, it is required to train and educate Indonesians for labour and staff
positions, including executive management positions. Costs of such training are regarded

Petroleum Act, section 117 and schedule 2.
Mikesell, above n38, at p.64.
SPA, clause 10.
Id., clause 19.
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as operating cost for tax purposes.9 These are similar to those provided under clause 14 of
the Standard Petroleum Agreement (SPA) of the P N G regime.91
Q. Termination

After consultation with Pertamina, the contractor may terminate its rights and
obligations under the contract at any time after the end of the second year.92 In P N G , the
right to terminate an exploration agreement can be exercised by the licensee at any time.93
Also, the Minister can cancel it at any time for breach of one of the essential terms of the
licence, after giving reasonable time to the licensee to rectify it but if it fails to remedy it
without any reasonable cause.

R. Processing of Products

The contractor undertakes to refine 10 percent of its share of production in
Indonesia. If there is no refining capacity, the contractor m a y establish one, provided
Pertamina so requests and approves it, and provided also that the contractor's share of oil is
not less than 100,000 bpd, and further, that both parties agree that it is economical to
undertake such a project.

N o corresponding provisions are found under the P N G

regime.
S. Participation

Pertamina has the right to take a total of 10 percent equity in the total rights and
obligations under a contract. Pertamina m a y then transfer this interest to a company of its
o w n choice, provided the shareholders of it are Indonesian citizens. This equity right has
to be exercised within three months after the contractor has notified Pertamina of a
discovery. The Pertamina-nominated participant m a y opt to pay for the interest in cash
Mikesell, above n38, at p.64.
'Jl

SPA, clause 14.
Mikesell, above n38, at p.64.
Petroleum Act, section 97.
Id., section 98. See also SPA, clause 27.
Mikesell, above n38, at p.64.
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within three months of the date of its acceptance or out of 50 percent of its production
entitlements.96 T h e P N G government's 22.5 percent participating interest and its recent
arrangements with Orogen (examined in chapter seven) corresponds to this provision.
T. Taxes

The contractor is subject to Indonesian income and dividend taxes. However,
Pertamina assumes the contractor's tax obligations, including transfer tax, import and
export duties on materials, equipment and supplies brought into Indonesia by the contractor
or its sub-contractors, and other taxes associated with its operations.97 This is not the case
in P N G .
Indonesia's PSC model has been adopted by many countries.98 Although fiscal
provisions and a few minor areas in the general framework m a y not be the same as that of
Indonesia, it is generally accepted that the following are the main features of PSCs today:
1. The IOC is appointed by the host country as contractor on a certain area.
2. T h e I O C operates at its sole risk and expense under the control of the host
country.
3 T h e production, if any, belongs to the host country.
4. T h e I O C is entitled to a recovery of its costs out of the production from the
contractual area.
5. After cost recovery, the balance of production is shared on a pre-determined
percentage split between the host country and the IOC.
6. The I O C income is liable to taxation.
7. Equipment and installations are the property of the H C , either at the outset or
progressively in accordance with their amortization schedules.99

06

97

Id., at pp.64-65.
Ibid.
The countries that have PSC regimes are: Angola, Albania, Bangladesh, Benin, Burma (Myanmar),
China, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guyana, Honduras, India, Ivory Coast, Israel, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, O m a n , Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rumania, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Surinam, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Vietnam, Venezuela and Yemen:
see Gao, above n4, at p. 102.

W

Blinn, above nl4, at p.69.
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VI.

BRAZIL'S RISK-SERVICE CONTRACT

(RSC)

Service contracts first came into use in the 1960s.100 However, they did not gain
favour until 1976 w h e n Brazil opened up its offshore areas to international investors to
carry out petroleum exploration and exploitation under what became k n o w n as the "riskservice contract" (RSC).
.

Today the Brazilian R S C often serves as a model for service

102

agreements.
From its independence from Portugal in 1822 to 1937, Brazil had the old
concession system. However, from 1938 to 1975, Brazil closed its doors to IOCs because
of oil nationalism, based on the widespread belief that Brazil was "floating" on oil, a belief
widely held even before any oil was discovered.

In 1938, president Vargas promoted

this oil nationalism by the passage of Decree-Law N o 395 creating the National Petroleum
Council ( C N P ) to explore for and develop Brazil's oil as a monopoly.

That law

provided that the C N P could '"carry out the official operations of oil and natural gas
exploration through a technical agency to be created'".105 In 1953, L a w 2004 established
Petrobras (Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A.) as a state monopoly to undertake petroleum
exploration and exploitation.106 Petrobras was given absolute and non-transferable power
to (1) prospect for and develop petroleum, (2) refine both imported and locally produced
crude oil, and (3) construct pipelines, ports and facilities to transport crude oil and byId., at p.82; Gao, above n4, at p. 105. A few service contracts were first signed by P E M E X (the
Mexican national oil company) in the 1950s and by Y P F (the Argentinian national oil company)
subsequently, but it was not before the 1960s that international oil companies (IOC) began to accept
the concept that they can explore for and exploit petroleum resources without actually acquiring the
ownership rights, as before. It was the French national oil company ( E R A P ) which took the lead in
that direction by concluding agreements with N I O C first in 1966 and then in 1968.
101

Gao, ibid.

102

Blinn, above nl4, at p.86.
William H. Weiland, "Survey of Oil and Gas Development Policy in Brazil" in International Bar
Association (IBA) ed., International Energy Law, Proceedings of the Sixth Energy Law Seminar
Organised by the IBA's Section on Energy and Natural Resources Law (hereafter IB A Proceedings)
(Houston, Texas: IBA, 1984) p.169, at p. 170.
George Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
pp.227-230.

105

J. S. C. Neto, Risk Service Contracts in Brazil: An Overview, diploma thesis, University of
Dundee, M a y 1983, quoted in Gao, above n4, at p. 107.

106

Ewell E. Murphy, Jr, "State Entities and Private Oil Companies: The Contest for Leadership in the
Development of Latin American Oil and Gas" in I B A Proceedings, above n!03, p.79, at p.88.
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products and market petroleum and petroleum products.107 Subsequently, Petrobras
created subsidiaries and affiliates to undertake specialized functions such as fertilizers
(Petrofertil), petrochemicals (Petroquisa), retail marketing (Distribuidora), hard minerals
(Petromisa), the purchase of Middle Eastern crude (Interbras) and overseas exploration
(Braspetro).108

Beginning in 1975, Brazil realised that its "go alone" policy could no longer be
maintained. Private capital and technology w a s required to maintain exploration in order to
discover and produce petroleum to attain self-sufficiency in oil. The need for private capital
and Brazil's decision to invite I O C s in the industry w a s necessitated by a number of
inevitable and accidental factors. First, decades of oil monopoly established that Petrobras
alone w a s not able to assume the enormous task of exploring for and develop petroleum at
such a speed as required by increasing domestic demands, because it was constrained by
capital and technology needs.

Second, the oil crisis of the early 1970s came at a time of

increasing consumption and falling production.

Third, the price for imported oil which

was once thought of as acceptable to maintain national pride, could no longer be justified in
the light of the increasing oil prices.

Fourth, Brazil's expenditure for imported oil
119

increased from $500 million in 1972 to $1.8 billion in the first six months of 1975.
Finally, it w a s realised that domestic production could offset this sky-rocketing bill if only
sufficient reserves were found.113 But Petrobras was not able to do this alone.
In inviting IOCs, Petrobras developed the RSC system, which defined their rights,
obligations and responsibilities. Below are the main features of the model R S C .

U Grant Keener, "Current Legal Developments in Brazilian Energy Laws and Performance of Service
Thereunder" in IBA Proceeding, above nl03, p.157, at p.159.
Murphy, above nl06, at p.88.
Gao, above n4, at p.l 10.
Ibid.
Id., at p.l 11.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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A. Ownership

Petrobras is the sole and unconditional owner of all petroleum and rare gases
produced and recovered by the contractor."4

B. Bidding Procedure

Service contracts are awarded through competitive bidding. A bidder is required to
pay bidding fees ($400,000 in 1976 and $250,000 in 1977), which entitle it a set of
geological and geophysical data for its o w n exclusive use.115 If the applicant comprises
more than one company, each applicant is required to pay the bidding fee."6 The bidding
variables usually include:
1 the number of blocks;
2 minimum expenditure;
3 exploration program;
4 commencement of thefirstdrilling;
5 cash bonus or other advantages the bidder wishes to offer;
6 effective interest rate on development investment;
7 term of recovery of capital investment; and
8 proposed service remuneration.
C. Contractor's Services
The contractor's services, are firstly, to carry out exploration, evaluation and
development of commercial fields in the service area under the contract and, secondly, to
furnish all funds required for the performance of these activities. These activities are to be
undertaken by the contractor at its sole cost and risk. The contractor m a y be refunded by
Petrobras in the event of a commercial discovery, but if no commercial discovery is made,
1 | Q

the contractor bears all the risks.

114

115

116

117

Article 1 of model PSC, quoted in Blinn, above nl4, at p.87.
Gao, above n4, at p.l 18; Mikesell, above n38, at p. 100.
Ibid.
Gao, ibid.
Article 2, model PSC, quoted in Blinn, above nl4, atp.88.
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D . Production Operations

Petrobras takes full and effective control of all productions in the event of a
commercial discovery, commencing from the date of commercial production."9
E. Contractor's Remuneration

Funds committed by the contractor in exploration which results in a commercial
discovery are to be reimbursed, with no interest whatsoever charged on the amounts.
However, funds expended in developing a commercial field are to be reimbursed with
interest at the rate the parties specify in the agreement.120

F. Term of Service
— - 191

The term of service is not specified in the model R S C .
However, the service
period is divided into three phases - the exploration phase, the development phase and the
production phase. The first phase has a duration of three years for offshore contracts and
five years for onshore. At the end of the first three years for onshore, the contractor m a y
have the option to withdraw and conclude the contract, or get an extension for the two
remaining years. The development phase commences on the date of commercial discovery
and terminates on the date Petrobras approves, accepts and receives the producing, storing,
gathering, delivering and transporting facilities from the contractor.
Generally, the obligations of the contractor can be summarised as follows:
a. pay an unrecoverable bonus (e.g., $500, 000);

1 Iy

b.

disburse the m i n i m u m work expenditure;

c.

commence the drilling within time limit;

d.

take all disbursements required for development operations upon a
commercial discovery;

Article 14, model PSC quoted in id., at p.89.
Article 19, model P S C quoted in ibid.

121

Gao, above n4, at p. 120.

122

See J. S. C. Neto, "Risk-Bearing Service Contracts in Brazil" (1985) 3 JENRL

114.

e.

report to Petrobras at the end of the exploration period on the expenditure
and pay any difference between the disbursement and the obligation;

f.

deliver a bank draft covering the total m i n i m u m exploration expenditure;

g.

assist Petrobras during the transfer of any production unit;

h.

carry out all services in accordance with good petroleum practice without
causing ecological damage to the public and private property, and carry out
cleaning operations in the event of pollution;

1.

keep Petrobras informed by furnishing daily, weekly and or monthly
reports on the progress of operations as well as a final report upon the
completion of each operation;

j.

provide Petrobras with full and complete facilities so as to enable it to
inspect at all times all operations;

k.

maintain full records of all technical operations and keep accounting records
of all activities;

1.

comply with all applicable provisions of laws and regulations issued by
the competent authorities;

m.

furnish to Petrobras all information, data and interpretation concerning the
operations;

n.

respect industrial property rights and keep Petrobras free from claims
resulting from violation of such rights; and

o.

be always mindful of the rights and interests of Brazil and Petrobras.123

VII. EVALUATION OF MCC, PSC AND RSC
A. Ownership
One of the major objectives of host governments is to assert ownership over
petroleum resource and control its exploration and exploitation, either by domestic
companies or IOCs, or both. Under a concession system, ownership is not granted to
I O C s at the exploration stage. However, once commercial reserves are discovered,
ownership is absolutely transferred to the licensee. Under a P S C , the contractor has no
title except to his share of profit oil, but then at the point of sale. Under a R S C , the
contractor has no title to any oil except its remuneration or service fees, which m a y be in
kind (a portion of production) or in cash, as agreed between the parties in each contract.
Source: Article 5 of Brazil's model P S C quoted in Gao, above n4, at p. 123.
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T h e main difference between a P S C and R S C lies in the mechanism for the recovery of
costs and the remuneration of the contractor, which are effected according to a mutually
agreed formula.124 The R S C assures m a x i m u m control over petroleum operations by the
host state. At the same time, the national oil company of the host country cooperates with
IOCs to explore for and develop petroleum resources. "From an ideological and political
standpoint, this certainly constitutes a major improvement over other current petroleum
agreements. It is thus favored by those developing countries which place greater emphasis
on the ownership of natural resources and national independence."125

What does this mean for PNG? We have seen in earlier chapters that PNG states
expressly that citizens should control and participate fully in the exploitation of its natural
resources, using local skills and resources. The dilemma is whether this objective should
remain a political ideology or whether efforts should be m a d e to work towards its
achievement. Brazil had a similar ideology and attempted to implement it from 1938 to
1976, quite successfully until external and internal factors intervened and dictated that it
should not go alone anymore. B y then, Brazil had established a powerful national oil
company which has widespread international operations. Today, Brazil exploits its
resources at par with IOCs. At the same time, Brazil had adopted a petroleum framework
which attracts foreign capital and technology without compromising its national objective
for effective control and ownership. P N G could do that, but first it has to make necessary
amendments to the current regime. Without a wholesale replacement of the petroleum
framework, amendments can be done providing for majority P N G ownership in petroleum
projects, as is done in Canada and Australia, as seen in chapter seven. But such a
proposition tends to go against current government attitude, which shows a trend towards
vesting State assets in private hands, as exemplified by the partial privatisation of M R D C .
If this continues to happen, it might continue to inflame anti-government and anti-foreigninvestor sentiments, such as those noted in chapter one.

Blinn, above nl4, at p.82.
Gao, above n4, at p. 138.

B .

Attract Risk Investment

The need to attract risk investment from IOCs obviously has large bearing on the
terms a petroleum framework provides, regardless of its type. This means that irrespective
of whether the petroleum framework is a M C C , P S C or R S C , foreign investors look at the
overall regime as a package to determine whether or not it is worth taking the risk to invest.
The two persuasive factors are firstly, the prospectivity of the country and, secondly, the
cost recovery period and net interest on the investment. Therefore, for the host country,
the prospectivity of its country can m e a n a lot to the terms and conditions it sets. For
instance, the P N G regime w a s formulated at a time w h e n no oil w a s discovered and
exploration risk was rated two to three times higher than that in Australia. This meant that
P N G had to give a lot of concessions in order to attract IOCs. For instance, the royalty rate
in most countries ranges from 8 to 16 percent but P N G ' s is 2 percent. This is one of the
lowest in the world. In fact, after a comparative evaluation of petroleum agreements
around the world, R. F. Mikesell concluded: "It should be noted that most concession
contracts are not as liberal as that of PNG." 126

On the other hand, countries which have successful rates of exploration provide
more onerous and harsh terms. For example, a study of the fiscal terms in the Far East,
South America, North Africa and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by
Dennis Smith, vice-president of Petroconsultants, Inc. of Houston, U S A , concluded that
Indonesia and Malaysia provide "certainly the harshest fiscal systems in our study but they
also have the corresponding historical success to go with it."127 This clearly shows that the
harshness of a country's fiscal regime can be mitigated by its prospectivity.

The issue for PNG is to ascertain whether its liberal regime, which is certainly in
favour of IOCs, should be maintained on the basis of past perceptions of low prospectivity
and high exploration risk. In m y view, the former perception of low prospectivity in P N G
has changed n o w because of significant discoveries of gas reservoirs, condensate and
crude oil in Kutubu, G o b e and Paua. Botten confirmed this when he said: "Exploration
success rates are world class, especially in the Highlands Fold Belt area, and are above

Mikesell, above n38, at p.l 15.
127

Dennis Smith, Comparison of Fiscal Terms in the Far East, South America, North Africa and
C./.S. (Houston, Texas: Petroconsultants, Inc., undated mimeograph) at p. 18.

265

those of its neighbours in S E Asia."128 However, the perception about risks has not
changed because exploration areas are, generally, remote and inaccessible except by
helicopters. This means that any desire to increase the "government take", as in Indonesia
or Malaysia, because of the increased prospectivity would have to be restrained or
cautiously taken because of the high risk factor.

C. Control and Management of Operations

A PSC, such as Indonesia's, provides for ultimate control and management of
operations to be in the hands of the host government or its national oil company ( N O C ) ,
while the day-to-day responsibilities are in the hands of IOCs. However, Fabrikant said
that the host government or its N O C is not able to do this from a practical point of view.129
Practically, it is difficult to separate the overall management of operations from the day-today conduct, especially in the context where the I O C bears the financial risk of
operations.1 ' Therefore, any view that P N G should adopt a production-sharing regime
because it provides a better opportunity for greater control and management of operations
by the government should fail.

On the other hand, joint management of operations, as provided for under the
Malaysian P S C , can be worked out more easily, because this can be effected through a
joint advisory committee to discuss programs and budgets.

A joint management

committee, as such, m a y not be any different from the joint management committee of the
joint venture partners, which discusses budgets and programs with Chevron Niugini in
P N G with relation to the Kutubu fields, for example. Only under a R S C can one truly say
that control of management of operations is exercised by the host country or its N O C in the
practical sense. But there are m a n y factors which m a y prevent P N G from making R S C a
119

viable option.
Peter Botten, "Petroleum Prospectivity of P N G : Comparative Risks and Rewards", a paper presented
at a conference organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum in Sydney, M a y 1995, at
p.8.
Fabrikant, above n37, at p.351.
Blinn, above nl4, at p.78.

1.12

For example, the concession regime is simple and easier to administer than the risk service system.
Lack of manpower and technology capacity in P N G could be other important factors.

266

D.

Training, E m p l o y m e n t and Technology Transfer

All contractual arrangements may require the contractor to train and employ
nationals and transfer petroleum technology in the process of petroleum operations.133 The
realization of such a provision is not dependent on whether a petroleum framework is a
concession, a R S C or a production-sharing arrangement, but on h o w well the host
government implements it in a workable, practical manner. For example, in relation to this
clause under the Indonesian production-sharing regime, it has been said: "Like the
management clauses, the Indonesianization provision remains largely ineffective due to its
nature as a general commitment." 14 O o n pointed out that these obligations are ineffective
because "these commitments set no clear-cut target which could provide a yardstick to
assess the company's compliance with the government's dicta in this regard."135 This
supports the argument that it is not the type of petroleum framework that matters, but the
initiative and willingness of the host government to be practical to ensure that it achieves
what it wants under the legal regime it has.

Like Indonesia and other countries, PNG makes provisions for training and
employment of nationals and for the transfer of technology. However, it is doubtful
whether there is a clear-cut target in terms of what specific training is to be provided, the
quality as well as quantity, timing, and a method for assessing the company's compliance.
For example, a requirement that a company must train 20 petroleum engineers and 10
petroleum economists in ten years' time, and that they will be tested by such and such
internationally reputed firm or institution, would be more specific and practical than a
general and ambiguous requirement that P N G nationals must be trained and employed.
The training and employment clauses in the PNG petroleum development
agreements and mining development contracts are not specific. I submit that training and
employment clauses must be precise, workable and their implementation assessable. In
respect of technology transfer, the particular technology that needs to be transferred, and
when and h o w it is to be transferred, must be spelt out clearly. Meanwhile, the P N G

Training is increasingly specified as a minimum expenditure each year, especially in developing
countries: see Barrows, above n 1, at p. 173.
Gao, above n4, at p. 102.
Oon, above n37, at p.98.
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government should budget for and put the necessary facilities in place to receive the
technology transferred.

E. Government Take
"Government take" is the phrase used for total revenue accruing to the host
government from the development of a commercial petroleum field. Under a P S C and a
R S C , the government take primarily comes from the sale of its share of production,
whereas under a concession regime, its principal source is royalty and taxation. The source
of revenue to the host government, either through sale of its share of production or through
tax/royalty, is not so important. W h a t is important is h o w m u c h the host government
receives, irrespective of the type of petroleum framework. If this is accepted, then h o w
m u c h the host government can expect to receive will be influenced by other factors, like
prospectivity, risk, etc as considered under section B above. Therefore, any view in P N G
that the government take under a production-sharing regime or other regimes would be
higher than under the concession regime P N G has is simply not true. T h e P N G
government can simply increase its royalty rate, or introduce bonuses, or impose taxes like
export tax, or increase its equity to 50 percent without replacing its concessionary regime.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The MCC, such as the one PNG has, is widely used throughout the world. "It has
the advantage of being a tried-and-true system that has proved that it works. Also this
system is flexible enough to accommodate different approaches for its implementation: it
can be enacted as a corpus of legislation (as in the United Kingdom, United States, France,
and Australia), or it can be negotiated directly to incorporate the same requirements and
achieve the same results (as in the Middle East)."136 T h e M C C satisfies developing
countries' desire to exercise s o m e review of, control over, and participate in the
concessionaire's operations through its national oil company or equivalent government
agency.137 From the investor's point of view, attributes such as the generous grants, less
1-1Q

government interference, and the appropriation of production are preferable.
Binn, above nl4, at p.68.
'"

D A Suleiman, "The Oil Experience of the United Arab Emirates and Its Legal Framework" (1988) 6
JENRL 7-8.
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Gao, above n4, at p.57.

268

In response to the old concession system, Indonesia has developed and given the
world an alternative regime which has become very popular a m o n g developing countries.
The popularity of the P S C has been said to be based on the politically appealing features,
such as ownership of production and subjecting I O C s to a mere contractor status.139
Fabrikant described this in these words:
The PSC represents an important effort to equalize the historical imbalance between
the producing countries and the foreign petroleum companies. Although the
contracts exaggerate the actual shift in power between the parties, they provide an
appearance of equality as well as a means for ultimately achieving such equality.140
The RSC can be said to be the most extreme system of the three systems of
contracts from the view of IOCs. However, from the view of host governments, it can be
the most favorable and progressive of the contractual forms currently in operation.141 The
"risk service contract is simpler and clearer to administer and comply with, and its terms are
more favorable to host countries."14

On the basis of the foregoing, I submit that PNG does not need to replace its
petroleum framework with another system. W h a t it needs, however, is a precise and
specific program to implement its stated petroleum policy objectives. For instance, if it
wants to save costs on imported oil, it m a y require a petroleum company, as a condition of
a petroleum development licence, to construct a refinery and refine and supply oil at a
subsidised or reduced price. If it desires to increase revenue, it m a y increase its royalty rate
or introduce bonuses, export tax etc or increase its equity to as high as 50 to 60 percent, as
in the Middle Eastern countries.

If it wants majority P N G ownership in all petroleum

projects, it m a y demand that this be so before development of a project is approved, as
Australia and Canada require. If it requires nationals at managerial levels, this can be
stipulated in the agreement. It has to provide a time frame within which this is to be

Id., at p. 103.
Fabrikant, above n37, at p.351.
Y Omorogbe, "The Legal Framework for the Production of Petroleum in Nigeria" (1987) 5 JENRL
282.
Gao, above n4, at p. 141.
However, this must be weighed with other considerations, for instance, the high risks and the need to
attract investment.
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implemented, h o w it is to be assessed, and when it is to be completed.144 P N G can achieve
what it wants under the present regime.

For example: " W h e n the licensee fully recovers its cost plus 10 percent profit, it has to train 20
petroleum engineers during the entire life of the field"; or "20 petroleum economists are to be fully
trained within ten years from the date of commencement of production. Failure to do so would be a
fundamental breach of the development licence. If no reasonable cause is shown for non compliance,
the development licence will be canceled."
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CHAPTER

TEN

CONCLUSION
Papua New Guinea is exploiting its mineral and petroleum resources at an
accelerating pace with capital and technology of foreign multinational companies. This is
happening at a time w h e n most of the population are still yet to be educated to the level
where they can be able to compete with these multinationals, and acquire capital,
technology and skills to develop the natural resources themselves. It is happening at a time
when most of them are still dependent on the subsistence economy. From experiences of
impacts of multinational companies' operations in other developing countries,1 the P N G
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) adopted, as the third national goal, the need to
direct and control foreign investment to conform to P N G laws and policies. It also
expressed the desire for citizens and governmental bodies to exploit bulk of the natural
resources using local skills, finance and technology.2 While enacting the Petroleum Act
Ch.198, the P N G Parliament dutifully embodied this goal as objectives one to four of the
six policy objectives for petroleum exploitation. However, contrary to this stated policy
objective, all petroleum exploration and exploitation are being carried out by foreign oil
companies.

The CPC also warned that to bring foreign investment when most of the people are
yet to be educated and lack the capacity to participate on an equal footing with foreign
investors would amount to vesting control and management of our resources in foreign
hands. " W e believe it is seriously detrimental to the long-term interests of our people for
large scale foreign enterprises to be established, employing substantial numbers of skilled
expatriates, with our o w n people being involved only at the lower levels of management
and operations for m a n y years to come." The Committee further warned that:
Bringing foreign investment into our country at this stage of its development can be
likened to using a bucket of water to fill a cup. The cup can only contain a small

The CPC's reference was the report of the United Nations on the "Impact of Multinational
Corporations on Development and International Relations": see the C P C Final Report, chapter 12.
See Goal 3 of the National Goals and Directive Principles, set out in the Preamble to the PNG
Consitution.
C P C Report, chapter 12, at p.3, quoted in B. Brunton and D. Colquhoun-Kerr, The Annotated
Constitution of Papua New Guinea (Waigani: U P N G Press, 1984) p. 16.
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amount of water in the bucket and the excess water simply overflows and runs away,
as do the benefits of excessive foreign investment.4

This is exactly what is happening in PNG. The PNG economy is small, and like
the small cup which cannot hold all the water in a bucket, the resources wealth in the
country cannot be retained. The excess wealth from natural resources is simply
overflowing and running away elsewhere.5 This is, in m y view, one of the main reasons
w h y P N G is said to be a rich country with poor people. Therefore, as Nahau Rooney 6
suggests, perhaps the solution would be to halt further exploitation of natural resources
until Papua N e w Guineans develop the capacity to manage and assert substantial control in
the exploitation of these natural resources.

As long as this remains to be done, PNG's legal framework for petroleum, like
other natural resources legal frameworks, will continue to be challenged from m a n y fronts.
O n e of the challenges will be, as already being experienced, a call for the petroleum legal
framework to be replaced. This is based on the assumption that it is the law and policy that
is shifting control and ownership of natural resources like petroleum in foreign hands for
negligible benefits that do not improve the economy of the country in any substantial sense.
Although the petroleum law and policy is generally sound, from the examination above,
certain amendments are required to emphasize majority national ownership and control.

Foreign domination of the resources industries also gives rise to another problem challenge to the State's title. A s seen in chapter four, legal actions against State title in
minerals and petroleum were c o m m e n c e d as a result of the State's refusal to give
encouragement, preference and/or protection to interests of national entrepreneurs to
participate in petroleum exploitation. A s the Donigi cases in the National and Supreme
Courts show, although there were insufficient grounds and interests for the plaintiff to
institute those actions, the cases were, nevertheless, pursued with vigor in an attempt to
establish that customary landowners are owners of minerals and petroleum beneath their
land and, as such, their rights should not be divested entirely to foreign investors for
meagre licence fees, a low royalty and income tax; without any involvement of nationals in
a substantial way in petroleum businesses. Although any legal challenge to state title in the
4

Ibid.
See chapter one for references to this effect in letters to the Viewpoint of the Post-Courier.

6

Post-Courier, 30 August 1996, p. 10.
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courts m a y not be successful, the ownership challenges in the National and Supreme
Courts clearly indicate the desire of Papua N e w Guineans to to participate and obtain some
form of control in the exploitation of P N G ' s natural resources.

A further challenge to the petroleum legal framework comes from landowners who
push for a greater equity participation. Since the inception of the development forum
process, successive governments have allowed several benefits to flow to landowners.
A m o n g other benefits, landowners have been given the option to purchase a certain
percentage of equity from the government's equity interests in mining and petroleum
projects. Despite this, landowners have continued to demand for more benefits. This
resulted in the the State awarding 5 percent free equity of its 30 percent equity in mining
projects, and 2 percent free equity of the its 22.5 percent equity in petroleum projects to
landowners, beginning with the Lihir gold mine. Even after this policy has been
introduced, landowners are demanding greater participation, as shown by actions of the
Gobe landowners, which delayed development of the Gobe fields.

The Kutubu pipeline ownership struggle between national entrepreneurs and
foreign multinationals also highlights the desire of Papua N e w Guineans to be involved in
petroleum businesses.

To address these challenges, several things need to be done. First, amendments to
the petroleum framework, without having to replace it, are required. In particular, the
Petroleum Act needs to be amended to provide for majority national ownership in any
petroleum project. O n e w a y to do this is, as Great Britain did in relation to the North Sea
fields, by amending the criteria for selection of exploration, development and pipeline
licensees. The overriding criteria should be to award a licence to a company which is
totally owned by nationals, or one in which majority of the shares are held by Papua N e w
Guineans. Another w a y is to follow the Australian or Canadian practice by requiring that a
majority of the interests in a petroleum project must be owned by P N G citizens. This can
be done at the stage when the development forum considers the development proposal of a
proposed developer. The government should then introduce appropriate legislation to
protect the national shareholders from being bought off by foreigners.
There is another area which have farther reaching consequences than the above
challenges, and needs to be dealt with urgently. This is in the area of management of
financial benefits from resources exploitation. It is true that substantial benefits are flowing
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to landowners and provincial governments as a result of recent policy changes, such as
institution of the development forum. Also significant contributions are m a d e to the
national purse. However, there appears to be gross mismanagement of these benefits, both
at the national and local level. In m y view, the result of this mismanagement is the
perception and argument that the petroleum framework needs replacement. But, even if
the petroleum legal framework is amended and even if national ownership and participation
in petroleum businesses is increased, mismanagement of financial benefits will, if not
addressed and rectified, continue to weaken the P N G economy. This will continue to leave
the people dissatisfied with the petroleum legal framework. It is for this reason that the
first and foremost reform should c o m e from responsible individuals and institutions to
manage resources revenue in a w a y that brings sustainable and tangible benefits to the
people of P N G .

In my view, it would be fair to say that PNG's petroleum framework is one which
addresses the concerns of both parties - the investor and the State. However, from the
view of m a n y Papua N e w Guineans, the framework is liberal and more favourable to
foreign investors than the government. This view is supported by Mikesell, w h o after
analysing several petroleum frameworks of developing countries around the world,
n

concluded that the P N G concession regime is one of the most liberal regimes in the world.
This liberal regime, from the government's point of view, is necessary to attract foreign
investment, because of the high exploration and development risks. However, the
necessity to attract foreign investment at this time, when P N G lacks the capacity to assume
substantial control in resources exploitation, is what appears to be disputed by many.
Although foreign investment is welcomed, local capacity has to be developed first, so that
citizens can compete at par with international investors. This can be seen not as an onerous
demand but a call for re-direction of foreign investment to be consistent with and in
furtherance of the relevant National Goals and Directive Principles of the Constitution and
the petroleum policy objectives.
There is no doubt that the liberal petroleum framework was adopted at a time when
known reserves were few and w h e n no commercial field was established. N o w that the
number of proved and probable reserves has been enhanced and four commercial fields
have increased the prospectivity of the country, perhaps it is time for the government to re-

R. F. Mikesell, Petroleum Company Operations and Agreement in Developing Countries
(Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984) p.l 14.
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examine the petroleum legal framework again. However, this exercise must be cautiously
taken because lack of infrastructure still causes the high exploration and development risks.
Even if nationals have substantial ownership and control, a sense of responsibility
with respect to equitable and sustainable management of resources revenue has to be
developed and promoted. Without doing this, there is no guarantee that P N G ' s rich
resources will improve the country's economy and increase the people's living standards .
In m y view, mismanagement is something which the law or Parliament cannot adequately
deal with, because it proceeds from the insatiable ego and selfishness of humanity.
However, unless this source is dealt with, P N G ' s resources regime, of which the
petroleum legal framework is one and has been the subject of examination in this thesis,
will continue to be challenged from many fronts. A s long as P N G remains a rich country
with poor people, such challenges will be difficult to avoid.

275
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Aaronovitch, Monopoly: A Study of British Monopoly Capitalism (London: Lawrence
& Wishard Ltd., 1955)
Al-Chalabi, F. J., OPEC and the International Oil Industry: A Changing Structure
(London: Oxford University Press, 1980)
Aleck, J. and J. Rannells eds., Custom at the Crossroads (Waigani: Law Faculty
U P N G , 1995)

Anderson, D. L., Foreign Investment Control in the Canadian Mineral Sector: Lesso
from the Australian Experience (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for Resources Studies,
Queens University, 1984)
Asia Pacific Group, The Barnett Report: A Summary of the Report of the Commission
of Inquiry Into Aspects of the Forestry Industry in Papua New Guinea (Hobart: AsiaPacific Group, 1990)

Australian International Assistance Bureau, Papua New Guinea: The Role of Governme
in Economic Development (Canberra: Economic Insights Pty Ltd., 1994)
Australian Mineral Foundation, Economic Evaluation in the Petroleum Industry
Adelaide: A M F , 1990)
Banks, N. B., The Registration and Assignment of Crown Mineral Interests with
Particular Reference to the Canadian Oil and Gas Act (Working Paper No.5) (Calgary:
Faculty of Law, University of Galgary, 1985)
Baring, M., Papua New Guinea Resources Review (Port Moresby: March 1995)
Bates, R. L. and J. A. Jackson, eds., Glossary of Geology (Virginia: American
Geological Institute, 1987)
Bedford, R. and A. Mamak, Compensation for Development: The Bougainville Case
(Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 1977)
Beredjick, R. and T. Walde, eds., Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing
Countries (London: Graham and Trotman, 1988)
Biskup, P., B. Jinks and H. Nelson, A Short History of New Guinea (Sydney: Angus
& Robertson, 1968)
Blinn, K. W., C. Duval, H. L. Leuch and A. Pertuzio, International Petroleum
Exploration and Exploitation Agreements (London: Euromoney Pub., 1986)
Brossard, E. B., Petroleum Politics and Power (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Pennwell Books,
1983)

Brunton, B. and D. Colquhoun-Kerr, The Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea
(Waigani: U P N G Press, 1984)
Brunton, B. D., The Struggle for the Oil Pipeline in Papua New Guinea (NRI
Discussion Paper No.68) (Waigani: NRI, 1992)

Bull-Berg, H. J., American International Oil Policy (London: Frances Pinter, 1987)

276
Burton, J., Axe Makers of the Waghi, Ph.D thesis (Canberra: Australian National
University, 1984)

Carman, G. J. and Z. eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua New Guinea: Proceedings
of the First PNG Petroleum Convention, Port Moresby, 12-14 February, 1990 (Port
Moresby: P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 1990)
Cattan, H., The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa (Dobbs
Ferry, N e w York: Oceana Pub. Inc., 1967)

Connel, J. and R. Howitt eds., Mining and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia (Sydne
Sydney University Press, 1991)
Daintith, T. ed., The Legal Character of Petroleum Licences: A Comparative Study
(London: The University of Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Studies, and
Energy and Natural Resources Committee of the International Bar Association, 1981)
Dam, K. W., Oil Resources: Who Gets What? (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1976)
Denman, D. R., Studies in Land Economy: The Place of Property: A New Recognition
of the Function and Form of Property Rights in Land (Cambridge: Geographical Pub.
Ltd., 1977)
Department of Mining and Petroleum, Petroleum Policy Handbook (Port Moresby: May
1993)
1994 Annual Report on Petroleum Activity in Papua New
Guinea (Port Moresby: February 1995)

j

1993 Annual Report on Petroleum Activity in Papua New
Guinea (Port Moresby: February 1994)

?

Kutubu Petroleum Development Project (Port Moresby: 22 July
1994)

5

Brief on the Kutubu Development Project (Port Moresby: 1 July
1992)

5

Donigi, P., Indigenous or Aboriginal Rights to Property: A Papua New Guinea
Perspective (Utrecht, The Netherlands: International Books, 1994)
Ernst & Young, PNG Taxation Law and Practice (Port Moresby: 1996)
Taxation of Petroleum Projects in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby:
1992)

?

Freudenburg, R. and R. Gramling, Oil in Trouble Waters: Perceptions, Politics and
Battle Over Offshore Drilling (Albany, N e w York: State University of N e w York Press,
1994)
Gao, Z., International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1994)
Garnaut, R., and A. C. Ross, Taxation of Mineral Rents (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983)

Ghai, Y. P. and A. J. Regan, The Law, Politics and Administration of Decentralisation
in Papua New Guinea (NRI Monograph No.30) (Waigani: NRI, 1992)

Giuliano, F. A. ed., Introduction to Oil and Gas Technology 3rd ed. (Eaglewood Cl
N e w Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989)
Goldring, J., The Constitution of Papua New Guinea (Sydney: The Law Book Co.,

Gupta, D., The Law and Order Crisis in Papua New Guinea: An Economic Explanation
(NRI Seminar Paper No.l) (Waigani: NRI, 1991)
, Political Economy of Growth and Stagnation in Papua New Guinea
(Waigani: U P N G Press, 1992)
, The Exchange Rate and the Cash Flow Problem in Papua New Guinea:
Some Self-inflicted Wounds (NRI Special Publication No.21) (Waigani: NRI, 1995)

Gupta, D., T. Deklin and C. Yala, Issues in Mineral Exploitation in Papua New Gui
(NRI Discussion Paper No.85) (Waigani: NRI, 1995).
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., p.743, para. 1227
Hartshorn, J. E., Oil Companies and Governments: An Account of the International
Industry in its Political Environment (London: Faber & Faber, 1967)
Hawdon, D. ed., The Changing Structure of the World Oil Industry (London: Croom
Helm, 1985)
Hemingway, R. W., The Law of Oil and Gas 3rd ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Pub.
Co., 1991)
Hogbin, I. and P. Lawrence, Studies in New Guinea Land Tenure (Sydney: Sydney
University Press, 1967)
Hossain, K., Law and Policy in Petroleum Development: Changing Relations Between
Transnationals and Governments (London: Frances Pinter, 1979)

Howitt, R., J. Connell and P. Hirsch eds., Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peop
- Case Studies from Australasia, Melanesia and Southeast Asia (Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1996)
lames, R. W., Land Law and Policy in Papua New Guinea (Monograph No.5) (Port
Moresby: P N G L a w Reform Commission , 1985)
Jenkins, G., Oil Economist_ Handbook (London: Applied Science Pub. Ltd., 1977)
Kemp, A. G., Petroleum Rent Collection Around the World (Halifax, Nova Scotia:
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987)
Khan, K. I. F. ed., Petroleum Resources and Development - Economic, Legal and
Policy Issues for Developing Countries (London: Belhaven Press, 1987)

Kuntz, E., Classifying Non-Operating Interests in Oil and Gas (Calgary: Faculty of
Law, Calgary University, 1988)

278
Kwa, E. L., The Environmental Law Aspects of Forestry Resources Development in
Papua New Guinea: a Critique, Master of Laws (Hons.) thesis (Centre for Natural
Resources L a w and Policy, L a w Faculty, Wollongong University, 1994)

Lamour, P. ed., Customary Land Tenure: Registration and Decentralisation in Papua
New Guinea (NRI Monograph No.29) (Waigani: NRI, 1991)
Latimer, P., Australian Business Law (Sydney: CCH, 1995)
Latukefu, S. ed., Papua New Guinea: A Century of Colonial Impact 1884 - 1984
(Waigani: NRI, 1989)

Leslie, R. B., H. J. Evans and C. L. Knights, eds., Economy of Geology of Australi
and Papua New Guinea: 3. Petroleum (Monograph Series No.7) (Victoria: The
Australian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy , 1976)
Madelin, H., Oil and Politics (Westmead: Saxon and Lexington Books, 1975)
Makabady, S., Energy Law (London: Euromoney Pub., 1990)

Mikdashi, Z., Transnational Oil: Issues, Policies and Perspectives (London: France
Pinter, 1986)
Mikesell, R. F., Petroleum Company Operations and Agreements in the Developing
Countries (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future Inc., 1984)
Neild, R., Taxation Policy in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: INA, 1980)
Noreng, O., The Oil Industry and Government strategy in the North Sea (London:
Croom Helm, 1980)
O'Connor, H., The Empire of Oil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962)

O'Faircheallaigh, C, Mining and Development: Foreign Financed Mines in Australia,
Ireland, Papua New Guinea and Zambia (London: Croom Helm, 1984)
Offer, A., Property and Politics 1870 - 1914: Landowners hip, Law, Ideology and
Urban Development in England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)
Oon, K. C, The Politics of Oil in Indonesia: Foreign Company - Host Government
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum,
Papua New Guinea, Orogen Mineral Limited Prospectus (Port Moresby: 1996)
Government Statement on Petroleum Policy and Legislation (Port
Moresby: March 1976)

5

Medium Term Development Strategy: Mining and Petroleum Sector Sector Strategy (Port Moresby: 30 November, 1984)

>

, Government Statement on Natural Gas Policy (Port Moresby:
March 1995)
Parsons, D. and D. Vincent, High Stakes: Minerals and Petroleum Development in
Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: INA, 1991)

279
Paul, E. F., F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul eds., Property Rights
Cambridge University Press, 1994)

(Cambridge:

Penrose, E. T. and P. R. Odell, The Large International Firm in Developing Countri
The International Petroleum Industry (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968)
Petroleum Legislation Company ed., North Africa: Basic Oil Laws and Concession
Contracts vol.1. (New York: Gordon H. Barrows, 1959)
Middle East: Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts
(Original Texts) vol.1 and 2 (New York: Gordon H. Barrows, 1958)

5

Philip, G., Oil and Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pre
J
1982)
PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, Glossary of Words and Phrases Used in the Oil
and Gas Industry (Mt. Hawthorn, Western Australia: Energy Publications, undated)
Rannells, J., PNG: A Fact Book on Modern Papua New Guinea 2nd ed. (Melbourne:
Oxford University Press, 1995)

Razavi, H., The New Era of Petroleum Trading: Spot Oil, Spot-Related Contracts and
Futures Market (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1989)

Regan, A. J., National Government Control of Funding of Provincial Activities (IAS
Discussion Paper No.55) (Waigani: IASER, 1988)
Rensburg, V. W. C. J., Macro Economics of Petroleum and Strategic Planning
(Adelaide: Australian Mineral Foundation, 1990)
Rickwood, F. K., The Kutubu Discovery (Victoria: Book Generation Pty Ltd., 1992)
Rodd, J. and A. Elaisi eds., Papers and Materials Presented at the SOPAC-OIC
Hydrocarbon Legislation and Policy Workshop: SOP AC Miscellaneous Report 143
(Port Villa, Vanuatu: S O P A C Secretariat, 1992)
Sack, P., Land Between Two Laws (Canberra: ANU, 1973)
Salmon, J. W., Jurisprudence 7th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984)
Scaglion, R., Customary Law in Papua New Guinea: A Melanesian View (Law Reform
Commission Monograph No.2) (Port Moresby: P N G Law Reform Commission, 1983)
Sentheyval, T., Students Guide to Papua New Guinea Income Tax (Boroko: Nades &
Associate, 1989)
Shaffer, E., The United States and the Control of World Oil (London: Croom Helm,
1983)
Slesser, M. ed., Macmillan Dictionary of Energy 2nd ed., (London: The Macmillan
Press, 1988)
Smith, D., Comparison of Fiscal Terms in the Far East, South America, North Africa
and CIS. (Houston, Texas: Petroconsultants Inc., undated mimeograph)
Stocking, G. W., Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970)

280
l^S?6155' W" L"

Summers

'

0il and Gas voIL

<St-

Pau1

' Minnesota: West Pub. Co.,

J?nz^r' M\, The Energy Crisis: World Struggle for Power and Wealth (New YorkMonthly Review Press, 1975)
The Administrator, Territory of New Guinea Annual Report - 1921-1922 (CanberraThe Commonwealth Government Printer, 1922)
^ Territory of Papua Annual Report - 1912-1913 (Canberra- The
Commonwealth Government Printer, 1913)
Territory of Papua Annual Report - 1924-1925 (Canberra: The
Commonwealth Government Printer, 1925)

s

The Commonwealth Government, The Power Resources of the Commonwealth of
Australia and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea: Report to the World Power
Conference, London, 1924 (Sydney: Government Printer, 1924)

The Law Society of Western Australia, Royalties (Perth: The Law Society of Western
Australia, 1992)
The World Bank, The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New
Guinea (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965)
Tilton, J., J. Millet and R. Ward, Mineral and Mining Policy in Papua New Guinea
(Port Moresby: INA, 1986)
Toriguian, S., Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in the Middle East (Beirut:
Hamaskaine Press, 1972)
Tudor, J. ed., Pacific Islands Yearbook and Who's Who 10th ed. (Sydney: Pacific
Pub., 1968)

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, (1994) XL
(2) Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific
Waiko, J., Land: Customary Ownership and Control in Papua New Guinea and
Australia (Pacific Studies Monograph no. 18) (Sydney: Centre for South Pacific Studies,
1995)
Williams, W. A., The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A study of the Growth
and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Random
House, 1969)
Yergin, D., The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1991)

281
ARTICLES

Allan, R. H., J. P. Nieuwenhuysen and N. R. Norman, "Government Intervent
the Economy of Australia" in Maunder, P. ed., Government Intervention in the
Developed Economy (London: Croom Helm, 1979) p.41

Barrows, G. H., "Production-Sharing in Indonesia, 1966 to 1993: Evolution
Trends" (1993) 11 (1) OGLTR3
, "Trends in Petroleum E & P Contracts Worldwide" (1992) 7 OGLTR 111

Bentham, R. W., "The International Legal Structure of Petroleum Explorati
J. and P. Odell, eds., The International Oil Industry: An Interdisciplinary Pers
(London: The Macmillan Press, 1987) p.57

Bird, J. K. and R. Seggie, Barikewa and Iehi Gas Revisited" in Carman, G.
eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua New Guinea: Proceedings of the First PN
Petroelum Convention (Port Moresby: P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 1990)
p.551

Boulos, A. J., "Negotiating an E & P Agreement: Are There Mutuality of In
Host Governments from an Oil Company Perspective?" (1990) 12 OGLTR 414

Botten, P., "Petroleum Prospectivity of PNG: Comparative Risks and Reward
paper presented at the conference on Mining and Petroleum Investment in Papua New
Guinea organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, Sydney, May 1995

Bradbrook, A. J., "The Relevance of the Cujus Est Solum Doctrine to the S
Landowner's Claims to Natural Resources Located Above and Beneath the Land" (1988)
11 Adelaide Law Review 462

Brunton, B. D., "Prices, Mining and Taxation in Papua New Guinea" (1978) 6
Melanesian Law Journal 5

Butt, P., "The Limits of Application of the Maxim 'cujus est solum ejus e
coelum'" (1978) 52 Australian Law Journal 160

Cameron, P. D., "Government - Company Relations After the Contract: Recon
Objectives and Strategies for Long-Term Relations" in Khan, K. I. F. ed., Petroleum
Resources and Development - Economic, Legal and Policy Issues for Developing
countries (London: Belhaven Press, 1987) p.l 10
Carter, J. D., C. Carter and R. Carter, "Compensation for Surface Rights
(1985) 23 (3) Alberta Law Review 435

Causebrook, R. M. and G. J. Solomon, "Hydrocarbon Exploration and Structu
Northwest Darai Plateau" in Carman, G. J. and Z. eds., Petroleum Explorations in
Papua New Guinea: Proceedings of the First PNG Petroleum Convention (Port
Moresby: P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 1990) p.337

Comment, "From Concession to Participation: Restructuring the Middle East
Industry" [1973] New York University Law Review 115

Connell, J., "Compensation and Conflict: The Bougainville Copper Mine, Pap
Guinea' in Connell, J. and R. Howitt eds., Mining and Indigenous Peoples in
Australasia (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1991) p.55

Crommelin, M., "The Legal Character of Petroleum Production Licences in Australia" in
Daintith, T. ed., The Legal Character of Petroleum Licences: A Comparative Study
(London: University of Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Studies, and Energy
and Natural Resources Committee of the International Bar Association, 1981) p.60
Dalton, D., "Papua New Guinea: Resources Legislation and Policy" IT9881 AMPLA
Yearbook 112
Date-Bah, S. K. and M. Rahim, "Promoting Petroleum Exploration and Development:
Issues for Government Action" in Khan, K. I. F. ed., Petroleum Resources and
Development - Economic, Legal and Policy Issues for Developing Countries (LondonBelhaven Press, 1987) p.93
Davies, G. J., "The Legal Characterisation of Overriding Royalty Interests in Oil
Gas" (1972) 10 Alberta Law Review 232
Department of Commerce and Industry, "Hides Gas - PNG's First Commercial
Hydrocarbon Project" (1991) 2 (2) Market Place: The Export Trade Magazine of Papua
New Guinea 18
Dobunaba, S., "Petroleum Policy in Papua New Guinea: Entering the Development
Phase" in Rodd, J. and A. Elaisi eds., Papers and Materialss Presented at the SOPACOIC Hydrocarbon Legislation and Policy Workshop: SOP AC Miscellaneous Report 143
(Port Villa: S O P A C Secretariat, 1992) p.121

Donaldson, J. C. and J. T. Wilson, "Geology and Hydrocarbon Potential of the SepikR a m u Area, R a m u Basin" in Carman, G. J. and Z. eds., Petroleum Explorations in
Papua New Guinea: Proceedings of the First PNG Petroleum Convention (Port
Moresby: P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum) p.499
Doust, H., "Geology of the Sepik Basin, Papua New Guinea" in Carman, G. J. and Z.
eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua New Guinea: Proceedings of the First PNG
Petroleum Convention (Port Moresby: P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 1990)
p.461.
Dundas, C, "Work Commitments and Assignments Under a Petroleum Licence or
Agreement" in Rodd, J. and A. Elaisi eds., Papers and Materials Presented at the
SOPAC-OIC Hydrocarbon Legislation and Policy Workshop: SOPAC Miscellaneous
Report 143 (Port Villa: S O P A C Secretariat, 1992) p. 194
Ellis, W. H, "Property Status of Royalties in Canadian Oil and Gas Law" (1984) 22
(1) Alberta Law Review 1
Ernes. B. R., "Provincial Royalties and Credits" (1988) 27 (1) Alberta Law Review

Fabrikant, R., "Pertamina: A Legal and Financial Analysis of a National Oil Compan
a Developing Country" (1975) 10 Texas International Law Journal 495
"Production-Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry"
(1975) 16 Havard International Law Journal 303

1

Fingleton, J. S., "Policy-Making on Lands" in Ballard, J. A. ed., Policy-Making in
New State: Papua New Guinea 1972-1977 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press,
1981) p.212
Frances, G., "The North New Guinea Basin and Associated Infra-Basins" in Carman,
G. J. and Z. eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua New Guinea: Proceedings of the

283
First PNG Petroleum Convention (Port Moresby: P N G Chamber of Mines and
Petroleum, 1990) p.445
Garnaut, R. and A. C. Ross, "Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and the Taxing of Natural
Resources Projects" (1975) 85 (338) The Economic Journal 272
Garnaut, R., "The Framework of Economic Policy-Making" in Ballard, J. A. ed.,
Policy-Making in a New State: Papua New Guinea 1972 -1977 (St. Lucia- Queensland
University Press, 1981) p. 157
Giraud, P. N, "The Equilibrium Price Range of Oil: Economics, Politics and
Uncertainty in the Formation of Oil Prices" (1995) 23 (1) Energy Policy 35
Grace, J. G. and M. Williamson, "Papua New Guinea Standard Petroleum AgreementIts Strengths and Weaknesses" [1991] The APEA Journal 502

Grainage, A. M., A. J. D. Hine and P. J. Brawley, "Discovery and Development of th
Hides Gas Field in Licence PPL27, Papua N e w Guinea" in Carman, G. J. and Z. eds.,
Petroleum Explorations in Papua New Guinea: Proceedings of the First PNG Petroleum
Convention (Port Moresby: P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 1990) p.539

Hancock, G., "State Equity Participation in Mining and Petroleum Projects in Papu
N e w Guinea" in Rogerson, R. ed., Proceedings of the PNG Geology, Exploration and
Mining Conference, 1994, Lae (Melbourne: The Australian Institute of Metallurgy,
1994) p.280
Harrison, R., "Developing Petroleum Legislation and Policies for Hydrocarbon
Exploration" in Rodd, J. and A. Elaisi eds., Papers and Materials Presented at the
SOPAC-OIC Hydrocarbon Legislation and Policy Workshop: SOPAC Miscellaneous
Report 143 (Port Villa: S O P A C Secretariat, 1992) p.55
Harry, D., "Enga Experience of Participation in Mining Developments: A Comment on
Nonggorr" [1991 Special Issue] Melanesian Law Journal 125
Hattersly, T., An Analysis of Australian Petroleum Taxes" [1991] The APEA Journal
463
Haynes, C. E. P. V., "The Ownership of Minerals and Petroleum in Papua New
Guinea: Milirrpum to M a b o and Teori Tau to Tumbuna Tano?" (1994) 1(1) The
Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 33
Henton, D., "Mining Compensation in Papua New Guinea" (Port Moresby: November
1988)
Hyndman, D., "Mining, Modernization and Movements of Social Progress in Papua
N e w Guinea" (1987) 21 (3) Social Analysis 20
Iamo, W. and T. Deklin, "The Cooperative Decentralisation" (1991) 3 (1) Current
Issues 17
Imbun, B., "Who Said Mining Companies Take and Do Not Give?: The Mining
Companies' Role of Social Responsibility in Papua N e w Guinea" (1994) 2 (1)
Taimlain: A Journal of Contemporary Melanesian Studies 27
Ipp, D. A. and A. W. Maloney, "Dealing with Interests in Petroleum Tenements"
(1983) 57 Australian Law Journal 513

284
Jackson, R., "Not Without Influence: Villages, Mining Companies and Government in
Papua N e w Guinea" in Connell, J. and R. Howitt eds., Mining and Indigenous Peoples
in Australasia (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1991) p. 18
Johnston, D., "Fiscal Terms and Petroleum Licences: The Global Market", a paper
presented at a conference on Oil and Gas Production-Sharing Contracts, Concessions and
New Petroleum Ventures in the Asia-Pacific Basin organized by th Institute for
International Research, Houston, Texas, 28-30 April, 1993

Kearton, L., "The Oil Industry: Some Personal Recollections and Opinions" in Hawdo
D. ed., The Changing Structure of the World Oil Industry (London: Croom Helm'
1985) p.l
Keener, U. G., "Current Legal Developments in Brazilian Energy Laws and
Performance of Service Thereunder" in International Bar Association (IBA) ed.,
International Energy Law, Proceedings of the Sixth Energy Law Seminar Organised by
the IBA's Section on Energy and Natural Resources Law (Houston, Texas: IBA, 1984)
p.157

Kemp, A. G., "Economic Considerations in the Taxation of Petroleum Exploitation" i
Khan, K. I. F. ed., Petroleum Resources and Development - Economic, Legal and
Policy Issues for Developing Countries (London: Belhaven Press, 1987) p. 121
Kennedy, D., "Development or Sustainability at Kutubu, Papua New Guinea?" in
Howitt, R., J. Connell and P. Hirsch eds., Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peoples
- Case Studies from Australasia, Melanesia and Southeast Asia (Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1996) p.236
Khan, K. I. F., "Petroleum Taxation and Contracts in the Third World - A Law and
Policy Perspective" (1988) 22 (1) Journal of World Trade 67
Kisakiu, P., "Resources and the Future of Customary Land in PNG" [April - June
1993] PNG Resources Reporting on PNG's Petroleum, Mineral and Forestry Industries
75
Kreye, O. and L. F. P. Castell, "Development and the Environment: EconomicEcological Development in Papua N e w Guinea" (1991 Special Issue) 21 (3) Catalyst 1
Kumar, R., "Taxation for a Cyclical Industry" [1991] Resources Policy 133
Laws, R. A., "Petroleum and Mineral Royalties in South Australia" (1985) 10 (3)
AMPLA Bulletin 152
Leuch, H. L., "Contractual Flexibility in New Petroleum Investment Contracts" in
Beredjick, N. and T. W a d e eds., Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing Countries
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1988) p.81

Kugler, A. Jr., "Geology and Petroleum Plays of the Sepik Basin, Papua New Guinea"
in Carman, G. J. and Z. eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua New Guinea:
Proceedings of the First PNG Petroleum Convention (Port Moresby: P N G Chamber of
Mines and Petroleum, 1990) p.482

Lamerson, P. R., "Evolution of Structural Interpretations in Iagifu/Hedinia Field
N e w Guinea" in Carman, G. J. and Z. eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua New
Guinea: Proceedings of the First PNG Petroleum Convention (Port Moresby: P N G
Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 1990) p.283

285
Lewis, I., "Communication - The Misima Story" in Rogerson, R. ed., Proceedings of
PNG Geology, Exploration and Mining Conference 1991, Rabaul (Melbourne:
Australian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 1991) p.213

Linder, A. W., "Petroleum Prospects, Blight Water, Fiji" [1972] The APEA Journ

Link, W . K , "Significance of Oil and Gas Seeps in World Exploration" (1925) 36
Bulletin of American Association of Petroleum Geologist 1505
Loko, J., "Mining and Petroleum in Papua New Guinea - An Internal Revenue
Commission Perspective", a paper presented at the conference on Mining and Petroleum
Investment in Papua New Guinea organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines and
Petroleum, Sydney, M a y 1995
Martin, B. A. and S. J. Cawley, "Onshore and Offshore Petroleum Seepage:
Contrasting a Conventional Study in Papua N e w Guinea and Airborne Laser
Fluorescensing Over the Arafura Sea" [1991] The APEA Journal 62
Mclntyre, J. M., "The Development of Oil and Gas Ownership Theory in Canada"
(1969) 4 (2) U.B.C. Law Rev. 245

Mc Walter, M., "Towards a Gas Policy", a paper presented at the conference on M
and Petroleum Investment in Papua New Guinea organised by the P N G Chamber of
Mines and Petroleum, Sydney, M a y 1995

Meakin, C. P., "The Significance of Surface Indications of Petroleum" [1971] T
APEA Journal 126
Mikesell, R. F., "Profitability and Risk in Third World Petroleum: The Host
Government Perspective" in Khan, K. I. F. ed., Petroleum Resources and Development
- Economic, Legal and Policy Issues for Developing Countries (London: Belhaven
Press, 1987) p. 157

Moaina, R., "Recent Trends in Exploration and Development", a paper presented a
conference on Mining and Petroleum Investment in Papua New Guinea organised by the
P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, Sydney, M a y 1995
Morse, B. W., "Common Roots But Different Evolutions: The Development of
Aboriginal Rights at C o m m o n L a w in Australia, Asia and North America" (1984) 12
Melanesian Law Journal 49

Moses, J., Imperial German Priorities in New Guinea 1885 - 1914" in Latukefu, S
Papua New Guinea: A Century of Colonial Impact 1884 -1984 (Waigani: NRI, 1989)
p.163
Muroa, G. M. S., "Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights: A Papua New Guinea
Experience" in Aleck, J. and J. Rannells eds., Custom at the Crossroads (Waigani: Law
Faculty, U P N G , 1995) p.81
Murphy, E. E. Jr., "State Entities and Private Oil Companies: The Contest for
Leadership in the Development of Latin American Oil and Gas" in International Bar
Association (IBA) ed., International Energy Law, Proceedings of the Sixth Energy Law
Seminar Organised by the IBAs' Section on Energy and Natural Resources Law
(Houston, Texas: IBA, 1984) p.79
Neto, J. S. C, "Risk-Bearing Service Contracts in Brazil" (1985) 3 JENRL 114

286
Nonggorr, J., "Foreign Investment in the Mining and Petroleum Sectors of Papua N e w
Guinea: Benefit Sharing and Customary Land Issues" in Quah, E. and W . Neilson eds.,
Law and Economic Development: Cases and Materials from South East Asia (SingaporeLongman, 1993) p.343
, "Economic Development Contracts and Investment Security in Papua
N e w Guinea" [1992] AMPLA Yearbook 686
, "Resolving Conflict in Customary Law and Western Law in Natural
Resources Development in Papua N e w Guinea" (1993) 16 (2) UNSW Law Journal 433
, "Provincial Government Participation in Mining and Petroleum
Developments" [ 1991 Special Issue] Melanesian Law Journal 91
, "The Development of an "Indigenous Jurisprudence" in Papua New
Guinea: The Past Record and Future Prospects" in Aleck, J. and J. Rannells eds.,
Custom at the Crossroads (Waigani: Law Faculty, U P N G , 1995) p.68
Omorogbe, Y., "The Legal Framework for the Production of Petroleum in Nigeria"
(1987)5 JENRL 282
Ongwamuhana, K, "The Art of Legislating for the Constitution" in James, R. W. and
Fraser eds., Legal Issues in a Developing Country (Waigani: L a w Faculty, U P N G ,
1992) p. 183
5

"Ownership of Minerals in Papua New Guinea" [June 1991] Law
Tok31

O'Regan, R. S., "The Ownership of Minerals and Petroleum in Papua New Guinea: A
Comment" [1992] QUTLJ 141

Osborne, D. G., "Evolution of Structural Interpretations in Iagifu/Hedinia Field,
N e w Guinea" in Carman, G. J. and Z. eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua New
Guinea: Proceedings of the First PNG Petroleum Convention (Port Moresby: P N G
Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 1990) p. 197
Palaso, L. L., "Petroleum Activity in Papua New Guinea", paper presented at a
conference on SE Asia Australia Offshore , Darwin, Australia, 30 July 1991
"Future Opportunities for Hydrocarbon Production and Utilization in
PNG", paper presented at the Tenth JCCP International Symposium, Tokyo, Japan, 11
November 1991

5

"Petroleum Exploration and Development Terms in Papua New Guinea"
a paper presented at a 1993 conference on Oil and Gas Production Sharing Contracts,
Concessions and New Petroleum Joint Ventures, (place unknown) 16 September, 1993

?

Parkpo, P., Customary Rights and the Forestry Act 1991" in Aleck, J. and J. Ranne
eds., Custom at the Crossroads (Waigani: L a w Faculty, U P N G , 1995) p. 108

Payani, H, "Equality and Participation in the Papua New Guinean Bureaucracy" (199
2 (1) Current Issues 27
Phillips, C. W. O. and M. F. Gibney, "Dealing with Roaylty Interests" [1993] The
APEA Journal 418
Player-Bishop, H., "Financial Non-Working Interests in the Resources Industry"
[1990] AMPLA Yearbook 398

287

Price, J. B., "Kutubu Petroleum Development Project Crude Oil Export System" in
Carman, G. J. and Z. eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua New Guinea: Proceedings
of the First PNG Petroleum Convention (Port Moresby: P N G Chamber of Mines and
Petroleum, 1990)p.581

Quint, D. P., "Assault on Multinationals: French and American Reallocation Provis
(1974-1977) 50 Notre Dame Lawyer 662
Regan, A. and K. Ongwamuhana, "Ownership of Minerals and Petroleum in Papua
N e w Guinea: The Genesis and Nature of the Legal Controversy" (1991) 7 QUTLJ 109

Renton, J. F. A., J. H. S. Black and A. M. Grainage, "The Development of the Hides
Gas Field, Papua N e w Guinea" [1990] The APEA Journal 223
Rickwood, F. K., "The Geology of Western Papua" [1968] The APEA Journal 51
"Towards Development - The Long History of Petroleum Exploration
in Papua N e w Guinea" in Carman, G. J and Z. eds., Petroleum Explorations in Papua
New Guinea: Proceedings of the First PNG Petroleum Convention (Port Moresby: P N G
Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, 1990) p.l

5

Rushby, I. L., "PNG - The Best Potential to be Asia Pacific's Next LNG Supplier",
paper presented at the conference on Mining and Petroleum Investment in Papua New
Guinea organised by the P N G Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, Sydney, M a y 1995
Ryan, G. L. J., "Petroleum Royalties" [1985] AMPLA Yearbook 328

Spinks, R. B., "Offshore Drilling Operations in the Gulf of Papua" [1970] The APEA
Journal 108
Stevens, A., "Land Matters and Business Development Associated with the Misima
Mines" in Rogerson, R. ed., Proceedings of the PNG Geology, Exploration andMining
Conference 1991, Rabaul (Melbourne: Australasian Institute of Metallurgy, 1991) p.213
Stevens, P., "A Survey of Structural Change in International Oil Industry 1945 in Hawdon, D. ed., The Changing Structure of the World Oil Industry (London: Croom
Helm, 1985) p. 18
Strathern, A., "Compensation: What Does It Mean?" (1993)1(1) Taimlain: A Journal
of Contemporary Melanesian Studies 57
Suleiman, D. A., "The Oil Experience of the United Arab Emirates and Its Legal
Framework" (1988) 6 JENRL1

Summers, W. L., "Transfers of Oil and Gas Rents and Royalties" (1931) 10 (1) Texas
Law Review 1
Thompson, H., "The Economic Causes and Consequences of the Bougainville Crisis"
[1991] Resources Policy 69
Thomson M. and B. Williams, "The Hides Gas Project Providing Electrical Power to
the Porgera Gold Mine" in IMPS Profile: Second PNG Petroleum Trade Fair: Profiles of
the Trade Fair Exhibitors and Other Useful Facts and Figures about the Petroleum
Industry in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: IMPS Research, 1993) p.25

Tillinghast, D. R., "Taxation and Royalty Problems: Royalty and Taxation Issues i
Petroleum Operations" in International Bar Association (IBA), Energy Laws 1981:

288
Seminar Organised by the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Section on
Business Law - Proceedings, vol.2 (London: IBA, 1981) p.251
Tjhin, K. T., "Trobriand Basin Exploration, Papua New Guinea" [1976] The APEA
Journal SI
Tom'tavala, Y., "The Impact of Introduced Law on Customary Marine Tenure in Papua
N e w Guinea" in Aleck, J. and J. Rannells eds., Custom at the Crossroads (Waigani:
L a w Faculty, U P N G , 1995) p. 121
Trivedi, P., "What is India's Privatisation Policy?" (1993) 28 (22) Economic and
Political Weekly 11
Wade, T., "Exploration Sustaining Development - Taxation Considerations" [1993] The
APEA Journal 423

Walker, A. W. Jr., "The Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
in Texas" (1931-32) 10 Texas Law Review 291

Weiland, W. H, "Survey of Oil and Gas Development Policy in Brazil" in International
Bar Association (IBA) ed., International Energy Law, Proceedings of the Sixth Energy
Law Seminar Organised by the IBA's Section on Energy and Natural Resources Law
(Houston, Texas: IBA, 1984) p. 169
Warrillow, C, "A Brief History of Oil Exploration in Papua New Guinea" (Port
Moresby: undated)

Wingti, P. (former Prime Minister), "Benefitting from Resource Developments - Lookin
Beyond Taxation", keynote address at the conference on Asia Pacific Oil and Gas Tax
Issues, Singapore, 18-20 January 1993
Wright, "Airspace Utilization on Highway Rights of Way" (1970) 55 Iowa Law Review
761

OTHER

MATERIALS

Department of Lands and Physical Planning, "Economic Trees and Plant Price Schedule
(Waigani: undated)
Geoff Hiatt (of Porgera Joint Venture), "Hides Gasfield Landowner Compensation" (a
letter to Fred Haynes of British Petroleum, 13 September 1993)
Kennedy, D., (August 1996) Habitat Australia 21
Laffite, G., (August 1996) Habitat Australia 20
Lowa, P. (former Minister for Minerals and Energy), "LNG: Utilisation of Gas
Reserves in P N G " (Press Release) (Port Moresby: October 1990)
Mills, F. and Associates, The Kutubu Project: Ol Askim na Bekim Bilong Kutubu Wei
Projek: Questions and Answers About the Kutubu Oil Project (Port Moresby: Frank
Mills & Associates Pty Ltd., undated and unpaged)
Petroleum Gazette (1993/2) vol.28 (1)
Phelan L., (August 1996) Habitat Australia 19

289
P^G Resources Reporting on PNG's Petroleum, Mineral and Forestry Industries
(October - December, 1995)
, (January - March, 1995)
^ (January - March, 1994)
PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum Bulletin, vol.2 (1) (1995)
PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, "Mineral Resources Development Company"
(Port Moresby: undated)
^ "Mineral Ownership and Equity: Position
Paper" (Port Moresby: 15 March, 1990)
"Recommendations, Land Compensation" (Port
Moresby: 22 October, 1990)

?

"Land Mobilisation Program" (Port Moresby: June
1990)

5

"Hides Gas - Land and Landowner Compensation Issue Paper" (Port Moresby: undated)

5

"The Compensation Problem - Mining and Petroleum in
P N G ' (Port Moresby: undated)

5

Post-Courier, 17 November 1995
?

18 November 1995

1

4 January 1996

, 30 August 1996
, 25 September 1996
, 3 October 1996
The Saturday Independent, 4 November 1995
The Independent, 19 January 1996
, 26 January 1996
, 10 May 1996
, 30 August 1996
The National, 17 January 1996
, 19 January 1996

